




CIA ORGANIZATION 1947



CIA ORGANIZATION 1950




CIA ORGANIZATION 1953




[DELETED]


CIA ORGANIZATION 1961




CIA ORGANIZATION 1964



CIA ORGANIZATION 1972



CIA ORGANIZATION 1975



LIST OF ACRONYMS

- ADDP*: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans, second person in line of command of the DDP.
- ADPC*: Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, the senior administrative officer in the Office of Policy Coordination.
- ADSO*: Assistant Director for Special Operations, the senior administrative officer in the Office of Special Operations.
- ARC*: Ad Hoc Requirements Committee, an interdepartmental group established in 1955 to coordinate intelligence collection requirements among the Departments for the U-2 program. Succeeded by COMOR in 1960.
- BID*: Basic Intelligence Division, a component of ORR, responsible for production of National Intelligence Surveys. Became Office of Basic Intelligence in 1955.
- CA Staff*: Covert Action Staff, a component of the DDP, responsible for review of covert action projects for the Directorate as well as management and control of some field operations.
- CIG*: Central Intelligence Group, 1946-1947, predecessor of the CIA.
- CI Staff*: Counterintelligence Staff, a component of the DDP, which until recently maintained virtual control over counterintelligence operations.
- COMINT*: Communications Intelligence, technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications, not including foreign press, propaganda, or public broadcasts.
- COMIREX*: Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation, established in 1967 to succeed COMOR as the USIB subcommittee responsible for the management of collection planning.
- COMOR*: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance, a USIB subcommittee established in 1960 to coordinate intelligence collection requirements among the Departments for the development and operation of all overhead reconnaissance systems.
- CRS*: Central Reports Staff, a component of the CIG, responsible for correlation and evaluation of information drawn from other Departments.
- DCI*: Director of Central Intelligence, chief officer of the CIG and the CIA.
- DCID*: Director of Central Intelligence Directive, a directive issued by the DCI which outlines general policies and procedures to be followed by the intelligence community. It is generally more specific than an NSCID.
- DCS*: Domestic Contact Service, a component of CIG, responsible for soliciting domestic sources for foreign intelligence information. Renamed the Domestic Contact Division in 1951; became a component of the DDI in 1952; renamed the Domestic Contact Service in 1965; transferred to DDO in 1973 and renamed the Domestic Collection Division.

- DDA*: Directorate for Administration, established in 1950, responsible for personnel, budget, security, medical services and logistical support for overseas operations.
- DDCI*: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, second person in line of command of CIA.
- DDI*: Directorate for Intelligence, created in 1952, responsible for production of finished intelligence (excluding scientific and technical intelligence since 1963) and for collection of overt information.
- DDP*: Directorate for Plans, created in 1952 from the integration of OSO and OPC, also known as the "Clandestine Service." Responsible for clandestine collection, counterintelligence, and covert operations. Renamed the Directorate for Operations in 1973.
- DDR*: Directorate for Research, created in 1962, immediate predecessor to the Directorate for Science and Technology.
- DDS&T*: Directorate for Science and Technology, organized in 1963, combining OSI, the Data Processing Staff, the Office of ELINT, the DPD, and a newly created Office of Research and Development. Responsible for research development and operation of technical collection systems and for production of finished scientific and technical intelligence.
- DIA*: Defense Intelligence Agency, created by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1961, responsible for production of military intelligence.
- DPD*: Development Projects Division, a component of the DDP, responsible for overhead reconnaissance. Transferred to DDS&T in 1963.
- EIC*: Economic Intelligence Committee, a subcommittee of the IAC created in 1951, charged with interdepartmental coordination of economic intelligence activities and the production of publications. Continued under USIB.
- ELINT*: Electronic Intelligence, technical and intelligence information derived from the collection (or interception) and processing of foreign electromagnetic radiations such as radar.
- ERA*: Economic Research Area, established in 1950 as a component of ORR, responsible for production of economic intelligence. Eventually developed into OER.
- EXCOM*: Executive Committee, established in 1965 for the management of overhead reconnaissance, giving the CIA and the Department of Defense decisionmaking authority over the national reconnaissance program.
- FBID*: Foreign Broadcast Information Division, as element of CIG which monitored overseas broadcasts. Became a component of the DDI in 1952; renamed the Foreign Broadcast Information Service in 1965.
- GMAIC*: Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, a USIB subcommittee established in 1958, responsible for interdepartmental coordination of intelligence related to guided missiles.
- GMIC*: Guided Missiles Intelligence Committee, an IAC subcommittee created in 1956, responsible for interdepartmental coordination of intelligence related to guided missiles. Succeeded by GMAIC in 1958.

- GRA*: Geographic Research Area, created in 1950 as a component of ORR; in 1965 transferred to OBI, which was renamed Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence; OBI became the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research in 1974.
- IAB*: Intelligence Advisory Board, an advisory group to the DCI, composed of the heads of the military and civilian intelligence agencies. Existed for the life of CIG.
- IAC*: Intelligence Advisory Committee, created in 1947 to serve as a coordinating body in establishing intelligence requirements among the Departments. Merged with USCIB in 1958 to form USIB.
- IC Staff*: Intelligence Community staff, established in 1972 as a replacement for the NIPE staff. Responsible for assisting the DCI in the management of intelligence community activities.
- ICAPS*: Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff, a component of the CIG, which handled the administrative aspects of CIG's contacts with the Departments.
- INR*: Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the State Department's intelligence analysis component.
- IRAC*: Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, an interdepartmental group established in 1971 to advise the DCI in preparing a consolidated intelligence program budget for the President. Members included representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, OMB, and CIA.
- JAEIC*: Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, a subcommittee of USIB, responsible for interdepartmental coordination of intelligence relating to atomic energy.
- JAG*: Joint Analysis Group, an interdepartmental body established in 1962, to provide regular assessments on Soviet and Chinese future military strengths.
- KIQs*: Key Intelligence Questions, initiated in 1974 and designed to produce intelligence on topics of particular importance to national policymakers, as defined by the DCI.
- MBO*: Management by Objectives, a system established in 1974 to measure performance against explicitly stated goals.
- MONGOOSE*: Operation MONGOOSE, a program conducted between 1961 and 1962, aimed at discrediting and ultimately toppling the Castro government.
- NIA*: National Intelligence Authority, supervisory body of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), comprised of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and the personal representative of the President.
- NIE*: National Intelligence Estimate, a predictive judgment on the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and courses of action of foreign nations. It represents the composite view of the intelligence community.
- NIOs*: National Intelligence Officers, a senior group of analysts, organized in 1973 to replace ONE. Responsible for the management of intelligence collection and production.
- NIPE Staff*: National Intelligence Programs Evaluation Staff, established in 1963 under the DCI to serve as a coordinating body in the management of interdepartmental intelligence activities. Replaced by IC Staff in 1971.

- NIPP*: National Intelligence Projections for Planning, interagency assessments on Soviet and Chinese future military strengths, produced by the JAG.
- NIRB*: National Intelligence Review Board, established in 1968, to advise the DCI in making judgments on foreign intelligence resource needs. Replaced in 1971 by IRAC.
- NIS*: National Intelligence Survey, a compendium of factual information on foreign countries drawn from throughout the intelligence community. The program was terminated in 1974.
- NPIC*: National Photographic Interpretation Center, established in 1961 under the direction of the DCI to analyze photography derived from overhead reconnaissance.
- NSC*: National Security Council, the senior decisionmaking body in the Executive branch. Established in 1947, comprised of the President, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense with representatives of the JCS, Special Assistant to the President and other officials attending as required.
- NSCID*: National Security Council Intelligence Directive, a directive issued by the NSC to the intelligence agencies. NSCIDs are often augmented by more specific DCIDs and by internal departmental or agency regulations.
- OCB*: Operations Coordinating Board, established in 1953 to replace the PSB as a senior review body for covert operations. Its members included deputy-level officials from the Departments of State, Defense, the office of the President, and from the foreign aid program.
- OCD*: Office of Collection and Dissemination, a component of the DDI charged with the dissemination of intelligence and the storage and retrieval of unevaluated intelligence. Renamed the Office of Central Reference in 1955; renamed the Central Reference Service in 1967.
- OCI*: Office of Current Intelligence, a component of the DDI, established in 1951. Responsible for the production of current intelligence in numerous areas.
- OER*: Office of Economic Research, a component of the DDI, established in 1967. Responsible for production of economic intelligence.
- ONE*: Office of National Estimates, organized in 1950, to produce National Intelligence Estimates. Dissolved in 1973.
- OO*: Office of Operations, a component of the DDI, charged with the collection of overt information. Dissolved in 1965.
- OPC*: Office of Policy Coordination, a component attached to the CIA but reporting to the Departments of State and Defense. Established in 1948 with responsibility for the conduct of covert operations. Merged with OSO in 1952 to form the DDP.
- OPR*: Office of Political Research, established in 1974 as a component of the DDI. Responsible for long-term political research.
- ORE*: Office of Research and Evaluation, a component of CIG and CIA, established in 1946. Responsible for intelligence production and interagency coordination. Dissolved in 1951.
- ORR*: Office of Research and Reports, established in 1950, became a component of DDI in 1952. Responsible primarily for economic and strategic research. Dissolved in 1967.

- OSI*: Office of Scientific Intelligence, created in 1949. Responsible for basic science and technical research. Became a component of the DDI in 1952. Transferred to the DDS&T in 1963.
- OSO*: Office of Special Operations, a component of CIG and CIA, established in 1946, responsible for espionage and counterespionage. Merged with OPC in 1952 to form the Directorate for Plans.
- OSR*: Office of Strategic Research, established in 1967 as a component of the DDI, combining military intelligence units in OCI and ORR.
- OSS*: Office of Strategic Services, U.S. intelligence agency from 1942-1945. Responsibilities included research, analysis, espionage and overseas operations.
- PBCFIA*: President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, an advisory body created in 1956 by President Eisenhower. Renamed President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) in 1961.
- PSB*: Psychological Strategy Board, a subcommittee of NSC established in 1951, charged with directing psychological warfare programs. Its members included departmental representatives and Board staff members. Replaced by OCB in 1953.
- SEC*: Scientific Estimates Committee, a subcommittee of the IAC, established in 1952, charged with interagency coordination of scientific intelligence and the production of publications. Renamed the Scientific Intelligence Committee in 1959.
- SIGINT*: Signals Intelligence, which involves the interception, processing, analysis and dissemination of information derived from foreign electrical communications and other signals.
- SNIE*: Special National Intelligence Estimate, request by policymakers for a judgment on a particular question.
- SPG*: Special Procedures Group, a component of OSO, established in 1947. Responsible for the conduct of covert psychological operations.
- SSU*: Strategic Services Unit, a component of the War Department charged with clandestine collection and counterespionage. Transferred to CIG in 1946.
- SWNCC*: State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee, established in 1944, the predecessor body to the NSC.
- TSD*: Technical Services Division, a component of the DDP, engaged in research and development to provide operational support for clandestine activities. Transferred to DDS&T in 1973.
- USCIB*: United States Communications Intelligence Board, established in 1946 to advise and make recommendations on communications intelligence to the Secretary of Defense.
- USIB*: United States Intelligence Board, an interdepartmental body established in 1958, through the merger of the IAC and the USCIB. Responsible for coordinating intelligence activities among the Departments.

INTELLIGENCE AND TECHNOLOGY¹

I. Background

The First Amendment right to free speech and the Fourth Amendment right to be secure in one's person, papers, and home have been violated in recent years. Although these rights have been abridged in time-honored ways, in some cases the abridgement has taken place in ways that could not have been foreseen by the framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. A partial list of means employed follows:

- Breaking and entering into offices and homes;
- Opening of letters in the Postal System;
- Bugging or use of hidden microphones with no party to the conversation witting;
- Wiretap of telephone communications;
- Intercept of telephone communications without actual connection to wires; and
- Intercept of facsimile or printer communication.

