can discuss that pressure and the role of the police, and the relations
between the police and the press during that period, better than anyone
else we could have found.

He is Glen King, a captain in the Dallas Police Department; he is
administrative assistant to Chief Curry. Better than that, from our
standpoint, he is a former newspaperman. He was a police reporter on
the Dallas Morning News, when he joined the police department in
1948. He served in every division of the department until he has risen
to his present spot.

He has studied journalism in college, at the University of Texas and
Southern Methodist University. He has attended a number of police
institutes; he has lectured at some. He writes in the field of police
science; he is the author of two books and numerous magazine articles.
We are especially grateful to him for coming here this morning to tell
us how the police saw this story.

CAPTAIN GLENN KING, Police Department, Dallas, Texas;

I think one of my primary problems here this morning is going to be
one of selection. Because in a few brief moments, I'm going to have
to try to condense days of preparation for the visit of the President to
Dallas and weeks of investigation that followed his assassination there
into some logical order.

I'm going to have to omit entirely many points that I might touch
upon. If I fail to address some point that you are particularly interested
in, I apologize to you in advance. Time won't permit me to touch all
of it.

I also should explain to you at the outset that I am appearing here
under certain limitations. Investigations into the assassination and the
events which followed it are continuing. It has been indicated to the
police department in Dallas the Warren Commission prefers that we
not comment on certain areas of this investigation and on certain aspects
of the evidence we have.

It might seem inconsistent to you, because I might talk about one
part of a question then not go further on it. There might not be any
logical or explainable reason for it. It's going to have to be on my
appraisal of it. So, again on this, I'll apologize.

The police department involvement can be broken down into some
rather clearly definable categories.

The first one I would like to touch on was the preparation for the
visit of the President to Dallas. At that time we occupied purely a
supportive role. The Air Force was primarily responsible for getting
the President and his party to Dallas. The Secret Service was primarily
responsible for his safety while he was in Dallas.

We occupied, as I say, a supportive role. We performed a supportive
function here. To do this we met with the Secret Service and with other
official agencies and civic organizations in Dallas at least daily and on
most days many times beginning on November 18.

On that day we received the first official notice that the President
would visit Dallas. We had known of it prior to this time of course.
We had read it in the newspapers that he was going to take a trip, and
that Dallas was going to be one of the stops on the trip. But it was
only on the 13th that we received official notification that he would
be in Dallas. This came through the Secret Service.

From that time, as I say, until the 22nd when he arrived, there
were at least daily conferences. Most days—and on those days almost
the whole day for some members of the department—were devoted
to the conferences preparing for the President's visit.

The plans for security that were eventually worked out called for
our assignment of manpower at three specific locations. The first one
was at Dallas' Love Field, where the President's plane was to land. We
assigned a deputy chief and 54 men to that location to contain the crowd
and to perform those functions that had to be performed so that the
President's party could leave Love Field on time to make his speech.

The second place was the route the motorcade would take. Prior to
the visit, our deputy chief of traffic traveled the route several times in
the company of Secret Service men and decided with them the loca-
tions where officers would be assigned.
We put men at all signalized intersections. We put two to four men at all locations where turns would be made—because it was believed that there would be a bigger concentration of the viewing public there—at all overpasses, railroad trestles, bridges. Every place the President’s motorcade would travel under, we assigned additional men to.

On our own, we assigned detectives in the middle of the blocks where we thought the greatest number of viewers would be. In all, we had 178 men assigned to the parade route.

The third location was the Trade Mart, the building at which the President was to make his speech. We assigned 83 men to work outside there, working the parking area, making sure everything was in order there.

Inside we had the deputy chief and 150 men. Our association with the press during this part of it was rather limited. As I said, the Secret Service was the primary agency of jurisdiction. We were aiding them as best we could. Most of the contact with the press during this part of it was either with the Secret Service or the public relations organization, Mr. McKnight mentioned to you.

With the assassination and the few seconds that it took, our position changed from one of support to the agency with primary investigative jurisdiction. When the President was shot, it became our responsibility to investigate in an attempt to determine who had committed the violation and effect the arrest.

We were fortunate that we were able to talk to a person at the location of the events who gave us a description of a person, an employee who, he said, had been in the building prior to the assassination but was not there following it.

We broadcast this description on our police radio within a very few minutes after the assassination. The description was of a slender white male, about 30 years of age, about five feet ten, weighing about 165 pounds. At the time he was seen, he was carrying something that looked like either a 30-30 rifle or some type of a Winchester.

