The below-listed material is contained in enclosures following testimony and documents relating to Wilcott's testimony on the Oswald project.

These enclosures are letters which I have written and letters which I have received in reply to these letters.

1. Downing 10-4-76; entire letter.
   Refer to note to Stasulat 10-5-76, see Item 1.
   Refer to Fazio letter 10-1-76.
2. Nelligan 10-3-76
   Sections 1, 4, 5, 6.
3. Hess 2-4-77.
   Items 1, 4, 6.
   See report of Zapruder film same letter.
   Note: enclosure on Hunter's Point investigation by FBI and former U.S. Attorney Browning. Relate to port development, fisheries development, California Water Project, FBI competence, SLA investigation, and Chowchilla kidnapping.
6. Saunders for Senator Tunney. See paragraphs 2, 3. (Relate to Mansfield's subsequent public disclosure on Sihanouk's house arrest.)
7. Saunders for Tunney:
   paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 17;
   " 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13;
   " 14, 15, 16;
   " 17, 18;
   " 19, 20;
   " 21, 22.
   pp. 5, last paragraph, SLA, continue pp. 6.
   pp. 7, bottom last paragraph on house arson, heroine.
8. Sheinbaum letter, Fall, 1974 (see enclosed copy of Sheinbaum reply.)

In addition, note conversation with Michael Goldsmith of the House Committee in March, 1970. This conversation is contained in notes on Wilcott testimony concerning Oswald Project for CIA.

It must be noted that I cannot locate March 28, 1978 article or March 24, 1978 article in New York Times by Nicholas Horrock. Horrock reports committee conducted 1400 field interviews. Were these interviews in examination of what H. Landau? Require symposium.
9-16-78  Station Finance  Tokyo  

Insert (such verification is needed if competent investigation is performed.)  
Approximately April–June 1963, Cryptonym for Oswald Project approx. RX-ZIM.  
Standard two consonants followed by 2, 3, 6 letter pronounceable word.  

Two case officer money dispersal methods:  

USSR SR Branch - believed responsible for Oswald Project.  
Korea Korea Branch  
All stations operate the same, especially Class A Station.  
Special Base deep cover CIA base - Atsugi.  
True name file destroyed in seconds - told to Committee.  

Principle agents - subsidiary agents. Wilcott - includes Diet members. Code ex. AN AIM 1, AN AIM 2, AN AIM 3, etc.  

AN AXCL (approx.) project code name.  
Moral Rearmament - CIA project funding (talking to ministers, etc.)  
One goal: placing CIA agents in strategic locations.  

Washington, D.C. Sept. 64 - May 65: disbursed and audited funds to National Student Association, AFL-CIO, universities (Columbia U.).  

Oswald Project Summary:  

submit project outline to Chief of Japan Branch;  
submit outline to desk of Japan Branch HDGT.  
Project returned to Japan Station.  
Nothing sent by mail. Use diplomatic courier. Allotment determined.  

Quarterly allocations from approved disbursement. Two withdrawal methods. Advance request signed:  

a. agent  
b. branch officer  
c. finance  
d. station auditor checks project code number under cryptonym.  
TSD - logistics, etc. all under number code.  

Funds withdrawn accounted by agent monthly:  

a. difficult to account for all agents expenditures;  
b. if balance existed, refunded.  
c. If deficit, advance to cover deficit.  
d. some advance requests. Some revolving funds. Some agents used own funds.  

Year-
Year-end final accounting. Often year long delays in accounting.

CIA Inspector=General Kirkpatrick. CIA Finance under Division of the above.

Example:

Dick Delaney case officer at Tokyo Branch with China Branch Project. Finance reviews all account balances before case officer arrives. If case officer wants changes, difficult to change since required accounting balances, since change was strictly forbidden and all balances were reviewed.

Two stamps existed which were difficult to backdate, since these were serial stamps, according to Wilcott.

Funds forms were retyped, restamped, and approved by Finance Officer. Then, Inspector=General arrives.

After two years, all these records shredded, burned in incinerator.

Same proceeding in Operations Branches, Operations Reports regularly changed, although this change forbidden.

Summary, Project Numbers associated with each project at HQ. files.

Each government agency has CIA budget portion concealed in budget. Complex accounting system. General Ledger Department difficult to operate. Official CIA instruction classes - total CIA budget larger than total State Department budget.

Miami Station:

Dispatch delivered by Miami station security officer. Payroll officer at Miami station.

Mafia connection:
1. attended strip tease at Flame Room, Perrine, Fla.
2. saw station official with well-known Mafioso figure, with possible nickname Chicken Catchattore, or possibly Traffacante.
   a. official: Deputy Chief of Security.
   b. Wilcott group included Chief of Finance, 6 or 7 other Finance and other personnel present.
   c. Wilcott was told that Mafia was used on CIA projects. Cost was cheap for injuries to target in Little Havanna among refugees. Specified two hundred dollars for broken leg.
   d. Disbursement Officer - Miami; "Charlie" under case officer direction, requested by Chief of Finance. 1965-66.

Wilcott, one other disbursement met case officer at baseball diamond in Miami after hours, counted off pesos collected from refugee community in Little Havanna, which were converted to US dollars to pay the Cuban agent who operated within Little Havanna in the US.

See article on Tokyo personnel - ie, personnel list.

Insert - if JFK had wanted Castro dead, he would have used Special
Forces. He did not. My ship, USS MONTICELLO LSD-35 carried a Special
Forces Marine team which did reconnaissance in North Vietnam. Verify
above insert in total with NIMS, Office of Naval Intelligence.

Ballistics: requires verification.

1. fragments from around JFK entrance wound missing. Committee
Congressman asked Vincent Gwin: 5, 6 exhibit pieces examined.
Do other evidence pieces exist? Gwin was sent 10-12 pieces.

Answer by Gwin: bullet fragments in back of coat% previously
scraped off as result of apparently previous FBI tests.
Answer Gwin: Curb bullet- Gwin sent vial bf concrete allegedly
from curb position. No bullet fragments remained. Apparently all
fragments used in previous tests.

2. See Cahill test. Possible contradiction or unreliability in
Gwin tests exists. Cahill test extremely inexpensive and requires
only Cahill to test.

Note: CAHILL TEST MUST BE PERFORMED BY COMMITTEE. THIS IS A LEGAL
NECESSITY. ALL MISSING FRAGMENTS MUST BE VERIFIED. REASONS FOR
MISSING FRAGMENTS MUST BE VERIFIED.

Conversation with Michael Goldsmith approximately Mar. 16-22, 1978:
Wilcott named Tokyo Station personnel present at conversation on
Oswald as member. Goldsmith said Committee would call CIA to
verify membership of personnel whom Wilcott named. THIS IS A
TOTALLY IMPROPER AND WHOLLY INADEQUATE INVESTIGATORY PROCEDURE.

Wilcott met source in Bay Area in Jan-Feb 1978. Source is son
of a good friend, who is sex-FBI agent. Son walked in on father and
another agent in study. Son overheard conversation that FBI knew
Oswald was CIA agent. Verify.
Father discovered son had overhead conversation and swore son to
secrecy. Father later died of heart attack. Son afraid. Verifies
Wilcott statement. Son refuses to testify since committee cannot
guarantee anyone's security and since witnesses are still dying.

Concerning Michael Goldsmith conversation: same conversation included
Goldsmith desire to insure secrecy of Wilcott testimony. Goldsmith
said Committee did not want any public revelation on his committee
appearance.
Schaap, Wilcott refused. Agreed to not reveal specifics of specific
questions. Committee agreement with Goldsmith as agent:
1. Committee provision of transcript of testimony before committee
after a time;
2. no receipt of this transcript as of today;
3. no receipt of transcript of testimony;
4. Schaap and Wilcott have seen copy of written transcript. Harold
Leap, former principle investigator with Committee brought copy
to Annex 2 cafeteria. Leap stated that receipt of transcript was
pending.
Committee interested with detailed questioning in details of how CIA audits records and how these audits could be changed. Greatly detailed interrogation.

Approximately

Oswald:

Approx. Mar 16, 1978, Wilcott met person in Bay Area who claimed knowledge of Oswald in New York City. Source member of Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New York City after Oswald returned from USSR. Source says SWP involved with Fair Play for Cuba. Source in Fair Play for Cuba Committee NYU office and saw Oswald in SWP office. Oswald was quiet and no political discussion was attempted by Oswald. Speculate Oswald's attempted initial involvement with left. This occurred before the New Orleans literature distribution incident.

Two days after the assassination, FBI came to house of Source's sister in New York. On first visit, source not at home.

Harold Leap - anonymous investigative source possible for committee. Leap claimed much information on Oswald as CIA agent. Date for claim: approx. 2-15-78. Leap has since left the committee.

Concerning alleged discrepancy in Wilcott testimony by Nicholas M. Horrock, Mar. 26, 1978 special letter to New York Times:

time and date of assassination and correspondence with time and date of Wilcott's hearing of assassination. According to Wilcott, Tokyo time of killing was approx. 2 AM, Nov. 23. Wilcott was a private pilot and landed his plane at noon, 11-23-63, Tokyo time. Told to report to base by the tower. Wilcott then learned of assassination.