Although files have existed for many years in all societies, and have sometimes been used to pernicious ends, technology has now made available to the managers of personal files greater speed and efficiency in the retrieval of data, as it has to managers of inventory files, of airline reservations, of the corpus of legal decisions, and of the United States House of Representatives Computer Based Bill Status System. In recent years, too, heightened public sensitivity and legislative activity have begun to introduce legislation, guidelines and standards regarding governmental and private files on individuals, granting the individual in many cases the right to know of the existence and the content of such a file, and to be able to challenge information which may be found in that file (Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552A). Computer technology may not have been instrumental in the misuse of CIA or IRS files to provide information to the White House on U.S. citizens, but the future impact of such technology must be assessed.

It is a logical possibility that the modern technological tools employed in the exercise of other rights and freedoms for the general and individual good might inadvertently result in such general exposure that the First and Fourth Amendment rights could no longer be preserved, or that their preservation would require severe restriction of other rights and freedoms with major damage to society. For example, such might be the impact of (fanciful and unphysical) spectacles which, while restoring perfect vision to older people, endowed them as well with the ability to look through envelopes and walls.

A second logical possibility is that the general exercise of technology for individual good and the good of society does not in itself imperil the rights under discussion, but that specific targeting of this technology toward individuals can imperil these rights. In this case, the particular threat to these rights could of course be removed by outlawing the subject technology and enforcing such laws. It may be,

¹ This staff report was prepared for the Select Committee by Richard Garvin, consultant.

however, that comparable protection of these rights may be obtainable by legal restrictions on the use of such technology, for such invasion, without denying society benefits which would otherwise be obtainable. If similar guarantee of rights may be achieved in this way, the banning of technology (even if politically feasible) would be an exaggerated remedy.

Finally, in some cases new technology may aid in restoring privacy against invasion by people or tools. An old example is the use of locks on doors; newer ones are the use of encryption for written communications and for the privacy of information in files. On the other hand, it would be inappropriate to require the individual to go to great cost to preserve his rights if such preservation could be obtained at lesser social cost. *e.g.* by restrictions of the actions of individuals who would intentionally violate these freedoms or whose activities might inadvertently imperil these rights. Thus, the expectation of privacy for the contents of a post card sent through the mails is quite different from that of a first-class letter in a sealed envelope, and the cost of an envelope is not regarded as an excessive charge for the guarantee of privacy. As the human senses and capabilities of vision, hearing, and memory are expanded by the use of new tools, what is the place for the analog of better envelopes?

II. Covert Observation and Intercept

Covert hearing (hidden microphones).—It has always been possible for a person to secrete himself, unbeknownst to the participants in a conversation, in such a way as to hear the conversation and so to violate an expectation of privacy (“eavesdropping”). No doubt mechanical aids in the form of tubes were used at times to make eavesdropping easier and less dangerous. Furthermore, rooms equipped with speaking tubes to convey orders to another part of a building were vulnerable to another kind of eavesdropping in which the use of the apparatus was other than that intended.

Microphones were in use in the 19th century for telephone communication and more recently for radio, public address, and recording. The present state of microphone technology is apparent to us all, with microphones a few millimeters across and a millimeter thick common in portable cassette recorders in use for business, education, and pleasure throughout the world. Over the last few years, the development of integrated-circuit technology and its extremely wide use in such recorders, in stereo equipment, and in calculators has provided not only the possibility but also the widespread capability to house amplifiers in a space of a few cubic millimeters and with power consumption of microwatts. Thus, microphones can be hidden in walls or moldings of rooms, in furnishings, or in personal possessions. They can be left behind by visitors or can be introduced as part of the normal resupply or refurbishment process.

Microphones can be accompanied by self-contained recorders or can transmit the signal (usually after amplification) either along near-invisible wires or by radio. In the case of wire or radio transmission, there would normally be a recorder or more powerful relay at some small distance of a few meters to a few hundred meters. The power requirements for microphones and amplifiers can be provided by batteries, by connection to the normal building power supply, from the

telephone system, or by silicon or other cells converting sunlight or roomlight into electrical power. Microphones can also be provided with power by the absorption of radio or microwave signals, and can retransmit intelligence on the same carrier waves. In addition to dedicated wires or radio transmission, the microphone signal can also be transmitted on the building power line or on the telephone lines, if any. Under most circumstances, the ability with further advance of technology to make microphones still smaller would not be of great utility. They are already small enough to pose a near-maximum threat.

Not only are apparatus containing microphones available by the tens of millions throughout the world, but the components are also common articles of commerce and can be assembled by any one of millions of people. Many rooms are now permanently equipped (entirely overtly) with microphones for use in recording conferences or in picking up clearly comments made by an audience during question period. Such microphones could easily feed recorders, wires, or transmitters at other times as well. Furthermore, every loudspeaker, whether built-in or part of a portable electronic device, is capable of working as a microphone in just the same way. Individuals with impaired hearing have particularly small microphone-amplifiers, some of them concealed in the frames of eye glasses.

A slightly different kind of covert hearing is said to be possible by detecting with laser beams the vibration of ordinary windows enclosing a room in which the target conversation is taking place. Another approach to overhearing conversations outdoors is to use large directional microphones distant as much as one hundred meters.

Retarding the further development of microphone technology for commercial purposes would be of little help, even if it were feasible, given the already small size of microphones. It seems likely that privacy can be adequately protected against covert hearing in the United States by proper legislation and enforcement requiring a warrant for the exercise of covert hearing capability. There being no expectation of privacy against a person present, legislation in the future, as now, should not restrict covert recording or retransmission by a person present, whether that person participates in the conversation or not. Of course, covert hearing capability can be banned administratively from designated premises, as it is now, by those in control of the premises—*e.g.*, “no microphones, radios, recorders, etc. at defense installations” (or on premises operated by the XYZ company).

Covert seeing (hidden cameras).—Hidden cameras (whether electronic or film) can imperil Fourth Amendment rights in analogous fashion to hidden microphones. Observation through a crack or peephole; personnel observation via a partially transparent overt mirror; large automatic or remote-control cameras or TV-type sensors behind an overt mirror; small cameras behind a small aperture—this series represents the application of technology to the goal of covert seeing. Vision comparable with that of a person can be obtained through a hole about 3 mm ($\frac{1}{8}$ -inch) in diameter. A 1 mm hole would permit commercial TV-quality picture. Reading the text of papers on a desk across the room will require a larger aperture. Unlike microphones, such cameras are not yet common or cheap. A film camera taking a picture every 5 seconds would need a considerable film supply and would have to be quiet if covert; a TV camera capable of communicating even

at such a rate, with human vision quality is feasible, but is at present costly. With time, the technology of fiber-optic signal communication will allow unobtrusive relay from a hidden camera. A command link could direct the view of the camera toward the interesting portion of the room, saving power and communications rate (as could built-in intelligence at a later time).

Clearly, the invasion by covert seeing of privacy would be intentional, not the result of innocent exercise of rights on the part of others. As such, preservation of such privacy can look toward legislation and the enforcement thereof, with such unconsented observation available only under warrant.

Wiretap of telephone lines.—Anywhere on the line running from the telephone instrument through the building to the junction box and on to the local exchange (typically a mile or so from the subscriber's instrument), connection to the line or proximity to that line will allow a high-quality telephone conversation to be provided for listening or recording. For many decades there has been no need for physical contact with the line to allow "wiretap," and no telltale click or change in quality is necessary or likely.

The technology needed for wiretap (whether by contact or non-contact) is primitive compared with that used for covert hearing. There is no way in which this technology can be outlawed without outlawing telephones themselves. However, in this field particularly, there is no necessity to abandon the protection of privacy. The intercept of communications from telephone lines may readily be controlled by legislation and by the requirement of a warrant for such actions by government bodies.^{1a}

Intercept of voice from domestic microwave relay.—In the United States, most telephone calls beyond the local area are now transmitted via microwave relay. Towers about 20 miles apart contain receiving antennas, amplifiers, transmitters, and transmitting antennas. The microwave relay system operates near 4000 megahertz and 6000 megahertz, at wavelengths on the order of 6 centimeters.

The transmitted beam from each of these relay towers has an angular width on the order of one degree and so can be picked up well over a wedge some 20 miles long by a third of a mile wide. Leased-line services such as the federal government FTS system, WATS lines, and individual corporate "private-line" networks occupy permanent positions in the frequency spectrum in those relays which are used to carry the signals (not always by the most direct path) over the fixed network. Direct-distance-dialing calls, constituting the bulk of the traffic, cannot be so precisely located. In general, however, these DDD calls are preceded by digital information which serves to direct the call to the receiving telephone number and to indicate the calling telephone number as well.

At present, an individual with an instruction manual and a few thousand dollars worth of equipment can set up a makeshift antenna and listen or record continuously calls on any desired fixed-assigned channel. In principle, even the DDD calls could, at substantially larger investment, be matched with a list of "interesting" telephone numbers

^{1a} Omnibus Safe Streets and Crime Control Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. 2510-2520).

so as to record only those calls originating from or directed to a given subscriber number.

These voice messages, having traveled by wire at least some distance may be from the telephone instrument, legally afforded the same protection as calls carried on wire from sender to receiver.² However, questions of extra-territoriality arise. There appears to be no way in which individuals on foreign embassy and consular properties can be forbidden from listening into those microwave links which pass their territories. It must be anticipated that certain powers will use such information not only for affairs of state,³ but also simply to earn funds by taking advantage of information which is obtained in this way. Communication in regard to commodity markets, stock exchanges, and bidding prices for large contracts all convey information which can have substantial value.

Given this peculiar situation, one might judge that the threat to privacy from all but extra-territorial intercept is adequately controllable by a legislative ban on such intercept (and the requirement of warrants for government "search"), and that the rather limited exposure to personnel controlled by foreign powers and based outside the reach of U.S. law can be controlled by other means. Voice links carrying defense information are all encrypted. Other important information of the federal government can be rerouted to avoid some small number of possible listening posts. Direct-distance-dial calls eventually will be relayed with the destination and origination information going over separate channels. When all-digital transmission is used to carry voice, encryption can be available at negligible cost. It could be implemented with separate keys for each microwave link, or encryption could be done at the point of digitizing each signal, or both.

Intercept of non-voice from domestic microwave relay links.—Many channels on U.S. microwave relay are devoted to the transmission of non-voice information (facsimile machines, teletype, telex service, other printer traffic). The comments above regarding the intercept of voice communications from such microwave links apply with equal force to the intercept of non-voice communications. There is, however, a major difference. Existing law protects only communications from which intelligence can be "aurally acquired,"⁴ so there is at present no legal bar to the intercept of such non-voice communications.

At present, the value of the average non-voice communication relayed over the microwave net is probably greater than that of the average voice communication. Even if non-voice were protected by new legislation, it would still be subject to intercept from extraterritorial sites. Fortunately, the protection of non-voice data transmission by means of encryption is far easier than is the case for voice and is practical now over all telex and printer links. Several machines and electronic devices of varying effectiveness are available to provide end-to-end transmission security. The National Bureau of Standards

² 18 U.S.C. 2511.

³ Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, June 1975, p. 8.

⁴ 18 U.S.C. 2510(4).

has begun the promulgation of a national standard for data security via encryption, which apparently satisfies the concerns of the United States Government for maintaining the privacy of non-defense information.

Intercept of voice or non-voice from domestic communication satellite links.—About half the international common-carrier communications originating in the U.S. goes by satellite and half by submarine cable. A rapidly increasing fraction of purely domestic communications is now relayed by satellite. Present satellites may receive communications from any one of a number of ground stations and simply rebroadcast the signal at a different frequency, covering the continental United States with the microwave beam. For some communications with multiple addressees, this large potential receiving area is an advantage; for most communications with a single addressee, the particular ground station to which the message is addressed will recognize the digital address and record or retransmit the message into the local net (or print it and put it into an envelope for delivery, etc.).

