Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA

RECORD NUMBER : 180-10110-10007

RECORD SERIES : SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 014724 (FOLDER 1)

February 9, 1996

Status of Document: Open in Full

After consultation with appropriate Federal agencies, the Review Board determined that the attached record from the House Select Committee on Assassinations may now be opened in full -- as referenced in the Federal Register notice for the Board's 12/13/95 meeting.

Date: 07/17/95

Page: 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: HSCA

FROM: NOSENKO, YURI

TO:

TITLE: TESTIMONY OF YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO

DATE: 06/19/78

PAGES: 99

SUBJECTS: NOSENKO, YURI, TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE [R]

KGB, METHODOLOGY

KGB, FILES

CIA, METHODOLOGY

FBI, METHODOLOGY

NOSENKO, YURI, ASSOCIATION WITH OSWALD [R]

OSWALD, LEE, RUSSIAN PERIOD

MEXICO CITY

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL

CURRENT STATUS: OPEN

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 12/13/95

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS: Box 4.

JFK ASSASSINATION COLLECTION IDENTIFICATION FORM

	Record Number: /80 - /0/10 - /0007
	Record Series: SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY
	Agency File Number: 014724 (Folder 1)
	Originator: HSCA
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	To:R
	Title: Testimony of Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko R
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	Classification: U C S T
	Restrictions: Open 1A 1B 1C 2 3 4 5 D
	Current Status: O X
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	Comments:

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Washington, D.C.

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
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Monday, June 19, 1978

U.S. House of Representatives,

Select Committee on Assassinations,

Subcommittee on the Assassination
of John F. Kennedy

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:00 o'clock p.m., in Room 1-D, Headquarters, Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia, the Honorable Louis Stokes (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Stokes, Define, Preyer, Fauntroy, Burke, Sawyer, Dodd, Ford, Fithian and Edgar.

Also present: G. R. Blakey, G. Cornwell, E. Berning, J. Smith, R. C. Morrison, K. Klein and M. Goldsmith.

The Chairman. At this time we will open the hearing.

Will you read for the record those members officially
designated?

At this time the Chair will entertain a motion to go into executive session.

Mr. Dodd. I so move, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. That should be for today's hearing

and one subsequent day, to be held in executive session. On the basis of information obtained by the Committee, the Committee believes the evidence or testimony may tend to defame, degrade or incriminate people in accordance with Section 2(k)(5) and 116 of the Rules of the House and Committee Rule 3.3(5) requires such hearings to be in executive session.

Mr. Dodd?

Mr. Dodd. I so move, Mr. Chairman, in accordance with those rules, that the Committee be closed.

The Chairman. It has been properly moved that this Committee go into executive session.

The Clerk will call the roll.

Ms. Berning. Mr. Stokes?

The Chairman. Aye.

Ms. Berning. Mr. Devine?

Mr. Devine. Aye.

Ms. Berning. Mr. Preyer?

Mr. Preyer. Aye.

Ms. Berning. Mr. McKinney?

(No response.)

Ms. Berning. Mr. Fauntroy?

Mr. Fauntroy. Aye.

Ms. Berning. Mr. Thone?

(No response.)

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1	Ms. Berning. Mrs. Burke?
2	Mrs. Burke. Aye.
3	Ms. Berning. Mr. Sawyer?
4	Mr. Sawyer. Aye.
5	Ms. Berning. Mr. Dodd?
ó	Mr. Dodd. Aye.
7	Ms. Berning. Mr. Fithian?
8	Mr. Fithian. Aye.
9	Ms. Berning. Mr. Edgar?
10	Mr. Edgar. Aye.
11	Ms. Berning. Ten ayes, Mr. Chairman.
12	The Chairman. Ten members having voted in the affirmativ
13	the meeting is now in executive session and members of the
14	public are thereby excluded.
15	Will the witness at this time stand and be sworn?
ić	Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you will
17	give before this Committee is the truth, and nothing but the
18	truth, so help you God?
19	Mr. Nosenko. I do.
20	The Chairman. You may be seated.
21	The Chair will ask the Witness if he has been given a
22	copy of the Committee Rules?
23	Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir, I have them.
24	The Chairman. Have you been subpoenaed to appear

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before this Committee or are you appearing voluntarily?