The next time we heard of this person or had any contact was at 1:18 p.m. A citizen came on the police radio and reported to our radio dispatcher that a member of our department had been shot in the 400 block of East 10th, which is an estimated two miles from the location where the President was assassinated.

A later investigation revealed that one of our officers, J. D. Tippit, had been shot at that location and was dead on arrival at Parkland Hospital. Because Tippit is dead and because Oswald the man who, we eventually learned, shot him is also dead, we can only speculate on what happened. But this seems logical to us and this is what we believe did occur.

We know that Tippit was driving his squad car east on 10th Street; that he pulled alongside Oswald, who was walking west on 10th on the south side of the street; that he spoke to him briefly across the front seat of the automobile. Then he got out of the car and started to walk around the front of it. When he reached the front of the car, Oswald opened fire and Tippit was shot three times. He was hit twice in the head and once in the chest. We believe that any of the wounds would have probably been fatal.

Oswald fled the scene on foot. A short time later the department received information that he had entered a theater, the Texas Theater, approximately seven blocks away from the scene where the officer was shot. Our policemen converged on the theater. He was placed under arrest and brought to City Hall approximately an hour and ten minutes after the assassination of the President.

When you stand at the point of solution of an offense and you look back toward its commission, you see a very clearly defined pattern. It is easy to see each step of it. It is a little bit different when you stand at the point of the offense and attempt to look towards the solution. We were extremely fortunate to be able to effect the arrests in such a short amount of time.

By the time Oswald arrived at the police station, there was already a horde of newspapermen in the hallway. Within a very few minutes of the shooting of the President, they started coming into the police station—newspaper reporters, television men with television equipment cameras, cables.

We have been criticized, and perhaps with justification, for allowing the newsmen to remain in the hallways, for allowing newsmen to view the investigation and to keep in constant touch with the progress of the investigation. We felt that we had to do so, and for a variety of reasons.
One of the first causes of the policy of the department now I realize that policy is changeable and policy in this instance could have been changed. However, it had been the policy of our department for years and years and years to render whatever assistance was possible to the press in the exercise of their duties. We felt that the magnitude of this crime, the seriousness of the offense, made this more necessary rather than I seemed the necessity for it.

A second reason we realized that this probably was one of the most important events in recent history or in any history, actually. We realized the interest not only the American people would have in this but the world as well. We realized that if we arrested a suspect, that if we brought him into the police station and then conducted all of our investigations behind closed doors, that if we gave no reports on the progress of our investigation and did not permit the newsman to see the suspect — if we excluded them from it — we would leave ourselves open not only to criticism that we were fabricating a suspect and were attempting to pin something on someone, but even more importantly, we would cause people to lose faith in our fairness and, through losing faith in our fairness, lose faith to a certain extent in the proceedings of law.

We felt it was mandatory that as many people knew about it as possible. We knew, too, that if we did exclude the newsman, we would be leaving ourselves open to a charge that we were using improper action, dues — physical abuse, all of these things.

As a matter of fact, a short time after the newsman came into the police station, one of them did hold up a picture of Oswald and said, "This is what the person who is suspected of assassinating the President looks like. At least this is what he did look like. I don't know what he looks like now after an hour in the custody of the police department."

This was just a murmur, but I am convinced that if we had excluded the newsman, this would not have been merely a murmur. It would have been a deafening roar. We felt that the newsman had to be there.

Now, blessed also with hindsight, I am sure we would make some changes in what we did. There is no question that the newsman there interfered with the investigation. You saw the scenes in our hallway.

To bring a prisoner from our jail to our homicide office, the bureau that was handling this, you have to bring him for a short distance down a hallway. This is the way the building is arranged.

It is not the most desirable arrangement in the world, but it is the one we have to work with. With newsman in the hallway, with the noise that was constant outside the homicide bureau, certainly this had some effect on the investigative procedures. It was to a certain extent disadvantageous.

This is not an attempt on my part to evade any responsibility here in this field. The newsman admittedly were there because we permitted them to be there. Had we so chosen, we could have excluded them. So this is not on my part a condemnation of the newsman for exercising a privilege that we had given. Still their presence there was a hindering factor to us.

The next and last point that I think I will have time to talk about was the transfer and the resulting death of Oswald. There has been quite a lot of comment about our announcement of the time of transfer. This perhaps is an academic point, but I think it is one that should be made.