Modern relay satellites are in stationary orbit, so that a fixed antenna can be used to receive signals, rather than the tracking antenna initially required for the lower-orbit satellites. Thus, anywhere in the large area illuminated by the satellite microwave beam, a relatively simple antenna and amplifier would allow intercept of messages relayed by satellite. The satellite transmits microwave energy not only onto the land mass of the U.S., but also onto adjacent waters and countries, including Cuba. Non-U.S. citizens on non-U.S. territory are completely free to receive satellite relay of domestic U.S. communications and to do with this information whatever they will.

Although some satellite relay is digital in nature and thus readily protected by encryption at negligible added cost, the voice communication is primarily analog (whereby the intelligence is carried by continuous amplitude or frequency modulation as is the common case for terrestrial multiplex relay). Encrypted voice communication would require a wider channel at present than is needed by analog voice, but the additional cost for privacy via encryption might be small even so, since the satellite resource is a small part of the end-to-end communications cost.

Unfortunately, domestic satellite relay, as presently practiced, is an example of a case in which the indisputable benefits of technology bring with them a threat to privacy. In this case, it is not the application of technology to intercept but the technological nature of satellite transmission which makes intercept as easy outside U.S. territory as within, thus putting protection of privacy outside the reach of U.S. law. Technology in the form of encryption provides an adequate solution. This remedy is available now for non-voice communication and could be used with equal ease for digital voice. Aside from encryption, satellite voice communication could be provided some degree of protection in the near future by avoiding fixed-assignment schemes for users desiring privacy.

III. File Technology

Some examples of current status.—Among the early large computerized file-oriented systems were the airlines seat reservations systems now in use by all U.S. airlines. The overall system accommodates thou-

sands of flights per day, with a hundred or more seats per aircraft, and can handle reservations months in the future. A reservation can be made, queried, or cancelled within seconds from many hundreds or thousands of terminals. Some of the records may contain little more than the name of the passenger; others may include a complex continuing itinerary, with hotels, car rental, telephone numbers, and the like.

Seismic data bases are used by oil exploration companies to hold seismic reflection data and core logs. The former is the pattern of reflected sound waves versus time at various microphones which are sensitive to signals from a small explosion at the surface of the ground. The reflection comes from change of structure at different levels in the earth below. Core logs (or bore logs) may measure the detailed ground conductivity, water content, radioactivity content, and the like in tens of thousands of oil exploration wells. The material is kept computer accessible so that it can be retrieved and processed in a timely fashion as new tools are developed or as new information makes it desirable to compare with old information in the neighborhood.

Several government echelons have tax data bases. At the city or county level, such a data base may include details about every dwelling in the city. Such data bases can be particularly useful in case a blanket reassessment is desired.

The New York Times Information Bank ("NYTIB") provides at the New York Times building both abstracts and full texts of articles published in that newspaper. From remote terminals, subscribers can search the compendium of abstracts for all articles which have been published in the New York Times and may request photocopies of the full articles whose abstracts satisfy the search criteria. The abstract searching can be full-text search, i.e., a search on the name "Harold Ickes" might result in a sheaf of abstracts, accompanying stories most of whose headlines say nothing about Ickes, but may refer to Roosevelt.

Full-text search capability is used in several states for purposes of law and legal decisions. In addition to struggling with the often inadequate index to such a corpus, an attorney can undertake a full-text search for statutes or cases which have some characteristics in common with his current concern.

The United States House of Representatives Bill Status Office handles over 1000 telephone inquiries each day concerning the status and content of legislation which has been introduced into the House.

All these are file-oriented systems, some of which may retrieve files according to the index system under which they were prepared; others, as we have seen, have a full-text search capability, such that a file can be retrieved in accordance with its *content* rather than heading.

Computer file systems are now in common use for text preparation and editing. A draft letter, report or publication is typed at a terminal connected with a computer (or sometimes at a stand-alone system). At any time, portions of the draft can be displayed, typed out locally or on a fast printer. The typist can enter corrections into the computer system (including global changes, e.g. to change the group of characters "seperate" every place it may occur into the group "separate"), can rearrange paragraphs, append additional files, and the like.

Use of files in intelligence work.—The work of intelligence agencies and their analysts is in large part the production of reports. There are routine periodic reports, reports in response to specific tasking on questions of concern to national leaders, reports which are initiated internally to the agency in response to some fact or complex of facts which seems to require attention at a higher level. In presenting any such material, the analyst needs to obtain as much other information about the subject (What is the significance of the appointment of an unexpected person as premier?) as is possible. There is a strong analogy to the NYTIB which should also serve to provide responsible reporters with other information on the subject of current interest (earlier, perhaps contradictory speeches of public officials, and the like).

Intelligence files may also have agents' reports, which are in the nature of fragmentary newspaper articles except that they are secret. Raw intelligence files may also contain the full text of foreign radio broadcasts as transcribed and circulated in printed form by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). If plaintext messages of a foreign military command are available, they will also be filed, and for efficient search and retrieval preferably in a computer store.

The use of computers in all these file applications—commercial, educational, and intelligence—is motivated by the same drive for efficiency, reliability and the capability to retrieve materials at places, times, and by persons other than those who have filed them. Computers at present are not normally used to store pictures or things, but indexes to such collections can as readily be placed in the computer as can any other kind of information. In contrast with a single physical file of paper documents, the computer store never suffers from the document's unavailability because it is on somebody else's desk. Multiple copies of a micro-image store can also satisfy the requirement for multiple simultaneous use, but cannot be updated or searched so readily as can a computer store.

Near-term future file technology: performance and cost.—In any case, it is not the purpose of this note to design a file system for the intelligence community, but rather to inquire as to certain aspects of privacy in regard to such files. The Privacy Act of 1974 is both the result and cause of increased interest in design of safeguards, which is at present the concern of an active subset of data-processing professionals and of a number of existing organizations,⁵ including the Privacy Protection Study Commission, but a brief discussion of near-term future technology may be of help.

Obviously, concern regarding files and privacy is with the chain of information from collection through storage and retrieval. One worry is that some government organization by the expenditure of enough money, could have the capability to "know everything about everyone" at any time. Because there is no general public right of

⁵ See for instance National Bureau of Standards Publications: FIPS PUB41—"Computer Security Guidelines for Implementing the Privacy Act of 1974" (SD Catalog Number C13.52:41) and "Executive Guide to Computer Security" (Available from the Institute for Computer Sciences and Technology, NBS, Washington, D.C. 20234).

access to the files of the intelligence agencies, it is of interest to know what these capabilities might amount to, as a guide to the introduction of safeguards.

In order to provide some intuitive feeling for the magnitudes involved, consider the storage of full page, double-spaced text. Such a page may have thirty lines of sixty-five letters or digits, or about 2,000 characters per page. Except as noted, it is assumed that a character requires one "byte" (8 bits) of storage, although by appropriate coding of text, one can store as many as three characters per byte.

Using a typical modern disk-pack magnetic storage device, storage of 300 million bytes can be obtained for a rental of about \$1500 per month, or some \$5 per month per million characters. Such a device can transfer about 1.2 million characters per second, so it would require 250 seconds to search its entire contents if the logical search device could operate at the storage data rate. Search is normally done by a query, looking for an exact match in the data stream as it is brought from the store. Examples of simple queries are: "theft of service" in the case of the legal corpus; "Chamberlain/Munich" in the case of the NYTIB (where the "/" simply means that both "Chamberlain" and "Munich" should be in the same document); "seperate" in the case of ordinary text processing where the properly spelled word "separate" is to be substituted. Such queries against a small data base are handled well by a general purpose computer. Indeed, large data bases also have some structure which can often be used to reduce by large factors the amount of data which actually has to be searched. But even if the data base has little structure, one could imagine streaming the entire data base past some modest special-purpose electronic device (a "match register") which may detect a match against the query and divert the matching document into a separate store, where it may be brought to the attention of the analyst. In large production, such a match-register might be bought for \$100 in modern integrated-circuit technology. In any case, the cost of special-purpose match-registers would be small compared with the cost of the massive store and will henceforth be neglected here.

By such techniques, as many queries as are desired may be entered from terminals and simultaneously matched against the entire data stream. If the data base is entirely in this type of storage (at a present cost of \$5 per month per megabyte, or 50 cents per month per nominal file of 50 typed pages) any query can be answered within five minutes. Of course, a single query might lead to many other sequential queries before all the desired facts are at hand, but the time is measured in minutes, not months.

Given that most queries need not be answered in minutes, one can ask the cost of a slower system. There are now commercially available tape library products, of which a typical one can store 35 billion characters at a cost of about \$18,000 per month (so 50 cents per million characters per month). This particular device can deliver data at a rate of 0.8 million characters per second, so that it would require some twelve hours for such a store to be searched entirely for as many queries as have been presented. The range of cost associated with such a system with current technology and twelve-hour response time thus

goes from \$10 million per month for a system capable of storing 50 pages on each of 200 million individuals (without encoding) to about \$200,000 per month for a system storing the same amount of information on each of 10 million individuals, with the characters compacted into more efficient form for storage.

So much for the near term technology. It is being developed in this country and abroad entirely for commercial purposes. It serves highly important functions in allowing any organization—commerce, industry, government, and the professions—to manage information quickly and accurately.

Yet fresh in our memory is the use by the White House of the CIA to provide a “psychological profile” on Daniel Ellsberg. An ordinary file drawer would be adequate if one knew long in advance that information would be requested on this particular person. Given the unusual nature of the case and the non-existence of that particular file drawer, it would be technically possible to search all government files for documents which mentioned the name in question. This would bring to light, of course, income tax returns, military service history, all employees for whom social security tax had been paid in the past by the individual in question, names of relatives, etc. This material would not be found in *intelligence* files, but it could be found if the queries were made available to cooperating individuals with access to files in non-intelligence agencies like the IRS, Selective Service, and the like. Additional important information might be available by use of the NYTIB as a commercial subscriber.

Thus the problem in regard to those intelligence agencies with large files of raw data is to ensure that these files are used only in support of the authorized mission of the agency and are *not* exploited for purposes of improving prospects of incumbent officials in an election, of punishing those on an “enemies list,” and the like. But it is no longer enough to proscribe the creation of specific files on U.S. citizens; it is now possible to recreate such a file from the central file in less than a day, or to answer questions from the central file without ever having a manila folder or file drawer labelled “John Smith.” There must therefore be control over the queries asked of the file, of whom, and by whom. It is just as important to ensure that information given freely by individuals to non-intelligence agencies is not exploited for unauthorized purposes and is not accessible to unauthorized individuals.

The computer technology which makes possible rapid access to large masses of information also allows in principle for control of access to that information. Measures for preventing illegitimate use of government files could be proposed by the Executive, which can obtain help from equipment manufacturers, organizations experienced in computer use and analysis, and from the scientific societies. Such measures could be embodied in Executive Orders. Their adequacy and the need for legislation providing criminal and civil penalties should be the subject of Congressional hearings and research.

Safeguards which are being considered and partially implemented in non-intelligence files are the following:

1. There should be a limitation as to who can keep files on individuals. (But clearly the New York Times is allowed to put their own newspaper into computer-readable form. And

is it a file on an individual if the individual's name is only mentioned in a larger document?);

2. Individuals should be allowed access to their files (for repayment of the actual cost of search) and to receive the information in the file on them. (But if the file is very large, such access might be *made* very expensive. On the other hand, if the access were treated like an ordinary query in the example above, the cost might be quite reasonable.);

3. The individual should be allowed to write into the file in order to contest the facts or in order to present his own point of view;

4. There should be limitations on those who gain access to the file or who can receive information from the file;

5. Duplication of the file should be limited and unauthorized access prevented;

6. There should be an indelible record of *who* has queried the file and *what* questions were asked, so that failure of access limitations will not go undetected.

