

Mr. TREVERTON. We are certain. I just don't have it right here in front of me.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Is it prior to our involvement with going ahead with the 1970 program against Allende? Or don't we have that?

Mr. TREVERTON. It would have been after Allende's inauguration—that is, after the Track I, Track II period, after the election period. It came in the period after Allende's inauguration. We decided on the program to support opposition parties and media.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Would it have been before the September 15 meeting in 1970?

Mr. TREVERTON. It was after that. It was either November 1970, or April 1971. Perhaps I can give you the exact date. Perhaps it was as late as September 1971, so it was surely after the 1970 election period.

Senator SCHWEIKER. That's all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Huddleston?

Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I've not heard all the questioning and I hope I'm not repetitious. In our relationship with the removal and subsequent death of General Schneider it was not clear that our policy was that he should not be done away with. There was no tension there, although we were attempting to foment a coup d'etat to prevent the ascension of Allende to the presidency. And, I think its important to understand that the reason that General Schneider had to be removed was that even though he was not a particular sympathizer with Allende, he was a constitutionalist, and he believed in his Government's constitution, which subordinated the military to civilian rule. And because of that, he was not interested in leading a coup or participating in one.

Is that not accurate?

Mr. TREVERTON. Yes; those points are correct and well taken.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions of this panel? If not, thank you very much, gentlemen. We will call the next three witnesses, Mr. Ralph Dungan, Mr. Charles Meyer, and Mr. Edward Korry.

[Pause.]

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, in accordance with the practice of the committee would you stand and be sworn?

Do you solemnly swear that all the testimony you will give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. KORRY. I do.

Mr. DUNGAN. I do.

Mr. MEYER. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I understand each of you has an opening statement and perhaps the logical way to proceed would be chronologically, starting with Mr. Dungan, please.

TESTIMONY OF RALPH DUNGAN, FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO CHILE

Mr. DUNGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate your invitation to testify in this public hearing on U.S. intelligence activities in Chile. You are ultimately interested, I take it, in the question of

what changes in policies, laws, and administrative procedures are indicated as a result of this committee's inquiries and other information which has been made public recently.

I am prepared to answer questions about any matter of interest to the committee about which I had knowledge and which I can recollect, but I shall refrain with your indulgence from mentioning names of either Chilean or U.S. nationals. As a citizen who for many years in and out of Government had advocated stringent curbs on covert action, I must candidly state that I have very serious doubts that further public disclosure of specific instances of excess, of illegal or immoral operations are necessary to enable the Congress to act forthrightly, intelligently, and effectively in correcting what has been for many years—we now see with the amazing clarity of hindsight—a national disgrace. But whatever the committee's decision is with respect to the revelation of specific actions, I intend to assist in any way that you think I can in your difficult task. With the greatest respect to the members of this committee, to the Senate, to the House, it is well to remember that to the extent that excesses have occurred in the past in Chile, or elsewhere, they have transpired under imprecise congressional mandates, haphazard congressional oversight, and with moneys provided by the Congress.

During the 1964-67 period, when I was Ambassador to Chile, U.S. covert activities in Chile were not extensive and most were irrelevant to and not directed at Chilean political institutions. They were on the whole directed toward the gathering and cross checking of intelligence about internal, hemispheric, and international affairs. The chief of station was an old hand in Latin America and had a strong bias toward the intelligence function and shared my personal skepticism about the desirability or utility of U.S. involvement in covert activities not specifically oriented toward the collection of intelligence. The names of CIA agents or sources were not made known to me except on specific request. First-hand sources tended to be on the political right.

In addition to covert intelligence gathering there were three other types of covert activities—my classification: those involving international targets or problems such as surveillance of suspected agents from other countries; those activities of the agency of a benign nature—my term, benign—albeit interventionist, such as support for a private agency engaged in social or economic development; and finally those directed toward the influencing of some Chilean institution, individual, or even for the purpose of producing a result which ostensibly advanced U.S. interests.

None of these three types of actions was extensively engaged in Chile during the 1964-67 period. To the extent that they were, especially as regards the latter category, that is, intervening political activity, they were reprehensible in principle, I now believe. I might add that at the time they were relatively harmless and ineffective.

To sum up, during the 1964-67 period in Chile relatively little covert activity was undertaken and little of more than marginal significance or effectiveness was directed at Chilean institutions or political processes.

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that we should accept the fact that covert activity has characterized and will continue to characterize

statecraft. It would be foolish and hypocritical for the Congress or the executive branch to pretend that we can, will, or should abstain from covert activity. Nor do I think that it is realistic to confine covert actions by law solely to intelligence gathering or counterintelligence, much as one might be tempted to follow this course.