It has been said that we told the newsman that the transfer would be made at ten o'clock on Sunday morning. This is not exactly the case. On Saturday night, some of the newsman come into our administrative offices and pointed out to us that they had been there for some hours. They told us they were hungry, that they were tired and that they would like to get something to eat but that they had come to Dallas from considerable distances and couldn't afford to be away from the station when something of importance happened. They asked if we were going to transfer Oswald that night.

King Exhibit No. 4—Continued
We were not at that time far enough along with the investigation. We hadn’t completed the part of it that we needed to do with him at our custody. We told them to be back by ten o’clock the next morning, Sunday, that this would be early enough.

The hallways outside were still full of newsmen. We told them the same thing. Now this, on our part, did indicate certainly that we didn’t intend to transfer him prior to ten o’clock, and we did not. It also indicated our intention to allow the newsmen to be present regardless of the time the transfer was made. This we did.

We have been criticized, and again perhaps justifiably, for not transferring Oswald under cover of darkness. It has been said to us that three o’clock in the morning when the streets were vacant and deserted would have been the proper time. Well, there are a couple-of failings in this. The streets were not vacant and deserted at three o’clock in the morning, and the hallways were not vacant and deserted at three o’clock in the morning. The scenes that you just saw on slides might well have been made at three o’clock in the morning. I don’t know what time they were made, but they could have been made almost at any time of the day.

There was not any time at which the newsmen said, “Well, let’s close down for the day and reassemble here at seven o’clock in the morning.” They were there around the clock. People were in the streets around the clock. So regardless of the time we selected, we were going to have to make a transfer with people present.

The hours of darkness we felt were had. We needed as great a degree of visibility as possible to provide as great a degree of protection as possible. We needed daylight. We felt that daylight would work better for us. We were not lax in our efforts to provide security and we didn’t approach this with the lackadaisical attitude we have been charged with.

Obviously our efforts were inadequate, because Oswald was killed in our attempt to transfer him. But we did take precautions prior to the transfer, prior to the murder—precautions we thought would be entirely adequate.

The newsmen began to assemble in the parking area very early in the morning. We went into the parking area and requested them to leave. Then members of the department went over the entire parking area. We looked every place where a person could conceivably hide. We checked every vehicle in the parking stations. We even opened the trunks of these cars and looked inside to make sure that no one was hiding there.

We stationed men on all doorways leading into the basement, all ramps leading into the basement, all stairways, all elevators, ramps—everything leading into the basement. Then we brought the newsmen back in, checking their credentials—if they were not recognized—as they came in.

I am not now at liberty to say how Ruby came into the basement and was able to kill the prisoner we had. I am able to say that it was a temporary breakdown in security at one specific location. An officer, who was assigned in a place, because of circumstances that occurred at his place of assignment, failed to see Ruby when he entered, and Ruby was able to commit the murder.

Again, there is no question in my mind that the presence of the newsmen in the basement made it possible for Ruby to enter the basement and remain there for the length of time that it took to bring the prisoner out of the jail office and made it possible for him to kill the prisoner.

If there had been nothing but police officers there—we knew each other, but we didn’t know most of the newsmen who were there—I am sure we would have recognized an alien person and would have been able to take the appropriate action to prevent the occurrence that did happen.

Again this is not a condemnation of the press for being there and it is not an attempt on our part to evade the responsibility that we had either. Newsmen were there because we permitted them to be there. I haven’t covered everything that you are interested in. If you have

--- Glen D. King Exhibit #4 ---
questions later in the program and if I am able to answer them I will be glad to do so. If I have to refract from answering them I won't regard it also.

I promise you that I won't refrain from answering one of your questions because I think it is too hot to handle. I won't because I think it reflects unfavorably on my department or upon myself and if I do because of this reason, I'll tell you about it.

Mr. Black: As I said when we introduced this panel, we have here this morning only people who are basically friendly toward the press but who are still concerned about some aspects of the performance at Dallas.

Our next speaker, Mr. Homa Hill, is chairman of the Public Relations Committee of the State Bar of Texas and has been in that post for a number of years. As a result, we owe him quite a debt for the fact that Texas is one of the states where Canon 35 has not been in effect.

As you know, it is the practice in Texas for judges to have the authority to permit cameras in their court. Mr. Hill has supported the press in this position down through the years and in many other of the fights down there. He has consistently been a defender of the press.