Among the safeguards for any system should be adequate requirements for identification of terminals from which queries are being made, identification and authorization of the individuals who query; a complete record of the queries (with terminal and individual identification), adequate security against transmitting large amounts of information and the like. The moment-by-moment execution of these controls on access is the task of the set of computer instructions known as the "operating system."⁶ Although the design of an adequate operating system is a difficult task, the detailed specification of the controls is itself non-trivial and must be done with some understanding of what is technically feasible at present. Fundamental to the continued effectiveness of such safeguards is the maintenance of the integrity of the main program which controls the computer. Even in highly classified applications, there is no reason for this main operating program to be classified, and a source of strength should be public scrutiny of this operating system. Clearly, the introduction of access controls should not wait for the perfect operating system.

No matter what the safeguards, individuals might be able to gain access to some information for which they are not authorized. Adequate legislation, criminal penalties, and the enforcement of these laws should deter many who might otherwise try. Data security measures, such as encryption of the file itself, can help also.

What must be particularly guarded against is not so much the misuse of intelligence files but the misuse of information freely given or collected for authorized purposes and which is then turned to an improper use. Indeed, open analysis by all those concerned should lead to an understanding of the protection which may be provided.

⁶ An introduction to the problem can be found in "The Protection of Information in Computer Systems," J. H. Saltzer and M. D. Schroeder, Proc. IEEE, Vol. 63, No. 9 (September 1975), pp. 1278-ff.

ADDENDA TO THE INTERIM REPORT ON ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS

The following sections are intended to supplement the Committee's Interim Report on alleged assassination plots.¹ One of these sections summarizes evidence involving the plot against Chilean General Rene Schneider which has come to the Committee's attention since the issuance of the Interim Report. Two other principal sections—"The 'Special Operations' Unit" and "The Question of Discrediting Action Against Jack Anderson"—report on the Committee staff inquiry into allegations of CIA involvement in assassination planning; neither inquiry revealed evidence of such planning. Finally, some miscellaneous corrections of errata in the previous report and some additional pieces of evidence are included.

I. SCHNEIDER CASE

Since the issuance of the Committee's Interim Report on alleged assassination plots involving foreign leaders, the Committee has received statements from two sources to supplement its earlier inquiry into the death of Chilean General Rene Schneider:² (1) former President Richard M. Nixon's responses to written interrogatories from the Committee; and (2) the recent statements and testimony of Edward Korry, former United States Ambassador to Chile.

¹ The Interim Report was published on November 20 (legislative day, November 18), 1975 (91st Cong., 1st Sess.; Report No. 94-465).

² With respect to the death of General Schneider, the Committee found: "On October 25, 1970, General Schneider died of gunshot wounds inflicted three days earlier while resisting a kidnap attempt. Schneider, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and a constitutionalist opposed to military coups, was considered an obstacle in efforts to prevent Salvador Allende from assuming the office of President of Chile. The United States Government supported and sought to instigate a military coup to block Allende. U.S. officials supplied financial aid, machine guns and other equipment to various military figures who opposed Allende. Although the CIA continued to support coup plotters up to Schneider's shooting, the record indicates that the CIA had withdrawn active support of the group which carried out the actual kidnap attempt on October 22, which resulted in Schneider's death. Further, it does not appear that any of the equipment supplied by the CIA to coup plotters in Chile was used in the kidnapping. [The Committee found] no evidence of a plan to kill Schneider or that United States officials specifically anticipated that Schneider would be shot during the abduction." (Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, 11/20/75, p. 5; hereinafter cited as Interim Assassination Report.)

A. Interrogatory Responses of Richard M. Nixon

Of the 77 written interrogatories submitted to former President Richard Nixon by the Select Committee on February 4, 1976, 36 dealt with Chile. Of these, all but eight specifically related to the events discussed in the Schneider chapter of the Committee's Interim Assassination Report.

In summary, Mr. Nixon's responses to the Committee's interrogatories included the following statements relevant to the subject covered in the Interim Report.³

—According to the former President, the purpose of the September 1970 White House meeting, attended by Mr. Nixon, CIA Director Richard Helms, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, and Attorney General John Mitchell was to discuss “the prospect of Salvador Allende's election to the Presidency of Chile.”⁴ Mr. Nixon stated that he informed Director Helms that he wanted “the CIA to determine whether it was possible for a political opponent of Mr. Allende to be elected President by the Chilean Congress.”⁵ “Specific means” to be used by the CIA to prevent Allende from taking office were not discussed; “general means” were. These included “the direct expenditure of funds to assist Mr. Allende's opponents, the termination of United States financial aid and assistance programs as a means of adversely affecting the Chilean economy, and the effort to enlist support of various factions, including the military, behind a candidate who could defeat Mr. Allende in the congressional confirmation procedure.”⁶

—Mr. Nixon stated that he was not aware that from September 15, 1970, to mid-October 1970 “the CIA was attempting to promote a military coup in Chile.”⁷ With the exception of a mid-October discussion with Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Nixon stated: “I do not presently recall being personally consulted with regard to CIA activities in Chile at any time during the period September 15, 1970 through October 24, 1970.”⁸

In mid-October 1970, Mr. Nixon was informed by Dr. Kissinger that “the CIA had reported to him that their efforts to enlist the support of various factions in attempts by Mr. Allende's opponents to prevent Allende from becoming president had not been successful and likely would not be.” According to Mr. Nixon, Dr. Kissinger informed him that “under the circumstances he had instructed the CIA to abandon the effort.”⁹ Mr. Nixon stated that he informed Dr. Kissinger that he agreed with that instruction.

—Mr. Nixon stated that he did not receive information “concerning plans for a military coup in Chile involving the kidnapping of General Rene Schneider.”¹⁰ He also stated that he was unaware that “the CIA passed machine guns or other material to Chilean military officers known to the CIA to be planning a coup attempt.”¹¹

Mr. Nixon's statements regarding the events surrounding the death

³ The full text of the Committee's interrogatories and former President Nixon's responses (hereinafter cited as Interrogatories) is set forth at pp. 143-171.

⁴ Interrogatory 39.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Interrogatory 45.

⁷ Interrogatory 51.

⁸ Interrogatory 49.

⁹ Interrogatory 52.

¹⁰ Interrogatory 54.

¹¹ Interrogatory 55.

of General Schneider contrast with evidence received previously by the Committee. All CIA officials stated that they interpreted President Nixon's September 15 instruction as a directive to promote a military coup in Chile in the Fall of 1970; both CIA documents and the testimony of President Nixon's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Kissinger, are consistent with this interpretation.¹² Mr. Nixon has stated that he instructed Richard Helms to determine whether it was possible for a political opponent of Mr. Allende to be chosen as President by the Chilean Congress. He further stated that he "informed Mr. Helms that to be successful, any effort to defeat Mr. Allende would have to be supported by the military factions in Chile."¹³ Mr. Nixon stated that he did not recall, however, instructing the CIA to promote a coup in Chile.¹⁴

Of equal importance is the controversy surrounding whether the White House knew of the CIA's continuing efforts to promote a coup in Chile after mid-October, 1970. According to an October 15 CIA memorandum Dr. Kissinger instructed DDP Thomas Karamessines at a White House meeting to suspend coup planning by "de-fus[ing] the Viaux coup plot, at least temporarily" and Kissinger also "instructed Mr. Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in Chile, working clandestinely and securely to maintain the capability for Agency operations against Allende in the future."¹⁵ Kissinger testified—and his former deputy, Alexander Haig agreed—that after October 15, the White House neither knew of nor specifically approved CIA coup plans in Chile. CIA officials, however, testified that their encouragement of coup planning by the Chilean military after October 15 was known to and thus authorized by the White House.¹⁶ Mr. Nixon's recollection is that in mid-October he had agreed with Dr. Kissinger's instruction to the CIA to abandon its effort in Chile to prevent Allende from becoming President. Mr. Nixon did not recall "being personally consulted with regard to CIA activities in Chile" between October 15 and the October 24 vote in favor of Allende.

The clear import of Mr. Nixon's statements, is that the CIA was pursuing coup plans in Chile without sufficient authority. His statement with respect to the September 15, 1970, White House meeting is, however, at variance with those of CIA officials and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Kissinger. With respect to the mid-October instruction if Mr. Nixon's statements accurately describe the events, and if Dr. Kissinger unambiguously informed the CIA on October 15 to suspend all coup plans in Chile and gave no indication

¹² See Interim Assassination Report, pp. 228, 233; e.g., Richard Helms, 7/15/75, pp. 6-7, 10-11; Chief, Chile Task Force, 7/31/75, p. 53; Deputy Chief, WH Division, 7/15/75, p. 20; Memorandum/Genesis of the Project, 9/16/70; CIA Cable 236, Headquarters to Station, 9/21/70; Cable 240, Headquarters to Station, 9/21/70; Kissinger, 8/12/75, p. 12.

¹³ Interrogatory 39.

¹⁴ Interrogatories 39, 45.

For a full account of the evidence in the Committee's record relating to the question of authorization for the CIA to promote a coup in Chile, see the Interim Assassination Report, pp. 225-254. Richard Helms' notes of his September 15, 1970 monthly meeting with President Nixon and his testimony about the meeting is included at pp. 227-228. See also the Committee Staff Report "Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973" (12/18/75).

¹⁵ CIA Memorandum of Conversation/Dr. Kissinger/Mr. Karamessines/General Haig, at the White House, 10/15/70.

¹⁶ See Interim Assassination Report, pp. 227, n. 1; 246-247; 250-253; e.g., Karamessines, 8/6/75, pp. 8, 72-73, 89.

of support for renewed coup planning before October 24, then the CIA would have been acting in contravention of White House policy. On the other hand, if, as CIA officials testified, the coup activity was authorized from the beginning and the White House was kept informed until the end, then the accounts of Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger are called into question.

B. Statements and Testimony of Edward M. Korry

Former U.S. Ambassador to Chile Edward Korry has testified and submitted statements to the Committee since the issuance of its Interim Report on assassination plots.¹⁷ He made the following comments with respect to the Schneider case:

¹⁷ Mr. Korry appeared before the Committee in public session on December 4, 1975, to testify on Chile. In addition to his testimony, Mr. Korry submitted a 28-page letter, with accompanying documents, detailing his views on events in Chile. His testimony and letter (with accompanying documents) are contained in the Senate hearings before the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Vol. 7, "Covert Action," December 4 and 5, 1975. Finally, Mr. Korry was deposed by the Committee on February 24, 1976, in a six-hour session. During his testimony and deposition, and in various letters to the Committee, Mr. Korry objected to several items in the Schneider chapter of the Committee's Interim Assassination Report.