I noted with interest the staff report makes that point very clear. You cannot distinguish intelligence from other kinds of covert activity.

On the other hand, the inquiries of this committee seem to me to establish conclusively the urgent need to define with greater clarity and precision than in the past, the limits we impose on ourselves in utilizing covert action in the pursuit of our objectives. Of equal importance is the necessity to establish processes and procedures which establish an effective system of checks and balances in accordance with the fundamental constitutional principle to which we subscribe. I submit that as regards our treatment of covert action we have neglected to apply rigorously either this principle or the principle of enumerated powers.

It is difficult to specify in detail covert actions which may be utilized but I believe that Congress should examine the basic statutes under which the Agency operates with a view to introducing general prohibitions against certain types of actions except under extraordinary circumstances and pursuant to specific approvals defined by regulation. For example, one might wish to prohibit generally any action to be taken outside the United States which if committed in the continental limits would be subject to criminal penalties. Murder would be one of those. I do not mean to suggest that this is the only or necessarily the most important statutory guideline or restriction. I use it only as an example.

If anything is clear from the record you have compiled and from the experience of many over the years, it is that individuals at all levels have taken great liberties without the knowledge or authorization or any responsible person or group. To be fair, responsible persons may have knowingly or unwittingly given some signal or tacit approval, or so it may have been perceived by those with operational responsibility. Suffice it to say that it is high time we state at least in general what type of covert actions we as a Nation believe are permissible and in accord with our values and traditions.

I think that with respect to our intelligence activities, we have forgotten that we are a Government of laws and not of men. We have relied excessively on the best and the brightest. We need to return to a system grounded in law, regulation, and procedure. Therefore, I believe that, at a minimum, we need to develop more explicit procedures which must be followed, and approvals which must be obtained before departing from the usual standards which should be set forth generally in statute and, with greater particularity, in regulation.

Mr. Chairman, as important as a general statutory definition of the rules of the game is, it is of paramount importance that a structure of statutory and regulatory checks and balances be created promptly. One should strive for simple mechanisms so that the lines of responsibility and accountability are clear and unambiguous.

My experience and a reading of the record suggests that any future President would be well advised to appoint a deputy to the National

Security Advisor whose sole responsibility would be to monitor intelligence activities of all agencies, especially covert actions. It is apparent to me now and should have been in years past, that the special intricacies of this field and the special responsibility of the President strongly suggests the need for more capability than we had in the early 1960's in the Office of the National Security Adviser. Those who might argue that this arrangement unnecessarily concentrates in the President's Office superoperational power ignore, I believe, the burden which the President bears in this area and his need for capable, informed, and independent judgment.

While I feel less secure in this suggestion because I do not consider myself an expert in the internal organization and structure of the CIA, I think it worth considering the adverse results which oftentimes flow from the establishment of a permanent organization and cadre of bright, active persons. Like any other bureaucracy, private or public, an established group tends, following the Parkinson principle, to generate work to keep it occupied. Where, as I believe has been the case with CIA, a unit is amply funded and prides itself in being gung ho and capable of response to the most extravagant demands, you have the ingredients of trouble. If you add a degree of ideological bias within the unit and lack of restraint by political authority outside the unit, almost any excess is imaginable.

All of this leads me to suggest that a drastic cutback in the number of persons involved both in the field and Washington should be examined. As regards what is now known as DDO, I would venture to say that the elimination of permanent personnel and units dedicated to the perfection of devices or techniques to meet esoteric contingences would go far to eliminate some of the excesses which have crept into the system, and which you have documented very well.

I do not maintain that there are some capabilities which should be maintained at the ready, but I suspect that most could be energized as requirements arose and that any delays which might be involved would be beneficial rather than otherwise.

I am hopeful that these few remarks may be helpful to the committee, Mr. Chairman, and I stand ready to answer any questions you may have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Dungan.
Mr. Meyer?

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES A. MEYER, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

Mr. MEYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished Senators.

I am present by your invitation, Mr. Chairman, and as I wrote this on December 3, I hadn't received for study your committee paper on Chile. I had received the published document on alleged assassination. And quite obviously, I hadn't a clue as to the staff statement which I understood would introduce this meeting.

My statement, therefore, does not respond to any of the specifics of your Chilean examination except that I am not, have never been, and never expect to be party to assassination.

Instead, if I may, I'll simply say that my reason for being here in the context of the long work of your committee is that I believe