CIA mode of operation: compartmentation and need to know yields plausible cause for denial.
Names of CIA Personnel at Tokyo Station, 1960-1964, Which I Recall

Pete Wheeler, Chief of Station
William V. Broe, Chief of Station
Fred Randall, Deputy Chief of Station

Case Officers

Glen Nelson, Japan Branch (Embassy cover)
Jerry Fox, Soviet Russia Branch
Reid Dennis, Soviet Russia Satellite Branch
Bill Center, China Branch (Embassy cover)
John P. Horton, Political Section (Embassy cover)
John Ishi, Japan Branch
Chester Ito, Japan Branch
Kan Takai, Japan Branch
Jim Delaney, China Branch
Bob Rentner, Soviet Russia Branch (?)
Larry Watanabi, Japan Branch (Senior Case Officer)
Robert Hashima, deep commercial cover
Dave ------, China Branch
Nakamora, Japan Branch

Support Personnel
Finance

Clay Norment, III, Chief of Finance
Jack Randall, Chief of Finance
Elwood D. Martin, Deputy Chief of Finance
William Dougherty
Will Dunham, Auditor
Frank Wells, Auditor
Fred Friendly, Auditor
Wes ------, Auditor

Registry

Jim Woods, Chief of Registry
George Breen
Edward Luck

Logistics

Bob Ojiri, Chief of Logistics
Shizu Mac Yamada

Personnel

Charlie Redmond, Chief of Personnel

Secretaries

Joan Rentner
Mike Todd
Doris Watanabi
Eleanor Breen

Marie Martino
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Job Description</th>
<th>Rate &amp; Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5/57-1/60</td>
<td>Potomac</td>
<td>Finance--</td>
<td>general accounting</td>
<td>GS-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unvouched Funds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/60-6/60</td>
<td>Potomac</td>
<td>Finance-Field</td>
<td>making payments and keeping pay records</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Payroll</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/60-6/64</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>Finance-Cash</td>
<td>all cash payments and record keeping</td>
<td>GS-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Station</td>
<td>Disbursements</td>
<td></td>
<td>(career status granted)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/64-12/64</td>
<td>Rosslyn</td>
<td>Finance-Policing</td>
<td>auditing of special accounts</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Accounts</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1/65-3/65</td>
<td>Langley</td>
<td>Finance-Policing</td>
<td>auditing of special GS-9 accounts</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Accounts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4/65-4/66</td>
<td>Miami</td>
<td>Finance-Staff</td>
<td>prepare and reconcile payroll</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Station</td>
<td>Payroll</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/66</td>
<td>Resigned from CIA.</td>
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</table>
The Kennedy assassination came as no great shock to most of the people at Tokyo Station in Japan, a class A Station of the CIA. It seemed a logical culmination of the steadily building anguish and discontent over the Bay of Pigs fiasco and Commie sell out of the Kennedy Administration; that was the prevailing sentiment. This was particularly true of the higher echelon operational people. The branch chiefs and deputy chiefs, project intelligence officers and operational specialists viewed Kennedy as a threat to the clandestine services. The loss of special privileges, allowances, status and early retirement that come with the CIA cloak and dagger job were becoming a possibility, even a probability. The prestigious positions of the bureaucratic dominions, ambitiously sought, might be no more. Adjustment to a less glamorous job in a common profession could be the result.

Politically, at the station, as in CIA generally, strong anti-communist conservative views were dominant. To openly support the "Kennedy liberal" position was not wise as promotion and job advancement was at stake. By November 22, 1963, we had all come to understand this quite well. "Treason" and "dupe of the USSR" were commonly applied during the heated political conversations concerning the September, 1963, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Administration support of integration, and "Kennedy's personal crusade" against the oil depletion allowance were also seen as an attack on free enterprise. Greatly feared, also, was a winding down and eventual pull-out in Viet Nam, with a political settlement, rather than an all-out military
slaughter to win. More frequent and more bitter, however, was the charge that Kennedy had reneged on his secret agreement with Dulles to support the Bay of Pigs invasion.

There was a group of Kennedy supporters; the so called "Kennedy liberals", mostly all from the lower grade positions. My wife and I were of this group, as were all of our friends with whom we had regular social contact. Our political discussions took place outside the building, in our homes or at the base clubs and the night life spots in and around Tokyo. Persons of the same job rank tended to associate socially. In CIA, additional lines of association were also drawn from which of the two major classifications in which one worked; operations or support. Support employees were the clerks, typists, secretaries, accountants, etc. Operations people were the intelligence officers, agents, specialists, etc., performing the clandestine activities. By 1963 rather rigid lines were also developed on the political split - liberal or conservative.

My job in the Finance Branch, a support branch, disbursing station funds and keeping housing and vehicle allowance records, bought me in contact with the operational staff regularly. My wife, Elsie, had worked for SH-Satellite as a secretary during our first tour, 1960 to 1962. I had also been involved in an operational project and had come to know many of the agents, case officers, and specialists. In addition, in order to make extra money beyond my regular salary, I pulled security duty. All station personnel in support, below the management level, were required to pull this duty unless someone else would do it in his place.

Our major task on security was to keep the doors locked and
no one enter without proper identification; answer the tele-
phone; contact the Security Officer in case of trouble or problems.
and give and receive messages to and from agents and Case Officers,
etc. Depending on the activity at the station, the staff would be
coming in at all hours to secure classified materials and reports,
usually after clandestine meetings with their outside agents. On
night duty, I was allowed to go to sleep after 10 pm. A bell at
the door or the phone would wake me to perform necessary tasks. On
weekday night duty I would be relieved at 8:30 by the receptionist
and go to my regular job in the Finance Office. Many times on week-
ends I would pull security duty for 24 hours at a time. Particularly
on weekends, but on weekdays also, some employees would be working
overtime in their offices as well. A coffee pot was always in read-
iness, especially for agents returning from meetings, who had had
a few drinks too many. While they were waiting for their wives to
pick them up; or waiting for phone calls; or for a break from over-
time work, I came to know many of the station people. Consequently,
many conversations developed which would usually include a political
dissertation. A very loose application of the "need-to-know" prin-
ciple was not uncommon. The alcohol-loosened tongue often kept me from
my little bed in a small room close to the entrance in the early hours.

The University of Maryland conducted extension courses at Fuchu
Air Base for US military and civilian personnel. Frederick C. Randell,
Deputy Chief of Station, was the instructor for a course I started
in November of 1963, "International Political Relations" to fill in
idle hours on security duty while increasing college credits. He
d embassy cover, diplomatic status and a role in the propaganda effort at the station. Such courses were taught by CIA people and served the purpose of minimum level political indoctrination of the official line. Our mid-term exam, for example, called for answering four essay questions. This was one of them: "International law is limited in its effectiveness. Discuss in detail the major limitations involved, and consider the reasons why these limitations exist."

We heard about the assassination around noon Saturday, November 23, 1963 from my boss, Jack Randall, Chief of Finance. We were ordered to stay near a phone where we could be reached, either at home or in the building on base. He said all hell had broken loose at Headquarters in Washington and at the station. I might have to come in and make some emergency disbursements or worse yet, the station might even be attacked by left agitators if they broke thru the meager base defenses and we would all have to help to destroy files or even defend the building. Everywhere in Japan was off limits except our homes and the base. My friend, George Breen, and his wife, Eleanor, came over to our house. George and I went to the station. It was a scene of great excitement, confusion and wild talk. The conservatives were obviously elated and there was talk of an invasion of Cuba. From the very first day, everyone talked in terms of an operation, particularly the operational people, or in popular terms—a conspiracy.

George and I returned to my house after a couple of hours. We all talked politics for a long time. We were angry, stunned and saddened as well as concerned about our homes and families.
The following day, November 24, Sunday, I had day duty. Much talk was still going on although meetings had gone on among the branches all night. Much was said at these meetings about observing the "need-to-know" principle. The mood had changed from the elation of the previous day to a more serious one. That was when I first heard about CIA somehow being involved. Not long before going off duty, talk about Oswald's connection with CIA was making the rounds. While this kind of talk was a jolt to me, I didn't really take it seriously then. Very heavy talk continued up to about the middle of January. Based solely on what I heard at Tokyo Station, I became convinced that the following scenario is true:

THE ASSASSINATION SCENARIO

CIA people killed Kennedy. Either it was an outright project of Headquarters with the approval of McConne or it was done outside, perhaps under the direction of Dulles and Bissell. It was done in retaliation to Kennedy's reneging on a secret agreement with Dulles to support the invasion of Cuba. The other political factors previously mentioned were also issues, but the breaking of the secret agreement was the principal point. It was believed that unless Cuba was seized by military force all of Latin America would eventually go communist and the US would fall to the communists soon after. Elaborate preparations had been made to firmly put the blame on Castro, and an immediate attack on Cuba would follow. But something had gone wrong. The attack was called off at the last moment.

Prior to the election, the Eisenhower administration was in
complete agreement with CIA, that Cuba must be invaded. Bissell had been assigned the task of directing the operation. The original plans called for an extensive spy network throughout Cuba that would be of great support to the invasion. Thus, a relatively small force would be needed. Considerable popular support would be mustered and the island secured quickly. By all appearances it would have been done by Cuban patriots with only private and insignificant US material and training. All US citizens or military involved would be strictly volunteers. To all it would seem a truly popular expression of the will of the majority in Cuba. Nixon's support of all this was a certainty, had he won. Kennedy was a disaster to the Bissell "brain child" as the invasion came to be called. Even before inauguration, much effort was directed to influence and pressure Kennedy, especially thru the military. By the time of the secret agreement meeting in November of 1960 some softening up had been achieved, but he was, by no means, ready to buy. The accomplishments of the project to date were well behind schedule and Kennedy knew it. The spy network was far from established. Evidence of popular support against Castro was lacking. Reports and analysis lacked substance. Rumors of bad planning, air drop failures, poor morale and difficulty with the exiles leaked out. More serious, however, was the charge of falsified reports of popular sentiment fabricated by CIA. Efforts to stall off the meeting failed. Dulles and Bissell met their Commander-in-Chief, both anticipating a difficult session. The extensive and complete reports called for in the summons were absent. Instead, an application of the most advanced techniques of subterfuge at a "state of the art" level was presented. Kennedy was
better prepared than had been anticipated. A very stormy parley took place. Reasonable sounding denials were made and tentatively accepted on the most serious points, but were to be substantiated in further reports. Humble admissions to lesser failures with assurances of corrections and improvements, reorganizational plans along with some painful compromises won partial and immediate success. A specific reporting procedure on a regular basis was established. Certain oversight concessions were agreed upon as a last resort, especially difficult for Bissell to take. Finally, Kennedy concluded a secret agreement support position contingent on absolute plausible cause for denial by the US government and complete satisfaction on the other areas of contention; the popular support area most emphasized.

Tokyo Station people discussed the details of this meeting and what the real situation was, which surprised me for an affair so secret. It was said that the answer given about phony reports of the true sentiments was that, since the Cuban people could not openly talk against Castro or the government, a scientific method developed on some kind of sampling basis was used. This was a method developed by Bissell's top experts. Kennedy was taken in by it and so was Dulles. While some said outright that it was phony and Bissell knew it, others said that he believed it and that it came about by an unreasonable pressure put on his next in command as the entire operation fell further and further behind schedule. Kennedy was not completely taken in by it when presented. He had told Bissell and Dulles that he would have it checked out by his own experts. Dulles, at least, knew that it would be controversial and Bissell knew that it would not go over. Others said that this plan was concocted after the fact - that
the Case Officers running the field agents were the real culprits.

As Bissell pressured his top lieutenants, they in turn pressured the case officers, intelligence officers and project officers who in turn pressured the field agents to turn in reports that the Cuba Desk wanted to hear. This was not simply a question of poor management. It was a contrived plot to secure a minimum basis to claim support after it was realized that truly valid minimum popular support could not be had. The original invasion plans were then changed to include the creation of an incident that would call for an all out attack by the US military. Kennedy was not to know of this change, and it was not discussed at the November 1960 meeting of the invasion briefing.