The following points, among others, were made by Mr. Korry: (1) Korry stated that his two-phase proposal (see Interim Assassination Report, p. 229) of June 18, 1970, had been requested the previous January "by the State Department" and CIA representatives in response to his suggestion that the Chilean presidential election be viewed in two phases ("one up to September 4th and then between September 4th and October 24, 1970"). He was asked to "submit with dollar figures a precise scenario for a phase one and a phase two" (Korry deposition, 2/24/76, pp. 20-26). (2) Referring to the 40 Committee's directive of September 14 (see Interim Assassination Report, p. 230) "to go directly to President Frei" about a plan to prevent Allende's confirmation, Korry testified that he "refused to go" see President Frei (Korry deposition, 2/24/76, p. 36). Despite Korry's statements that he "would not approach Frei . . . even indirectly" (Korry deposition, 2/24/76, pp. 43-46), on September 16, 1970, in response to the 40 Committee's instructions, Ambassador Korry cabled Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson: "I am extremely grateful for the confidence and support of President Nixon and the Forty Committee. . . . To provide that moral base (so that President Frei will feel there is sufficient justification to move against Allende) is largely our task. . . . It is highly unlikely that I shall be able to see Frei. I cannot go to the presidential palace without creating a storm; I cannot go to his home anymore since it is subject to the same observation that my residence is. There are no U.S. visitors . . . in sight to provide an innocuous cover for another talk. Hence I delivered my message to Frei one hour after receipt of your message through [an intermediary] that there was no point in further analysis of the situation . . . we were prepared to give appropriate support if Frei could decide his own course, but if he preferred to live interminably the Hamlet . . . I would take [his] indecision to mean that he had opted for a Communist Chile." (3) Although he did refer to General Schneider in a September 21, 1970, situation report to Dr. Kissinger and Assistant Secretary Charles Meyer. (See Interim Assassination Report p. 231.) Korry told the Committee that this was "an assessment provided by the Chileans," it was not a reference to kidnapping or assassination, and he was not personally advocating any action with respect to Schneider. (Korry deposition, 2/24/76, pp. 57-63.) Korry also stated that, months earlier, he had reported the view that Schneider's constitutionalist "doctrine" would prevent the Chilean military from intervening in the electoral process:

"I met with General Schneider myself in the middle of the spring of 1970 to understand exactly what he stood for. I reported promptly thereafter what the Schneider doctrine was and said it was immutable and said that it would prevail in the military.

"The military attaché, subsequently to my recollection . . . repeated again and again that the Schneider doctrine was a fact and as long as Schneider was in that job, nobody would ever move." (Korry deposition, 2/24/75, p. 60.)

—Korry took issue with the view, expressed in the Committee's Report and by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, that the line separating Track I and Track II often became blurred.¹⁸ According to Korry:

Much is made in the assassination report of the "two tracks" that the U.S. policy followed in Chile in September and October of 1970. The report stitches a new myth to suit some consciences or some ambitions or some institutions. There are many who it might wish the public and history to believe that no real difference existed between the diplomatic Track I that I followed, and the covert military Track II that the White White launched. It is hogwash. Track I followed Mr. Frei, then the President of Chile and its constitutional leader. It adopted certain minimal and cosmetic suggestions put forward by one purportedly in President Frei's confidence. Track I led nowhere because President Frei would not encourage or lead any Chilean military action, and because I would neither have the United States through the CIA, or anyone else even in the private community, assume a responsibility that had to be Chilean. I never informed President Frei of the money which was authorized for work for Track I, and not a penny, as you also say, was spent on it.

Track II, on the other hand, did not deal with Frei, did not seek his concurrence, did not follow his lead, did not pretend to be within any constitutional framework of Chile.¹⁹

In his deposition of February 24, 1976, Korry qualified his assertion of the differences between Track I and Track II, which was to be carried out without his awareness. When asked if Tracks I and II blurred together in that they both sought the same objective, he replied:

You could say blurring of objective. And at the point of inspiration. But at the point of execution, there was no blurring whatsoever.²⁰

—There were numerous references in the Interim Assassination Report to United States contact with retired Chilean General Roberto Viaux, a Chilean coup-plotter, and the coup-oriented activities of a United States military attache assigned to Santiago.²¹ In his letter to Senator Church, Korry stated that these activities were contrary to the instructions he had issued while in Chile:

A. I barred, from 1969 on, any U.S. Embassy or U.S. military contact with the circle around General Viaux. I renewed this ban in the strongest terms again and again in 1970 and thereafter. I checked periodically by direct questioning of the CIA and of the military attaches, and by corroborative investigation, to satisfy myself that this order was being carried out.

B. I barred the CIA, in late 1968 or early 1969, from any operational contact with the Chilean military without my prior knowledge and approval, (I can recall no permissive instance), from any physical contact with a colonel or higher

¹⁸ See Interim Assassination Report, pp. 229-232.

¹⁹ Hearings, Vol. 7, "Covert Action," December 4 and 5, 1975, pp. 30-31.

²⁰ Korry deposition, 2/24/76, p. 100.

²¹ Interim Assassination Report, pp. 235-246.

rank, from any contact with Frei or any Minister or deputy Minister, from any contact with any major political figures without my prior approval (rarely given) or any contact with the head of, or a leading figure in a government agency aside from the approved liaison with the Chilean police. I checked in every conceivable way, regularly.²²

—The Committee noted in its Interim Assassination Report that Ambassador Korry had informed the 40 Committee that the Chilean military would not move against Allende after he received the plurality in the presidential election of September 4, 1970.²³ In his testimony before the Select Committee, Korry added:

I consistently warned the Nixon administration, starting in early 1970, months before the election, that the Chilean military was no policy alternative in Chile. I was pressed in September and October by Washington to develop possible scenarios for independent Chilean military intervention in Chile. Without exception, my responses excluded all possibilities. Indeed, I warned gratuitously and very strongly on two occasions that if anyone were considering such schemes, it would be disastrous for U.S. interests.²⁴

Korry then cited two cables he sent after the September 4 election:

Let me read from two cables sent to Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson and Dr. Henry Kissinger, so that the public can judge for itself.

One, on September 25: "Aside from the merits of a coup and its implications for the United States, I am convinced we cannot provoke one and that we should not run any risks simply to have another Bay of Pigs. Hence I have instructed our military and CAS", that is, the CIA, "not to engage in the encouragement of any kind."

Again, on October 9, to the same two addresses, "Eyes Only," "In sum, I think any attempt on our part actively to encourage a coup could lead us to a Bay of Pigs failure. I am appalled to discover that there is liaison for terrorists and coup plotting, names deleted. "I have never been consulted or informed of what, if any, role the United States may have in the financing of" names deleted. "An abortive coup, and I and my chief State colleagues, FSO's are unalterably convinced that this is what is here under discussion, not more beknownst to me, would be an unbeliev'd disaster for the United States and for the President. Its consequences would be to strongly reinforce Allende now and in the future, and do the gravest harm to U.S. interests throughout Latin America, if not beyond." ^{24a}

—Ambassador Korry also told the Committee that in late September or early October 1970, he became suspicious that "the CIA was

²² Hearings, Vol. 7, "Covert Action," December 4 and 5, 1975, pp. 122-123.

²³ Interim Assassination Report, pp. 230, 250.

²⁴ Hearings, Vol. 7, "Covert Action," December 4 and 5, 1975, pp. 31-32.

^{24a} *Ibid.*, p. 32.

'up to something behind my back.'"²⁵ According to Mr. Korry, he asked his Deputy Chief of Mission to investigate. Neither he nor his deputy were able to uncover any factual basis for Korry's suspicions.²⁶

—Mr. Korry testified that in the period September 15 to October 15, 1970, he informed the Frei government of the identity of a likely assassin of Allende, "a military man who was then involved in provocative acts, bombings throughout Santiago."²⁷ This man, Major Arturo Marshal, was arrested shortly thereafter, a few days before the shooting of General Schneider.

—Mr. Korry also informed the Committee that in the final two weeks of the so-called Track II period he met with President Nixon in the White House. According to Korry:

I told President Nixon in the Oval Office in mid-October 1970 that the United States had to avoid a self-fulfilling prophecy however correct my reporting and analysis might be, by seeking generally an understanding with Allende, starting even before his inauguration. I said this effort need not prevent subsidies by the CIA to non-conformist media and to non-conformist, non-extremist political parties which we knew, we knew from superb CIA penetrations and from excellent State Department reporting were soon going to be squeezed to the wall.²⁸

—Finally, Mr. Korry objected to the fact that the Interim Report attributed sole authorship²⁹ of the so-called "nuts and bolts"³⁰ cable to him. He has asserted that, his cable had a CIA designation, and that the Santiago CIA Station at least concurred in the wording of the cable.

Mr. Korry also stated that the idea for such a severe cable originated not with him but with President Frei: "President Frei asked the Ambassador [Korry] through the minister of national defense for a statement that could be used" in Frei's negotiations with the Chilean military.³¹ Korry said that the harsh language of the cable was a deliberate overstatement of the repercussions an Allende administration could expect from the United States:

I had to retain the confidence of an administration in Washington that I believed would inevitably get involved in military relationships with the Chileans. . . .

²⁵ *Ibid.* The Committee noted in its Interim Assassination Report (p. 227) that on September 15, 1970, President Nixon had informed CIA Director Helms that there should be no U.S. embassy involvement in what became known as Track II.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

²⁹ Interim Assassination Report, p. 231.

³⁰ That cable read: cc Frei should know that not a nut or bolt will be allowed to reach Chile under Allende. Once Allende comes to power we shall do all within our power to condemn Chile and the Chileans to utmost deprivation and poverty, a policy designed for a long time to come to accelerate the hard features of a Communist society in Chile. Hence, for Frei to believe that there will be much of an alternative to utter misery, such as seeing Chile muddle through, would be strictly illusory. (Situation Report, Korry to Meyer and Kissinger, 9/21/70.)

³¹ Korry deposition, 2/24/76, p. 68.

I know I deliberately, and the embassy knew it, overstated the message . . . in order to prevent and halt this damn pressure on me to go to the military.³²

II. THE "SPECIAL OPERATIONS" UNIT

On December 26, 1975, the *New York Times* reported that former CIA officer E. Howard Hunt, Jr., told an interviewer that:

[H]e was told in the mid-1950s that the CIA had a small unit set up to arrange for the assassination of suspected double agents and similar low-ranking officials . . . Hunt said he recalled having been told by CIA superiors in 1954 or 1955 that Boris T. Pash, an Agency official, was in charge of the assassination unit.³³

Hunt was also reported to have said that he once met with Colonel Pash and broached the subject of planning an assassination of a suspected double agent.

The Committee staff investigation concluded that a special unit headed by Colonel Pash in the early days of the CIA was assigned, among other things, responsibility for assassinations and kidnappings—including any which might be directed against double agents—in the event that such operations were authorized. We have found no evidence, however, that this unit performed any covert action involving assassination or kidnapping operations.³⁴ Although the "Special Operations" unit had general jurisdiction for assassination or kidnapping, it appears that no such operations were ever seriously considered by this unit.

A. Program Branch 7: A Special Operations Unit with Assassination Jurisdiction

Boris T. Pash, an Army colonel specializing in intelligence and counterintelligence, was assigned to the CIA from March 3, 1949, to January 3, 1952, and worked in connection with the CIA on several projects after that date.³⁵ In the formative years of the CIA, Pash served as Chief of Program Branch 7 (PB/7), a "special operations" unit within the Office of Policy Coordination, the original clandestine services organization which was eventually transformed into the Directorate of Plans. The responsibility for standard forms of covert action was assigned to the six other program branches within OPC's Staff 3: political warfare, psychological warfare, economic warfare, escape and evasion, sabotage, and countersabotage.³⁶ According to Colonel Pash, PB/7 was responsible for "such activities which the other six branches didn't specifically have."³⁷ Pash testified that PB/7 was "not opera-

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 74-76.

³³ *New York Times*, December 26, 1975, p. 9.

³⁴ Due to the fact that CIA has no record of documents which deal with this aspect of Pash's unit (CIA letter to Select Committee, January 16, 1976), the Committee has relied upon the testimony of the principal witnesses. It should be remembered that this testimony relates to events that transpired twenty-five years ago.

³⁵ CIA letter to Select Committee, January 16, 1976.

³⁶ Director of Operations Planning (Staff 3), January 1, 1976, pp. 4-5.