Mr. Hill is a graduate of Baylor University. He has been a director and vice president of the State Bar of Texas. In addition to his chairmanship of the Public Relations Committee, he has also served as a member of the special committee that determined this policy of the bar on Canon 35.

In 1960, he received from the Texas Sigma Delta Chi an award for service in journalism in Texas for outstanding contributions to freedom of information.

So he comes to us with good credentials as our friend.

Early this year, Mr. Hill, in a letter to President Herb Brucker, said, "The news media was very guilty of putting public officials under pressure and detailing evidence in such a manner that it would almost have been impossible to have ever given Lee Oswald a fair trial within the United States."

He is concerned about the ramifications of this in Texas. He sees us in danger of losing some ground that has been gained down there. We are very glad to have Mr. Hill with us to detail the progress itself.

Mr. Homa Hill: I am glad that I was introduced as a friend of the press in the past. When I get through here today, though, there may be those who wonder.

I hope I come out as well as Mr. Brucker did a few years ago when he came to Texas as chairman of your Freedom of Information Committee and made a speech. The first half of his speech was devoted to freedom of the press, the second half was to a defense of the Supreme Court of the United States at our annual convention of the State Bar. Many of the people were represented in their thinking by a man next to me who, at the conclusion of Mr. Brucker's remarks, said, "I don't agree with a damn thing he has said, but I accord him the right to say them."

We look forward in July at our State Bar convention to hearing Mr. Ralph McGill. I think it is well that we hear each other at times.

I am glad to come here today to associate with men who exercise such responsibility in molding public opinion in the United States. I have had the good pleasure of working with news media through many years. I had a good beginning back in college when I had the job of being chauffeur, butler, and valet to distinguished guests who visited the Baylor campus. For some six hours one day I had the pleasure of being with William Allen White, George B. Dealey and Dean Walter Williams of the School of Journalism at the University of Missouri. So I have always thought of you and the men who comprise the editorial profession as being men of that caliber.

King Exhibit No. 4—Continued
comment on that point?

President Black: I think, Joe, that would be a matter for board action. I think each of us as individuals might have opinions about it.

I know that Russ Wiggins, a former FoI Chairman and former ASNE President, is deeply suspicious that anything of this kind would lead to the things that make us insist on the fullest publicity for everything. I myself think there is never any harm in study and would like to see ASNE go along with it just so long as we are not bound by the outcome.

But I think this is a pretty serious matter of state that you have raised and we had better not leave it to a momentary opinion but better have the board study it.

Mr. Black: I might say this is one area in which we very much look forward to the counsel and advice of Mr. Rogers.

Do we have other questions for members of our panel?

Mr. David E. Gillespie, Charlotte Observer: Mr. Chairman, any of the members of the panel might want to comment on this question since I am sure all of them are familiar with the problem that Eric Sevareid wrote about in his analysis of what happened to the breakdown of justice and order in Dallas.

His theory was that Dallas, although it is metropolitan in area, has not developed a metropolitan sense of the dispensation of justice in the contact of its officials with the press and with the public.

We may have seen some of this perhaps in interviews with the judge and trial—Belli we can discount of course—but is there not something to be said in this case for the handling of the press and the public by the individuals involved—the police chief, district attorney, the judge at one or two? Is there anything to be said on this side?

Mr. Knight: I made myself a promise and I will attempt to keep it. I did read this piece, and I don't remember all of it now, of course. But I would like to confine any remarks I have to the press aspect of the story and not to the problems of my study.

I come here, I suppose, with a certain amount of sin and guilt, as any other person does in the room. We are not pure. Admittedly we made many mistakes, but I would prefer not to debate them unless you have specific points in any areas.

Mr. Black: Perhaps Captain King could comment on that as far as the police are concerned.

Captain King: I think it probably would be improper for me to comment on it even before the other members of the panel. As a member of an official organization of the city of Dallas, the comments that he made were to a large extent, or did to a large extent, concern my department. I am likely to be biased in my viewpoint.

Mr. Black: Mr. Hill, would you care to comment on it?

I should say, which I didn't in my introduction, that Mr. Hill is not from Dallas but from Fort Worth. You must take this into account on anything he says about Dallas.

Mr. Hill: As an active member and committeeman of the Fort Worth Chamber of Commerce, one week after the CAB Examiner held against us on the regional airport, I might be a little prejudiced in my remarks. But I am interested in what the gentleman was saying about the city of Dallas not being cosmopolitan. Over in Fort Worth, where we wear shirtsleeves to the Fort Worth Club, we consider Dallas as sort of an Eastern city. The lawyers when they have parties over there, they wear tuxes; we don't.