One such plan was to somehow get Castro to attack Guantanamo by making him believe that rebels were attacking from there. Another was to interpose a ship in a rebel attack and get it blown up. This was said to have been discarded when ONI (Office of Naval Intelligence) got wind of it and became very angry, and perhaps was the source of some of the snitching on the Cuba foul ups to Kennedy. Just prior to the Bay of Pigs, and some said even earlier, the military intelligence community had become antagonistic to CIA since they were not let in on the invasion as they thought they should have been. They knew CIA was holding out on them as information about this real big operation was coming their way from time to time. This was one of the excuses Dulles was said to have given Kennedy for some of the rumors. Just plain jealousy. Several other provocator type stories were also making the circuit, that are now lost from my memory. The theme was always
the same; get something started to overtly call in the military and follow up with complete seizure and installation of a favorable government. Once started, Kennedy would go along with it, but it had to be done soon. A further liberal trend of the administration was expected and the chance might be lost forever. If communists were allowed to stay in the Western Hemisphere the US would lose face and could not be relied upon as the bulwark against communist encroachment. So went the rationalization for such extreme measures. How much Dulles was to be cut in on the full extent of the provocation incident was also debated. Perhaps, it was reasoned, Dulles would say, "do what you must but I don't want to hear the details". This is a standard practice in the execution of a "black" operation, and was widely practiced. Those in positions of authority are isolated from the specific details, or even any part of them, and someone at a lower level assumes full responsibility. Should it come to light, the higher level can claim that it was done without authority, a few people are fired and the mission accomplished, without appreciable damage.

Tainted revelations one after the other, following Kennedy's killing, bought with them increased criticism and disparaging analysis of "Bissell's brain child" at the station. Too heavy a reliance on the polygraph to ferret out Castro agents was a common charge. From the beginning of the recruitment program of the exiles for the invasion, difficulties in infiltrating were not severe. Cuban intelligence efforts and expertise had been badly underestimated. Common knowledge among the Cubans of suspicious persons was not
properly reported to counter intelligence agents in the project. One reason was the lack of Spanish speaking staff with the proper knowledge and clearance. More difficult was the conflict between the pro-Batista and the anti-Batista exiles. Kennedy had been told that these two dissenting factions were in the process of being separated. That, in fact, was the case. What he hadn't been told was that the pro-Batista elements were sent to the better camps, and he may not have known of the many other training camps in addition to the big one in Guatemala. This was the showplace for the invasion training program. Several others existed where certain specialized training was taking place for the pro-Batista exiles. This was the favored faction by CIA since they had the greater training and were considered the more reliable. It was once explained to me that the final plans for the invasion called for sending the anti-Batista units in first as the front line shock force. The heaviest casualties would be inflicted on this group. The tougher, more experienced and reliable pro-Batista units would follow to assume the command positions and secure the country. The remaining initial force would then be manageable or removed from the field of action. Word somehow got back to the anti-Batista faction, making them very angry, and they informed to Castro agents just prior to the invasion. It was also said that this was a propaganda plot by Cuban agents to demoralize the troops. In any case, the exiles' performance was less than expected. Miscalculation as to sincere commitment was also a contributing factor.
From the November 1960 meeting right up to April 15, 1961, the day of the invasion, events deteriorated from bad to worse. It was said that this was due to "sabotage" by Kennedy. He wanted to call off the invasion. Completely turn it over to the exiles and let them do with it what they could. Only completely volunteer US personnel, released from duty on leave of absence, would be involved. He wanted financial support to come from private sources, Latin America, or other sympathetic governments. Kennedy worked to influence the military away from participation in the invasion and to even give up support for the idea of it. It was suggested that the coordination failures with the military were not merely accidental. Success of the invasion was dependent on air strike and cover. Kennedy refused to send in the jets to support the assault, as it was said that he had promised in the secret agreement. The token air support that did arrive was the result of a desperate last minute compromise. It was not intended to aid in victory, but as a gesture to keep from alienating CIA and others. Kennedy could then say that he had lived up to his agreement. All this was said by the supporters of Bissell and the invasion.

The critics, conversely, claimed that it was Dulles who did not live up to the secret agreement. The reports submitted to Kennedy were simply more subterfuge for short of what was promised. None of the provisions of the agreement were met. But certain meaningless shuffling of various sorts did take place to create the illusion of compliance. Kennedy summoned Dulles again. Dulles made certain trips as an excuse to evade the summons. He knew he could
not explain the discrepancies between what was agreed on and what was delivered. Kennedy would order the invasion stopped if they met. This was unthinkable to both Dulles and Bissell. It must take place, even if that meant going against the President's wishes. Much more was at stake than just the invasion. The whole concept of Para Military action (PM), as it was called, as a function of the Clandestine Services or Deputy Director of Plans Division, was in jeopardy. Without a clandestine military strike force to back up normal diplomacy, where overt military action could not be undertaken, the US would lose ground to the communists. This was the basis for the PM concept that was the essence of the Bissell philosophy. Fears that the Kennedy Administration would revert back to reliance on normal diplomatic relations, compromise and negotiation were, indeed, strong in the CIA hierarchy. The failures and partial successes of the past PM actions had not demonstrated forcefully the validity of the Bissell line. A clear cut, unmistakable success was needed now. The invasion was it, whatever the cost. So intense was this obsession that logical, rational judgement was obscured and the invasion failed. Critics considered Dulles and Bissell fired by Kennedy as a result—not only for the Cuban failure but due to the obscuration and subterfuge they had engaged in.

Much post mortem analysis of the Bay of Pigs within CIA led to the "higher duty theory" as I heard it called. Certain defects existed within the US system. Many years of experience and great expert knowledge in intelligence were necessary to see these defects. In time, thru advanced technology, computers etc., those in the Executive, Legislative and Judicial could be conveyed the proper
information needed to make the correct decisions and have the system corrected. Until then, it was a responsibility; a higher duty, to exceed the limitations of the CIA charter, or even the congress and the president to "preserve democracy, keep the world free for investment and meet the communist threat".

CIA also found rationalization for this theory in the Cuban Missile Crisis, the U-2 incident and other facets of unfolding world developments. All previous projects were examined from this perspective. Emerging domestic conflicts of racial strife and criticism of the US in Southeast Asia, too, were seen from this view.

McCone's replacement of Dulles was said to have been a compromise quite favorable to CIA. He was not Kennedy's choice but was finally appointed, after some behind the scenes maneuvers. Who could seriously say that Kennedy had it in for the oil interests after appointing McCone, an oil man, to head the CIA. Some skillful manipulations recognizing that Kennedy wanted to avoid these charges and still carry on the "oil depletion allowance crusade" won a director who was "manageable" from the view of the top ranks of the agency. Dulles and Bissell still had advisory status. The Bissell philosophy continued, virtually unchanged.

Strenuous efforts were made to improve relations with other agencies and departments of the government. The long-standing jurisdictional dispute with the FBI was settled. Certain domestic concessions were won, clearly in violation of the charter. FBI cover and assets would be utilized more. Alliances in the military and a tightening of the intelligence community were achieved. Certain of the clandestine activities were to be farmed out, some to private
industry firms. Contacts with individuals in private industry were made and recruitment explored. Testing of their response to the "higher duty theory" was an important criteria. Sharp lines between friends and enemies were drawn.

Within the agency, vast reorganization was undertaken. DDP (Deputy Director of Plans) - the clandestine department of CIA - was changed to the Covert Action Staff. Far greater adherence to the official line was required for promotion and advancement. At Headquarters the pool was established and certain employees were channeled into it. They would be given 30 days with pay to find another job, reporting in once a week to pick up their checks. Many involved in the invasion, at the lower levels, left thru the pool. I was told how, in the earlier years, CIA relied much on the experience of the OSS during WW II. After Dulles departed as director, intensive examination of other intelligence services was made. Old Nazi files of the SS were brought out and scrutinized. The Galen Organization in West Germany was examined. Many university contracts were let to develop, in CIA terms, special assets. A greater interest was taken in the use of Labor organizations, particularly AFL-CIO. CIA was coming of age, developing into a sophisticated disciplined corp of specialists. TSD (Technical Services Division) was beefed up. Bazaar and esoteric techniques were developing thru the use of chemistry, photography, graphics, psychology, etc., and particularly, electronics. Computer sciences were widely applied on an enormously expanded scale.

At Tokyo Station this was manifested in a great clamping down.
At lower levels we saw it in the form of speed-up. Jobs were cut leaving offices short handed requiring us to work harder. Allowances for housing, rugs, drapes and personal vehicle mileage reimbursement, etc., were more carefully audited. Housing, in particular, was not the juicy fringe extra that it formerly was. There was much grumbling about jobs being filled by "outsiders" rather than promotions from within. In operations, greater reliance on deep cover assets outside the station cut into the more sensitive projects that bought the higher promotions. Sweeping changes in the Cryptonym and coding system made more work for everyone. More strict enforcement of security, compartmentation and need-to-know were imposed. Security violations became more serious. Fun and games that were formerly a fringe benefit (with booze, women and expensive night clubs) in the guise of operational necessity were not as easy to pull off. Safe houses were more restricted to operational uses. Criticism in earshot of supporters became more unwise.

These were the developments that occurred from the invasion fiasco to November 23, 1963. With the assassination came more criticism and talk outside the confines of the "need-to-know" principle especially after a few drinks away from the station, to let off steam. Lee Harvey Oswald was a favorite subject. He had been trained at Atsugi Naval Air Station, a plush super secret cover base for Tokyo Station special operations. As I understood it, SR Ranch had the responsibility for it with much special expertise and direction from Headquarters. The U-2 flights that originated from there were also a major project of CIA. The Chief of Station, William V. Broe, and
later Pete Wheeler also supervised it closely.

Oswald was recruited from the military for the express purpose of becoming a double agent assignment to the USSR. It was said that they had some kind of special "handle" on him. Perhaps, went the speculation, they had discovered that he had murdered someone or committed some other serious crime, during a routine lie detector test. In any case it was a very risky assignment. CIA taught him Russian and it was said that he had been to the farm (CIA's agent training camp, Camp Peary, Va.) although probably not in one of the regular agent training programs. He may not have even known that he had been there. (That was often done with very special cases. They would be put to sleep and wake up in a strange place and be told that it was some other place than the farm). Although they said that he knew he was working for CIA, he was kept rigidly compartmented from any of the normal contacts that a regular CIA employee would have. The operational people that I knew never admitted that they were working on the project, although some hinted at it. Jerry Fox, an SR agent who purchased Soviet information, may have been one of them. The Deputy Chief of SR, (first name was Dave, I've forgotten his last name) may also have been one, too. (We went drinking once in Shinjuku with a small group of other people). More than once, I was told something like "so-and-so was working on the Oswald project back in the late 50's. Conversations with the SR people were not numerous, however. Very few took place and were short. While Support, Korea Branch, China Branch and Japan Branch people talked more SR was quite tight-lipped about it. This was once offered as proof that there was such an SR project. It was, also, not a topic of continual or loose discussion
or chatter. I was somewhat cautious in talking about it except with my closest friends and then always away from the building. Some others would say that this was a subject that was better not discussed.