³⁷ Colonel Boris T. Pash testimony, p. 13.

tional," but rather involved in the planning of "special operations" such as promoting defections from Communist countries, facilitating the escape of prominent political refugees, disseminating anti-Communist propaganda behind the Iron Curtain, and contingency planning for the death of foreign leaders, such as Stalin.³⁸

Howard Hunt's testimony pointed to an additional function of Program Branch 7. Hunt stated that, based on "hearsay" from his superiors in the CIA's Southeast Europe division in the early 1950s, he had the "distinct impression" that Colonel Boris Pash had run a unit which would arrange an assassination mission if it were required.³⁹

The Director of Operations Planning for OPC, who supervised program branches, confirmed the fact that Colonel Pash's Program Branch 7 unit was responsible for assassinations and kidnapping as well as other "special operations."⁴⁰ The supervisor testified that he consulted with Frank Wisner, the Director of OPC, who agreed that Pash should have jurisdiction over assassinations.⁴¹ Kidnapping was also part of PB/7's "catch-all function," according to the supervisor—"kidnapping of personages behind the Iron Curtain . . . if they were not in sympathy with the regime, and could be spirited out of the country by our people for their own safety; or kidnapping of people whose interests were inimical to ours."⁴²

Boris Pash testified that he did not believe that he had been charged with responsibility for assassinations, but allowed for the possibility that he was viewed as if he had such responsibility:

It is conceivable to me that, if someone in OPC had thought that an assassination program and policy should be developed, the requirement might have been levied on PB/7 because of the "catch-all" nature of its responsibility . . . I was never asked to undertake such planning. It was not my impression that such planning was my responsibility. However, because of the "catch-all" nature of my unit, it is understandable to me that others on the PP [Political and Psychological Warfare] Staff could have had the impression that my unit would undertake such planning.⁴³

The Deputy Chief of PB/7, who served under Pash, testified, however, that he had a clear recollection that the written charter of the "special operations" unit included the following language:

PB/7 will be responsible for assassinations, kidnapping, and such other functions as from time to time may be given it . . . by higher authority."⁴⁴

He said that the charter also assigned to PB/7 responsibility for any functions not specifically assigned to the other program branches.⁴⁵

³⁸ Boris Pash testimony, pp. 16-18, 20.

³⁹ E. Howard Hunt testimony, 1/10/76, pp. 33, 36, 51.

⁴⁰ Director of Operations Planning, 1/12/76, pp. 16, 18, 24-26.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁴³ Boris Pash affidavit, 1/19/76.

⁴⁴ Deputy Chief, PB/7, testimony, 1/5/76, p. 19-79. The CIA was unable to locate a charter for Program Branch 7. (CIA letter to Select Committee, 1/7/76.)

⁴⁵ Deputy Chief, PB/7, 1/5/76, p. 19.

The Deputy Chief did not recall any discussion at the CIA of the assassination or kidnapping aspects of this charter because, compared to the charters of the other program branches, he believed that PB/7's charter was "more secret than any of the others."⁴⁶ He construed the charter's reference to "higher authority" to include "State Department, Defense Department, National Security Council, the President of the United States."⁴⁷

Boris Pash did not recall "particular wording" in a charter that included a reference to assassinations, but he did not dispute the accuracy of the Deputy Chief's testimony: "It could have been there without my recalling it, but I didn't give it any serious consideration because I knew that . . . it would be beyond us."⁴⁸

The Director of Operations Planning did not recall the charter of PB/7, but he testified that whether or not there was a written directive "it was clear" to everyone in OPC that assassination and kidnapping "was within the purview" of Pash's responsibilities.⁴⁹ The Director testified that "the heads of the program branches" were all involved in general discussions of assassination as a tactic, although the subject did not have a high priority.⁵⁰ The Director of Operations Planning said that Colonel Pash was entrusted with this jurisdiction not because he had performed any assassination in the past, but because he had a general background in clandestine operations in World War II.⁵¹

None of the witnesses testified that any actual assassination operation or planning was ever undertaken by PB/7, which was disbanded along with the other program branches when the DDP was formed in late 1952.⁵² Pash testified that he was "never in charge of or involved

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Pash, 1/7/76, p. 22. Pash speculated that the reason he may have dismissed charter language relating to assassination was that he saw it as a part of the wartime mentality carried into the CIA's clandestine services by former officers who served in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II:

"I probably just sort of glanced over it, thinking well, this is a typical OSS approach to things . . . to them using words like that is maybe a common thing. . . . I think they felt big in talking that way.

". . . There were some very good men in OSS, some dedicated men. . . . But also there were a lot of entrepreneurs and adventurers. . . . So when the CIA was formed, a lot of these people with these wild ideas and wild approaches were there. So, of course, when you say you're in charge of 'all other activities' . . . these fellows might have ideas [such as] . . . 'it's easier to kill a guy than to worry about trailing him'." (Pash, pp. 15-16, 22.)

⁴⁹ Director of Operations Planning, 1/12/76, pp. 18-19, 26.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* p. 12. The Director explained the reason for discussion of assassination in the early phase of organizing OPC after World War II:

"One of the things that was taken into account and was discussed on a sort of last ditch basis was assassination . . . [I]t was a matter of keeping up with the Joneses. Every other power practiced, and as far as I know still practices, assassination if need be. So, reluctantly we took that into account." (Director of Operations Planning, 1/12/76, p. 8.)

⁵¹ Director of Operations Planning, 1/12/76, p. 23. It should be noted that, among his noteworthy activities in military intelligence, Colonel Pash was decorated for his leadership of the Alsos Mission to protect nuclear secrets at the end of World War II.

⁵² Each area division in the DDP subsequently performed the functions which the program branches had handled.

in any assassination planning, nor ever requested to do so.”⁵³ Pash’s Deputy said that no action or planning was ever undertaken pursuant to that portion of the PB/7 charter which assigned responsibility for assassination and kidnapping.⁵⁴ The Director of Operations Planning testified that he knew of no assassination mission or planning, including contingency planning, by Pash or anyone in OPC.⁵⁵ The only consideration of assassinations that the Director was aware of was the general discussion among Pash and other program branch chiefs in the process of establishing OPC.⁵⁶ Likewise, Howard Hunt was unaware of any assassination planning or attempts by Pash.⁵⁷

B. The Hunt-Pash Meeting and the Handling of Double Agent Problems

Howard Hunt testified that he once met with Boris Pash and his Deputy to discuss “on hypothetical basis” a method of dealing with a situation in which the CIA suspected that a double-agent was undermining the Agency’s liaison with a group in West Germany. Although suspicion had not yet focused on a particular agent, Hunt described his inquiry to Pash as “a search mission to determine the alleged capability of Colonel Pash in ‘wet affairs’ . . . that is, liquidations, would have any relevance to our particular problem.”⁵⁸ Hunt said that Pash “seemed a little startled at the subject. He indicated that it was something that would have to be approved by higher authority and I withdrew and never approached Colonel Pash again.”⁵⁹ Nonetheless, it was Hunt’s impression even after leaving the meeting with Pash that assassination was one function of Pash’s unit.⁶⁰

Hunt testified: “I never asked [Pash] to plan an assassination mission, I simply asked if he had the capability.”⁶¹ Pash did not encourage the discussion, according to Hunt, and “made it very clear that if anybody was going to get approval for such a thing, it would have to be . . . my division; . . . he was not going to go forward.”⁶² Hunt stated that he believed that Pash was referring to Frank Wisner as “higher authority,” but Hunt did not think that Wisner ever considered the idea: “no direct approach or a request for such approval was ever made.”⁶³

Colonel Pash testified that he did not recall any incident like the one described by Hunt: “I deny that I have ever talked to him about it and that he ever asked me about it.”⁶⁴ Pash did not recall “any dis-

⁵³ Pash, 1/7/76, pp. 23–25, 33. Pash added that he was philosophically opposed to assassination except in extreme situations where “if you don’t do it, the United States is destroyed.” (Pash, p. 28.)

⁵⁴ Deputy Chief, PB/7, 1/5/76, p. 64.

⁵⁵ Director of Operations Planning, 1/12/76, p. 25.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁵⁷ Hunt, 1/10/76, pp. 12–13.

⁵⁸ Hunt, 1/10/76, pp. 8–11. Hunt said that “liquidations” included “removals” by assassination or kidnapping.

⁵⁹ Hunt, 1/10/76, p. 10.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* p. 38.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* p. 52.

⁶² *Ibid.* p. 38.

⁶³ *Ibid.* p. 35.

⁶⁴ Pash, 1/7/76, p. 41.

discussion of any double-agent-type activity anyplace.”⁶⁵ The Deputy Chief of PB/7 also said that he knew “absolutely nothing” about the incident recounted by Hunt.⁶⁶

Pash stated that PB/7 would not have dealt with double-agent problems because his unit was more oriented to planning rather than “operational” activity.⁶⁷ Likewise, Pash’s Deputy Chief testified that PB/7 never handled double agent problems.⁶⁸

The Director of Operations Planning testified, however, that Pash’s unit would have had responsibility for the planning aspects of dealing with a double-agent problem. But the Director was not aware of any specific instances in which the “Special Operations” unit had to handle a double-agent problem. The Director said that assassination or complete isolation was generally regarded as the means of dealing with a suspected double-agent.⁶⁹

C. Assassination Suggestions Rejected by CIA Headquarters

The Deputy Chief of the “Special Operations” unit recounted two instances where assassination was seriously suggested and, in both instances, was quickly and firmly rejected at CIA headquarters.

1. Asian Leader

The Deputy Chief testified that in the summer of 1949, while he was serving as Acting Chief of PB/7 because Boris Pash was out of the country, the Chief of the CIA’s political warfare program branch approached him to request the assassination of an Asian leader. After attending a planning meeting at the State Department, the Chief of the political branch—who was the CIA’s liaison with the State Department—told Pash’s deputy that the Asian leader “must be sent to meet his ancestors.” The Deputy Chief of PB/7 testified that the political branch chief assured him that there was “higher authority” for this request.⁷⁰

The Deputy Chief referred the request to OPC Director Frank Wisner’s assistant. Soon thereafter Wisner’s assistant told the Deputy Chief: “It has gone right to the top, and the answer is no . . . we don’t engage in such activities.” He instructed the Deputy Chief to

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 38, 48–49. Pash also stated: “Mr. Hunt claims to have discussed the alleged assassination matter with me sometime in 1954 and 1955, at least two years after I left the Agency. . . . I categorically deny having had any discussion on any subject whatsoever with Mr. Hunt during those years.” (p. 33) Hunt testified that his meeting with Pash could have occurred before 1950 or after 1953—Hunt was on assignment to a non-European nation in the interim—but that it was much more likely that the meeting took place in 1954 or 1955, during which period Hunt was dealing with operations in West Germany. (Hunt, 1/10/76, p. 44–45.) It should be noted that Pash did undertake certain projects in liaison with the CIA after his formal assignment terminated in January 1952.

⁶⁶ Deputy Chief, PB/7, 1/5/76, pp. 73–74.

⁶⁷ Pash, 1/7/76, pp. 37–38, 48–49.

⁶⁸ Deputy Chief, PB/7, 1/5/76, p. 67.

⁶⁹ Director of Operations Planning, pp. 27, 34. He testified: “In the international clandestine operations business, it was part of the code that the one and the only remedy for the unfrocked double-agent was to kill him . . . and all double-agents knew that. That was part of the occupational hazard of the job. . . . So in a shadowy sort of a way, we did have in mind that possibly as a last ditch effort [assassination] might come up. But it didn’t come up within my time there because we were very slow in getting off the ground on any of these activities.” (Director of Operations Planning, 1/12/76, p. 9).