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Mr. Nosenko. I am appearing voluntarily.

The Chairman. Thank you.

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At this time it is my obligation to advise you that this Committee has been constituted by virtue of a resolution passed by the House of Representatives, United States Congress and part of the resolution by which we were constituted, in order to investigate the death of the late John F. Kennedy, states under House Resolution 222 that the Committee shall conduct a full and complete investigation to study the circumstances surrounding the assassination and death of President John F. Kennedy, including determining whether the existing laws of the United States Congress concerning the protection of the President and the investigatory jurisdiction and capability of agencies and departments are adequate in their provision and enforcement, and whether there was a disclosure of evidence and information among the agencies and departments of the United States Government, and whether any evidence or information not in the possession of an agency or department would have been of assistance in investigating the assassination and why such information was not provided or collected by that agency or department, and to make recommendations to the House if the Select Committee deems it appropriate, for the amendment of existing legislation or the enactment of new legislation.

At this point, the Chair will recognize counsel for the Committee. You may proceed to question the witness.



Mr. Klein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


Before we begin, I would like to note for the record that in addition to a stenographer taking stenographic notes of this hearing, that it is also being recorded on tape. It has been agreed that this hearing will be taped pursuant to certain conditions, and these conditions are being set down because of the security procedures involved, in that the witness fears any permanent tape being made of his voice, that it might get into the hands of KGB agents and this would greatly endanger his own physical well-being.

The conditions that are being agreed upon are that it will be taped with a single purpose of verifying the transcript and that it does not constitute an agency record; and that the tapes will be placed in a sealed envelope and handed to Mr. Gmirkin who is a CIA agency employee. He will keep them for retention until they are required for review at CIA Headquarters by the reporter. The reporter will review those tapes at CIA Headquarters and he will be accompanied by a designated staff member of this Committee. Upon completion of the review of the tape by the stenographer, the tapes will be returned to Mr. Gmirkin. He will first erase them and then arrange for the destruction of these tapes.

Would you please state your name for the record?

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TESTIMONY OF YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO

Mr. Nosenko. My name is Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko.

Mr. Klein. Mr. Nosenko, do you have any difficulty speaking or understanding English?

Mr. Nosenko. I understand English. I can speak. Of course, it is not perfect language, but I understand and I think I can deliver my thoughts.

Mr. Klein. You don't need any interpreter for this hearing?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Klein. You are appearing before this Committee voluntarily?

Mr. Nosenko. Absolutely.

Mr. Klein. Prior to today, you have been given a copy of the rules of this Committee?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. I would like you to listen to the following paragraphs of biographical data and tell us if they are correct.

Your name is Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko. You were born the 30th of October, 1927, in Nikolayev, Ukraine, in the Soviet Union?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. As a child you lived in Nikolayev in the
Ukraine and in Leningrad, where your father, Ivan Nosenko, was
a prominent Soviet shipbuilding engineer. At the time of his

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
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death in 1956, your father was a Soviet Minister of Shipbuilding in Moscow?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. As a teenager, during World War II, you attended various naval training schools. At the end of the war you entered the Institute of International Relations in Moscow where you specialized in International law and English?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. In early 1953 you arranged for a transfer to the KGB Second Chief Directorate, where you were assigned as a counterintelligence officer in the American Embassy Section of the American Department?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. As a member of the embassy section you were targeted against American correspondents and U.S. Army personnel residing in Moscow?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. In June of 1955 you transferred to the Tourist Section of the Seventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. In 1958 you joined the newly created American British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. In January, 1960, you were transferred to the

