Assassination Records Review Board

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After consultation with appropriate Federal agencies, the Review Board determined that the attached record from the House Select Committee on Assassinations may now be opened in full -- as referenced in the Federal Register notice for the Board's September 27, 1996 meeting.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
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

ASSASSINATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY

- - -

Thursday, June 1, 1978

- - -

U.S. House of Representatives,

John F. Kennedy Subcommittee of the Select Committee on Assassinations,

Washington, D. C.

Deposition of

BRUCE SOLIE,

called for examination by staff counsel for the subcommittee, pursuant to notice, in the offices of House Annex II, Room 3370, Second and D Streets, Southwest, Washington, D. C., beginning at 10:33 o'clock a.m., before Elizabeth Berning, a Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia, when were present on behalf of the respective parties:

For the Subcommittee:

Ken Klein

For the Deponent:

(There was no representation by counsel.)

P R O C E E D I N G S

Mr. Klein. Why don't we just begin.

Mr. Solie, why don't you identify yourself, please.

Mr. Solie. Bruce L. Solie.

Mr. Klein. And where do you work?

Mr. Solie. I am employed by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Klein. Will the Clerk please swear Mr. Solie.

Ms. Berning. Mr. Solie, would you stand, please, and raise your right hand.

Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give will be true to the best of your knowledge, information and belief?

Mr. Solie. I do.

Ms. Berning. Thank you.

Mr. Klein. And Ms. Berning, do you have the authority to swear in a witness in the District of Columbia?

Ms. Berning. Yes. I am a Notary Public under the laws of the District of Columbia.

Mr. Klein. Thank you very much.

TESTIMONY OF MR. BRUCE L. SOLIE, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. Klein. Mr. Solie, will you please give me your background in the CIA?

Mr. Solie. I have been employed by CIA since August 1st, 1951. Throughout my career, I have been with the Office of Security. During much of that time, I have been involved in counterintelligence matters for the Office of Security.

Mr. Klein. Could you give me some idea what the function of the Office of Security is?

Mr. Solie. The Office of Security is responsible for the security of the Agency personnel, Agency facilities, and also for contractual matters in which the Agency has classified material.

Mr. Klein. I am just going to back up for one moment at this time and state for the record that it is 10:35 a.m. on June the 1st, 1978, and we are present in the House Select Committee on Assassinations headquarters at Second and D Streets, Southwest, in Washington, D. C.

Now, when was the first time that you heard the name Yuri Nosenko?

Mr. Solie. The early days of June, 1962.

Mr. Klein. And was that at the time that Nosenko made contact with U.S. agents in Geneva?

Mr. Solie. I probably learned of the case shortly after

the first contact or the second contact in Geneva, Switzerland.

Mr. Klein. And what was the reason that you became aware of Nosenko and the fact that he was in contact with United States agents?

Mr. Solie. Nosenko, as a KGB officer, was of definite interest to the Office of Security for counterintelligence reasons. Interest was in obtaining any information which he could furnish which would be of value or assistance in maintaining the security of the Agency and its personnel.

Mr. Klein. Were any other people from your department involved with Nosenko at that time in 1962?

Mr. Solie. Naturally the Director of Security and the Deputy Director of Security would have been aware of it, or I should say were aware of it. I do not recall that anyone else in my immediate office was aware of it because the matter was very closely held.

Mr. Klein. Did you go to Geneva in 1962?

Mr. Solie. I went to Geneva in June 1962. I cannot give you the exact date, but it would have been -- I believe I arrived about the time or shortly after the fourth contact with Nosenko.

Mr. Klein. Did you have an opportunity to speak with Nosenko?

Mr. Solie. The situation at that time was not such that I spoke to Nosenko. Details in regard to it involved

a certain unwillingness on the part of the individuals handling the case, and second, it was also a question of advisability since Nosenko was in the immediate future returning to the USSR.

Mr. Klein. Did you pose questions or -- did you pose questions for him to answer that would relate to your department?

Mr. Solie. Yes. I gave the responsible case officers certain questions in certain areas which I wanted to have covered during the remaining interview with Nosenko.

Mr. Klein. Were these questions asked?

Mr. Solie. To a certain extent. Not satisfactory as far as I was concerned.

Mr.Klein. In what way?

Mr. Solie. However, there were various circumstances involved which, for one thing, time, so it should not be considered as a complete criticism.

Mr. Klein. Did you receive any information from Nosenko in 1962 relating to security matters which you then had an opportunity to check out at a later date?

Mr. Solie. It was agreed that any information furnished would be very closely held and only limited action would be taken in order to protect the security of the source. In answer to your question, there were no leads at that time which definitely pointed toward the Agency. I am speaking of counterintelligence leads.

Mr. Klein. Did you receive any information as a result of those contacts by Nosenko in 1962, did you receive any information relevant to the areas in which you were working?

Mr. Solie. Relevant, yes. But again, the briefing which I received concerning remarks by Nosenko were somewhat limited and at the least, incomplete.

Mr. Klein. Why were you given incomplete and limited information pertaining to Nosenko's statements?

Mr. Solie. I do not think I could attribute it to or should attribute it to -- attribute motive. I feel it is sufficient to say that, in retrospect, that even at that time it is apparent that I did not receive all of the details.

Mr. Klein. In light of what followed in 1964, concerning the assessment and treatment of Nosenko by certain members of the Agency, would you believe that the kind of briefing you received in 1962 is in any way related?

Mr. Solie. No.

Mr. Klein. The people who briefed you, what division of the CIA were they in?

Mr. Solie. I believe both at the time were in the Soviet Russia division.

Mr. Klein. Do you recall who it was that briefed you?

Mr. Solie. Pete Bagley and George Kissevalter.

Mr. Klein. At the time you spoke to them in 1962, did you ask for a more detailed briefing or in any way indicate

that you were not satisfied with the information that you were being given relative to Nosenko?

Mr. Solie. No, because it was agreed at that time that whatever the information, it would not be acted upon except in isolated instances for the protection of the source.

Mr.Klein. In what way do you think those original briefings were incomplete?

Mr. Solie. Well, a retranscription of the meetings, of the 1962 meetings in '67-'68 reflected some differences in the previously reported information and also provided additional details.

Mr. Klein. Were the differences --

Mr. Solie. Material?

Mr. Klein. Was it differences as far as misinformation as opposed to leaving something out in the briefings that you received?

Mr. Solie. No, I would not call it misinformation. Incomplete information.

Mr. Klein. I don't mean misinformation as making a comment on intent.

Were you given any information that was incorrect based upon a reading of the transcript at the later date?

Mr. Solie. Yes, based on the later date, but then you have to recognize that all I had in 1962 were verbal briefings. No verbal briefing can be as complete as a written record.

Mr. Klein. Again, I am asking not whether there was information that was left out of the briefing. I am asking whether it was intentional or not intentional, there was information given that was not correct upon reading the actual transcript.

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Were you specifically prohibited from reading these transcripts of the 1962 interviews in 1962?

Mr. Solie. At the time I was involved, I do not believe the transcripts had actually, or the alleged transcripts had actually been prepared. What happened was that for -- it was agreed that only very limited action would be taken in this particular case, based on the information, for the protection of source. The actual contact of Nosenko would be very closely held for security reasons. And it was hoped that in the reasonable future he would be able to come out again.

Mr. Klein. Do you know when that transcript of his 1962 contact was transcribed?

Mr.Solie. No, I couldn't say.

Mr. Klein. You stated that you read it in 1966 or '67, is that correct?

Mr. Solie. By that time.

Mr. Klein. Was there any reason that you didn't read it prior to '66?

Mr. Solie. Well, until '64, during that period of time,

nothing was being done in regard to the information except, as I say, in certain cases, but this was for the protection of the source.

Mr. Klein. In 1962, subsequent to Nosenko's first contact with United States agents, was there any kind of rivalry within the Agency with relation to Nosenko and what he was saying?

Mr. Solie. If not at that time, very shortly thereafter.

Mr. Klein. And what was the extent of this competition or conflict?

Mr. Solie. Opinion in regard to whether the information furnished by Nosenko was somehow related to information furnished by Golitsyn.

Mr. Klein. The people in the Soviet bloc bureau, department, whatever you call it, what was their position as to Nosenko in 1962, subsequent to June?

Mr. Solie. I cannot put a date on this, but I was well aware that by 1963 there was rather strong opinion that Nosenko was dispatched or under the control of the KGB.

Mr. Klein. Subsequent to the June 1962 contacts, what was your opinion about Nosenko, based on the briefings that you had received?

Mr. Solie. I had an open mind. A, five meetings would be insufficient. If I had all the details, five meetings would be insufficient to come to a conclusion one way or the other.

Mr.Klein. The information which was given to you as a result of the 1962 meetings, did you find any of it to be incorrect, meaning did Nosenko supply any information which you checked out and it did not check?

Mr. Solie. For what limited information I had, the answer is no.

Mr. Klein. No meaning it did check out.

Mr. Solie. It checked out, which is it did, when I say that I had only limited information.

Mr. Klein. At that time, in 1962, based on your background as an intelligence officer, what was your opinion on the general proposition that the Soviets would dispatch an agent, an intelligence agent to feed misinformation to the U.S.?

Mr. Solie. That they would dispatch an agent, I have little doubt. I am necessarily more skeptical that they would permit an experienced KGB officer to defect.

Mr. Klein. Would you consider Nosenko, according to his own description of his background, to be an experienced intelligence officer in the KGB?

Mr. Solie. Yes, in particular since he was from the Second Chief Directorate, of which little was known at that time.

Mr. Klein. Subsequent to you receiving the briefing which you had in 1962, when did you next become involved in any way with Nosenko?

Mr. Solie. I became aware that Nosenko had returned to Geneva, Switzerland, almost immediately after it occurred, January 1964.

Mr. Klein. Other than the Chief and Deputy Chief of the Security Division, was anybody else in your division aware of Nosenko's reappearance in Geneva?

Mr. Solie. My estimate would be that for the first ten days it was rather closely held because he was in place. After the defection it was an entirely different matter. The members of my branch became then aware of the case.

Mr. Klein. During the first days, when first contact was made in 1964 with Nosenko, what role did you play, if any?

Mr. Solie. I remained at headquarters?

Mr. Klein. Did you travel to Geneva in 1964?

Mr. Solie. No .

Mr. Klein. Did you travel to Germany in 1964?

Mr. Solie. No.

Mr. Klein. During 1964, did you meet Nosenko at any time?

Mr. Solie. No.

Mr. Klein. Did anybody from Security meet Nosenko during 1964?

Mr. Solie. The Office of Security handling Nosenko after arrival in the United States had certain involvement. I did not

personally be involved in it. In other words, I did not meet Nosenko.

Mr. Klein. Did you have an opportunity to read any transcripts of statements given by Nosenko in 1964?

Mr. Solie. Yes, a certain amount of it.

Mr. Klein. Did you read these in '64?

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Did you have an opportunity to submit questions to be asked of Nosenko in 1964?

Mr. Solie. I submitted probably a hundred, several hundred.

Mr. Klein. Were they asked?

Mr. Solie. They were partially asked and partially not asked.

Mr. Klein. Was there any kind of dividion determining, that you recognized determining which questions would be asked, and which wouldn't be?