⁷⁰ Deputy Chief, PB/7, 1/5/76, pp. 28, 30, 34.

inform anyone involved of this position and to destroy any document related to the incident. The Deputy Chief followed these instructions. The Deputy Chief speculated that Wisner's assistant had been referring to the Director of Central Intelligence when he said that the matter had gone to the "top."⁷¹

2. East Asian Leader

The Deputy Chief testified that during his tenure at a CIA's station in Asia, where he served after PB/7 was disbanded, he sent a cable to headquarters from the station outlining a proposed media propaganda program. He later learned that the other station officers had attached an additional paragraph to his cable suggesting that an East Asian leader should be assassinated to disrupt an impending Communist conference in 1955.⁷²

A reply cable was received immediately from CIA headquarters disapproving the recommendation to assassinate the East Asian leader. According to the Deputy Chief, the cable "strongly censured" the Station and indicated "in the strongest possible language this Agency has never and never will engage in any such activities." The cable added: "immediately proceed to burn all copies" of any documents relating to this request." The Deputy Chief testified that a senior representative from CIA headquarters arrived shortly at the station to reprimand the officers involved in the incident.⁷³

III. THE QUESTION OF DISCREDITING ACTION AGAINST JACK ANDERSON

The Washington Post recently reported that, "according to reliable sources," former CIA officer E. Howard Hunt, Jr., "told associates after the Watergate break-in that he was ordered in December, 1971 or January, 1972, to assassinate syndicated columnist Jack Anderson." The *Post* further reported that Hunt had said that the order, which came from a "senior official in the Nixon White House," was "cancelled at the last minute but only after a plan had been devised to make Anderson's death appear accidental."⁷⁴

According to the newspaper article, Hunt's "alleged plan"

. . . involved the use of a poison to be obtained from a former CIA physician, said the sources, who added that the poison was a variety that would leave no trace during a routine medical examination or autopsy.

Hunt told the sources Anderson was to be assassinated because he was publishing sensitive national security information in his daily newspaper column . . .⁷⁵

The Committee staff has found no evidence of a plan to assassinate Jack Anderson. However, a White House effort was made in consultation with a former CIA physician to explore means of drugging Anderson to discredit him by rendering him incoherent before a public

⁷¹ Deputy Chief, PB/7, 1/5/76, pp. 35-37.

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48, 50.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51, 56-57.

⁷⁴ Washington Post, "Hunt Told Associates of Orders to Kill Jack Anderson," by Bob Woodward, 9/21/75, p. A1, A20.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

appearance. This effort apparently never proceeded beyond the planning stage.

The Committee staff inquiry into allegations of CIA involvement in this matter produced no evidence of such involvement.

A. The Meeting Between Howard Hunt and Charles Colson

Howard Hunt testified that somewhere in late 1971 or early 1972 Special Counsel to the President Charles Colson called Hunt into his office and asked him to find a means of discrediting newspaper columnist Jack Anderson:

Mr. Colson at that juncture was—appeared rather nervous. He . . . had a common wall with President Nixon's suite in the Old Executive Office Building, and although he did not glance in that direction, my impression was that he had been with the President not too long before . . . [W]hat he indicated to me was that Mr. Anderson had become a great thorn in the side of the President and that . . . it was thought that one way to discredit Anderson was to have him appear incoherent or rambling on a radio broadcast. . . . Mr. Colson asked me if I could look into it.⁷⁶

Hunt testified that neither Colson nor anyone else ever mentioned to him the possibility of assassinating Anderson, even in the sense of contingency planning.⁷⁷

Hunt stated that Colson never explicitly mentioned any discussion with President Nixon about discrediting Jack Anderson.⁷⁸ Hunt's impression that Colson had recently spoken with the President before giving him the Anderson assignment was an "inference" Hunt drew from Colson's demeanor:

Colson was normally a highly controlled individual. . . . He was agitated when he called me in, sort of talking to me and rifling through papers on his desk, which was very much unlike him, and the inference I drew from that was that he had just had a conversation with the President. So when I accepted the assignment I assumed, as I usually do with Colson, that he was either reflecting the desires of the Chief Executive or else that he, as a prescient staff officer, was attempting to find a solution to a problem that was troubling his chief.⁷⁹

Like Hunt, Charles Colson testified that he "never heard anyone discuss any plan to kill Jack Anderson," nor did anyone ever request him to make such a plan.⁸⁰ Colson could not, however, "discount the possibility of having said something in jest" along this line.⁸¹

Colson testified that he was asked "many times" by President Nixon to take action to discredit Jack Anderson; and action was "probably" taken in response to those requests.⁸² Colson did not recall being asked

⁷⁶ Hunt, 1/11/76, pp. 4-5.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 11, 15.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁸⁰ Charles Colson testimony, 3/6/76, pp. 7, 20.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 34.

by the President to find a means of drugging Jack Anderson or rendering him incoherent during a public appearance.⁸³

Colson said that the only discussions that he recalls initiating "involving Howard Hunt regarding Jack Anderson would be during the ITT flap" when he sent Hunt to interview ITT lobbyist Dita Beard.⁸⁴ Colson testified that his logs show that he met with Hunt on March 14, 1972, and he assumed that the ITT affair was the subject of that meeting.⁸⁵ Colson did not recall if the subject of drugging Jack Anderson was raised during those discussions.⁸⁶

Despite Howard Hunt's testimony that the discussion of drugging Jack Anderson was at Colson's initiative,⁸⁷ Colson recalled "Hunt on a couple of occasions coming to me with some hare-brained schemes, something to do with drugging involving Jack Anderson." Allowing for the possibility that a serious discussion of the subject took place which he did not recall, Colson said that as a routine matter he "would dismiss" most such suggestions coming from Hunt.⁸⁸ Colson said that, in the context of casual storytelling, as opposed to planning an operation against a specific target, he recalled hearing Hunt describe techniques for the covert administration of drugs:

I do recall him telling me about the CIA inducing drug reactions and how they did it, and the fact that it could be entered into a person's body through bodily contact.⁸⁹

The only serious discussion with Hunt about the effect of drugs on a specific target that Colson recalled involved a plan to disorient Daniel Ellsberg, which Colson said "never received a very sympathetic reaction" from him.⁹⁰

B. Hunt and Liddy Discuss Drugging Techniques with a Former CIA Physician

Howard Hunt testified that within a few days of the meeting in which Colson assigned him to "look into" means of rendering Jack Anderson incoherent during a public appearance, Hunt "got in touch with a retired CIA physician" and arranged to meet for lunch at the Hay-Adams Hotel in Washington, D.C.⁹¹ Hunt then contacted G. Gordon Liddy, "who at that point had just left the White House and moved over to the Committee to Re-elect the President," to invite Liddy to attend the luncheon meeting.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 33-35.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 23, 29.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁸⁷ Hunt, 1/11/76, p. 10.

⁸⁸ Colson, pp. 24-25.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 17, 31, 35.

⁹¹ Hunt, p. 5. The physician testified that he received Hunt's telephone call shortly prior to March 24, the day on which the meeting took place. (Former CIA Physician testimony, Before the Senate Subcommittee on Health of the Committee of Labor and Public Welfare and the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee of the Judiciary, 11/7/75, pp. 38, 40.) This places the Hay-Adams Hotel meeting within ten days of the Colson-Hunt meeting of March 14, 1972, which was recorded in Colson's logs.

Hunt said he contacted the former CIA physician because "he had some knowledge of the unorthodox administration of behavior-changing or altering substances." Hunt said that he never contacted anyone who was a current CIA employee in relation to this matter.⁹²

Hunt stated that he invited Liddy to attend the meeting "because Liddy also was interested in Jack Anderson." He said that he explained to Liddy while walking to the Hay-Adams Hotel that Colson "wants me to find out something about hallucinogenic drugs and their applications to a particular individual, in this instance Jack Anderson, and Colson wants him to appear incoherent and rambling during a broadcast."⁹³

The former CIA physician testified that he met with Hunt and Liddy at the Hay-Adams Hotel on March 24, 1972. He said that he knew Hunt from their previous work at the CIA; during the meeting, "Hunt said that he had an office in a part of the White House." The physician described the purpose of the meeting as follows:

I was asked if I could help them provide behavior altering medication to an individual, unidentified, and in no way could I detect of whom they were speaking. I said I could not. I had retired in 1971. . . . I had no access to any kind of medicines. So I did not provide it.⁹⁴

The former CIA physician testified that Hunt wanted an "LSD-type drug" in order "to make someone behave peculiarly in a public situation."⁹⁵

Despite his inability to provide a behavior-altering substance, the former CIA practitioner of "occupational medicine" testified that he discussed with Hunt and Liddy the operational problems involved in administering such a drug through ingestion or absorption through the skin.⁹⁶ According to Hunt, they discussed various means of administering a drug: painting the steering wheel of a car "for absorption through the palms of the hand," switching bottles in a medicine cabinet, or dropping a pill into a cocktail. Hunt added that during the meeting with the doctor there was no discussion of techniques of assassination.⁹⁷

Hunt said that he made it clear to the former CIA doctor that he was making this inquiry on behalf of the White House.⁹⁸

Hunt did not ask the former CIA physician to procure any drugs because he "felt confident . . . that if the time came when any controlled substance were needed, that Mr. Liddy could secure what was

⁹² Hunt, pp. 5, 13, 17.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13. G. Gordon Liddy submitted a sworn statement to the Committee indicating that he would refuse to answer any questions on this subject under his Fifth Amendment privilege and that he would continue to refuse to answer such questions even if he were granted use immunity. (G. Gordon Liddy affidavit, 2/8/76.)

⁹⁴ CIA physician, 11/7/75, pp. 38-39.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 38-42.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 40-42.

⁹⁷ Hunt, 1/11/76, pp. 6, 14.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

necessary through a secure source" within the Treasury Department, where Liddy previously worked.⁹⁹

C. Report to Colson on the Impracticability of Drugging Anderson

Hunt testified that, while walking back to their offices, he and Liddy "discussed the matter . . . pointing out the impracticability of utilizing [the] administration methods indicated" by the former CIA physician:

We almost had to have him under clinical conditions to make sure that A, he got a measured amount of the substance, whatever it might be, and that the timing was just right, and that he would be able to sit down or stand up at the lecture platform in apparently good condition, that at least he would be navigable to get there before he began to talk and make a fool out of himself. . . . None of these conditions pertained at all.¹⁰⁰

Hunt said he promptly reported to Charles Colson that he met with "a former CIA physician who knows something about these things" and "in terms of what Mr. Colson was thinking about it was impractical and we should just forget about it."¹⁰¹

Charles Colson testified that he did not recall receiving such a report from Hunt nor did he recall whether he ever learned that a meeting took place between Hunt and a former CIA physician.¹⁰²

"That was the end of the affair," Hunt said. The proposal to drug Jack Anderson "never advanced beyond simply the information-gathering phase. There was never any proposal or any further reference made to it." According to Hunt, Colson did not seem to be disappointed and did not ask him to explore other alternatives.¹⁰³ Hunt concluded:

I don't think Colson would have been willing to let that thing drop on the basis of simply my preliminary inquiry if he were under great pressure from the Chief Executive.¹⁰⁴

Thus, although the prospect of drugging columnist Jack Anderson was explored by White House personnel, it appears that the planning was terminated in an early stage.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 9. Hunt said they considered the possibility that Anderson's car was chauffeured and, if he drove his own car, that he would be wearing gloves in the wintertime or would have moist palms in the summer, eliminating the possibility of absorption of a drug on the steering wheel. Second, they decided that a surreptitious entry to place a fake medicine bottle was impractical; it was impossible to know who would swallow the drug or to control when it would be taken. Finally, Hunt understood that Anderson did not drink and thus could not be drugged by means of a pill in a cocktail. (*Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.)

¹⁰¹ Hunt, 1/11/76, pp. 8, 14.

¹⁰² Colson, 3/6/76, pp. 27, 33. Colson did recall "Hunt at one time or another talking about having met with CIA doctors" in connection with consideration of covert action against Daniel Ellsberg." (*Ibid.*, p. 28.) Colson also said that his logs do not show a meeting with Hunt after their meeting on March 14, 1972. (*Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.)