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
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American Embassy Section of the American Department? 1 2 Right. Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Klein. In March, 1962, you accompanied the Soviet 3 delegation to the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, 4 Switzerland as a security escort. You remained in Switzerland 5 until the 15th of June, 1962, at which time you returned to the Soviet Union and resumed your duties in the American-7 British Commonwealth Section? Mr. Nosenko. In the Seventh Department of the Second 10 Chief Directorate. Mr. Klein. In January, 1964, you again traveled to Switz 11 erland as a security escort for the Soviet delegation and at that time you defected. On 4 February 1964, you were subsequently 13 brought to the United States? 15 Mr. Nosenko. Right. Mr. Klein. Mr. Nosenko, are you voluntarily appearing 16 17 before this Committee without a lawyer? 18 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir. Mr. Klein. Would you tell the Committee what is the KGB? 19 Mr. Nosenko. KGB is the Committee of State Security under 20 the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union. 21 22 Klein. What is its function? 23 Mr. Nosenko. Secret police, it is intelligence, counterintelligence. More correctly to say, if you take CIA, FBI,

all other agencies who are dealing, working in the field of

intelligence, put in one fist, this is the KGB.

Mr. Klein. You worked for the First and the Seventh Departments of the Second Chief Directorate, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. What is the function of the Second Chief Directorate?

Mr. Nosenko. Prior to 1960 the Second Chief Directorate was responsible for counterintelligence work against all foreigners coming to the Soviet Union, diplomats, tourists, businessmen, delegations, private visitors.

But in 1960, from January, 1960, the Second Chief

Directorate in process of reorganization, took in one

fist, put all counterintelligence services which were prior

different services in the KGB. Let us say prior to 1960 KGB

were involved in counterintelligence work six different outfits.

Second Chief Directorate working against all foreigners,

counterintelligence work; Third Chief Directorate counter
intelligence work against all Soviet armed forces. Fourth

Directorate counterintelligence work against Soviet intelligencia;

Fifth Directorate counterintelligence work in Soviet industry,

economy; Sixth Directorate, counterintelligence work in

transport; and Department K counterintelligence worked on all

atomic industry enterprises.

In 1960 it was made reorganization sponsored by the Central Committee of the Communist Party Soviet Union, and personally

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by Khrushchev, on the proposal of the Chairman of KGB, former Chairman, Shelepin, and they put all these counterintelligence outfits in Second Chief Directorate, excluding Third Chief Directorate, which was dealing with counterintelligence in all armed forces. From 1960 and up to my defection, Second Chief Directorate was responsible for the whole counterintelligence work, excluding the armed forces.

Mr. Klein. You also worked in the Seventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate. What is the function of the Seventh Department?

Mr. Nosenko. The Seventh Department was responsible for the work, counterintelligence work, against all foreign tourists coming to visit Soviet Union, excluding Soviet Bloc countries. I mean Czechoslavakia, Poland, Hungary, and this type.

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Mr. Klein. What were your responsibilities when you worked in the Seventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate?

Mr. Nosenko. In the period 1955 up until January, 1960, I was working in Anglo-American Section -- no, first of all, '55 to '57, it was one section, against all tourists. In 1958 they were created on this base of one section, two sections to work against tourists, one section against United States, Britain, and CAnada, and the other section against all other countries. I was working in the Anglo-American Section.

From 1960 the whole department was working against tourists; it was expanding because the tourists were expanding, the amount of tourists coming Soviet Union was expanding and

KGB in Moscow responsible Seventh Department for work against tourists also was expanding its apparatus.

Mr. Klein. Was it part of your job to try to entrap American and British tourists and recruit them for the KGB?

Mr. Klein. How did you try to entrap them?

Mr. Nosenko. Absolutely right.

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Mr. Nosenko. The main task in the work, counterintelligence work, of the KGB against tourists, first of all, to spot
the so-called interesting targets. Who are interesting
targets? Speaking about American tourists, anyone on whom the
KGB has any information that he is an officer of American
intelligence community or suspected in connection with American

Anyone who is working for Federal Government of the United States, number one target.

intelligence community, number one target.