Mr. Solie. I am not referring to a selection regarding the questions on a particular piece of paper. What I am referring to is questions concerning an entire topic which was submitted separately. In other words, if they had covered the topic, it was not missed questions, but all of the areas which I wanted explored were not explored or were not covered.

Mr. Klein. Did you then or do you now have any reason why certain areas were not covered which you requested be covered?

Mr. Solie. Well, at that time there was a positive conclusion by certain officials that Nosenko was dispatched, and therefore the aim was to get an admission.

Mr. Klein. What was your opinion at that time as to Nosenko's bona fides?

Mr. Solie. I had an open mind because he had not been sufficiently debriefed for a logical conclusion to be made.

Mr. Klein. In your opinion, was this disposition to regard him as not bona fide, did it begin prior to the 1964 defection?

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr. Klein. And what specifically leads you to that conclusion?

Mr. Solie. Not necessarily my conclusions. It was the way the case was handled immediately after he returned to Switzerland?

Mr. Klein. How?

Mr. Solie. And particularly after he arrived in the United States.

Mr. Klein. What was done or said that you are referring to at this time?

Mr. Solie. Normally, in the case of a defector, hours, hours, days, weeks and months are spent debriefing him, obtaining information. It was not done in that case.

Mr. Klein. He was not debriefed for a period of weeks in

1964?

Mr. Solie. He arrived in the United States, give or take a couple of days, I would say 10 February, 12 February 1964, and by early April his movements were restricted. This is only a six week period, approximately.

Mr. Klein. Would a six week period be far less than a normal defector would be questioned and debriefed?

Mr. Solie. Surely, because part of this time was spent on vacation.

Mr. Klein. Is it unusual to have a defector's movements restricted?

Mr. Solie. Certain security precautions are taken in regard to defectors for security reasons, for protection of the individual. In this case, the handling was completely different.

Mr. Klein. Could you be specific?

Mr. Solie. I believe the date was April 4th, 1964, Nosenko was placed in confinement.

Mr. Klein. Had any other defectors been placed in confinement?

Mr. Solie. No.

Mr. Klein. During February-March of 1964, were you aware of deliberations at the Agency regarding what to do with Nosenko?

Mr. Solie. I was quite aware of the controversy, but in answer to your question, if you are referring to the confinement,

that took my by surprise, and I was out of town on related business when it occurred.

Mr. Klein. During the two months of controversy, February and March of 1964, did you have an opportunity to make your views known as to your opinion of Nosenko and what should be done with him?

Mr. Solie. Part of this time was spent by me running down or disproving an allegation which had already been made against a former employee of ours.

Mr. Klein. Was the allegation made by Nosenko?

Mr. Solie. No.

Mr. Klein. Was it made in relation to what Nosenko had said?

Mr. Solie. It was made in relation to what Nosenko hadn't said, perhaps. Anyhow, it was a very serious allegation which was necessary to either establish or put an end to it, and that is what I was doing at that time.

Mr. Klein. At that time, -- would you describe the work you were doing at that time as being related to Nosenko?

Mr. Solie. Oh, very much.

Mr. Klein. And considering --

Mr. Solie. And Golitsyn.

Mr. Klein. And Golitsyn.

And considering that you were working in that area, and considering that you had been involved beginning in June of

1962 with the Nosenko matter, was it unusual that you were not consulted before Nosenko was put into isolation?

Mr. Solie. Well, the actual decision pertaining to this was made fairly quickly, and at the time it occurred, I was out of town, as I say, on related business. The deliberations on this, discussions on this particular matter I was not involved in. I believe the first I knew that this was going to happen was really after it had happened. The controversy I was aware of because perhaps at that time I was already a part of the controversy.

Mr. Klein. How would you have been a part of the controversy at that time?

Mr. Solie. As I told you, I was involved in proving or disproving a theory concerning a former Agency employee.

Mr. Klein. You stated that you eventually disproved the theory, is that right?

Mr.Solie. Rather quickly.

Mr. Klein. By disproving that theory, did that serve to show Nosenko to be bona fide or not bona fide?

Mr. Solie. Well, it was difficult, really, to relate this to him in the first place because he had nothing to say about it of significance.

Mr. Klein. So --

Mr. Solie. It is a matter of interpretation. There was reasoning which at that time I couldn't or later agree with,

drawing conclusions without any substantiating evidence.

Mr. Klein. At that time in 1964, did you feel they had drawn conclusions without any substantiating evidence?

Mr. Solie. I would prefer to say it was insufficient, yes.

Mr. Klein. Were you aware specifically of all the materials they had considered in 1964 before they made their decision to isolate Nosenko?

Mr. Solie. Pretty much.

Mr. Klein. How did you become aware of that at that time?

Mr. Solie. I was aware of what was going on at that time, but I was not personally involved.

Mr. Klein. But when you say you were aware of what was going on, were you aware specifically of what kinds of things they were asking and what things Nosenko was answering, and what the final decision to isolate him was based upon? Were you aware of the specifics of that?

Mr. Solie. Yes, if you can call it specifics. I do not call it specifics. It was a particular opinion.

Mr. Klein. When you learned that Nosenko had been confined, what was -- what action, if any, did you take?

Mr. Solie. I made an effort at that time, or shortly thereafter, as soon as it settled down, to try to have him systematically debriefed. However, I did not meet Nosenko. This consisted of questions, subjects submitted with detailed

questions to ask, and to ask him, to follow up on, and this went on for two or three months, three or four months in '64.

Mr. Klein. Were your questions presented to Nosenko?

Mr. Solie. As I said before, up to a certain point, and after that, the questions were not, sir.

Mr. Klein. And based on the questions that were given to Nosenko and his responses, did you form any opinion as to the credibility of Nosenko?

Mr. Solie. The information which anyone had at that time would not permit an honest conclusion one way or the other. At that time, I had what I considered at that time, and which I still consider to have been an open mind on it.

Mr. Klein. Let me suggest -- and correct me if I am wrong -- that there could be two ways at that time of analyzing what Nosenko was saying. One might be to analyze whether the information he was giving us was correct information, whether the leads were valid, and the second question is whether he is dispatched or not, and it would seem that he could be giving us valid information and still be dispatched.

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr.Klein. And my question to you is, based on the questions and answers given by Nosenko in '62 and '64, which you were aware of, did you form an opinion as to whether his answers to our questions were valid and credible as opposed to whether he was dispatched or not?

Mr. Solie. Well, it became apparent that a number of the leads which he was furnishing were good leads. That does not say he could not have been dispatched, but the leads were checking out.

Mr.Klein. This was in 1964.

Mr. Solie. Yes. The FBI which has gotten numerous leads domestically, things were checking out. Now, that isn't to say that every lead from Nosenko was a lead to a KGB agent, but the pieces of information being furnished checked out.

So at that time, I had to be leaning toward the opinion that it was a KGB officer, that he had served in the Second Chief Directorate.

Mr. Klein. And at that time did you have any thoughts one way or the other as to whether he was dispatched?

Mr. Solie. I had to keep an open mind on that. There was insufficient information for anyone to make a conclusion.

Mr. Klein. You stated that at a certain point in 1964, your questions were no longer being given to Nosenko. Is that correct?

Mr. Solie. My requests were no longer being serviced.

Mr. Klein. And did you have any further contact with Nosenko after your requests were no longer being serviced?

Mr. Solie. Well, let's make it clear. I had no personal contact with Nosenko until October '67.

Mr. Klein. I understand that. When I say contact, I mean of any kind, of questions being given, or were you involved in any kind of process to determine what to do with Nosenko?

When was the next time you had any kind of contact with Nosenko, not necessarily personal?

Mr. Solie. That I was aware of the case? I continued to have a certain awareness in the case.

Mr. Klein. What was that?

Mr. Solie. Well, certain interviews which were conducted I had limited knowledge of.

Mr. Klein. Did you continue through '64 and later to check out leads given by Nosenko?

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Did you check these leads out through 1965?

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Through 1966?

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Through 1967?

Mr. Solie. '67, positively.

Mr. Klein. Other than checking out leads given by Nosenko during that period of time, '64 to '67, did you have any other contact with the whole Nosenko issue at the Agency?

Mr. Solie. Yes, I was deeply involved in it.

Mr. Klein. What was the extent of your involvement?

Mr. Solie. I was involved in Golitsyn.

Mr. Klein. Now, Golitsyn is another Soviet defector, is that correct?

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr.Klein. And would you describe for me how your involvement in Golitsyn involved you in Nosenko at the same time, give us a summary of that?

Mr. Solie. Golitsyn's opinion or I should say expressed opinion was in agreement with the conclusions of the SI Division and the CI Staff.

Mr. Klein. Let me interrupt you for just a moment.

Why do you make a distinction between his opinion as opposed to his expressed opinion? Do you believe that he might have a different opinion that he does not express?

Mr. Solie. I really wouldn't care to comment concerning the thinking of Golitsyn. When I used the word "expressed opinions" that is exactly what I meant.

Mr. Klein. I just wondered if there was a particular reason that you put in that word.

Mr. Solie. I have had my differences with Golitsyn, too.

So I would prefer to keep personalities out of it as much as possible.

Mr. Klein. I interrupted you.

Mr. Solie. That I didn't agree with Golitsyn is a matter of record, on certain things.

Mr. Klein. You were telling us about your relationship

with Golitsyn and how that involved Nosenko.

Mr. Solie. Well, the two became complete, almost completely intermeshed after '64.

Mr. Klein. What was the extent of your relationship with Golitsyn, for what purpose were you involved with him?

Mr. Solie. Agency security matters, personnel, counter-intelligence.

Mr. Klein. Were you checking out leads that he would supply?

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Was it very similar to your involvement with Nosenko as far as one of them provides a lead and you check it out?

Mr. Solie. Yes, similar, but after '67 when I became involved in Nosenko, I found that he was very cooperative. The leads from him were more numerous, two different personalities.

Mr. Klein. Did you find Golitsyn to be uncooperative?

Mr. Solie. At times, quite.

Mr. Klein. The leads that Golitsyn gave you, did they check out as often as the leads that Nosenko gave you?

Mr. Solie. Nope.

Now, that is not -- the leads were a little different, but I had problems with Golitsyn's opinions.

Mr. Klein. Could you elaborate on that a little more?

Mr. Solie. Well, I had found as far as Nosenko was concerned, his facts were quite consistent, very cooperative, and very, very helpful as far as straightening out conflicts. Golitsyn indulged in opinions which became -- which came out as facts rather than opinions, and opinions can be wrong. Facts are facts.

Mr. Klein. Who was the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1964 when the decision was made to isolate Nosenko?

Mr. Solie. It must have been McCone.

Mr. Klein. Did you make any attempt to make whoever was the director, if it was McCone, to make him aware of your viewpoint of the treatment that was being given to Nosenko?

Mr. Solie. In '64?

Mr. Klein. Yes.

Mr. Solie. No.

Mr. Klein. I have before me a report written by you, in June of '67, June 19th, '67, and I will show it to you.

(The Witness inspected the document.)

Mr. Solie. Only the pages to here are my report.

Mr. Klein. That is up to page 18.

And the pages that you are stating are not your report are the report by the polygraph operators. Is that correct?