It was said that they had many difficulties with Oswald, the exact nature of which has been forgotten. Critics said that it was a stupid project from the start. They should have known that the Soviets would never buy the story. He was a poor subject for such a deep cover operation. There were too many compromising facets to his background which would make it a difficult story to sell.

When Oswald returned from the USSR in June of 1962, either on his way back or after he got back, he was bought back to Japan to either Atsugi or Yokosuka for debriefing, it was assumed. At one point, soon after Ruby shot Oswald, I was talking with someone, I can't recall who for sure, and I expressed disbelief about Oswald even being a CIA project. I was told something like: "Well, Jim, so and so drew an advance sometime in the past from you for Oswald" or "for that project under such and such a crypto". It was a familiar cryptonym to me at the time, which I have since forgotten, as well as the time that the advance of funds was drawn.

Among the close circle of friends with which I discussed all this openly, there was no doubt that Ruby was paid by CIA to do away with Oswald, and Oswald was a patsy. Information from other rather tight social circles would occasionally come our way and we would seize upon it and try to fit it into our own version of the scenario. There was no doubt that CIA was in "as thick as thieves" with the Dallas Police. Several different individuals or firms in Dallas had been involved in one way or another with acting as cut-outs for arms shipment to Cuban exiles for the invasion. This we concluded from putting various
pieces of information together. I remember hearing about some CIA people who had somehow helped the right-wing Minute Men in Texas to get arms, originally intended for the invasion.

One of the reasons given for the necessity to do away with Oswald was the difficulty they had with him when he returned. Apparently, he knew the Russians were on to him from the start, and this made him very angry.

After one discussion we had, it seemed quite likely that the original assassination project may have been to kill Kennedy and blame it on Oswald, who would be solidly linked to Castro as a pretext for another invasion attempt or build up. There was something about some kind of alert, just prior to November 22, having to do with Cuba that was used to support this theory. Perhaps Cuban intelligence knew about it, CIA found out they knew, and that part of it was never attempted. It would seem that if this was the case, CIA records would indicate such an alert, and this approach could be followed up on.

Marine Oswald was thought to have been a sleeper agent, perhaps recruited some time before Oswald's "defection", waiting there in Russia for Oswald in order to help him out. It was reasoned that she may have been "blown" when Oswald contacted her with the KGB following along behind. A deal was made between the Russians and CIA and she was allowed to return to the U.S. with Oswald.

Even before public exposure revealed the impossibility of Oswald as the trigger man, or even firing a gun in Kennedy's killing, analysis at the station produced this conclusion. The uncensored early versions
of events were broadcast on Japanese TV, and discrepancies pointed out by persons with special training and long experience at this sort of analysis and were further confirmed by an avalanche of subsequent revelations.

Kennedy was not killed by the lone assassin Oswald as the Warren Commission concluded. He was killed with the criminal involvement of CIA! Further criminal implication of other government persons and private individuals is certain to be shown when all the facts are known.

This was the Kennedy assassination as I knew it at the completion of my second tour at Tokyo Station as of June 1964. No other information acquired after that period has been included.

I am willing to give sworn oath as to the truth, accuracy and completeness to the best of my knowledge, belief and recollection of the above presentation under penalty of the law for perjury to whatever investigative or other government, congressional, court, legal body or other private investigative group which may ask for it.

I resigned from CIA in April of 1966, after 9 years of employment.
EXECUTIVE SESSION

ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 22, 1978

House of Representatives,
John F. Kennedy Subcommittee
of the Select Committee on
Assassinations,

Washington, D. C.
The subcommittee met at 10:20 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 2344 of the Rayburn Office Building, the Honorable Richard Preyer (Chairman of the subcommittee), presiding.

Present: Representatives Preyer (presiding), Dodd and Sawyer.

Also Present: Michael Goldsmith, Counsel, and Gary Cornwell, Counsel.

Also Present: Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk, and Charles Berk, Betsy Wolf and James Wolf.

Mr. Preyer. Thank you for being here today, and I will call the subcommittee to order at this time.

I will ask if you will stand and be sworn

Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you are about to give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Wilcott. I do.

Mr. Preyer. I would like before we begin to read a written statement concerning the subject of the investigation.

We are operating under House Resolution 222, which mandates the Committee to conduct a full and complete investigation and study of the circumstances surrounding the assassination and death of President John F. Kennedy, including determining whether the existing laws of the United States concerning the protection of the President and the investigatory jurisdiction and capability of agencies and departments are adequate in their provisions and enforcement; and whether there was full disclosure of evidence and information among agencies and department of the United States Government and whether any evidence or information not in the possession of an agency of department would have been of assistance in investigating the assassination and why such information was not provided or collected by that agency or department, and to make recommendations to the House if the Select Committee deems it appropriate for the amendment of existing legislation or the enactment of new legislation.
That is what we are attempting to accomplish, which is quite a big order.

We appreciate your being here today, Mr. Wilcott.

(Whereupon, a recess was taken while the members of the Committee went to the floor of the House for a vote.)

Mr. Preyer. We will come to order.

We will resume the session, and I will recognize Counsel to begin his questioning.

TESTIMONY OF JAMES B. WILCOTT, A FORMER EMPLOYEE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY:

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, would you please state your name and address and occupation?

Mr. Wilcott. My name is James B. Wilcott. My address is 2761 Atlantic Street, in Concord, and my occupation is electronic technician.

Mr. Goldsmith. Where is Concord located?

Mr. Wilcott. It is a little bit east of Oakland, California.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you received a copy of the Committee's rules?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. And a copy of the relevant House Resolutions?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. And, Mr. Wilcott, is it true that you are a former employee with the CIA and that you are here today testifying voluntarily without a subpoena?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.
Mr. Goldsmith. During what years did you work for the CIA?

Mr. Wilcott. I worked from the years, May, of 1957 to, April, of 1966.

Mr. Goldsmith. And in what general capacity did you work with the CIA?

Mr. Wilcott. All in the finance -- in accounting all of the time.

Mr. Goldsmith. How did you become employed with the CIA?

Mr. Wilcott. I was recruited from the school in Syracuse New York, where I was taking a course in accounting and business administration.

Mr. Goldsmith. Very generally now, what were your responsibilities as a finance employee with the agency?

Mr. Wilcott. Well, from May of 1957 to January of 1960 -

Mr. Goldsmith — excuse me, just answer the question very generally, without referring to anything right now, and please describe generally what your responsibilities were as a finance officer.

Mr. Wilcott. My responsibilities were primarily record keeping and disbursing of funds.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Wilcott, are you here with Counsel today?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, I am.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would your Counsel identify himself for the recorder?

Mr. Schaap. My name is William Schaap, S - c - h - a - p - a - p (spelling), and I am an Attorney here in Washington.
I will give my card to the Committee.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Wilcott, did I ask you to prepare a list indicating the dates that you were employed with the CIA and where you were stationed?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, you did.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you prepare such a list?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, I did.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have that list with you?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, I do.

Mr. Goldsmith. Referring to that list, would you tell the Committee where you were stationed during your period with the CIA?

Mr. Wilcott. Certainly, from May of 1957 to January of 1960, I was in the pre-fab building on the Potomac in finance. During the period, it was unvouchedered funds, and my duties were general accounting, and my rate in status was GS-5.

From about January of 1960 to about June of 1960, I was transferred to Finance Field Payroll, also, in this same building, on the Potomac. This was making payments and keeping pay records.

From June of 1960 to June of 1964, I was stationed at XXXXXXX Station, and my primary duty was finance and cash disbursements. This was all cash payments and record keeping for the station. And during that period, I had been promoted GS-7 and also gained a career status.

From June of 1964 to about December of 1964, I was at Roseland. This was just prior to moving to Langley, in finance, and my duties there were policing accounts, and included auditing of special accounts.

From January of 1965 to about March of 1965, I was at Langley in the same area, in finance, policing accounts and
auditing of special accounts, and I was promoted up to GS-9.

From April of 1965 to April of 1966, I was at Miami Station in finance, and I was handling the staff payroll. This was preparing and reconciling payrolls.

In April of 1966, I resigned from the CIA.

Mr. Goldsmith. I take it, from your testimony, that in November of 1963, you were stationed in XXXXXXXXXX Station, is that correct?

Mr. Wilcott. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Drawing your attention to the period immediately after the assassination of President Kennedy, at that time, did you come across any information concerning Lee Harvey Oswald's relationship with the CIA?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, I did.

Mr. Goldsmith. And will you tell the Committee what that relationship was?

Mr. Wilcott. Well, it was my understanding that Lee Harvey Oswald was an employee of the agency and was an agent of the agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. What do you mean by the term "agent"?

Mr. Wilcott. That he was a regular employee, receiving a full-time salary for agent work for doing CIA operational work.

Mr. Goldsmith. How did this information concerning Oswald first come to your attention?

Mr. Wilcott. The first time I heard about Oswald being connected in any way with CIA was the day after the Kennedy assassination.

Mr. Goldsmith. And how did that come to your attention:
Mr. Wilcott. Well, I was on day duty for the station. It was a guard-type function at the station, which I worked for overtime. There was a lot of excitement going on at the station after the Kennedy assassination.

Towards the end of my tour of duty, I heard certain things about Oswald somehow being connected with the agency, and I didn't really believe this when I heard it, and I thought it was absurd. Then, as time went on, I began to hear more things in that line.

Mr. Goldsmith. I think we had better go over that one more time.

When, exactly, was the very first time that you heard or came across information that Oswald was an agent?

Mr. Wilcott. I heard references to it the day after

the assassination.

Mr. Goldsmith. And who made these references to Oswald being an agent of the CIA?

Mr. Wilcott. I can't remember the exact persons. There was talk about it going on at the station, and several months following at the station.

Mr. Goldsmith. How many people made this reference to Oswald being an agent of the CIA?

Mr. Wilcott. At least — there was at least six or seven people, specifically, who said that they either knew or believed Oswald to be an agent of the CIA.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was Jerry Fox one of the people that made this allegation?

Mr. Wilcott. To the best of my recollection, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. And who is Jerry Fox?

Mr. Wilcott. Jerry Fox was a Case Officer for his branch the Soviet Russia Branch, XXXXXXXXXX Station, who purchased
information from the Soviets.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Wilcott, did I ask you to prepare a list of CIA Case Officers working at XXXXXXXX Station in 1963?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, you did.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you prepare such a list?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, I did.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is that list complete and does it have every CIA Case Officer who worked XXXXXXXXX in 1963?