¹⁰³ Hunt, 1/11/76, pp. 8-9, 15.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

IV. MISCELLANEOUS EVIDENCE AND ERRATA

A. *Aurand Affidavit*

After the publication of the Interim Report, the Committee received the following sworn statement from retired Vice Admiral E. P. Aurand:

. . . it was my honor to serve President Eisenhower as his Naval Aide during his second term (1957-61). My position was not one which included the regular discussion of high matters of state with the President. Therefore, the few occasions on which he did mention such problems to me were personally momentous and I recall them clearly. On one of these occasions, he mentioned that the assassination of a certain dictator (Fidel Castro) had been hypothetically suggested to him. His reaction was that even if it would do any good, which he doubted, it was immoral in the first place and might bring on a wave of retaliatory assassinations which could be counter to world peace, his highest priority.¹⁰⁵

B. *Affidavit of Eisenhower Administration Officials*

In January 1976, the Committee received a statement signed by Eisenhower administration officials Gordon Gray, C. Douglas Dillon, General Andrew J. Goodpaster, John S. D. Eisenhower, and Dr. Marion W. Boggs requesting the Committee to "disavow" the portion of the findings of the Interim Report on assassination allegations which stated that "the chain of events revealed by the documents and testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the plot to assassinate Lumumba was authorized by President Eisenhower." On February 2, 1976, Select Committee Chairman Frank Church and Vice-Chairman John Tower responded to this request, as follows:

After reviewing the evidence in the Lumumba case once again, we remain convinced that the language used in the Committee's findings was warranted. Thus, we have decided that the Committee cannot accede to your request for a disavowal of the portion of the findings of the Report which stated that "the chain of events revealed by the documents and testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the plot to assassinate Lumumba was authorized by President Eisenhower." We can only assure you that the Committee was mindful of the considerations you have raised when it wrote, at this same portion of the report:

"Nevertheless, there is enough countervailing testimony by Eisenhower Administration officials and enough ambiguity and lack of clarity in the records of high-level policy meetings to preclude the Committee from making a finding that the President intended an assassination effort against Lumumba."¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ E. P. Aurand affidavit, 12/24/75.

¹⁰⁶ The Committee cited the countervailing testimony from officials in the Eisenhower administration in its Interim Assassination Report on the Lumumba case, both in the discussion of Robert Johnson's testimony and in a separate section entitled "Testimony of Eisenhower White House Officials" (Interim Assassination Report, pp. 55-60; 64-65.)

In summary, the argument advanced as the basis of the request was as follows: (1) Robert Johnson's testimony that he received the impression that he heard a Presidential order for the assassination of Lumumba at an NSC meeting is contradicted by the testimony of all others who were in attendance at that meeting and who appeared before the committee. (2) The "reasonable inference" about Presidential authorization by President Eisenhower in the Lumumba case was not drawn in the Castro case in relation to President Kennedy.^{106a}

^{106a} The notarized statement submitted by Messrs. Gray, Dillon, Goodpaster, J. S. D. Eisenhower, and Boggs stated in pertinent part: [page citations are to the Interim Assassination Report].

"As far as the record discloses, Robert H. Johnson was the only person from whom the Committee received testimony who thought he had heard President Eisenhower say something that appeared to order the assassination of Lumumba and from a reading of the above quotation from his testimony it can be said that it was somewhat ambivalent.

"By contrast, Marion Boggs, who attended the meeting of August 18, 1960, as Acting Executive Secretary of the NSC, states, after reviewing the Memorandum of Discussion of the Meeting:

"I recall the discussion at that meeting, but have no independent recollection of any statements or discussion not summarized in the memorandum. Specifically, I have no recollection of any statement, order or reference by the President (or anyone else present at the meeting) which could be interpreted as favoring action by the United States to bring about the assassination of Lumumba." (page 59)

"Marion Boggs was Robert H. Johnson's superior officer in the NSC staff. "Gordon Gray, who was Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and responsible for the organization of NSC meetings, specifically impugned Johnson's testimony after hearing about it for the first time when he appeared before the Committee. The Committee report says that Gray testified that, despite the prevalent attitude of hostility toward Lumumba in the Administration, he did not recall President Eisenhower "ever saying anything that contemplated killing Lumumba." (page 64). Gray was head of the NSC staff and, therefore, was Robert H. Johnson's ultimate superior officer.

"It seems noteworthy that the Committee did not take specific note of the fact that Robert H. Johnson's testimony was said to be incorrect by two of his superior officers nor of the fact that the August 18, 1960, meeting was the first of only two NSC meetings ever attended by Robert H. Johnson, when President Eisenhower was present.

"Additionally, General Andrew J. Goodpaster, White House Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower, was listed among the participants of the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, and when asked if he ever heard about any assassination effort during the Eisenhower Administration, he replied unequivocally:

"* * * at no time and in no way did I ever know of or hear about any proposal, any mention of such an activity. * * * (I) t is my belief that had such a thing been raised with the President other than in my presence, I would have known about it, and * * * it would have been a matter of such significance and sensitivity that I am confident that * * * I would have recalled it had such a thing happened." (page 64)

"Furthermore, John Eisenhower, the President's son who served under Goodpaster as Assistant White House Staff Secretary, was quoted as saying that nothing that came to his attention in his experience at the White House "can be construed in my mind in the remotest way to mean any Presidential knowledge of or concurrence in any assassination plots or plans." (page 65)

"Acting Secretary of State, C. Douglas Dillon, attended the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, and testified, after reviewing NSC documents and being informed

(Continued)

In response to this argument, it should be noted that no witness in any of the other cases put forward eye-witness testimony about any presidential authorization. It should also be noted that Johnson's testimony was unambiguous on the central point: although he allowed for the possibility that what he heard was actually discussion of some more general political action, it was his "clear impression" that he heard an order for the assassination of Lumumba.¹⁰⁷

Nevertheless, if the account of this NSC meeting by one witness were the only evidence on presidential authorization before the Committee in the Lumumba case, we do not doubt that the findings would have been phrased in much the same manner as in the other cases.

The Lumumba case was distinguished, however, by the presence of a strong "chain of events," culminating in the dispatch of a CIA scientist to the Congo in late September 1960 on an assassination mission, that appeared to originate in a particular meeting over which

(Continued)

of Robert Johnson's testimony, that he did not "remember such a thing" as a "clear cut order" from the President for the assassination of Lumumba. (page 58)

"Finally, as has been pointed out, the Committee stated that "the chain of events revealed by the documents and testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the plot to assassinate Lumumba was authorized by President Eisenhower. Nevertheless, there is enough countervailing testimony by Eisenhower Administration officials and enough ambiguity and lack of clarity in the records of high-level policy meetings to preclude the Committee from making a finding that the President intended an assassination effort against Lumumba." (page 263)

"It is noted in this regard that, concerning the findings with respect to assassination attempts involving Fidel Castro, the Committee's report reads:

"In view of the strained chain of assumptions and the contrary testimony of all the Presidential advisors, the men closest to both Eisenhower and Kennedy, the Committee makes no finding implicating Presidents who are not able to speak for themselves." (page 264)

"We must point out that all of the Presidential advisors, the men closest to President Eisenhower, similarly gave contrary testimony in the case of the Lumumba allegations, as to any involvement on President Eisenhower's part. The Committee, in our judgment, was remiss in failing to point this out, as they did when President Kennedy's name was joined with that of President Eisenhower in the case of allegations regarding Castro.

"We do not undertake to evaluate the treatment given by the Committee to testimony concerning the extent to which President Kennedy and his senior advisors had specific knowledge of and involvement in the assassination plotting and efforts against Castro. In relation to the treatment given to Robert Johnson's testimony in the Lumumba case the contrast is, to say the least, significant. Robert Johnson was not an advisor to President Eisenhower and was certainly not one of those closest to him; in any case he has himself expressed doubt regarding the interpretation of what he heard.

"Finally the Committee disclaims "making a finding" that President Eisenhower intended an assassination effort against Lumumba. Yet in the very preceding sentence the Committee stated that "a reasonable inference" is permitted that Eisenhower authorized the plot—a statement that has the form of a finding and has been so taken in news reporting.

"We can only conclude that the Committee's work has been compromised by the inclusion of this reference to a "reasonable inference." We, therefore, call upon the Committee to disavow the statement that "a reasonable inference" is permitted as to President Eisenhower's involvement in the Lumumba matter."

¹⁰⁷ See Interim Assassination Report, pp. 55-60.

President Eisenhower presided, probably the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁸ This chain of events was summarized in the Interim Assassination Report at pp. 52-53, as follows:

"The chain of significant events in the Lumumba case begins with the testimony that President Eisenhower made a statement at a meeting of the National Security Council in the summer or early fall of 1960 that came across to one staff member in attendance as an order for the assassination of Patrice Lumumba. The next link is a memorandum of the Special Group meeting of August 25, 1960, which indicated that when the President's 'extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action' were conveyed, the Special Group

"... agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba. (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60.)

"The following day, CIA Director Allen Dulles, who had attended the Special Group meeting, personally cabled to the Station Officer in Leopoldville that Lumumba's REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE . . . A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION. YOU CAN ACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL HERE. (CIA Cable, Dulles to Station Officer, 8/26/60.)

"Although the Dulles cable does not explicitly mention assassination, Richard Bissell—the CIA official under whose aegis the assassination effort against Lumumba took place—testified that, in his opinion, this cable was a direct outgrowth of the Special Group meeting and signaled to him that the President had authorized assassination as one means of effecting Lumumba's 'removal.' (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 33-34, 61-62; see Section 7(c), *infra*) Bronson Tweedy, who had direct operational responsibility at Headquarters for activities against Lumumba, testified that the Dulles cable confirmed the policy that no measure, including assassination, was to be overlooked in the attempt to remove Lumumba from a position of influence. (Tweedy, 10/9/75, pp. 4-5.)

"On September 19, 1960, Bissell and Tweedy cabled Station Officer Hedgman to expect a messenger from CIA Headquarters. Two days later, in the presence of the President at a meeting of the National Security Council, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba 'would remain a grave danger as long as he was not yet disposed of.' (Memorandum, 460th NSC Meeting, 9/21/60.) Five days after this meeting, CIA scientist, Joseph Scheider, arrived in Leopoldville and provided the Station Officer with toxic biological substances, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba, and informed him that the President had authorized this operation.

"Two mitigating factors weaken this chain just enough so that it will not support an absolute finding of Presidential authorization for the assassination effort against Lumumba.

"First, the two officials of the Eisenhower Administration responsible to the President for national security affairs and present at the NSC meetings in question testified that they knew of no Presidential approval for, or knowledge of, an assassination operation.

"Second, the minutes of discussions at meetings of the National Security Council and its Special Group do not record an explicit Presidential order for the assassination of Lumumba. The Secretary of the Special Group maintained that his memoranda reflected the actual language used at the meetings without omission or euphemism for extremely sensitive statements. (Parrott, 7/10/75, p. 19.) All other NSC staff executives stated however, that there was a strong possibility that a statement as sensitive as an assassination order would have been omitted from the record or handled by means of euphemism. Several high Government officials involved in policymaking and planning for covert operations testified that the language in these minutes clearly indicated that assassination was contemplated at the NSC as one means of eliminating Lumumba as a political threat; other officials testified to the contrary."

Taking this chain of circumstances together with all the testimony and documents of the period, the Committee felt constrained "from making a finding that the President intended an assassination effort against Lumumba" but obliged to point out that, in this case, the evidence was "strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the plot to assassinate Lumumba was authorized by President Eisenhower," whether explicitly or implicitly.¹⁰⁹

C. Typographical Error

The last sentence in the first paragraph on page 65 of the Interim Report contained a typographical error. The sentence should read as follows: "As a participant at NSC meetings who frequently attended Oval Office discussions relating to national security affairs, John Eisenhower testified that nothing that came to his attention in his experience at the White House 'can be construed in my mind in the remotest way to mean any Presidential knowledge of or concurrence in any assassination plots or plans.'" ¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ Interim Assassination Report, p. 263.

¹¹⁰ John Eisenhower testimony, July 18, 1975, pp. 4, 14.