Mr. Solie. Yes. 1964.

Mr. Klein. Yes, the last part of this material is an April 8th, 1964 polygraph report, and other than that, the

rest of this material --

Mr. Solie. Those are actually two documents which should not be stapled together because they are not -- one was not an attachment to the other.

Mr. Klein. Well, taking them one at a time, then, and I should read for the record the title page to identify this report. I won't mark it since it is a CIA document, but it says Bruce Solie's 26 page report, 058-1441/A, i.e., Nosenko, 19 June 1967 from OS -- I would imagine OS is Office of Security.

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Now, could you take this material -- as you say, it is two separate reports, and tell us what each of the reports is and give us a little background on why each was written?

Mr. Solie. Are you speaking of these two reports?

Mr. Klein. Yes. You told us the first two parts of this -- no, I am not talking about the polygraph report. I am talking about -- oh, I think I may have made a mistake. You are saying that all the pages other than the polygraph are one report?

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr. Klein. And that the polygraph report is a separate report which should not have been attached.

Mr. Solie. Which I do not care to comment on.

Mr. Klein. I see.

Mr. Solie. They are attached together but they should not be. They were never attached together.

Mr. Klein. Leaving out the April 8th, 1964 polygraph report, would you explain the background of this June 19th, 1967 report?

Mr. Solie. This report was prepared in 1967 at the request of the Director of Security and the Deputy DCI.

Mr. Klein. Who were the two people who you just referred to?

Mr. Solie. Howard Osborne was Director of Security, and Admiral Taylor was Deputy Director, or Deputy DCI.

Also, the DCI was involved, but the matter of the Nosenko case had been given by the DCI, the DDCI to try to come to some conclusion.

Mr. Klein. Who was the DCI at that time?

Mr. Solie. Richard Helms.

There were discussions in 1967 between the Director of Security and the DDCI concerning the case. Mr. Osborne was very much concerned over the case, advised the DDCI that I had considerable knowledge concerning the case, and was not in agreement with certain conclusions which had been made by SI. The DDCI requested that I write some type of an answer to a large report which had been prepared by SI, and also which would also include pertinent observations concerning the case.

This is the result of the memo which you have here. It was not intended to indicate that I had all the answers in the case. It was more intended to -- some answers are needed in the case.

Mr. Klein. Osborne was head of the Security Department.

Mr. Solie. Director of Security.

Mr. Klein. Director of Security in 1967. Was he Director of Security in 1962?

Mr. Solie. In 1962, Osborne was Chief, SI.

Mr. Klein. He was the Chief --

Mr. Solie. I believe he was Chief, SI, Deputy Chief -- Chief, SI.

Mr. Klein. And in 1964 where was he?

Mr. Solie. In early 1964 -- the dates are a little hazy -- I believe Osborne was Deputy Director of Security, and Robert Bannerman was Director of Security, but at least shortly thereafter Osborne became Director of Security?

Mr. Klein. Sometime in 1964?

Mr. Solie. I would say sometime in 1964. I would have to check my dates a little bit because I am not sure how long Mr. Bannerman was Director of Security before he moved on.

Mr. Klein. Do you know of any reason why Mr. Osborne expresses his concern with the Nosenko matter in 1967 as opposed to '66, '65, or '64?

Mr. Solie. One can't say that his concern just started

in '67. This was a matter of concern during the period '64, '65, and '66 also. It was a matter of concern --

Mr. Klein. My question was not so much was it a matter of concern, but why was 1967 the time when your concerns were brought up and you were given an opportunity to write a document such as the one we have before us? Why did that happen in '67?

Mr. Solie. It is difficult to say why something happens at a particular time.

The case of Nosenko was a matter of deep concern to Mr. Osborne as it was to Mr. Helms and it was to Mr. Taylor, Admiral Taylor, although Admiral Taylor was relatively new in his position as DDCI. The answer to your question, why didn't it happen in '66, why didn't it happen in '66?

Mr. Klein. Or '65?

Mr. Solie. Well, you have to realize that certain rather high officials in the Agency had some rather fixed opinions on this case. I didn't agree with them. '67 seemed to be the year. I am not sure why.

Mr. Klein. Would you elaborate what you would see to be your qualifications to investigate the bona fides of Nosenko, why you as opposed to somebody else in Security or somebody else in some other division would be well qualified to do this?

Mr. Solie. Most of my career in the Office of Security, which is the same as CIA, has been in counterintelligence

matters. I worked closely with the Bureau for a good many years -- I am speaking of the FBI. It has been my field, it has been my career. I consider as far as Soviet Intelligence is concerned, I will match my knowledge against anyone in the business, and this is also with the qualification that nobody knows all the answers in this business. However, that is what I have done for, let's say, 25 years.

Mr. Klein. Had you conducted any investigations prior to this one?

Mr. Solie. Yes.

I would not care to state how many or where, but I can say that for years before this I was involved in that business.

Mr. Klein. Subsequent to this June 19th, 1967 report, what was your next involvement in this Nosenko issue?

Mr. Solie. This particular paper created a little bit of, or I should say a considerable stir because it was eventually given to SR division, and it was apparent that it was not in agreement with their paper.

So what happened on this was that aside from SR, the DDCI and the DCI were interested in something being done in a positive fashion concerning the case, and I was involved also in a couple of discussions with the DDCI and the Director of Security, the result of which, the decision was made to move Nosenko to the local area.

Mr. Klein. To the where?

Mr. Solie. To the local area where I could have complete access to him, and an effort being made to do something positive in the case.

Mr. Klein. Could you elaborate what you mean by positive, something positive.

Mr. Solie. What was happening was a dead end. Nothing was happening.

Mr. Klein. But what -- could you tell us, at the time this first report was written, what exactly to your knowledge was Nosenko's situation?

Mr. Solie. Isolated.

Mr. Klein. Was he being questioned?

Mr. Solie. No.

Mr. Klein. And when you say something positive, does that mean taking him out of isolation?

Mr. Solie. Correct. One of the things --

Mr. Klein. What else?

Mr. Solie. Trying to come to some conclusion in the case and see what could be done about putting him in the mainstream of life. No one had the answers at that time, either but it was at least a positive step.

Mr. Klein. Was there any discussion at that time as to what would be done if further investigation and debriefing determined that Nosenko was not bona fide?

Mr. Solie. No. The thought was that I would come up with

some kind of conclusion.

Mr. Klein. A conclusion as to whether he was bona fide, or a conclusion as to what to do with him if he wasn't bona fide?

Mr. Solie. I think it was one thing at a time. If you concluded bona fide, the second question is moot.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever speak to Helms about either this June 19th, 1967 report or the report you wrote following this?

Mr. Solie. Both. In this case, after this, there were discussions also in Helms' office, and when a final decision was made, this is what we are going to do.

Mr. Klein. What did Helms tell you as a result of this June 19th, 1967 report? What did he speak about?

Mr. Solie. Helms was acquainted with the work that I had been doing for a number of years before this. It was not a matter of any specific directions; it was more a matter of do something. It was clear that I was going to talk to Nosenko at length, and whether we were not speaking -- and we were not speaking in terms of a week or a month or how many months. It was a matter that this was something which was going to take time. But in connection with this, there was a change -- there was a change in living conditions, and with regard to the '67 report --

Mr. Klein. The June 19th report or the second one?

Mr. Solie. I mean the '68 report, there was discussion

in the office of the DCI, the Conference Room, following submission of my '68 report.

Mr. Klein. Upon finishing this June 19th, 1967 report, how soon was it decided that you would begin work on what turned out to be your 1968 report?

Mr. Solie. I would imagine probably about six weeks we were going to do something. Maybe it is six -- I couldn't tell you exactly, eight. However, there was some planning done before the move occurred in October.

Mr. Klein. When you wrote this June 19th, 1967 report, were you aware of the possibility that you might be given the task of writing a much longer, detailed report, which eventually was given to you?

Mr. Solie. Oh, I would suspect that, yes.

Mr. Klein. Did you consider this to be sort of a preliminary report as to where things were at that time?

Mr. Solie. Completely preliminary.

Mr. Klein. Did you at the time you wrote this June 19th, 1967 report, have any opinions as to whether Nosenko was dispatched?

Mr. Solie. I think the report speaks for itself. It draws no conclusions in there.

Mr. Klein. But did you draw any conclusions?

Mr. Solie. I still say I had an open mind.

Mr. Klein. At this time, that is, at the time of the

June 19th, 1967 report, you had for three years, or since 1964, been checking out leads provided by Nosenko, is that correct?

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr. Klein. And the leads themselves were checking out at that time, is that correct?

Again, recognizing that whether he was a dispatched agent and whether his leads check out are not the same question.

Mr. Solie. Which could lead me to the conclusion, the tentative conclusion that he was a KGB officer of the Second Chief Directorate. I do believe in June '67, contrary to other opinions, I believe I indicated that I thought he was an officer.

Am I right?

Mr. Klein. I believe so.

Mr. Solie. I am not really familiar with what I wrote in '67.

Mr. Klein. Let me read part of a paragraph on the first page of your June 1967 report.

And I am starting in the middle of a sentence, but if you want to look at the rest of it, you certainly can. "The ramifications of the KGB dispatching an agent or an officer with the knowledge of Nosenko concerning KGB operations and personalities can lead to only one conclusion: namely, that the KGB has sufficiently important penetrations of the United States Intelligence Community that any information furnished by

Nosenko would be minor in importance to the KGB in comparison to the value of misleading American counterintelligence and protecting current KGB sources."

Do you remember writing that?

Mr. Solie. Yes. It is a mouthful.

Mr. Klein. My question to you is, if Nosenko were dispatched in relation to Lee Harvey Oswald and the Kennedy assassination, then this statement wouldn't be correct.

Is that true? Or it wouldn't apply?

(The Witness inspected the document.)

Mr. Solie. I am not sure what you are saying, apply. The statement stands by itself. You have to put something into that sentence.

Mr. Klein. But what I mean is that this, as I understand it, this paragraph is discussing the fact that the Russians, if Nosenko were dispatched, would be willing to trade the information that Nosenko was giving us about operations and personalities in the KGB for the opportunity to mislead American counterintelligence as to the KGB in other, more important areas.

Mr. Solie. I think that the paragraph only indicates that I understood the possible ramifications of such activity. That is not saying it was true.

First you have to say he wasn't bona fide.

Mr. Klein. What I am getting at is, at the time you wrote

the June 19th, 1967 report, or at any time thereafter, did you ever consider it a real possibility that Nosenko could be dispatched with his primary mission being to give information pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald to the United States, be it false or true information, but information pertaining to Oswald, and that everything else was secondary to that?

Mr. Solie. Are you suggesting that I was blind to that possibility? The answer is no, I wasn't blind to that possibility, but you have to take a look at the entire case. The entire case did not start in January '64.

(A brief recess was taken.)

Mr. Klein. You were explaining your perception of the Oswald aspect of this case.

Mr. Solie. Well, in regard to the Oswald aspect, the case itself did not start in January '64. It started in June '62, long before the events of November 1963. If you conclude that he was bona fide in 1962, he was also bona fide in 1964 also.

Mr. Klein. Considering that the first contact with Nosenko came, as you said, in 1962, did you dismiss the possibility that his primary purpose of defecting to the United States could have been to provide information pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of Kennedy?