Mr. Wilcott. Oh, no. It doesn't have every one. It has every one that I can remember.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you bring that list with you today?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, I did.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were any of these people on your list possible subjects who made references to Oswald being a CIA agent?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you read the list to the Committee?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Only of Case Officers.

Ms. Berning. I think we ought to state that the record shows that Mr. Sawyer is a member of the Kennedy Subcommittee Preyer. We will.

Mr. Goldsmith. Upon your memory and the list that you brought with you today, will you tell the Committee the names of the CIA Case Officers who you remember working XXXXXXXXXX in 1963?
Mr. Wilcott. Yes. There was XXXXXXXXXXXX Branch, who had XXXXXXXXXXXX cover.

Jerry Fox, SR Branch, Soviet Russia Branch --

Mr. Goldsmith. Excuse me, please proceed very slowly.

Mr. Wilcott. Jerry Fox, SR Branch, Reid Dennis, Chief of Soviet Satellite Branch; and XXXXXXXXXXXX, China Branch, and he also had a cover.

John P. Horton, XXXXXXXXX Section; XXXXXXXXXX Branch; and Chester Ito, XXXXXXXXX Branch; and Kan Takai, XXXXX Branch; and Jim Delaney, China Branch; and Bob Rentner, SR Branch -- and there is some question about that, the branch he was with.

Larry Watanabi, XXXXXX Branch, Senior Case Officer; and XXXXXXXXXXXX, deep commercial cover agent.

There was a person, Dave, who was a Deputy Chief.

Dave -- I can't remember his last name, Deputy Chief of the China Branch; and then a person whose last name was XXXXXXXXXX in the XXXXXXXXXX Branch.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember which of these individuals if any, made the specific allegation or reference that Oswald was an agent?

Mr. Wilcott. It has been 15 years, and I can't remember specifically who said what, but certainly I am sure that Jerry Fox, for instance, had at least made some mention of it.

Mr. Goldsmith. At the time that this allegation first came to your attention, did you discuss it with anyone?

Mr. Wilcott. Oh, yes. I discussed it with my friends and the people that I was associating with socially.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who were your friends that you discussed this with?
Mr. Wilcott. XXXXXXXXXXXX George Breen, Ed Luck, and
XXX XXXXXX.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who was George Breen?

Mr. Wilcott. George Breen was a person in Registry, who was my closest friend while I was in XXXXXXXXXXXXX.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was he a CIA employee?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, he was.

Mr. Goldsmith. And would he corroborate your observation that Oswald was an agent?

Mr. Wilcott. I don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith. At the time that this allegation first came to your attention, did you learn the name of Oswald's Case Officer at the CIA?

Mr. Wilcott. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were there any other times during your stay with the CIA at XXXXXXXXXX Station that you came across information that Oswald had been a CIA agent?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. When was that?

Mr. Wilcott. The specific incident was soon after the Kennedy assassination, where an agent, a Case Officer -- I am sure it was a Case Officer -- came up to my window to draw money, and he specifically said in the conversation that ensued, he specifically said, "Well, Jim, the money that I drew the last couple of weeks ago or so was money," either for the Oswald project or for Oswald.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember the name of this Case Officer?

Mr. Wilcott. No, I don't.
Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember when specifically this conversation took place?

Mr. Wilcott. Not specifically, only generally.

Mr. Goldsmith. How many months after the assassination was this?

Mr. Wilcott. I think it must have been two or three months (sic) after the assassination.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember where this conversation took place?

Mr. Wilcott. It was right at my window, my disbursing cage window.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you discuss this information with anyone?

Mr. Wilcott. Oh, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. With whom?

Mr. Wilcott. Certainly with George Breen, XXXXXXXXXXXX the circle of social friends that we had.

Mr. Goldsmith. How do you spell XXXXXXXXXXXX last name?

Mr. Wilcott. XXXXXXXXXXXX (spelling).

Mr. Schaap. For the record, I have made a list of all of these spellings of the names which have been mentioned, which I will give to the stenographer so that he will have them correctly.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did this Case Officer tell you what Oswald's cryptonym was?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, he mentioned the cryptonym specifically under which the money was drawn.

Mr. Goldsmith. And what did he tell you the cryptonym
was?

Mr. Wilcott. I cannot remember.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was your response to this revelation as to what Oswald's cryptonym was? Did you write it down or do anything?

Mr. Wilcott. No; I think that I looked through my advance book — and I had a book where the advances on projects were run, and I leafed through them, and I must have at least leafed through them to see if what he said was true.

Mr. Goldsmith. And are you saying then that you attempted to investigate this allegation?

Mr. Wilcott. No, I am not saying that. It was more of a casual kind of thing, to my way of thinking.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you check your cash disbursement files?

Mr. Wilcott. Not the files, no.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am not sure I am following, then, what specifically you did check.

Mr. Wilcott. It was a book that I had. At the end of the day we would list all of the advances that were made in an advance book. It was just a three-ring binder, and we would list down the advances by cryptonym and the amounts and then reconcile that with the daily disbursements.

Mr. Goldsmith. How long were these records maintained?

Mr. Wilcott. They were maintained on a thirty-day basis, and then they were closed off at the end of the month.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, does that mean you were able to check back only thirty days from the time that you were given this information?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.
Mr. Goldsmith. I realize this is testimony 15 years after the fact. However, if you received this information two or three months after the assassination, at a time that Oswald was already dead and had been dead for two or three months, what purpose would have been served by checking records that were only 30 days old?

Do you follow the question?

Mr. Wilcott. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, in other words, if you got the information three months after the assassination, Oswald had already been dead for three months, is that right?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Answer "yes" or "no" for the recorder.

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. You testified that your records were only kept for thirty days, is that correct?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Then, by checking your records, which only went back thirty days, isn't it true that you wouldn't have gotten any information concerning Oswald anyway because Oswald had already been dead for one or two months?

Mr. Wilcott. That is true.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, then, really, no purpose would have

Mr. Wilcott. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. And did you check any other records?

Mr. Wilcott. No.

Mr. Preyer. I understand this might be a good place
for us to break and go and vote, so that we will take another recess for about ten minutes. I am sorry.

(Whereupon, a recess was taken while the members of the Committee went to the floor of the House for a vote.)

Mr. Preyer. The Committee will resume.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Wilcott, you indicated that after receiving this information concerning Oswald's cryptonym, you went back to check some files, is that correct?

Mr. Wilcott. Not really files; it was my book.

Mr. Goldsmith. Your book.

Mr. Wilcott. I flipped through it.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the name of the book?

Mr. Wilcott. It was my Request for Advance Book.

Mr. Goldsmith. And for purposes of clarification, now, if Oswald was already dead at the time that you went to this book, why did you go back to examine the book?

Mr. Wilcott. Well, I am sorry -- if Oswald was what?

Mr. Goldsmith. At the time you went to look at the book, Oswald was already dead is that correct?

Mr. Wilcott. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why did you go back to look at the book?

Mr. Wilcott. Well, the payments that were made especially to substations like Oswald's was operated -- it was a sub-station of the XXXXXXXX station, and they had one in XXXXXXX and they had one in XXXXXXXX-- and it may be six months or even a year after the initial allocation that the final accounting for those funds were submitted, and they would operate out of revolving funds or out of their own personal funds in many cases.
Mr. Goldsmith. So, is your testimony then that even though Oswald was already dead at that time, the book might have contained a reference to either Oswald or the Oswald project and that that reference would have been to a period six months or even a year earlier, is that correct?

Mr. Wilcott. That is correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Wilcott, how long were these advance books retained?

Mr. Wilcott. They were retained for approximately one year by the finance office, approximately one to two years, and were destroyed at the time of audit.

Mr. Goldsmith. So that they would be routinely destroyed at the time of auditing?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you check any of the earlier books?

Mr. Wilcott. No, I didn't, as far as the Oswald cryptonym was concerned; no, I didn't.

Mr. Goldsmith. So basically, you checked only one of the advance books, is that correct?

Mr. Wilcott. My current one that I had on my counter.

Mr. Goldsmith. And when you testified earlier that you learned Oswald's cryptonym, by that do you mean that you learned both Oswald's personal cryptonym and his project cryptonym, or was it one of the two?

Mr. Wilcott. Well, it was just a cryptonym, and it could refer to a person, or it could refer to something else and I would have no way of knowing what a cryptonym referred to.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, when the officer told you — strike that.

So, when the Case Officer made reference to a cryptonym
you didn't know whether the cryptonym referred to Oswald specifically or to a project in which Oswald had been involved is that correct?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, sir.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Wilcott, assuming that Oswald had been employed as an agent by the CIA, would there have been a reference to that fact in the CIA's cash disbursement file?

Mr. Wilcott. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why not?

Mr. Wilcott. Anything they had there would have -- sometimes they used as many as two or three different cryptonyms and they would have -- it all depended on how far they wanted to isolate it from the original source, from the original source as to where the project was run.

Mr. Goldsmith. But as a matter of routine, would the CIA cash disbursement files refer to the cryptonym of either the person or the project that is receiving funds?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, I am sure somewhere.

Mr. Goldsmith. As a matter of routine, there would be that reference? Do you believe that there was such a reference to Oswald?

Yes, I do, and I believe there was such a reference.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, if I understand your correctly, then, you answer now was somewhat different from what you testified earlier. And I will ask the question again, okay

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Assuming that Oswald was an agent for the CIA, would the agency's cash disbursement files have referred to either Oswald or to his cryptonym?
Mr. Wilcott. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. And you have had access to the cash disbursement files at XXXXXXXXXXXXX Station?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, for a limited period.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you ever able to check those particular files?

Mr. Wilcott. I was able to but I never did.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, you never checked the cash disbursement files to see if any reference was made there to Oswald's cryptonym, is that correct?

Mr. Wilcott. That is right. It was only my personal files — my internal files, prior to the end of the month.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand.

How long were the XXXXXXXXX cash disbursement files or records retained?

Mr. Wilcott. The details approximately two years. We had accountings, or we had audits about every two years, and then the files that I kept the requests for advances, the details of the accountings that were done usually on a monthly basis by the XXXXX Station Branches, would be destroyed and then they would be — and, in fact, I helped destroy them.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you saying, then, that the cash disbursement files as a matter of routine would be periodically destroyed? (sic)

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether CIA Headquarters would have had either copies or originals of the cash disbursement files?

Mr. Wilcott. They would have summaries of some sort.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would those summaries be destroyed as a matter of routine, to your knowledge?
Mr. Wilcott. I really don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you ever able to find any indication in any of the XXXXXXX Station's records that Oswald was, in fact, a CIA agent?

Mr. Wilcott. Well, I never really looked.

Mr. Goldsmith. To your knowledge, would any records at CIA Headquarters document that Oswald was a CIA agent?