Anyone who is specialist in any field on Soviet Union or Russia, if it will be language, history, law, economy, whatever it will be, it is also an interesting target.

All students, young people studying Russian language,
Russian history, Russian economy, whatever concerns the Soviet
Union or Russia, are interesting targets because there is always
the possibility that they in future will be working for the
Federal Government, for the State Department, for the Congress,
or maybe for intelligence community of the United States.

Besides that, anyone who has any Russian roots, if he was

not himself born in Russia but his parents, grandparents, were born in Russia, is an interesting target.

The last one, any tourist who comes to the Soviet Union second time automatically becomes an interesting target.


This is the category of people against whom Seventh

Department, Second Chief Directorate, was in the main working.

What I wanted to stress that KGB doesn't have possibility and capability to cover all tourists; they don't even have capability to cover 50 percent of all tourists. Small amount, those who belong into this category, as I said, are interesting targets.

Mr. Klein. How do you determine if a person fell into one of your categories of "interesting"?

Mr. Nosenko. Let us say a man comes, an American comes in Soviet Union. Before it may be some several years ago, 10 year, 15 years ago, he worked in the State Department. Maybe he worked in the American Embassy in Moscow. He is a very interesting target. Let us say there is information in the archives of KGB, Central archives of KGB or archives of intelligence service that Mr. Smith, let us say, was belonging to American intelligence community which was noticed in process of work of KGB, not only the Soviet Union but somewhere in any part of the world, in the United States, in Germany or any other place, and registration, what known facts about him, this what gives immediately necessity for KGB to pay on him special



attention.

Let us say they don't have anything on this person but in the process of being in the Soviet Union interpreter noticed that in a group of tourists, let us say, 20 or 25 persons, American tourists, everyone regularly, in the regular time, going for breakfast, and an appropriate time, let's say, 9:30, 10:00 o'clock, the guide from Intourist takes them and leading them to certain place, showplace for tourists; but one of the tourists leaving hotel at 6:00 o'clock or 7:00 o'clock, 8:00 o'clock in the morning alone; KGB immediately pays attention on him.

Let us say this tourist mailed a letter and this letter was intercepted by the KGB, going to one of Soviet citizens.

He immediately smells of the work of American intelligence.

Against this target the work is going on to catch them red-handed, those who are involved in any intelligence task, in any intelligence operations. And on the basis of this maybe try to recruit him or to put him on trial, to arrest him.

Tourists don't have any diplomatic immunity. It's not diplomate. It is very easy for the KGB to arrest them.

What they have done by the way, in 1960-'61, the whole number of processes against tourists, against those who are interesting from the point of view to recruit them as sources.

KGB trying to involve them, let us say, in any intimate relations with Russian women, to involve them in any black market

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activities and through their agents, informants, then in a certain moment to arrest them and on the basis of this threat that he is going on trial, try to recruit him; or, let us say, he showed some inclination toward homosexuality, which was very widely used by the KGB, trying to scare him, to frighten him, that in accordance with Soviet laws he is going in jail up to eight years; but there is possibility always to cover if he agrees also to help to those who will cover this case.

Mr. Klein. Was it difficult to recruit Americans?
Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sure, it was difficult.

Mr. Klein. The Americans that you were able to successfully recruit --

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. How did you use them?

Mr. Nosenko. The majority of cases of recruitment done by the Seventh Department, Second Chief Directorate,

99 percent were given to Intelligence Service and Intelligence
Service were deciding how they would use it. Prior to 1960,
there was a little bit, not a little bit, quite a bit, disorder in this field.