Mr. Solie. That is an assumption that he is a dispatched agent, he is under KGB control.

Mr. Klein. It is an assumption that he is a dispatched agent, but it differs from -- it differs from the assumption that he is dispatched to give misinformation or protect Soviet sources in the CIA. It assumes that he is dispatched for the primary purposes of providing information, be it misinformation or even correct information about Lee Harvey Oswald to the United States.

Mr. Solie. I think I directed my thoughts toward what you were referring to in the 1968 report.

Mr. Klein. I am aware that in the 1968 report it is discussed, and I am going to speak about that in a moment. What I am interested in is in the 1967 report, was what I have just posed to you about Oswald being the primary purpose, was that a possibility in your mind at that time?

Mr. Solie. The Oswald case was definitely in my mind in connection with the whole Nosenko case, and when I wrote that paragraph, I don't think I excluded that possibility.

Mr. Klein. I have to apologize for taking a minute. The problem is I didn't want to mark up the CIA document, and I am trying to correlate what I wrote in my notes to where it is on the page.

(Pause)

Mr. Klein. On page 2, you stated, and I will read from the beginning of the paragraph. It is the second paragraph. "This particular summary will not include a discussion in regard

to the bona fides or non-bona fides of other CIA or FBI sources. It is realized that consideration of these sources cannot be excluded in any analysis of the Nosenko case since, if Nosenko is not a bona fide defector, all sources which have supplied supporting evidence of the bona fides of Nosenko must be considered under suspicion."

Do you recall that paragraph?

Mr. Solie. Uh-huh.

Mr. Klein. Do you still believe that that is true, that if Nosenko is not bona fide, all sources who would provide information as to his bona fides, their own credibility must be questioned?

Mr. Solie. I don't think you read the full paragraph, did you?

Mr. Klein. I did not finish the paragraph.

Mr. Solie. That's right.

Mr. Klein. Well, I read for the record the rest of the paragraph. "However, the resolution of the question of whether Nosenko is or is not a bona fide defector will, it is apparent, be primarily dependent upon either a satisfactory resolution of the existing questions in the Nosenko case through interviews with Nosenko, or an admission by Nosenko that he is a dispatched KGB agent."

My question is still, if Nosenko is found not to be bona fide, do you believe it would place considerable suspicion

as to the bona fides of other sources who have supplied supporting evidence that Nosenko was bona fide?

Mr. Solie. Well, this, as far as I am concerned, is in the land of if, if.

Mr. Klein. That is correct.

Mr. Solie. If Nosenko was not bona fide, and had been dispatched by the KGB, you can be sure that only a handful of individuals in the KGB, and the Central Committee, more specifically, the Politburo, would be aware of this. It would not be common knowledge. So the fact that another source says oh, he is genuine, means nothing. You would have to consider it, though.

Mr. Klein. But would it raise some suspicion as to the bona fides of the second source, if they corroborated Nosenko and it were found out that Nosenko was not bona fide?

Mr. Solie. Well, it is something to consider, but you need to know more about the circumstances. Your question is so iffy, I could not hardly give you a specific answer to it, but you can be sure of a dispatched KGB officer, the individuals who have knowledge of that in the KGB or in the Central Committee are very limited. They would have to be limited. Otherwise, the whole operation would fall on its face. So it would be very tightly held anyway, and so the fact that someone or another source hadn't heard about it would be no reflection.

But again, in this business, you ought to look at all angles.

Mr. Klein. You also discuss in this report the motive for Nosenko defecting and you rechecked certain reasons and that you quote them, I believe, window dressing. I will try to find the particular quote.

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr. Klein. "He has made certain claims of dissatisfaction with the Soviet regime, but these expressions can probably be characterized as window dressing."

After completing your 1968 report of Nosenko, what do you believe was his motive, his prime motive for defecting?

Mr. Solie. I wrote a section on that. This is something which you can't really get a good grasp of motive. He was the son of the Minister of Shipbuilding over there, lived a very good life in the Soviet Union, would have been a good life in the United States. In '56 his father dies, life changed. I think this had some effect on him. Like in the West, he made a couple of trips to England, a trip to Cuba, I think he had been in Germany once, and spoke English well, had more access to papers and books of the United STates than the normal individual in the Soviet Union, perhaps was favorable to the west, I will accept that. But the point I am speaking of window dressing, I am speaking of someone who comes out of the Soviet Union waving an American flag when he might not be sure what it looks like, this type of thing. But motive, the best you can do is make an assessment. When does an individual

reach -- make the decision they are going to defect? It probably isn't done overnight, may be results of a year, two years, three years, a gradual build-up.

Mr. Klein. Considering the style in which he was able to live in the Soviet Union before and to some extent subsequent to his father's death, do your satisfaction, are you convinced of any one motive justifying him defecting from the Soviet Union?

Mr. Solie. I don't think that is something you have to justify. My question is, is he dispatched or did he leave under his own power, and that is what is important. Motive is something you can't really put a firm handle on. The question is, did he leave the Soviet Union with the knowledge or without the knowledge of the KGB? That is what is important.

Mr. Klein. Do you think that the absence of a credible motive for leaving might reflect upon the question of whether he was dispatched?

Mr. Solie. What is credible in my mind is not necessarily credible in someone else's mind.

Mr. Klein. Well, that is my question. In your mind --

Mr. Solie. It is credible.

Mr. Klein. Was there a credible motive for leaving?

Mr. Solie. Acceptable.

Mr. Klein. And maybe again, briefly, what would you say would be the acceptable motive?

Mr. Solie. Well, he wasn't happy over there. I don't think I could put any one factor as being more important than the other. I think -- when he made the contact in 1962, he hadn't made up his mind yet. During '62 -- in '64, I think he made up his mind.

In talking to him, I think he had only one real regret, and those were his two children. This isn't something to dwell on, but it was important. So when I would accept his motive, and which I did accept his motive, someone else would say oh, no, he can't, he wouldn't accept it.

Mr. Klein. You discussed --

Mr. Solie. In my business I have to get down to the nuts and bolts. I can't sit up in an ivory tower and look down at what somebody else is doing. I have to be involved. I was involved. I have certain feelings in this case which you wouldn't put down on paper. You can't describe it. Gradually over a period of time I came to certain conclusions. I didn't come to them overnight. And you can quarrel about motive, but you can take any defector and say what are their motives? What is the motive of someone who defects to the Soviet Union? If you can try to figure that out, be my guest. I am not a psychologist, and probably a psychologist would have a problem with some of these cases as to what really is the motive.

Mr. Klein. I think that I should point out that part of the basis for my question to you was what you had written in

your report which on page 2 said, during interviews with Nosenko, a completely acceptable explanation of motive has not been obtained from him, and it indicated to me that the question of motive had come up and that you had been looking for something.

Mr. Solie. I had been in '67 but the limit of the information on which I or anyone else was operating in that time was limited because from '67 on, there are thousands of pages of transcripts. It is a matter of record what he said. As of this time I had no personal contact with him on which I could base any conclusion or any opinion.

I recognize that motive, it is pretty important, but I don't believe it is as important as the question of whether he left the Soviet Union with the knowledge or without the knowledge of the KGB. That I think is the important --

Mr. Klein. I would suggest that the question of motive can aid you in answering the question of whether he was dispatched.

Mr. Solie. Right.

Mr. Klein. Subsequent to writing this June 19th, 1967 report, when did you begin writing the 1968 report?

Mr. Solie. It is difficult for me to put down the exact date.

Mr. Klein. Approximately.

Mr. Solie. The formal report are you referring to?

Mr. Klein. No, when did you begin working on what became the 1968 report? When did your investigation begin?

Mr. Solie. The investigation on it began in October 1967.

Mr. Klein. Did Helms inform you that you would be writing that report, the 1968 report we will call it?

Mr. Solie. Did he inform me?

Mr. Klein. Did he tell you that he wanted you to write the report? Did he discuss it with you at any time?

Mr. Solie. No. It was expected I was going to write a report. The timing of it was an open question. And sure, it was just normal. After all, if you spent hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of hours, you had to come up with some kind of report. The timing of the report was strictly my timing.

Mr. Klein. I think that my question isn't clear.

You spent approximately a year in what we will call your investigation, which resulted in a report.

Mr. Solie. Right.

Mr. Klein. And my question is did Helms personally inform you that you would be in charge of this investigation? Did he instruct you in any way about the investigation that you would be carrying out?

Mr. Solie. That I should do? (Nods in the negative.)

It was understood that I would interview -- I don't like the word "interrogate" -- Nosenko.

Mr. Klein. At what point did that become understood?

Mr. Solie. That was understood before, in August, September, what, of '67.

Mr. Klein. It was understood subsequent to this June 19th, 1967 report.

Mr. Solie. Yes. This was a preliminary which led to further discussions. Well, what do we do?

Mr.Klein. Well, that is what I -am trying to understand.

Mr. Solie. This led to further discussions about what do we do, so it was agreed that the DCI and the DDCI, that Solie would talk to him. If you are looking for a format or a plan, there wasn't any.

Mr. Klein. Well, I was just trying to understand what happened upon completion of this June 19, 1967 report.

Mr. Solie. Well, there was discussion, what do we do? Well, we just agreed I would talk to him. Plans are not made of what is going to happen in the future. It was sufficient that the plan was made I would talk to him.

Mr. Klein. And was it agreed how much time you would spend in this investigation?

Mr. Solie. No.

Mr. Klein. Was it agreed who would work with you in your investigation?

Mr. Solie. No. It was agreed who wouldn't work with me.

Mr. Klein. And who wouldn't work with you?

Mr. Solie. Anybody who had been involved before.

Mr. Klein. And eventually did a particular group of people aid you in this investigation? Did you have a team for this investigation?

Mr. Solie. Complete reports of everything that was being done were made available to the CI staff. They were made available later to individuals, to a certain group from SI, SB division, and all of the information was made available to the FBI.

Mr. Klein. I am more interested in ascertaining whether you had a team that worked under you in this investigation, that aided you in the investigation and ultimately in writing the 1968 report.

Mr. Solie. I had a branch -- after all, I was Deputy Chief of Staff at the time, I had my own office and in addition I had two, three, three professionals from DDO and DDP.

Mr. Klein. They worked with you on this report, on the investigation?

Mr. Solie. On the investigation, correlating material, doing -- these were all experienced persons who were familiar with their files and who were also familiar with what I was doing, and they had access to all.

Mr. Klein. Did they work with you?

Mr. Solie. On collecting the information?

Mr. Klein. And deciding.

Mr. Solie. They assisted me, but as far as the report is

concerned, it is my report.

Mr. Klein. But in the investigation itself, were they assigned to work with you on this investigation? Was anybody?

Mr. Solie. They started working with me, I would say, in March of 1968.

Mr. Klein. And when was the investigation completed?

Mr. Solie. There was no date of completion. You just draw a line somewhere and stop and write your report, and you keep on working.

Mr. Klein. And when did thathappen?

Mr. Solie. About August. I would say, not August, maybe. No, I think you have a report of an interview in August, so it was obviously continuing after that. There was only -- it would have been most -- well, by September, probably.