Mr. Wilcott. I believe they would at one time. Whether they are there now or not is hard to say.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any personal knowledge that any records at CIA Headquarters were ever destroyed?

Mr. Wilcott. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any knowledge of any record of the CIA at the XXXXXXX Station ever being destroyed out of the ordinary course of business, not as a matter of routine?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. To your personal knowledge, CIA records XXXXXXXXXX were destroyed?

Mr. Wilcott. Destroyed or changed.

Mr. Goldsmith. Could you give an example of that?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes. Let us say, for instance, that there was a certain project going on, and the project was one that became known that this project was being carried out — and we call it "flaps," — and the Case Officer in charge might get word that somebody from headquarters was coming to review the files to investigate the flap. Well, they would go through the files and take out anything that they thought was, say, indicative of how this flap occurred and change the files.

For instance, in accounting, when we had our audits, for instance, in most of the audits, he would call up some-
body -- let's say in China Branch -- and say "I know you were having problems with this, would you like to look it over before the auditors come?", and they might look it over and retype the accounting for funds for their project and, you know, make changes that they might think were in their interest to do.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever actually Xerox records being destroyed or changed?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, I did.

Mr. Goldsmith. And have you just described one of those instances to us?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Wilcott after leaving the XXXXXXXXX Station, was there any other time when you came across any information that indicated that Oswald was a CIA agent?

Mr. Wilcott. In conversation.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is the answer to that "yes"?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did that occur?

Mr. Wilcott. From the time I left I talked at various times, especially at parties and things like that, on social occasions, with people at headquarters and with people at my station, and we would converse about it and I used to say things like, "What do you think about Oswald being connected with the CIA?", and things like that.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was their response?

Mr. Wilcott. The response was, among quote a few people "Oh, well, I am sure he was."

Mr. Goldsmith. What were these people's names?

Mr. Wilcott. Well, George Breen, again, after we came
back from XXXXXXXX, for instance, XXXXXXXX was a person that I knew before I had gone to XXXXXXXX Station, and I met with him, and I had dinner at his house with his wife and my wife.

Mr. Goldsmith. Just give us their names. Anyone else?

Mr. Wilcott. Not that I can recall.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, it is your testimony that, once you left the XXXXXXXX station, people, both at headquarters, in Langley, and at the Miami Station, made references to Oswald being an agent, is that correct?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, in a speculative manner.

Mr. Goldsmith. How many people have you spoken to that said that Oswald was an agent of the CIA, to the best of your recollection?

Mr. Schaap. Do you mean, how many people who were in the CIA or how many people in the general population?

Mr. Goldsmith. How many people in the CIA?

Mr. Wilcott. With any degree of certainty, other than just speculation, I would say, six or seven with some degree of certainty.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have a personal opinion as to how or for what purpose the CIA might have handled any projects that involved Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Wilcott. I am sorry?

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have an opinion as to how the CIA might handled any projects involving Oswald and for what purpose they might have used Oswald?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, I have opinions.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is that opinion?
Mr. Wilcott. I believe that Oswald was a double agent, was sent over to the Soviet Union to do intelligence work, that the defection was phony and it was set up and that I believe that Marina Oswald was an agent that had been recruited sometime before and was waiting their in Tokyo for Lee Harvey Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the basis for that opinion?

Mr. Wilcott. The basis for that is discussions that I had with people at the XXXXX Station. Those are discussions with people who gave the indication that there was every certainty that Oswald was an agent of CIA, runout of XXXXXXX Station, and that he was freed from Russia there in the final courses in Russia and was trained by CIA people at Atsugi.

Mr. Goldsmith. However, your testimony is that you spoke to only six people as an estimate who indicated that Oswald was a CIA agent – and when I say six people, I mean six CIA people, is that correct?

There were more people than that that believed it, and six people with any degree of certainty that, you know, I felt from what they were saying that they either had some who had some knowledge.

Mr. Goldsmith. How many people from the CIA did you speak to who speculated that Oswald was an agent?

Mr. Wilcott. Dozens, literally dozens.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any explanation for why none of these people have come forward with this story?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is that explanation?

Mr. Wilcott. I have been trying to talk about this thing and other things for the last ten years. I found it
very, very difficult to talk about these things that I think ought to be talked about, very difficult. I talked to reporters from various papers, and I talked to people in other forms of meetings, and to me it is not surprising at

I think, or I am certain, in my own mind, that, if these people were approached that some of these people --

Mr. Goldsmith. Why has it been difficult?

Mr. Wilcott. Well, it has been difficult because people don't want to get involved, and people were scared. I was scared until the Carter Administration. I was really scared to go to the Government and talk about any of these things.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you bring your allegation to the attention of the Warren Commission?

Mr. Wilcott. No, I didn't.

Mr. Goldsmith. And what is the reason for that?

Mr. Wilcott. I really didn't think that the Warren saying that they purposely did anything, because I don't know, and maybe they did or maybe they didn't, but certainly, they didn't impress me as really trying to scrutinize the evidence that there was. And their security that there is in the Government didn't strike me as the kind of security that would keep me from getting attacked in some way, if someone wanted to do it.

Mr. Goldsmith. How did you know, in 1963, what type of security precautions the Warren Commission had for con-

Mr. Wilcott. I don't understand.

Mr. Goldsmith. You have indicated that you were not inclined to go to the Warren Commission because you were concerned about their security?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.
Mr. Goldsmith. Did you have any basis for thinking that their security was poor?

Mr. Wilcott. In 1963, I wasn't think that much about it.
Mr. Goldsmith. So, it never really came forward for you to go to the Warren Commission, did it?

Mr. Wilcott. Not until after I left the agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. When was the first time that you alleged in public that Oswald was a CIA agent.

Mr. Wilcott. In 1968.

Information in November of 1963, is that correct?

Mr. Wilcott. That is correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. And the first time you alleged in public this allegation was in 1968?

Mr. Wilcott. That is correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why did you wait five years?

Mr. Wilcott. We thought every year, my wife and I and the friends that we had — we said, "Well, this is one thing every year it was going to be coming out, and especially I didn't think that — since what I had heard was all hearsay that I would never have seen Oswald or anything like that — this is not the kind of thing that would be used for even something like the Warren Commission, and they would have to have something more substantial than that to go on, aside from the fact that I never would have done it in the CIA, being a very risky thing to do with the CIA.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it fair to say that the CIA is an operation that runs itself on a "need-to-know" basis?

Would you tell the Committee what the "need-to-know" principle is?
Mr. Wilcott. It is based on the principle that only those persons who are involved in a project or involved in operation—and even things that would not seem to be at all in any way secret—only those people should know about it and nobody else should know about it, and that was a "need-to-know" basis.

Mr. Goldsmith. If the agency, in fact, was run on the "need-to-know" basis, how would you account for so many people supposedly knowing that Oswald was an agent?

Mr. Wilcott. The "need-to-know" principle was not all that we followed, and just about every one of the big projects that the agency was involved in, information leaked out, and we especially within the CIA knew about it, and someone would go to a party and have a little bit too much to drink and start saying things that they really shouldn't be saying to keep in mind what the "need-to-know" principle was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why would anyone have shared this particular information with you?

Mr. Wilcott. Especially after Kennedy's assassination, there was a great deal of very, very serious discontent with CIA, and the morale at the station had dropped considerably, and we heard some very, very bitter denunciations of CIA and the projects that they were undertaking.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am not sure that that is responsive.

Why would anyone share the information that Oswald was an agent with you, Mr. Wilcott?

Mr. Wilcott. I don't know how to answer that.

Mr. Schaap. Excuse me.

(The witness conferred with his Counsel.)
Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have anything to add in response to that question?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, I was on security duty, and on security duty, agents were coming in and out of the station, and I pulled a lot of security duty, three and four nights right in a row, and pulled as much as 24 hours on weekends, and an agent would come back from meeting with somebody and he would be waiting for his wife to pick him up or would be waiting for a call from one of the indigenous agents that he was running and a lot of times conversations would be talked.

And I think that is why I probably heard a lot more things than other people did, for instance, than my wife did, because of that situation.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Wilcott, when did you leave the agency?

Mr. Wilcott. I left the agency in April of 1966 for the Miami Station.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorry, I didn't hear.

Mr. Wilcott. — to the Miami Station.

Mr. Goldsmith. And were you dismissed by the agency or did you resign?

Mr. Wilcott. I resigned.

Mr. Goldsmith. To your knowledge, did the CIA ever conduct an investigation into your allegation that Oswald was an agent?

Mr. Wilcott. Not that I know of.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever bring your allegation to the attention of anyone in the CIA?

Mr. Wilcott. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Can you give the Committee the names of any persons who might corroborate your allegation?
any persons who might corroborate your allegation?

Mr. Wilcott. All of the people that we mentioned in the case.

Mr. Goldsmith. And finally, as I said at the beginning is it fair to say that you are here voluntarily today?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, it is.

Mr. Goldsmith. And you testified without any reservation?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. And your testimony has been truthful and candid?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Preyer. I will ask a few questions. Why this information would come out to a CIA station XXXXXXX rather than some other part of the world is, I assume, because Oswald was trained in Japan, according to your belief. He was in the military service over there, and so you feel he was a double agent who was trained while he was in the military by the CIA, and you mentioned he was given a Russian course. And do you know for a fact that he was given Russian courses?

Mr. Wilcott. No; I know for a fact, or I know from hearsay, and I believe it to be true from the circumstances how this conversation came up and so on.

Mr. Preyer. Well, that is the other question that I want to be very sure on. I think you are making some important allegations here, and you have been very helpful in giving some witnesses' names through which we might be able to corroborate it, but I think it is very important that we know clearly how much of this was cocktail party talk and how much was shop talk and how much was speculation and rumor and how much was hard fact.
You mentioned the day after the assassination you talked to someone at the station about it. Did he say to you, "I think Oswald was a CIA agent," or did that first person say to you that he was a CIA agent? Can you recall whether the tone of it was rumor or shop talk or was the tone of it that "this is true"?

Mr. Wilcott. Well, sir, the day after the assassination I don't think that there was any of that kind of talk. The day after, perhaps, two or three weeks after, the kind of talk was that CIA was somehow connected.

Mr. Preyer. That was shop talk, speculation, I gather; people were saying that the CIA is somehow connected with it.

Mr. Wilcott. Well, I believed it to be a little more than speculation, that the source at least of this kind of talk was, I believe, to be something more serious than speculation.

Mr. Preyer. It was your conclusion from that talk that some of these people might have knowledge that he was a CIA agent rather than that they were speculating about it?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, sir.

Mr. Preyer. And you did mention the case officer who came in and told you that the money he had drawn out a few weeks earlier was drawn out for Oswald?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, sir.