The Seventh Department was recruiting right and left, not even thinking there is any necessity or there is any use. Why? Because recruitment considered a big success. Officers who recruited received a monthly salary, thanks from the Chairman, which go in his personal file. They were trying to recruit not

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thinking how it would be used, this target. I remember in 1957 was woman recruited. She was a secretary living and working in Salt Lake City in State of Utah. What KGB residentura in New York or Washington could do? They cannot travel in the State of Utah and she cannot travel such a long distance in Washington or New York. Surely nobody will use it. From 1960 there was a strict order in approachment to recruitment. If Seventh Department, Second Chief Directorate, sees there is possibility to recruit a person, they prepare a paper and before even transferring this paper to the Chiefs of Second Chief Directorate, they are going in appropriate department, let us say, concerning American tourists in American Department of Intelligence Service, First Chief Directorate, and showing we have such and such materials on such and such person. Are you interested in him or not?

The Intelligence Service is telling, yes, we are interested and Chief of department will put a signature. After that, the officer, through his chiefs, put in papers for asking permission from the chiefs of the Second Chief Directorate for recruitment.

Only in the cases when Intelligence Service agreed. As

I said, it was 99 percent. But from late 1950s the Seventh

Department, Second Chief Directorate, started to pay attention

to recruitment, let us say, with Americans from tourist firms

and tourist firms which had any deals, negotiations, any contracts

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with Soviet Intourist. Why? Because when KGB had sources in, let us say, Tours, Four Wind Tours, tourist firm and others, we had to get little crumbs of information on tourists who must come ahead before they will come.

I had a couple of such agents. Let us say he was recruited on the basis, he wanted to make a deal with Intourist. When he has come for negotiations with Intourist, my officer, one of the officers, who was under cover for Intourist, participated in the negotiations. Without permission of KGB Intourist is not making deals. KGB is telling when to make deals and with whom. The officer, being in contact with this American businessman, from the Soviet American tourist firm, invite him for dinner, for lunch, where he hints him, that I can maybe help you make a deal with Intourist. This tourist businessman interesting to have a deal because he is making money on this.

He says, "But, you know, there is such a saying, I will scratch your back if you will scratch my back. Agreed?" He says, "Agreed." Here is a deal with Incourist. After that, the officer slowly started to approach him to the prime interest, what they want from him. They are asking him, "When you are directing groups or individual tourists, if you find out that this or that American citizen who is going to visit Soviet Union is working for the Federal Government but he is not put it in the questionnaire, you know, you put us a certain mark

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and officer settles what kind of mark, a dot or a scrape of the fourth and proper corner, or let us say, you are gathering a group of 20, 25 persons and on the last day when you get 24 or 25 persons, there is added one or more Americans to this group. We are interested in this because the analysis of work showed it usually intelligence, American intelligence, adding their person or their officer.

Further, let us say this American citizen who wants to come to the Soviet Union knows Russian language but he did not put it in questionnaire because there is not such a question, "Do you know the Russian language?" There is a question, "Do you have any relatives in the Soviet Union? Any friends?"

If he found out that he knows Russian language or he has some friends, some relatives, he will put us certain mark.

For this purpose it was started from 1958 to recruit from American tourist firms, and I can tell you that by '60, '63, '64, we had almost in every American tourist firm which was dealing with Intourist, we had at least one source. This was for the purpose of using these foreigners by the Second Chief Directorate of the Seventh Department for its own purposes.

In other cases, what ever recruitments have been done, we immediately transferred file of materials to Intelligence

Service.

Mr. Klein. Were the people that you recruited ever used

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for propaganda purposes, anti-American, anti-Western propaganda? Mr. Nosenko. In myscases, in the Seventh Department, in

years of my work, I don't remember any case. I am not excluding any, but simply I am telling you that I do not know.

Mr. Klein. Did you personally ever induce any Americans to defect to the Soviet Union?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever try to induce any to defect?

I participated in recruitments, yes. Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. Can sometimes a recruitment lead to a defection?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, it can.

Mr. Klein. Was that considered a favorable result?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. Why is that?

Mr. Nosenko. KGB was interested to recruit and person goes back home, he can supply information, work with KGB residenturas in the United States.

Mr. Klein. Do you know of any KGB officers who had convinced Americans to defect to Russia?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not know. Just a second, sir. was a case, it was intelligence services started, a case of Martin and Mitchell, two employees of NSA; but I do not know the It seems to me they simply were warned by KGB it is time to go, because otherwise they will be arrested.