Mr. Klein. And who were the people that worked with you on the investigation?

Mr. Solie. There were lots of people that worked with me, a number of people.

Mr. Klein. Well, who were the ones that were specifically assigned to work with you?

Mr. Solie. Ben Pepper, Sally Downey, I can't think of his name, one other professional, but in addition I had my own staff.

Mr. Klein. Did your own staff work full time on this

investigation?

Mr. Solie. Well, not full time, perhaps. I had probably half of them helping me. But that's not a lot of staff. But I probably had three professionals at least that were helping me, too.

Mr. Klein. From your own staff.

Mr. Solie. Right.

Mr. Klein. What I am trying to determine is the people and time that was devoted to this, what became the 1968 report. So maybe that will make it clearer.

Mr. Solie. The FBI gave a lot, considerable assistance, was running down domestic leads, investigations conducted by the FBI which were within their responsibility.

Mr. Klein. Was this work done by the FBI completed prior to August of '67 or did it extend through '67 and into '68? Had they run down these leads prior to August of '67?

Mr. Solie. No, they did not have the information on some of it.

Mr. Klein. And the information came from Nosenko?

Mr. Solie. Yes- There were dozens and dozens of cases in which he went down -- I interviewed him for all of the details, al furnished to the FBI, and a considerable amount of work which substantiated what he had said. It makes it clear he had to have been there when it happened or he couldn't have given me the details. This is during the period of mainly,

say, late December of 1967 on.

Certain of the work continued on after October '68.

Mr. Klein. But the report was written when?

Mr. Solie. I think it is about 1 October, probably 2 October.

Mr. Klein. So the FBI worked from December of '68 through somewhere up to October of '68, which was the date of the report.

Mr. Solie. Well, they had no part in my report.

Mr. Klein. Well, the information they ran out --

Mr. Solie. Well, it was continuing, and then after October everything wasn't done. There were investigations or inquiries still being conducted.

Mr. Klein. But I am talking about limting us to the information on which you formed your conclusion for this report.

Mr. Solie. Okay.

Mr. Klein. And that information was run out by the FBI beginning in December of 1967 and running through the summer of '68, is that correct?

Mr. Solie. In addition, certain checks were being run overseas also, within our own facilities.

Mr.Klein. And the number of personnel who were directly working in this investigation at Langley were three people on your own staff, and three others from the Soviet Division.

Mr. Solie. I might have had three, I might have had four from our staff. It is difficult, even when they are doing something like this, it isn't that's all I was doing. I had other responsibilities. It wasn't say, you know, you take a year off and do this. Life isn't that way as far as I am concerned. You have other things to do, too. So your group is giving you support on one thing, and on this case, and they may be giving you support on something else.

Mr. Klein. Did the people working under you, the six or seven, did they also work on other projects during this period?

Mr. Solie. Well, not the three who were assigned from DDP or DDO, no, but they were on, like I said, from about March. My own individuals, my own staff, maybe one day, two days or three days, maybe six of them may be working on it, and maybe you have got to pull somebody off, and the next day you have got only three because other things had to be done, too. This was not just something which I could, say devote a whole year of my life to and not do anything else. It wasn't that way.

Mr. Klein. The three who you mentioned by name, they worked from March of '68 until -- through the summer of '68?

Mr. Solie. Yes, I would say roughly March to September.

Mr. Klein. Did you feel that the personnel assigned to assist you both from the CIA and FBI were adequate for the task?

Mr. Solie. Yes. No one -- I mean, the FBI wasn't assigned.

It was a matter that the work which was being done by the FBI was of considerable assistance in the overall problem.

Mr. Klein. You wrote your report, the beginning of October 1968.

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Did you feel that you had enough time and resources to adequately investigate and write the report at that time?

Mr. Solie. I have no complaints regarding it, and furthermore, if that wasn't my opinion I wouldn't have written it at that time.

Mr. Klein. So you are satisfied with the resources that went into the investigation and with the report itself.

Mr. Solie. Yes, I am satisfied. No so much, sometimes quantity as it is quality. You might have ten people working on something where three or four who are experienced could do the same amount.

Mr. Klein. Who did you speak to among defectors, Russian KGB defectors in doing the investigation on Nosenko?

Mr. Solie. Well, of course, I had Dr. Golitsyn in the past.

Mr. Klein. Did you specifically talk to Golitsyn about any aspect of this investigation?

Mr. Solie. I guess it was '67, I guess, before we started this. But I did not receive the type of cooperation which

I had hoped to receive. I had had my problems with Golitsyn before.

Mr. Klein. What was the reason that you didn't get cooperation from Golitsyn? What was the problem?

Mr. Solie. It wasn't my problem. It was his problem.

Mr.Klein. What was his problem?

Mr. Solie. Personality, I guess. If you don't do things his way, why, then, you don't do it. That is about it. If you don't do it his way, why, he won't cooperate.

And I didn't choose to do it his way.

Mr. Klein. As a result of that, was he -- was his information adequately incorporated into this invstigation or was --

Mr. Solie. His information?

Mr. Klein. Yes.

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr. Klein. I'm sorry?

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr. Klein. So he had some input into this investigation in that he provided information which you were able to use to evaluate Nosenko.

Mr. Solie. Oh, I wouldn't say that. Your question was -- there is a reference in there to whether they knew one another or not, and that is about all.

Mr. Klein. Other than his statements regarding whether he had ever met Nosenko, was he of any use in this investigation

of Nosenko's bona fides?

Mr. Solie. No.

Mr. Klein. Deryabin, Petr Deryabin.

Mr. Solie. Look, I think I should make a remark about this here. He defected in December 1961. Nosenko's first contact with him was in June '62. He didn't defect until January '64. Now, what kind of conclusions are you going to come to when you left the place in December '61. You have no personaly knowledge, right? You can have your opinion, but you have no personal knowledge.

Mr. Klein. Would he have knowledge of the KGB in general?

Mr. Solie. The First Chief Directorate, yes.

Mr. Klein. Would he have any knowledge of the Second Chief Directorate?

Mr. Solie. Very little. You know, Macy's doesn't tell Gimble's over there very much.

Mr. Klein. Was he working for the Second Chief Directorate for a month or two at some point in his career?

Mr. Solie. You mean working for --

Mr. Klein. Working in the Second Chief Directorate.

Mr. Solie. He could have had a little training before he went on an assignment. That's possible. I couldn't tell you for sure. But a month's training is rather common.

Mr. Klein. Petr Deryabin, did he -- did you speak to him as part of your investigation?

Mr. Solie. No.

Mr. Klein. Why didn't you speak to him?

Mr. Solie. I think it is expressed there in the report. I couldn't agree with the conclusions that he had reached in the first place, and furthermore --

Mr. Klein. Which conclusions were these?

Mr. Solie. Well, the conclusion he never was a KGB officer somewhere along the line in the past. In addition, there is nothing too magical about an individual who left the KGB in 1954. That is the end of his personal knowledge. We are now 13 years later, although having some personal knowledge of the KGB until '54 is useful, but I am sure none in the 13 years between there. The amount of information I had seen concering the KGB fastly exceeded the amount that he had seen. So this was an individual who in '54 had left the KGB.

Mr. Klein. In your investigation into Nosenko's bona fides, did you have occasion to read the prior statements made by Nosenko in '64, '65, '66, any prior statements possessed by the Agency?

Mr. Solie. Well, naturally I had received reports back on the questions I had asked in '64. I had seen parts of interviews that had been transcribed, but I don't really think an awful lot of them were transcribed. I had seen some things that had been written, and particular, this 900 page or whatever it is report, which is quite a compilation. So if you were to

ask that question, it would almost have to be a direct question, have I seen this or had I seen that, because I did see something.

Mr. Klein. Did you -- do you know if you saw all the statements that were transcribed?

Mr. Solie. No, I didn't.

Mr. Klein. So you saw some, but you don't know --

Mr. Solie. That's right, because I know in '68 they were going back and getting this and getting that from the previous materials.

So as I say, I had seen some. I didn't see them all. I don't know how many were transcribed. I have no idea.

Mr. Klein. Were the ones that you saw the ones that related to questions that you had posed in '64? Are those the transcripts that you had seen, or did you see others that were not questions posed by you?

Mr. Solie. Yes,I had seen some that were not posed by me. I can't tell you what they were, but again it was nothing like what we later had one, was ream after ream of transcript.

Mr. Klein. I'm sorry. When you say what you later had was ream after ream --

Mr. Solie. What I later had in '67 and '68 was ream after ream of transcripts. I didn't see anything like that in the '64-'65, and how extensive they were I don't know.

Mr.Klein. Other than the transcripts which were of

questions which you had posed which you saw, other than those --

Mr. Solie. They were not transcripts. These were just direct answers.

Mr. Klein. Other than the direct answers --

Mr. Solie. They were not transcripts. They were question and answer type things.

Mr. Klein. What determined which other transcripts of Nosenko you would have seen? Why did you see some and not see a large number of others? What determined whether you would see one or not?

Mr. Solie. Well, it might have been a particular question of some kind, a case I was particularly interested in. It is possible. I didn't see much of it, but at this time for me to say exactly what I saw, I couldn't do it. I was limited.

Mr. Klein. For example, I believe there are approximately 17 volumes of questions asked of Nosenko by Deryabin.

Did you see any of that?

Mr. Solie. Yes. I -- did I see it? I had -- that is one of the things I had done, was translate that into English.

Mr. Klein. Did you read it?

Mr. Solie. Did I read all of it? The answer is no.

Mr. Klein. Did you read some of it?

Mr. Solie. Enough.

Mr. Klein. When you say enough, did you then decide you didn't want to read the rest?

Mr. Solie. Look, when you get into some learned discussions of where there was a KI in 1956, that Nosenko is a liar because he said somebody came to the KGB from the KI, he says ipso facto you are lying, there was no KGB and KI. Well, that is baloney. There was a KI in 1956. It was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but KI didn't die in 1949. In '56 it was still in existence. I think it was in existence until '58.

There are these things, but I had it transcribed, that had not been done before.

Mr. Klein. But then you didn't read most of it?

Mr. Solie. Oh, I wouldn't say I read every word of it, but I read enough of it.

Mr. Klein. Nosenko was questioned. Prior to 1967 he had been questioned about Oswald. Did you read any transcripts of his answers relating to Oswald?

Mr. Solie. I did not see all of that. The interviews concerning Oswald, I believe, were partly done by the FBI and partly done by, particularly after April I think, were done by SR. I have seen parts of it. I may have seen more of it in '67-'68.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever compare the different transcripts relating to Oswald, what Nosenko said to the FBI as opposed to what he said in July of '64, as opposed to what he said in April of '64? Did you ever do that?

Mr. Solie. No. In the first place, there wouldn't be

any transcripts of the FBI anyway.

Mr. Klein. Well, the statements. The FBI had statements.

Did you ever compare that, compare that with what --

Mr. Solie. No, not word by word or line by line, no.

Mr. Klein. Well, did you speak Nosenko about Oswald?

Mr. Solie. No. Well, all I have, you have there. I did a writeup on it. I didn't see that it serously conflicted with what we had.

Mr. Klein. This writeup that you are referring to is a three page writeup, the first page beginning with the word O-s-v-a-l-d, underlined.