Mr. Preyer. He stated that as a fact and not that he believed it was drawn out for Oswald or it could have been or something like that?

Mr. Wilcott. It was stated as a fact — Oswald or the Oswald project.

Mr. Preyer. How many people were at the station in [REDACTED] approximately?

Mr. Wilcott. I believe our full strength was around [REDACTED] and we never actually had that many, I don't think. It
was about XXX I think, was our actual roster was.

Mr. Preyer. And Miami, was that comparable in size?

Mr. Wilcott. No, sir; that was a smaller station.

Mr. Preyer. So that in XXXX, you indicated, six or seven people talked to you and were, as I understood it, rather definite about the Oswald connection?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, sir.

Mr. Preyer. And dozens of others talked to you in a general, speculative manner?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, sir.

Mr. Preyer. Why did you resign from the CIA?

Mr. Wilcott. My wife and I came to believe that what CIA was doing couldn't be reconciled to basic principles of democracy or basic principles of humanism.

Mr. Preyer. It had no relation to your performance?

Mr. Wilcott. No, sir; I think I had good performance reviews right up to the time that I left.

Mr. Preyer. I believe you have written an article about this, an unpublished article.

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.

Mr. Preyer. And have you made that available to us?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, I have.

Mr. Preyer. Thank you. I have no further questions.

Mr. Sawyer. Do you distinguish between an agent and a paid informant or do you use those terms interchangeably?

Mr. Wilcott. Well, sir, I think of an agent as an actual employee of the Agency; we called them indigenous agents XX XXXXXX who were agents that were on a regular salary by the
case officer who was running an agent, and then there were a lot of one-time informers or maybe one- or two- or three-time informers that were paid like maybe $50 or so to attend a meeting of a political party or something of that nature.

Mr. Sawyer. When you refer to Oswald as an agent, you are referring to the extent you have -- as an agent as opposed to a paid informer, in effect?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes; it is my belief that he was a regular agent and this was a regular project of the Agency to send Oswald to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Sawyer. Now, did the XXXXXXXX station have any jurisdiction over the Russian operation or within the Soviet Union?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, sir. That was the SR branch which had all of the projects having anything to do with the Soviet Union.

Mr. Sawyer. It went through the XXXXXXXX station?

Mr. Wilcott. Well, that was just those that were assigned to XXXXXXX and those projects that were assigned to XXXXXXXX. Every station was divided up -- at least every class station was divided up into areas, where we would have a China branch, Korea branch and XXXXXXXX branch and SR branch and SR satellite.

Mr. Sawyer. I noticed in some of the information we are provided you say that following your leaving the CIA in 1967 or thereabouts, for a period of some three years or so, you were harassed by the CIA and the FBI and sabotaged, as I recollect it.

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, sir; I believe that happened.

Mr. Sawyer. Could you tell us what those things consisted of?

Mr. Wilcott. I think the most significant thing that can be actually substantiated is the circumstances surrounding my
employment with the community renewal program in Utica, and I was the finance analyst for the community renewal program in Utica. One day Frank O'Connor, the director of the program, called me into his office and he said that he had had a discussion with the public safety commissioner and that the public safety commissioner told him that my phone was bugged, that my house was under surveillance and that a Federal indictment was coming down on me at any time, that he had talked to the mayor and the mayor decided not to fire me but asked me to sign a resignation form which he would date the day previous to the date that the Federal indictment came down.

Mr. Sawyer. Who told this to the community development people?

Mr. Wilcott. My boss, Frank O'Connor said that this was told him by the public safety commissioner and that the FBI had told the public safety commissioner.

Mr. Sawyer. Who is the public safety commissioner?

Mr. Wilcott. I don't remember his name now offhand.

Mr. Sawyer. Was he in Utica?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes. The mayor, Mr. Sawyer, was Dominic Casaro. He was the mayor at that time.

Mr. Sawyer. Were there any other instances of harassment?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, there were several other incidents that I believe could possibly be somehow connected with CIA.

Mr. Sawyer. What were they?

Mr. Wilcott. Well, they were such incidents as the FBI agent that was working with a group — and this was an established fact that this person was an FBI agent and that he was working with the group that I was working with an antiwar group and, to my mind, there is a very great likelihood that this person was there to neutralize me, as the CIA term went.
Mr. Sawyer. What did he do – anything?

Mr. Wilcott. Well, I would get calls and they would say "We know all about you," shooting a machine gun into the phone, and hang up, and I would get notes written in snow or my windshield and I had slips of paper left under my windshield and this sort of thing.

Mr. Sawyer. What would they say?

Mr. Wilcott. They were extremely vulgar and I don’t think that I should give the full context of them.

Mr. Sawyer. What was the gist of them?

Mr. Wilcott. Well, it was "We all know all about you" and signed "The Minutemen" or some very vulgar remarks and "We know all about you and signed "Minutemen."

Mr. Sawyer. What was the name of the FBI agent who you think infiltrated this antiwar group?

Mr. Wilcott. Gordon Finch.

Mr. Sawyer. He was in Utica also?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.

Mr. Sawyer. What were some other instances?

Mr. Wilcott. Well, my tires were slashed and damage done to my car and I believe sugar poured in the gas tank, and whether this was actually CIA or not I have no way of knowing, and it could also have been just for harassment as a result of antiwar activities but I think there is also a possibility that it could have been attempts to intimidate me into talking about the CIA.

Mr. Sawyer. Are there any others that you can specifically identify as coming from the CIA or FBI?

Mr. Wilcott. I don’t confirm any of them except with
the community renewal program as coming from there and I am

suspicious that many of the other things that happened may
have had as its source the CIA.

Mr. Sawyer. Well, what were your antiwar activities
that you refer to?

Mr. Wilcott. We had – in Utica there was a group called
the Vietnam Educational Council, which was informed people,
formed to inform people as to what was going on in Vietnam,
and we didn’t feel that there was coverage enough in the
media as to what was going on, and the purpose of the Vietnam
Educational Council was to inform people as to what was
going on.

I was on the executive committee along with doctors and
lawyers and some of the most respected people in the
community.

Mr. Sawyer. How long were you associated with that?

Mr. Wilcott. Approximately two years, sir.

Mr. Sawyer. Thank you. That is all I have.

Mr. Dodd. I have just a couple of questions. First of
all I apologize for having to run in and out during your tes-
imony and some of this you may have already covered; and, if
you have, then I will not proceed with it. But I was
intrigued – and it may have been in the transcription but
you were in XXXXX as financial disbursement officer – is it
your testimony that you were told by a case officer that you
had disbursed funds for an Oswald project?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dodd. Am I to believe by that that you were not
aware at the time you made the disbursement that it was, in
fact, an Oswald project?

Mr. Wilcott. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Dodd. It would have been a cryptonym and he was telling you, you had, in fact, made a disbursement?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes sir.

Mr. Dodd. And this would have been, now, shortly after the assassination?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dodd. Talking about hours afterwards or a day afterwards?

Mr. Wilcott. It was at least a matter of weeks and perhaps as much as three months after.

Mr. Dodd. After the assassination actually occurred?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.

Mr. Dodd. When you were told all of this?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.

Mr. Dodd. And it includes the information that Oswald Was an agent?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dodd. Was he described as an agent to you or was he described as an operative or a paid informant?

Mr. Wilcott. No, sir; he was described to me as an agent and I was led to believe, from the conversations that he was an agent.

Mr. Dodd. As a point of information, are people who work within the Agency fairly careful in their language in describing what the category of certain people are who work for the Agency?

Mr. Wilcott. Generally so, I would say, at that time.
Mr. Dodd. And it is your clear recollection that he was described as an agent?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dodd. And the information given you occurred sometime three months after the actual assassination. That would have put it into 1964?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, sir, early 1964.

Mr. Dodd. When did you leave to go back?

Mr. Wilcott. June of 1964.

Mr. Wilcott. So it was sometime between February and June of 1964?

Mr. Wilcott. Or perhaps January.

Mr. Dodd. In 1964, of course, the Vietnam war was going on and Lyndon Johnson was now president. And when did you begin to develop attitudes of dissatisfaction with the Agency and its reaction and attitudes toward what you described as undemocratic principles and a lack of humanism?

Mr. Wilcott. Well, actually even prior to the Kennedy assassination, my wife and I both became disturbed about the stories that we kept hearing about things, control of newspapers and so on.

Mr. Dodd. How long had you been married by the way?

Mr. Wilcott. We were married in 1954, sir.

Mr. Dodd. And you and your wife both went to work for the CIA about the same time?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dodd. In 1957?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dodd. Am I to presume that you told your wife of the conversation you had with this case officer at the time it occurred?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dodd. And she was aware of it from 1964 up until 1968 –

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dodd. -- when you decided to release that information?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dodd. And your dissatisfaction with the Agency and with the course of American government preceded the actual assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. Wilcott. Well, with the Agency, yes, sir.

Mr. Dodd. And this was a view shared by you and your wife --

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wife --

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dodd. -- at that time?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.

Mr. Dodd. Did anyone else at the Agency know of your views at the Agency and did you communicate with other people about your dissatisfaction?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes.

Mr. Dodd. Would you care to tell us any of the names of people whom you communicated with?

Mr. Wilcott. Particularly George Breen and XXXXXXXX to
a lesser extent.

Mr. Dodd. I am a little confused, I suppose,

Mr. Wilcott. Did you vote for President Kennedy?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, sir, I did.

Mr. Dodd. You liked him?

Mr. Wilcott. Very much.

Mr. Dodd. I am just a little confused, I guess, over your reaction. Here, by your own testimony, you were supportive of the President, and certainly the most significant tragedy, I think, probably in the last 15 years or 20 years was the assassination of President Kennedy, and you are told by some who worked for the Agency that Oswald was a CIA agent and you already were dissatisfied with the actions of the Agency and you are told this in 1964 and yet it takes four years, or two years, after you had left the Agency, recognizing the tremendous import and significance of that, and I am terribly confused as to why you decided to keep that information to yourself and to your wife.

Mr. Wilcott. I was afraid quite frankly.

Mr. Dodd. You may have covered this as well, Mr. Chairman, and, if you have, I will drop the question. But you apparently indicated that you feel there was a direct connection between the Bay of Pigs operation and the assassination of the President. Did you cover this ground? Did you want to do this or intend to proceed with that line of questioning?

Mr. Goldsmith. I did not intend to get into that area.

Mr. Dodd. Just one second, then.

Mr. Wilcott, maybe we can expedite this somewhat by asking you this: Do you have any first-hand knowledge or information as to a link between the failed Bay of Pigs operation and the assassination of John Fitzgerald Kennedy?

Mr. Wilcott. No, sir.
Mr. Dodd. I have no further questions.