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is the only case.

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Mr. Klein. At the time you defected, what was your title? Mr. Nosenko. I was Deputy Chief of Seventh Department, Second Chief Directorate.

Mr. Klein. Was your advancement to that position in part due to your successes in recruiting Americans?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, Americans, British.

Mr. Klein. Did you receive awards and bonuses for recruitment?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. When you recruited an American, did you ever try to gather intelligence information from them?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. How would you go about doing that?

Mr. Nosenko. It depends. Let us say in 1956 it was recruitment of an assistant professor, one of the well known universities in the United States; he was recruited on compromising materials; he was involved in homosexual activity in the Soviet Union. KGB planted him an agent and made photography of this.

The pitch, the recruitment was done not in Moscow, but during his trip when he left Moscow. It was the first recruitment of -- tourism was opened in 1955, the first recruitment took place in 1956 of any tourist. It so happens that it was an American tourist. He was recruited and approached in Kiev by

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me. Colonel Kozlov, Deputy Chief of Seventh Department, I went with him to Kiev for this operation.


After recruitment, he agreed to cooperate on the basis of the threat that he is going to jail in accordance with Soviet law it is punishable; he does not have any immunity; besides that, the KGB will try to supply the information about his activity, such behavior in Soviet Union to university where he is working. The man agreed to cooperate with Soviet Intelligence. From him was taken in written form agreement.

After that, always in any case of recruitment, on the money basis or compromising material, always KGB officers trying to get from him something, some kind of information which can be later used, if he will be rejecting, to point out to him, "Just a second. You entered into relations; you started to supply material against your country" or whatever he knows. In this case, in the case of the assistant professor, we were interested and KGB very much interested. In Vatican there is Russian School. In Vatican in Rome there is a school well known, Russicum School, because it is known that intelligences of the West are using this channel. We were interested in who were the teachers whom he had seen, who were the students in this school.

Besides that, he had given several names whom he knew.

Besides that, we were asking him about his university and

professors or teachers who were teaching any Russian or Soviet



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1	Union disciplines in his university and try to get from him so
2	characteristics on this person whom he mentioned. The idea
3	was that after that we have always the possibility to press
4	him that he supplied materials. He started up the
5	road. By the way, as far as I know, even they had several
ó	meetings with him later in the United States.
7	Mr. Klein. Approximately how many people did you recruit
3	Mr. Nosenko. Twelve, fourteen.
9	Mr. Klein. How many years were you working when you
10	recruited those 14 people?
11	Mr. Nosenko. The first recruitment '56.

Mr. Klein. Up to '64.

Mr. Nosenko. Up to '64.

Mr. Klein. You were a specialist in recruiting Americans to work for the KGB?

Mr. Nosenko. No, I cannot say I was a specialist.

Mr. Klein. That wasn't your specialty?

Mr. Nosenko. No, specialty was counterintelligence work against foreigners. This is the specialty.

Mr. Klein. Wasn't recruiting part of the work?

Mr. Nosenko. It is a part, but this is not a specialty.

Mr. Klein. You also served in the First Department of the Second Chief Directorate; is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. The First Department, Second Chief Directorate, yes.

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Mr. Klein. What is the function of the First Department, Second Chief Directorate?

Mr. Nosenko. To work against the American Embassy in Moscow.

Mr. Klein. Could you elaborate a little bit on what you did do?

Mr. Nosenko. A process of studying. You see, the work against tourists differs from the work against diplomats, because tourists are coming a short period of time and diplomats are usually serving at least three, three and a half, four years in the country. That is why the approach, the methods are different, but the final task goes the same: first of all, to spot a man, all personnel of the Embassy of the United States in Moscow, those who are using the cover of diplomats but practically are officers of American intelligence community -- to spot these people and to watch them, to find their sources, to find their targets, to find their agents, and on the basis of this, catching him red-handed, try to recruit, personna non grata announced, and after that, ask him to leave the Soviet Union. Against diplomats who are not involved in intelligence, the work is going on in directions to accumulate as much as possible material to find on him as a character, to study his strong points, his weak points of character, his hobbies, his interests, his behavior, to find any weak spot on which to try to make an approachment for

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recruitment and for use in future by the Intelligence Service in the United States or in any other part of the world where he will be serving as a diplomat.