I had some remarks which I was going to make about the city of Dallas and deleted them. But I'll say this, as a citizen of Fort Worth and living nearby, we furnished Lee Oswald to Dallas. We got him secondhand though from New York—but it could have happened anywhere, as the man from San Francisco said. I will say this, I do not know of any city in America which is more intelligent, more cultured and with finer solid citizenry than the city of Dallas.

King Exhibit No. 4—Continued
Mr. William Hill, Washington Star: I would like to address a question to Captain King.

You know when a speaker keeps telling us and getting right up to the edge of the things he can't say, my curiosity wants to see how close I can get to where he stops talking. Captain King, I don't know whether you read a magazine called "Commentary." But there are constantly articles and rumors coming out that we don't really know the story of November 22. "Commentary" has carried the most detailed account. I am going to ask you a question. If the answer is "yes," that is all I want to know.

Is there anything, that gives you reason to have doubt about these events of November 22?

Captain King: You didn't reach that point with this one fell swoop, but I will take a stab at it.

There have been so many things reported in the press that if I say "yes, the things that have been reported in the press are true," then I am saying all sorts of things that contradict each other are probably true or that we believe them to be true.

The things that have been generally published, the things that have been given the widest distribution, the things that are generally, I think, throughout the United States held to be true are, I believe, true. I don't really expect anything of a startling nature to come forward.

Mr. William Hill: Well, for instance in this particular article to which I have reference, it was implied that it is not known for sure that Oswald did kill Tippit.

Captain King: The way you can become legally sure of anything is to have a trial. There was not a trial here and, very obviously and very unfortunately, there can't be one. So there will forever be this absence of legal determination. In my opinion, the only absence of determination is a legal one.

Mr. William Hill: Well, for instance, at the time that the descriptions were picked up, whoever it was that did kill Tippit—I am being the devil's spokesman now—the article indicated a description of the man who did kill Tippit did not match Oswald's.

Captain King: It didn't match in all details but it matched up very closely. The height might be a little bit off. But a description is not an exact thing and, in my opinion, based on my experience as a police officer, this was not a description that was at all out of line. We get eye-witness descriptions in all kinds of offenses that are inaccurate in certain details. The description that I heard broadcast was not far from the truth.

Mr. McKnight: May I rescue the Captain on one point, knowing the restrictions around. There are two points I think, should be made.

First of all, all of you will recall that Oswald went home and changed clothing after the assassination of the President and before the murder of Officer Tippit.

Number two, probably Captain King couldn't say this, but I think there are witnesses to the Tippit shooting. I don't know whether "Commentary" mentioned this.

Mr. Robert W. Lucas, Hartford Times: Captain, you said you were not at liberty to say how it was possible for him to get into the basement. Later you said that the pressure of the newsmen made it possible for him to get into the basement. Then you also said that something happened at one of the locations where you apparently had guards. Can you tell us anything more about that?

Captain King: I don't recall having said that the pressure of the newsmen made it possible for him to get into the location. I said something had occurred that distracted the attention of one of the officers on his assigned position and made it possible.

I can't actually go any further on it. I am afraid, than I already

have gone. If I did say, or if I gave you the impression that he came into the basement or he was able to enter the basement because of the newsmen, this is incorrect. I think I said that he was able to remain.

KING EXHIBIT No. 4—Continued
there long enough to do what he did because he was able to mix with
newsmen whom we didn't recognize. Certainly if the newsmen had not been
there, if the basement had been occupied only by police officers with
whom we were personally acquainted, then Ruby couldn't have stayed
there long enough. But I didn't mean to imply that he came in through
the efforts of the newsmen.

As a matter of fact, I can say this additional thing. There has been
speculation that he came in through collusion with a police officer. There
has been speculation that he came in through collusion with newsmen
or a newsman. The facts as we believe them to exist indicate that this
is not true, that there was not collusion with either a police officer or
with a newsmen.

Mr. Henry Schulte,

Mr. Henry Schulte, Savannah News-Press: We have spent the
morning chastizing ourselves because of a potential miscarriage of jus-
tice, but I think what we are all overlooking is the fact that this was
the story of the century and that people like us, editors all over the
country and the world, wanted everything they could get out of Dallas.
I for one wanted everything.