Is that the writeup that you are referring to?

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr. Klein. And how did it come about that Nosenko provided this information?

Did you ask him for it?

Mr. Solie. The transcript will reflect I not only asked him to prepare it in his own words on a previous day, a day or two before.

Mr. Klein. You asked him to prepare what in his own words?

I know that the document says something, but I want for the record for you to state what you asked him rather than referring to the document.

Mr. Solie. Why don't I use the record.

Mr. Klein. Sure.

Mr. Solie. The record reflects on 3 January 1968, I asked Nosenko to give me an account of everything he did in the Oswald investigation.

Mr. Klein. And is that three-page --

Mr. Solie. The memo was prepared in his handwritten form and what you have here is a typed copy of the handwritten memo.

Mr. Klein. And did you ever question him about what he wrote?

Mr. Solie. No, because I had no reason to disbelieve him.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever compare what he wrote to what he had said in earlier interrogations by either the FBI or by the CIA?

Mr. Solie. All of this information was provided to the FBI. They would be in a much better position for that judgment than I would be. The information was made available to the FBI.

Mr. Klein. I understand that they had it, so they could have compared it if they wanted to, but did you ever compare it?

Mr. Solie. I did not have all the information on the Oswald investigation. That was an FBI investigation.

Mr. Klein. Well, was it available to you if you had asked the FBI for their reports of what Oswald had said to them?

Mr. Solie. It might, under certain circumstances, but in

this case here, as far as our office was concerned, the Oswald matter was an FBI matter.

Mr. Klein. Did the Oswald matter have any relevance to the bona fides of Nosenko?

Mr. Solie. A factor to be considered.

Mr. Klein. So then to that extent wouldn't it be a CIA matter, too?

Mr. Solie. I fail to see what you are driving at. You are assing that Nosenko was dispatched.

Mr. Klein. No, that is not correct. My purpose is simply to determine to what extent the Oswald aspect of what Nosenko said was investigated. I have no assumption whatsoever about him being dispatched.

Mr. Solie. That he has no more information from what had been obtained from him in various interviews in '64, and had had been furnished to the Bureau.

Mr. Klein. That is precisely my question, is that when you made your judgment in '67, did you compare what he was saying in '67 to what he said in '64? Did you know what he said in '64?

Mr. Solie. There was no conflict as far as I was aware of.

Mr. Klein. That was my question.

Mr. Solie. As far as I am aware of.

Now, again, the Oswald investigation, I don't know the

extent of it. This only concerns one little aspect of Oswald's life.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever have an opportunity to compare all the statements made by Nosenko about Lee Harvey Oswald beginning '62 or '64, whenever he was first -- well, actually not '62, in '64, up to the statement which he wrote out for you in 1968? Is that when this statement was written?

Mr. Solie. I think about the first of January.

Mr.Klein. Did you ever have an opportunity to compare all prior statements with this statement?

Mr. Solie. No, I wouldn't say all prior, no.

Mr.Klein. After Nosenko wrote this account of his contact with Oswald and his knowledge of Oswald, was he questioned by you about what he had written?

Mr. Solie. No.

Mr. Klein. Was he questioned by anybody, to your knowledge?

Mr. Solie. I don't recall whether at a later date the FBI may have touched on Oswald with him. It is possible, but that would have been at a later date.

Mr. Klein. For your report, your 1968 report, he was not questioned.

Mr. Solie. Uh-uh.

Mr. Klein . Now, you mentioned in your 1968 report, in Section G, on page 32 you mention the possibility of Nosenko

having been dispatched in order to provide information on Lee Harvey Oswald.

Do you recall that?

Mr. Solie. Yes. I recognized the possibility.

Mr. Klein. Right. And you examine it, and then you concluded that the following reasons, you listed three, A, B, and C, rendered this possibility unacceptable, and as I say, they are listed on page three and four.

Do you recall the particular reasons, or would you like to read them again?

(The Witness inspected the document.)

Mr. Solie. I think they are all applicable.

Mr. Klein. Would it be your position that these -- this combination of factors, these three reasons listed here, eliminate the possibility that Oswald was -- that Nosenko was dispatched to give us information about Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Solie. In my opinion, yes. I think in matters like this, you have to confine yourself to an opinion, although the opinion has to be based on a lot of investigative work on the entire case.

Mr. Klein. One of the reasons you have listed here is the fact that the information Nosenko provided on Oswald would not have been sufficiently convincing for the U.S. to be expected to conclude that this was unequivocal proof of Soviet non-involvement, and therefore the Soviets would not have dispatched

Nosenko on such a mission.

Have I correctly stated your position?

I actually read much of it, but if you want to --

(The witness inspected the document.)

Mr. Solie. I think the KGB would be a little naive to think that we would accept that as actually establishing a fact.

Mr. Klein. Do you think however that it might not have been the KGB's purpose or thought that this information would represent to the United States unequivocal proof of Soviet non-involvement, but that their intent might have been more subtle to, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that Nosenko's information would be accepted? Do you think that that might be a different way to look at it which might have appealed to the KGB?

Mr. Solie. This is an assumption which I could not accept because, A, Nosenko's first contact was in '62, and if I come to the conclusion he was bona fide in 1962, I couldn't accept that he was sent out in 1964 by the KGB.

Mr. Klein. You are now referring to what you have listed as No. A on page 3.

Mr. Solie. Right.

Mr.Klein. Well, for one moment, if we leave A aside -- I will get to that in a minute -- on B, the one that I was posing to you, do you think that it might be reasonable to assume that

the KGB would send Nosenko if they thought that without any contrary evidence, he could be accepted, especially since it might be argued that many people in the United States would be willing to accept such an explanation because it is very uncomplicated and leaves Oswald as a lone assassin and removes the possibility of a conspiracy involving Russia and the possible ramifications of that?

Mr. Solie. I would think that they would consider that something like that would look fishy, very fishy.

November, I think, around the 23rd, around the time Kennedy was assassinated, here it is January '64, someone shows up with some firsthand knowledge of the Oswald matter. I think they would consider that pretty fishy, a defector. Now, if you -- to do it through sources or something like that, that is a little different matter,but a defector -- what I noticed about the Oswald case, I saw the file, I would think they would consider it fishy, that it would look too fishy, too pat.

Mr. Klein. But that is in fact what happened.

Mr. Solie. No, it is not in fact what happened.

Mr.Klein. What happened, I am saying, is that in effect he did show up in January and say I know about the Oswald case.

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr. Klein. So you are saying that it would be something

that they wouldn't do on purpose.

Mr. Solie. That's right. I don't think -- they are not stupid. They are not ten feet tall, either. But I think they would think it is kind of fishy.

Mr. Klein. Let me also pose one other possibility to you and get your thoughts on it, and this relates to the first points you made as far as Nosenko's first approach being in 1962 prior to the assassination.

My question to you is did you consider the possibility that Nosenko was always a dispatched agent, even in 1962, and that the decision to send him, have him defect in 1964 came as a result of the assassination of the President and the fact that the Soviets decided they wanted to pass information to the United States about Oswald, and they decided to use Nosenko, who possibly had some other mission in '62, but the mission now became to defec t and give the information to the United States?

Was that possibility considered, and what are your feelings about that?

Mr. Solie. Sure, the possibility was considered.

Mr. Klein. And why do you feel that that is not a legitimate or a valid interpretation of what happened?

Mr. Solie. I concluded that he was under his own power when he contacted us in 1962. He did it without the knowledge of the KGB, and he went back to the Soviet Union. If he had been dispatched out, it would have been quite logical that there

would have been contact with him in the Soviet Union, what he wanted, confusing, more the marks of a genuine individual who hadn't made up his mind to defect.

Mr. Klein. Is there any significance to you by the fact that in '62 he said he would never defect and in '64 he defected?

Could it be that the Oswald situation was the reason for the change? And if not, what do you see as the reason for the change?

Mr. Solie. As I remarked before, I think during that period of time he made up his mind. I don't pretend to be a psychologist. I don't think I necessarily have to come up with an airtight motive, either, because I don't think you can. It is not tangible. You can have an opinion, and maybe you are right, maybe you are wrong, but it is not tangible. It is not something you can set on the desk and say this is it.

Mr. Klein. Do you believe that Nosenko has told the truth in what he said relating to Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Solie. Yes, I have no reason to disbelieve him. Again, I am commenting on my specific knowledge. I have not discussed this matter with him. I imagine the Committee has discussed this in detail with him. I imagine --

Mr. Klein. Considering the fact that you haven't discussed it with Nosenko, would it be fair to say, and if not, correct me, would it be fair to say that you, your belief

in Nosenko's credibility as to what he says about Oswald is really based in your belief in his credibility in all the other aspects which you did check out as opposed to specific knowledge of the Oswald part of the case?

Mr. Solie. It has a certain relationship, not necessarily -- it is not necessarily conclusive, but if the person tells you the truth about -- and you can prove it on this, this, this and this, and you have this one you can't quite prove because it is not provable, it would have an effect on your opinion. Then you should look to see are there any holes.

Mr. Klein. Well, I am really giving you the converse of this. Does the fact that you know or believe that he is telling the truth on A, B, C, and D, did that more or less lead you to say that I believe he is telling the truth on Oswald because I really was not able to check out the Oswald aspect of this case?

Mr. Solie. No, I wouldn't quite say that. There were other cases you couldn't quite check out. You have got to believe it or you don't believe it.

Mr. Klein. Then if that wasn't it, what specifically leads you to believe that he was telling the truth when he tells you his account of Oswald?

Mr. Solie. Well, to make me think otherwise, I have got to see some evidence or someone to show me that he is not telling the truth. You have to have some contrary information.

And I have seen no contrary information.

Mr.Klein. So you start off with a presumption that he is telling the truth, and that has to be rebutted to some extent in order to question his statement on Oswald.

Mr. Solie. Well, your opinion of something is, you know, an opinion is an opinion. Some things are provable and some things are not provable.

Mr.Klein. Well, I guess I -- I am not trying to get into a word game. What I am really saying is he has got three pages that he has written out and given to you.

Mr. Solie. Right.

Mr. Klein. And you have told me that you believe what he says, and I am trying to understand specifically what you base your belief on, and that these three pages are correct.

Mr. Solie. I didn't have a part in the Oswald investigation. I did not talk to Nosenko in 1964 concerning the Oswald case, or any other case. It is regretable that this whole situation arises and in 1967 we are trying to resolve something that should have been resolved in 1964. So Oswald was gone over and over and over in 1964 by the FBI, by down there. I see nothing that says it wasn't true. What am I supposed to do, go over this again point by point by point?

Is there anything I have a reason to disbelieve his statement?

Mr. Klein. But when you say it was gone over in 1964, the

people who were conducting the interrogations with the CIA in '64 did not believe that Nosenko was credible, is that correct?

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr. Klein. So as far as the CIA was concerned, nobody had ever said that Nosenko was credible when he talked about Oswald.

So my question to you is, you can't base your belief that Nosenko was credible when he talks about Oswald on what the CIA had done.

Mr. Solie. And the FBI. The FBI talked to him, too.

Mr. Klein. Are you saying that you based your belief in his credibility about Oswald on the FBI, what they found?

Mr. Solie. No.

