

FOREIGN AND MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE

BOOK I

FINAL REPORT
OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
UNITED STATES SENATE
TOGETHER WITH
ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND SEPARATE
VIEWS



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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

(By Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities)

On January 27, 1975, the Senate established a Select Committee to conduct an investigation and study of the intelligence activities of the United States. After 15 months of intensive work, I am pleased to submit to the Senate this volume of the Final Report of the Committee relating to foreign and military intelligence. The inquiry arises out of allegations of abuse and improper activities by the intelligence agencies of the United States, and great public concern that the Congress take action to bring the intelligence agencies under the constitutional framework.

The members of the Select Committee have worked diligently and in remarkable harmony. I want to express my gratitude to the Vice Chairman, Senator John Tower of Texas, for his cooperation throughout and the able assistance he has given me in directing this most difficult task. While every member of the Committee has made important contributions, I especially want to thank Senator Walter D. Huddleston of Kentucky for the work he has done as Chairman of the Foreign and Military Subcommittee. His direction of the Subcommittee, working with Senator Charles McC. Mathias of Maryland, Senator Gary Hart of Colorado and Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona, has been of immeasurable help to me in bringing this enormous undertaking to a useful and responsible conclusion.

Finally, I wish to thank the staff for the great service they have performed for the Committee and for the Senate in assisting the members of the Committee to carry out the mandate levied by Senate Resolution 21. The quality, integrity and devotion of the staff has contributed in a significant way to the important analyses, findings and recommendations of the Committee.

The volume which follows, the *Report on the Foreign and Military Intelligence Activities of the United States*, is intended to provide to the Senate the basic information about the intelligence agencies of the United States required to make the necessary judgments concerning the role such agencies should play in the future. Despite security considerations which have limited what can responsibly be printed for public release the information which is presented in this report is a reasonably complete picture of the intelligence activities undertaken by the United States, and the problems that such activities pose for constitutional government.

The Findings and Recommendations contained at the end of this volume constitute an agenda for action which, if adopted, would go a long way toward preventing the abuses that have occurred in the past from occurring again, and would assure that the intelligence activities of the United States will be conducted in accordance with constitutional processes.

FRANK CHURCH.

NOTE

The Committee's Final Report has been reviewed and declassified by the appropriate executive agencies. These agencies submitted comments to the Committee on security and factual aspects of each chapter. On the basis of these comments, the Committee and staff conferred with representatives of the agencies to determine which parts of the report should remain classified to protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods.

At the request of the agencies, the Committee deleted three chapters from this report: "Cover," "Espionage," and "Budgetary Oversight." In addition, two sections of the chapter "Covert Action of the CIA" and one section of the chapter "Department of State" have been deleted at the request of the agencies. Particular passages which were changed at the request of the agencies are denoted by italics and a footnote. Complete versions of deleted or abridged materials are available to Members of the Senate in the Committee's classified report under the provisions of S. Res. 21 and the Standing Rules of the Senate.

Names of individuals were deleted when, in the Committee's judgment, disclosure of their identities would either endanger their safety or constitute a substantial invasion of privacy. Consequently, footnote citations to testimony and documents occasionally contain only descriptions of an individual's position.

Appendix Three, "Soviet Intelligence Collection and Intelligence Against the United States," is derived solely from a classified CIA report on the same subject which was edited for security considerations by the Select Committee staff.

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