Now in view of this, and with this in mind, I'd like to ask Mr. Mc-
Knight, as a newspaperman who was on the scene, if you had this to do
over again, how might you have done it differently and still perform
your mission as a newspaperman?

Mr. McKnight: It is a good question, and I agree with what you
say. I would not change a thing. I didn't have time to change anything.
I had four hours and a half that afternoon to get out three editions.

We are not challenging what was written, and that is the reason I
prefer to stay out of that area. I am only challenging the manner of
coverage. That is our problem more than what was written.

Yes, I think you were entitled to every shred of information out of
Dallas, and we certainly attempted to give it to you from the local
sources. I only raised the question for the future—what do we do with
this problem of "the regiments," as I believe Herb Brucker termed it?
It is a problem of coverage, not what is written. I would not challenge
one line of copy that went out of Dallas or I wouldn't change it if we
had to do it over again.

Mr. Friendly,

Mr. Alfred Friendly, Washington Post: I would like to direct this
question to Captain King.

You say at one point that you examined the credentials of the press
in the police station at the time of the Oswald transfer. We, on the other
hand, heard this was very perfunctory. There is one story that a fel-
low went into the basement, and did not have proper credentials. They
invited him in merely on the say-so of another man who identified him.
The other man had never seen the police officer before. My question is
are you satisfied that inspection of the credentials of the press was sys-
tematic and exacting?

Captain King: I think really to answer this properly you have to
take into consideration the conditions and circumstances. If we had
had time to set up a system whereby we established positive identifica-
tion for the newsmen, this probably wouldn't have been adequate.
Newsmen came into the city of Dallas who had no identification locally. Obviously, for many of them, it was the first time they had ever been in Dallas in their lives. So they are not going to have local identification and they are not known personally to us. Many of them came in whom we were able to identify and who didn’t have any identification with them. They had come down and had left it in their hotel, something like this.

It has been our experience in the past that the newsmen are the best allies you can have in keeping merely interested bystanders away from the scene of a police incident. At the scenes of our automobile accidents, at scenes of burglaries and robberies and all of these offenses, if a newsmen comes up to one of our officers whom he does not know and the officer doesn’t know him and the newsmen does not have his identification with him, we tell the officers to check with other newsmen. If the other newsmen present are willing to identify him and are willing to verify the fact that he is a newsmen, then he is admitted. We feel newsmen don’t want outsiders in.

This did occur probably. So far as a positive identification of the newsmen, no, we didn’t, we couldn’t, I think. We did check credentials on them and we did, I think, use reasonable methods.

Mr. Black: Is Jack Krueger still with us?

A MEMBER: He slipped out a few minutes ago.

Mr. Black: I wanted to ask him if he wanted to participate in this program. He had chosen to let Felix represent the Dallas press, but I did want to give him the opportunity to make any comments that he had.

I want to thank the members of our panel for a very stimulating discussion.

FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PRESS

An Address by The Honorable Arthur J. Goldberg, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States

Mr. Miles H. Wolfe, Greensboro Daily News, President: When I was asked to introduce Justice Arthur Goldberg, I had every intention of sticking to truly biographical data.

I was going to tell you that he was born in Chicago, attended public schools there and wound up receiving his B.S. and Doctor of Jurisprudence degrees from Northwestern.

I had intended to tell you, further, that he practiced law in Chicago and gradually moved into the labor union field to the exclusion of other work. He became General Counsel for the CIO, General Counsel for the United Steel Workers of America and then Special Counsel for the AFL-CIO.

As you can see, he was top man in his field.

All of these legal jobs, and they were good ones, too, came to an end in 1961 when President Kennedy appointed him to the high post of Secretary of Labor.

The President did not leave him there long. In 1962, he asked the Secretary of Labor to move on to the Supreme Court as Associate Justice.

At this point I could have stopped, but unfortunately, I started reading the clips on our speaker. They were fascinating, and I felt constrained to pass a few choice items on to you.

For example, Time Magazine had this to report: Goldberg graduated from high school at 15 and entered upon a triple-time existence. Mornings he went to junior college; afternoons he attended DePaul University and nights he held down a part-time job. As a tired but eighteen-year-old, he was admitted to law school at Northwestern University but only after proving, with some difficulty, that his two college transcripts represented the work of only one person.

Time also reported that when his children were growing up, he surrounded himself with three or four kids. They were a tired bunch, and over one occasion, the kids picketed the house with signs that read...

KING EXHIBIT No. 4—Continued