Mr. Klein. Let me make it simpler. I am trying to make clear my question. When I read your lengthy report, in many areas you go into long discussions as to why you have accepted a particular claim by Nosenko, why you have accepted he was a KGB officer, why you have accepted he is who he says he is, and why you have accepted that he served in a particular department he says he served.

My question is -- and you give specifics. You checked the things out. My question is on what do you base your belief that he is telling the truth about Oswald, because I have read no specifics in the report or anywhere else explaining that?

Mr. Solie. Well, tell me what is there there that is

checkable?

Mr. Klein. I am not saying that there is. I am asking you if there was anything that was checked out, or if there was anything that was done at all to determine whether he was credible when he spoke about Oswald?

Mr. Solie. Well, this is one of the factors I had to consider in connection with the entire case. I have accepted it, and I will continue to accept it until someone can show me some contrary evidence, not opinion.

Mr.Klein. One of the things that Nosenko states is that the KGB never personally interviewed Oswald. They didn't interview Oswald when Oswald stated he wanted to defect, and they didn't interview Oswald when they decided to allow him to stay in Russia and sent him to Minsk.

Do you, in your opinion, based on your knowledge of Nosenko, based on your knowledge of the Oswald case, based on your knowledge of KGB -procedures and techniques, do you find Nosenko credible when he says they never interviewed Oswald?

Mr. Solie. The question of what is meant by interview, a formal interview, taking him down to the local KGB headquarters, if that is what is meant --

Mr. Klein. What I am referring to is a KGB officer speaking face to face with Oswald, maybe not identifying himself as a KGB officer, but speaking to him under whatever identity he chooses to call himself. Nosenko says that never happened. My question

to you is do you find this credible?

Mr. Solie. Speaking to the best of his knowledge, I will have to -- I will accept it.

Mr. Klein. Why would you accept that?

Mr. Solie. Because it could happen.

Now, that wouldn't say that the KGB didn't have a large book on him.

Mr. Klein. Was any work ever done to check out the feasibility of statements such as this? For example, checking to see what the experiences of other defectors were, whether they ever were debriefed by KGB agents? Was that ever done, to your knowledge?

Mr. Solie. No, not unless the individual had been interviewed for some other reason, but not to check against the Oswald case because the Oswald investigation was an FBI investigation.

Now, whether there have been some who were in Russia in a proximate period of time and had been interviewed, it is very possible. You would almost have to confine yourself to a proximate period of time because the international situation changed from year to year. So the comparison should be within the approximate period of time.

Mr. Klein. Nosenko was given how many lie detector tests, to your knowledge?

Mr. Solie. Three.

Mr. Klein. Do you consider any or all of these tests to have been valid?

Mr. Solie. I consider the last test to be a completely valid test, that is, the 1968 test. I would prefer that you in actual discussion concerning the polygraph techniques with someone else from our office because I am not an operator.

Mr. Klein. I understand that, and I will only confine myself to questions relating to how you incorporated the lie detector information into your report.

The first two tests you do not consider them to be valid, is that correct?

Mr. Solie. I consider them not only to not be valid, to be completely invalid.

Mr. Klein. Is that based on your own knowledge of lie detector tests and procedures, or is it based on what some expert has told you and you have accepted that, and it has become your opinion?

Mr. Solie. I have certain knowledge concerning accepted procedures, polygraph procedures. Neither of these were in any way within the realm of accepted procedures.

Mr. Klein. Could you tell me how they departed from accepted procedures?

Mr. Solie. Well, I would prefer the details --

Mr. Klein. Well, I am, as I say, just to your knowledge. You don't have to tell me anything that was told you by anybody,

but in your knowledge of lie detector tests --

Mr. Solie. The 1964 went on the assumption that it was already established that he was dispatched. The test was run and it was completely run on that basis. It was just invalid.

Mr. Klein. Was the operator, to your knowledge, affiliated with the Agency?

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr.Klein. The questions that he asked, have you read them, or at some time did you read them?

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Was there anything improper about the questions themselves?

Mr. Solie. No.

Mr. Klein. Was there anything improper about the room that the test was given in, the physical surrounding?

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr. Klein. What was improper about it?

Mr. Solie. The whole thing was -- the whole thing was conducted on the basis that he was already guilty.

Mr. Klein. Could you be more specific by that?

How was it conducted on that basis? What did they do?

Mr. Solie. I would like to discuss something with you.

Mr. Klein. Now, let me make it clear that I want you to tell me what you personally know. If you know a procedure was used, and you know that that procedure was not the standard

procedure, then that is what I want to discuss with you. I don't want you to discuss with me something where some expert explained something to you and you are taking his word for it. In that case I will go to the experts.

Mr. Solie. The reactions on the '64 test were inconsistent with various questions. There was no challenge being made. He was being accused of being a Soviet agent, that's it. No challenge was made. No effort was made to determine if -- what reactions, what were the basis for the reactions. No effort was made, it was just a way you do not run a polygraph test.

Mr. Klein. To your knowledge, to your personal knowledge, do they -- how would a proper test be run that was different from how this test was run? What would be said to the subject that was not said here, or what wouldn't be said that was said here?

Mr. Solie. Well, if there were a reaction, an effort would be made to determine the cause of the reaction.

Mr.Klein. What kind of an effort? How would that be done?

Mr. Solie. Discussion with the operator.

Mr. Klein. A discussion between the operator and the subject?

Mr. Solie. And the subject, yes.

Mr. Klein. And what would that discussion be? Could you give me an example of what the operator would say?

Mr. Solie. Well, reactions, polygraph reactions can be caused by numerous factors. Some of the factors that cause the reaction may not indicate the individual is lying about something. It may be something, some other -- some cause, that might have caused the reaction. It is not that the individual is lying. Something else goes through his mind.

Mr. Klein. And how do you know that the operator in the first two tests did not discuss with the subject his reactions?

Mr.Solie. Well, the record reflects it.

Mr. Klein. And in the third test does the record reflect that the operator did discuss the reactions?

Mr. Solie. Well, there were no significant reactions.

Mr. Klein. Were the operators in the first two tests Agency contracted operators, to your knowledge?

Mr. Solie. The same operator was the first in '64 and in '66.

Mr. Klein. It was the same operator.

Mr. Solie. At that time he was under -- he was employed by the Soviet Russia division in '66. He was no longer with the office of Security.

Mr. Klein. And to your knowledge, was he instructed to use procedures that were not recognized lie detector, polygraph procedures?

Mr. Solie. I have to assume he was because that is what he did.

Mr. Klein. Did you personally read the transcripts where he -- to know that he did not discuss the reactions with the subject?

Mr. Solie. I have seen the actual report which is self-explanatory.

Mr. Klein. Would his discussions with the subject, if there were any, would they normally be included in the report?

Mr. Solie. Yes, at least the indication that there was a reaction to a certain area, and to clarify it.

Mr. Klein. Have you ever spoken to the operator about these two tests?

Mr. Solie. Which one?

Mr. Klein. The one who gave the first two tests.

Mr. Solie. No.

Mr. Klein. To your knowledge, was he ever asked why he did not discuss the reactions with the subject?

Mr. Solie. I did not have responsibility at the time of the '64 or '66.

Mr. Klein. I am talking about your investigation in '67.

Mr. Solie. And at the time in '67, I don't believe the individual was still employed. He might have been. I don't know. But I surely would not have gone to him for advice. I would not have gone to him for advice.

Mr. Klein. I am not really asking about advice as much as asking about why he did or did not do certain things when he

test.

Mr. Solie. It was already determined what they were going to do, how it was going to be done.

Mr. Klein. When you say it was already determined, are you referring to the fact that the lie detector operator was told that regardless of the conclusions reached by the operator, that the subject would be told he was lying?

Is that what you are referring to?

Mr. Solie. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Which I believe appears in the report, is that correct?

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Is it your opinion that the mere fact that the operator was told this invalidates the test?

Mr. Solie. Yes.

If he runs his test in that way, yes.

Mr. Klein. Does it necessarily affect the conclusion reached by the operator, the fact that the subject will later be told, when he has completed the test, that he failed. Does that necessarily invalidate the test?

Mr. Solie. Yes,I would say so. A polygraph test is supposed to be given for purposes of an indication of whether the individual is lying or telling -the truth, and that is just what it should be.

Mr. Klein. I understand that, but I --

Solie. If you already concluded you are going to tell him he is lying, how is it going to make it valid?

Mr.Klein. My question is that if you tell him he is lying, after he has finished taking the test, how will that affect the test itself?

Is it your contention that the operator was told that in his report he was to find Nosenko lying as opposed to being told at the conclusion of the test we will tell Nosenko that he was lying, but you can write your report up as it actually was, if he wasn't lying you can write that. If he was, you can write that.

Mr. Solie. I think I would have to let the report itself speak for itself. You are referring to the April '64 and I will let the report speak for itself.

However, in '67 I pointed out some very inconsistent reactions which were so inconsistent that to me they by themselves would have invalidated the test.

Mr. Klein. Referring to the inconsistencies that you pointed out, is it your opinion that -- well, let me withdraw that.

Referring to the inconsistencies you point out in the answers to the lie detector operator's questions, is it your opinion that mere inconsistent answers invalidate the findings?

Mr. Solie. Invalidate the findings? You couldn't find any -- if you couldn't come to any conclusions, you would have

to do something further in order to resolve it. You haven't proved it, you haven't disproved it.

Mr. Klein. If a man comes out with reactions that are found to be deceptive on ten questions and if some of those questions are contradictory, is it your opinion, then, that the whole test is invalid, or could it be that he is lying on a number of those questions and others you cannot say one way or the other whether he is telling the truth or not?

Mr. Solie. I don't believe I can hardly answer this type question.

Mr. Klein. Well, let me make one thing clear.

Is your analysis of these questions, where you go over the inconsistencies in the answers, is that a layman's analysis or is it an analysis based on knowledge of polygraph techniques and procedures?

Mr. Solie. I am not an operator.

Mr. Klein. Had you discussed that type of analysis, where you show that he couldn't be lying about questions because they are mutually contradictory, had you discussed that with a polygraph expert?

Mr. Solie. I can't be sure whether I did or not. However I have suitable knowledge concerning the use of a polygraph. I am not an operator.

Mr.Klein. The point I was trying to get at earlier, and I confess it was not very clear when I asked the question was

simply logically, as a layman, I understand the point you are making but experience teaches that sometimes scientific tests, lie detectors, whatever, do not operate by logic, and that there might be an explanation that a layman may not grasp that a lie detector expert would.

Mr. Solie. Correct.

Mr.Klein. And I am trying to understand whether your conclusions were run by such an expert to determine if the logics here are valid.

Mr. Solie. I think the conclusion which we reached in that was that the polygraph really didn't prove one way or the other. My recollection is that is the way it is written up in '67. It is just inconclusive.

Mr. Klein. I think that is a fair characterization, but my point is that the analysis went into great detail to show how he could not be lying about question 1 and question 2, because question 1 and question 2 were contradictory. He had to be telling lthe truth about one if he was lying about the other.

Mr. Solie. That's right. I point out the inconsistencies, but it only conclusion it led to I believe was in general it was inconclusive.

Mr. Klein. And my question was, had that type of analysis ever been discussed with a professional polygraph expert?