Mr. Cornwell. In the conversations which you have described occurring within a period of one, two or three months after the assassination with other CIA employees and officers, did they suggest in those conversations to you that their employment, the CIA's employment, of Oswald had any relation to the assassination or only that it related to the events you have already described -- namely, the training of him in Atsugi in the Russian language and the sending of him to Russia and using of him as a double agent and that sort of thing?

Mr. Wilcott. I am sorry, sir; I lost the thread of your question.

Mr. Cornwell. In the conversations you had with other CIA employees, the six or seven persons who purported to have good information about the use of Oswald as an agent, did any of those people say anything to you which suggested that the CIA had some role in the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, sir.

Mr. Cornwell. What did they say along those lines?

Mr. Wilcott. Along those lines they said things like, well, that Oswald couldn't have pulled the trigger, that only CIA could have set up such an elaborate project and there was nobody with the kind of knowledge or information that could have done this, and this was more in the speculative realm.

As far as that they actually said, they said they were having trouble with Oswald and that there was dissatisfaction with Oswald after he came back from the Soviet Union, and the would say things like "Well, you know this was the way to get rid of him -- to get him involved in this assassination thing and put the blame on Cuba as a pretext for another invasion or another attack against Cuba."

That was the kind of things that people said. How much exact knowledge they had it is impossible for me to say. I believe it was more in a speculative realm.
Mr. Cornwell. At several points in your testimony you have stated there were six or seven persons, and on each occasion you raised the extent of their knowledge as "knew" or "believed." Apart from the one officer who said to you that you had paid monies with respect to Oswald's cryptonym, what were the other six or seven persons' purported connection with Oswald and the Agency's relation to him.

Mr. Wolcott. They never revealed that to me, sir, as far as their relations with Oswald.

Mr. Cornwell. Do you have any knowledge, based upon your tenure XXXXXXX as to who would have trained Oswald in the Russian language if that occurred?

Mr. Wolcott. No, sir.

Mr. Preyer. Let me interrupt. I am afraid we are going to have to leave to make this vote right now. I will be back in about 10 minutes.

(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.)

Mr. Preyer. The committee will resume. Did you have further questions?

Mr. Cornwell. The cryptonym — did you write it down at any point?

Mr. Wolcott. I may have, sir, and I can't remember exactly for sure. It seems to me that I recall jotting it on a little pad that I had at my gate, and I did that with cryptonyms from time to time for something — we would want to check back into their accounting for something.

Mr. Cornwell. Is there any chance that that record still exists?

Mr. Wolcott. I doubt it, sir.

Mr. Cornwell. Your best memory is, you wrote it on a
note paid, is. that correct?

Mr. Wilcott. That is true, sir.

Mr. Cornwell. What routinely was done with such note pads?

Mr. Wilcott. Usually I threw them away at the end of the day or once in a while I would put it in — I had a little folder where I kept personal things and it is possible I could have out it in there, but certainly it would have bee destroyed when I left.

Mr. Cornwell. Do you recall whether or not you used that in the process of looking through the 30-day book you described?

Mr. Wilcott. I can't remember, sir.

Mr. Cornwell. It was not normally part of your duties or the scope of the knowledge that you routinely acquired on your job, as I understand it, for you to know what the cryptonyms meant; is that correct?

Mr. Wilcott. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Cornwell. However, I take it from the fact that, as you describe it, it wasn't always applied, that occasionally you did learn something about the identities of the persons or projects that the cryptonyms referred to; is that correct?

Mr. Wilcott. That is true.

Mr. Cornwell. When this cryptonym was given to you by the officer, did any part of it ring any familiar note with you? Did you recognize any part of it, the first two letters or the last portions of it, as referring to any geographic area or any type of activity or anything like that?

Mr. Wilcott. No, sir, not that I can recall.

Mr. Cornwell. Had you ever run into any similar cryptonym?
Mr. Wilcott. Yes, sir.

Mr. Cornwell. In other words, that is, the first two letters or the last ones would have been the same as this?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, sir; it was a cryptonym that I was familiar with, that it must have been at least two or three occasions that I had remembered it and it did ring a bell, yes.

Mr. Cornwell. Do you remember anything about it?

Mr. Wilcott. Not at this time. I can't remember what it was.

Mr. Cornwell. All you can recall is that, when you heard it, that was not the first occasion on which you had seen it or heard it?

Mr. Wilcott. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Cornwell. Why did you leave the CIA?

Mr. Wilcott. My wife and I both left the CIA because we became convinced that what CIA was doing couldn't be reconciled to basic principles of democracy or basic principles of humanism.

Mr. Cornwell. Is that the only reason?

Mr. Wilcott. The principal reason –

Mr. Cornwell. Let me rephrase it. Was there any dispute between you and the Agency?

Mr. Wilcott. No, sir.

Mr. Cornwell. Did they request that you leave?

Mr. Wilcott. No, sir, they did not.

Mr. Cornwell. Did any event cause any disagreement
between you and the Agency?

Mr. Wilcott. No, sir.

Mr. Cornwell. Had you done anything or said anything engaged in any activity which became of concern to them?

Mr. Wilcott. No, sir. I had been involved at one point with a group civil rights group, and they had investigated it and said that there was no wrongdoing on my part as far as this association with the civil rights group.

Mr. Cornwell. What group was it?

Mr. Wilcott. This was SNIC, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee before they became a black power group.

Mr. Cornwell. What, if any, investigation did the Agency do with respect to that?

Mr. Wilcott. They called me up to chief of security, the agent security, and they interviewed me on the association that I had had with the group, and then they gave me a polygraph – in fact, two polygraphs – concerning my association with the group of people that I met with the group.

Mr. Cornwell. Did they tell you whether or not you passed the polygraphs?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, they did. They told me that I had passed both of those.

Mr. Cornwell. It is your testimony, as I understand it, the first time that you spoke about the Oswald agency matter outside of the CIA was after you left the CIA; is that correct?

Mr. Wilcott. That is true, sir.

Mr. Cornwell. On that occasion to whom did you speak?

Mr. Wilcott. When I first started speaking, both my wife and I discussed it and we felt that we should be speaking out about not only Oswald but some other things. The was that we did this was to contact as many people all at once
and we figured this would be our best protection, that the more people that knew about it, the more protection it would be for us.

Mr. Cornwell. What type of people were they?

Mr. Wilcott. Most of the people were involved in the civil rights movement or in the antiwar movement in 1968.

Mr. Cornwell. How many of them were newspaper or magazine reporters or involved in at least the news business?

Mr. Wilcott. None initially. The first contact I had with any reporter or any newspaper people or any media people was with Glad Day Press.

Mr. Cornwell. What year was that?

Mr. Wilcott. That was late '68 or perhaps early 1969.

Mr. Cornwell. You had signed a secrecy oath while you were employed with the Agency?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, sir.

Mr. Cornwell. Did you — at the time you made the decision to discuss outside of the Agency this matter, did you focus on the secrecy oath problem?

Mr. Schaap. Mr. Chairman, I would like to interpose, I guess, an objection, although I would like to make it more in the nature of a request, that I have some problems in terms of advising my client with respect to possibly self-incrimination, that I would not advise him to go into questions of his specific knowledge of the oath and the application to what he did other than the fact that he has told you, which is a fact, that he did sign the oath; but to go into his mental processes as to whether he felt what he was then doing related to the oath in a particular way, I would request that those questions not be asked on the grounds that they may violate either his First Amendment rights or his Fifth Amendment rights, if that would be all right. If you
have something –

Mr. Cornwell. Perhaps I can rephrase the question and get more pointedly what I need without running into the problem that you see.

Did you contact any CIA officer or employee with respect to the secrecy oath and discuss with them whether or not you should be permitted to discuss these matters outside of the Agency?

Mr. Wilcott. No, sir, I did not.

Mr. Cornwell. To your knowledge, when was the first point in time at which your extra-agency discussions on this subject matter came to the attention of the Agency, if ever?

Mr. Wilcott. I have no idea, sir.

Mr. Cornwell. At what point in time did your discussions outside of the Agency first become a matter of publication in a newspaper or magazine or on television?

Mr. Wilcott. In December of 1975, in the little magazine called The Pelican at the University of California, and an interview was conducted by a reporter from that magazine.

Mr. Cornwell. And would that – at least in part –

would that interview have contained your resume of the Oswald agency matter, your statements about that matter?

Mr. Wilcott. Very briefly it did, yes, in what was finally published.

Mr. Cornwell. That is, that subject matter, your statement on the Oswald agency matter, be printed or otherwise publicized in a news publication, radio or TV or anything like that on any other occasion?

Mr. Wilcott. Yes, sir.

Mr. Cornwell. When was that?
Mr. Wrlcott. On two other occasions, I was on KPOO Radio in San Francisco and I discussed in detail, in quite a bit of detail, the speculations and also the incident of the case officer contacting me at the window.

Mr. Cornwell. What year was that?

Mr. Wrlcott. That was November of 1977.

Mr. Cornwell. Last November?

Mr. Wrlcott. Yes.

Mr. Cornwell. On any other occasion?

Mr. Wrlcott. Yes sir; at Oakland Technical High School, at the invitation of — the social department asked me if I wanted to speak and I said yes, and so I spoke to two classes at Oakland Technical High School. This was about, believe — about October of 1975.

Mr. Cornwell. On any other occasions?

Mr. Wrlcott. Not publicly. I spoke to groups in their homes and I spoke to groups in the Peace and Freedom Party and I was with the Peace and Freedom Party for several years.

Mr. Cornwell. But your testimony or your statements on the subject hadn't been made a matter of publicity on any other occasion?

Mr. Wrlcott. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. Cornwell. Has any representative of the Agency or anyone who you believed might be a representative of the Agency ever come to you and discussed these matters?

Mr. Wrlcott. Not directly, no, sir.

Mr. Cornwell. I have no further questions.

Mr. Preyer. Under our committee rules, Mr. Wilcott, a witness is entitled, at the conclusion of the questioning, to
make a five-minute statement if he wishes or to give a fuller explanation of any of his answers; so that at this time we make that five minutes available to you if you care to elaborate or say anything further.

Mr. Wilcott. I don't really have anything and maybe I would just like to say I think it is time we got this thing cleared up; and I think for the good of the country and for good of the people I think it is really time that all of the facts were brought out and the people really get the facts.

Mr. Preyer. Thank you. We appreciate that, and if at any time you think of any further way in which your testimony can be corroborated or the name of any other CIA man or any record or anything of that sort that might be available we hope you will get in touch with us and let us know about it.

Mr. Wilcott. Surely, sir.

Mr. Preyer. Thank you very much and we appreciate you and Mr. Schaap being with us today, and the hearing will stand in recess.

(Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m. the subcommittee recessed.)