Mr. Solie. Well, I really don't think I would need to

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that particular point because on the face of it they are inconsistent.

Mr. Klein. After you completed this report, the 1968 report, did you have an opportunity to meet with Helms?

Mr. Solie. I met with Helms in probably November, maybe early November 1968.

Mr. Klein. What was said at that time?

Mr. Solie. There was a general -- there was a meeting in Helms' conference room attended by I think Admiral Taylor must have been there, Gordon Stewart, Helms, the Chief SI at that time, two from the CI staff.

Mr. Klein. Do you remember this specifically, the people?

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Who were they, and also the Chief of the SI Divisoin.

Mr. Solie. That was Kingsley, Ralph Kingsley, Gordon Stewart, I believe, was NIG, Admiral Taylor, Mr. Helms, Scottie Mylar, and Ray Rocce from the CI Staff; the Director of Security, Howard Osborne, myself and maybe one else I can't think of.

Mr. Klein. And what was discussed at that meeting?

Mr. Solie. The discussion was that report.

Mr. Klein. YOur report.

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr. Klein. And what was decided?

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Mr. Solie. Well, the decision was that we are going to move out on this. There was a little, some comment, some contrary comments from Mylar and Rocce, but they didn't really have an answer, and neither had they prepared a paper presenting their views. So it was sort of decided we would move on this case and see what happens, moved toward resettlement. This was the big thing in their mind was let's get some movement out, and you can see why. To me that was the important thing anyway, after it reached the point here. So we moved in that direction.

Mr. Klein. In the direction of getting Nosenko out of isolation.

Well, he was already out of isolation, is that correct?

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr. Klein. What specifically did you decide to do after that meeting or as a result of that meeting?

Mr. Solie. Start to put him out in the economy.

Mr.Klein. Was it agreed at that time that he was at least according to the available evidence bona fide?

Mr. Solie. Well, there were two dissenters.

Mr.Klein. I understand that, but was the sense of the meeting that he was bona fide?

Mr. Solie. I said there was two dissenters. The others were inclined to go along with my assessment there.

Mr. Klein. My question is, was it specifically said at that meeting that the new position of the Agency would be that

Nosenko was bona fide, did that result at that time?

Mr. Solie. You don't change things quite that fast.

Mr. Klein. Well, then, tell me how it does get changed.

Mr. Solie. The decision was made that we are going to move forward on this. There was some dissent, and they opted to rebut it, but they didn't choose to do it. The decision was made we were going to move on the case.

Mr. Klein. By move you say get him out into the economy is what you said?

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr. Klein. You mean let him have a house?

Mr.Solie. Lead a normal life, and that is what happened.

Mr. Klein. When you were first given the assignment of investigating Nosenko, did you feel that you had to come out one way or the other?

Mr. Solie. No.

Mr. Klein. Did you feel that you had to make a decision, though, and if not make a particular decision, but reach a decision, he is bona fide or he is not bona fide?

Mr. Solie. No.

Mr.Klein. Do you think it would have been acceptable after completion of your investigation to come in and say I don't know?

Mr. Solie. Sure, they would accept it.

Mr. Klein. By acceptable, first, for you personally?

Mr. Solie. Well, it wouldn't be acceptable for me personally.

Mr. Klein. You wouldn't have been --

Mr. Solie. Because I wouldn't have felt I had done my job.

Mr. Klein. So you felt that you had to reach a conclusion in this question of whether he was bona fide.

Mr. Solie. That's right, but what the conclusion was was --

Mr.Klein. You are aware of the FBI source named Fedor?

Mr. Solie. I don't know whether I should discuss sources.

Mr. Klein. I won't ask you to specifically discuss anything about the source. Just I am interested in what part if any investigation of this source played in your investigation.

(Pause)

Mr. Klein. As I say, I won't ask you substantively what this source stated about the investigation, simply did you have an opportunity to check out the credibility of this source? That is my question.

Mr. Solie. That would not have been part of my job as regards what you are speaking of. As regards any effect or relationship with the Nosenko case, it was considered.

Mr. Klein. You say it was considered? But was anything done other than considering, checking it out?

Mr. Solie. Well, as regards sources, I think I would need

to defer discussion concerning that point.

Mr.Klein. Could you possibly make a phone call to somebody and explain that all I want to know is not anything substantive except was that particular source in any way investigated as a result of your investigation? Did you investigate that person, that source?

Mr. Solie. Did I investigate that source?

Mr. Klein. The bona fides of that source?

Mr. Solie. The answer is no.

You are speaking of personally.

Mr. Klein. Well, have you ever had an opportunity to investigate the bona fides of that source?

Mr. Solie. No.

Mr. Klein. Do you know or did you then believe that the bona fides of that source was related to the question of whether Nosenko was bona fide?

Mr. Solie. There is always a possibility of a relationship. I would prefer, I think, when you get into sensitive sources, possible sensitive sources and areas, methods area, I think I should probably check back with the authority on this particular thing.

Mr. Klein. Would you like to make a phone call? Maybe we can finish and you can make a phone call, the questions I have given you. That is the only question I am going to ask you, but maybe we will wait, I will finish the others,and

then maybe you can make a phone call just about that.

I don't have too much more.

Would it be fair to say that in your 1968 report that you wrote from the premise that Nosenko is bona fide unless there is some evidence to show that he is not?

Mr. Solie. I am not sure what your statement implies here.

Mr. Klein. No implication. Simply I think that you at some point made, and I don't know whether in our interview today you said something about it in regard to Oswald, and I may be wrong, but I think somewhere I read something which gave me the impression that that was your starting point, that if there is no implication. Simply I want to know if my reading of it was correct, that you started on the premise that he is bona fide and then looked for evidence to the contrary, and in the absence of any to the contrary, concluded he was bona fide.

Mr. Solie. I didn't start on the premise of anything because the premise implies the preconceived conclusion, and this is what I didn't have. I was trying to look at both sides. So sure, at some point in time I would be glad to have some ideas, but when I started out, if I had considered he was bad, I would be just as willing to call him bad as I would be to call him good. So I didn't start out with any premise that he was bad or good.

Mr. Klein. Well, if you don't start out with a premise

either way and then there are points where you just can't find any evidence one way or the other--

Mr. Solie. Uh-huh.

Mr. Klein. Now, then, do you determine that he is telling the truth or not telling the truth about those points?

Mr. Solie. Well, you have to come to an opinion. That is all you can do.

Mr. Klein. Well, that is what I was getting at. It seems to me that you might have to make some decision to begin with, that in those situations you will either believe him unless something comes up to show that he is lying, or in those situations you will disbelieve him unless you can find something to show he is telling the truth.

And my question is, is that a fair analysis?

Mr. Solie. On certain things you can't prove and you can't disprove, and that is about it.

Mr.Klein. During the time that you were investigating Nosenko in '67 and '68, approximately how often did you speak to Nosenko?

Mr. Solie. At first it was probably five days a week, and sometimes it may have been three days a week, four days a week. It was very regular.

Mr. Klein. And were you always discussing the facts of the case, the information that you were checking out?

Mr. Solie. Always? We have to spend a little time in the

circumstances on social amenities. I might shoot him a few games of pool or something like that. So it was a part of trying to move along on the case.

Mr. Klein. At what point did you make up your mind that Nosenko was bona fide, approximately?

Mr. Solie. Well, I would have to say prior to October 2nd, 1968, but if you were to try to fix a date, I couldn't give any date.

Mr. Klein. Was it sometime in '68?

Mr. Solie. I think so. It wasn't early '68, either.

I had two problems in that case. One is, is he who he says he is. That is one problem. And the second one, was he dispatched. Those were two things you had to consider, and I don't know if you can draw conclusions on the one without considering the other. So there were two things to consider, plus others, but I mean, there were two primary.

Mr. Klein. Would it be fair to say that Lee Harvey Oswald was a minor aspect of the investigation into Nosenko's bona fides?

Mr. Solie. No.

Mr. Klein. How would you characterize the Oswald aspect?

Mr. Solie. It was an important part to be considered.

Mr. Klein. Do you think that it received the full consideration and the time and effort to investigate it, the Lee Harvey Oswald aspect?

Mr.Solie. There was a tremendous amount of investigation done in '64.

Mr. Klein. If it were to be proven that Nosenko was not truthful in his relation, in what he said about Lee Harvey Oswald, would that be significant as to the question of whether Nosenko was bona fide?

Mr. Solie. It would be something I would have to consider.

Mr. Klein. Do you think it is possible that he could be lying about Oswald and still be bona fide?

Mr. Solie. I do not consider that he was lying about Oswald.

Mr. Klein. I'm sorry?

Mr. Solie. I do not consider it.

Mr. Klein. If it were proven that he was lying about Oswald, do you think that that would change your opinion as to whether he was bona fide?

Mr. Solie. It sure would.

Mr. Klein. When you wrote you 1968 report, did you write it all yourself?

Mr. Solie. Yes, except on colle ting some information, pulling together on some of those items, I had some assistance. As far as writing the report was concerned, I had the final report. I mean, naturally there were discussions.

Mr. Klein. Other than checking out leads for you, what else did the FBI contribute to the actual report?

Mr. Solie. The FBI?

Mr. Klein. Yes.

Mr. Solie. The FBI contributed nothing to that report. They had never seen it until after it was published.

Mr. Klein. Did you discuss the report with them, with FBI agents or FBI representatives?

Mr. Solie. We discussed various aspects of the case, various leads. That was continually going on. I was regularly fulfilling some requirements for the Bureau. They wanted me to do this, to do that.

Mr. Klein. So you discussed things you wanted them to check out as far as leads given by Nosenko?

Mr. Solie. Yes, and also I would interview Nosenko concerning things they wanted covered.

Mr. Klein. Did you discuss with the FBI Oswald?

Mr.Solie. As such, I can't recall any detailed discussions on Oswald now.

I couldn't say there wasn't something, but a detailed discussion, no.

Mr. Klein. Okay. I have finished.

One or two things. First, I gave you prior to us starting, I gave you a copy of our rules and our resolution.

Isthat correct?

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr. Klein. And you had an opportunity to read them and

you have them before you right now, is that correct?

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr. Klein. And this statement by you is a voluntary statement

Mr. Solie. Yes.

Mr.Klein. And I would like to thank you on behalf of the Committee for sitting with us and speaking to us, and also give you an opportunity, if there is anything you want to say at this point, go right ahead.

Mr. Solie. I have no comment. I just hope I have been able to answer your questions, and I thank you for the way you have handled it.

(Whereupon, at 2:11 o'clock p.m., the Deposition in the above-entitled matter was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Elizabeth Berning, the officer before whom the foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was taken by Alfred H. Ward, stenomask report, and thereafter reduced to teypwriting under his direction; that I am neither counsel for, nore related to any of the parties to the action in which this deposition was tkane, and further, that I am not a relative of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

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Notary Public in and for the
District of Columbia

My Commission expires _____.

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I, Alfred H. Ward, stenomask reporter, do hereby certify that the testimony of the witness which appears in the foregoing deposition was taken by me by stenomask and therafter reduced to typewriting under my direction; that said deposition is a true record of the testimony given by said witness; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this deposition was taken, and further, that I am not a relative or employee of any

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