This is the prime task in work against the American Embassy.

And one more, of course, to keep under complete control all social contacts or whatever acquaintances, with soviet population, having in mind those who havecontacts with American diplomats, with American personnel of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, must be agents or informants of the KGB or on many occasions officers are socializing under certain covers. And those who have had Soviet people, Soviet citizen contact, immediately take in active work, checking the basis, what is behind his acquaintance with this or that American diplomat and to cut this connection. This in main three task, main tasks in work against the American Embassy in Moscow.

Mr. Klein. You defected in early 1964. At what point did you make the final decision to defect?

Mr. Nosenko. Pardon me?

Mr. Klein. I say, you defected in early 1964; is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. At what point did you, in your mind, make the decision that you were going to defect?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, the decision of defection didn't come

TOP SECRET

1958 there were two GRU. One GRU work with armed forces, and another GRU was of navy intelligence separately. I was working in navy intelligence. I was sent and I was working at the Soviet Seventh Fleet in the Soviet Far East in the city of Sovetskaya Gavan, Soviet harbor, where I was working in intelligence of the Seventh Fleet.

I was working there in '51, '52, in the field of information. Daily I have seen American periodic press; I have seen newspapers. We were receiving San Diego Times, let us say. We were receiving Stars and Stripes. We were getting Army, Air Force and Navy magazines.

I, knowing language, , was digesting the press.

Besides that, intelligence of the Seventh Fleet had several radio detachments which functioned day and night, intercepting radio messages. Honestly, to tell you, gentlemen I remember it was the war in Korea, I tell you the Americans were talking their heads off. I never forget when it was in the Inchon operations prepared in 1952, we were leading by radio intercept; we were leading every ship from the West Coast up to Korea, every day on the map, where they are going, who is captain of the ship, what cargo, what troops are there, what air wings left the West Coast and going where he is making stops — all was intercepted, plus the press, and on the basis of this we were making daily reports.

That is my information, direction.

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Well, besides this work, I had the possibility to see
a little bit, not to see but to get the feel of American through
American press, not through Soviet newspapers. When I started
to work in KGB in Second Chief Directorate, it opened my
eyes. First of all, I think I was lucky I was working in
counterintelligence, not in intelligence, because working in
Second Chief Directorate, and not only in Moscow but every
year visiting different cities in Soviet Union, different
Republics and different inspection trips, or in some cases in
different conferences, I had the possibility to see how the KGB
working at the republics, different cities, different
districts.

I received a good, good feeling and understanding, working in Second Chief Directorate, how the people are controlled, the people of the Soviet Union, starting from small, urban region or rural region, city, districts, until there were republics, how to put the control of the whole population. Only working in Second Chief Directorate I could really understand how could one-party system — the true dictatorial system, could survive so many years, because of the strongest, strongest police, huge machine, like KGB. Besides, there is MVD police, which is also controlling population. Besides the party apparatus in every region, every district, every city, party organization, in any outfit, any factory, any plant, any institute, it is again watchdog for population. The Second Chief Directorate, working

in this directorate helped me to understand. Further, surely working in the Second Chief Directorate against the Americans in the main I have seen regularly Time, Newsweek, U.S. News and World Report, Reader's Digest. I read what is going on. My personal contact, even with those whom I recruited, with those whom I was not successful in the recruitment but were attempts, my personal contact with Americans, with British -- they opened for me my eyes in true understanding of what is the true freedom.

Further, my trips which I made, a few trips abroad as a security officer with the Soviet groups, sport delegations, diplomats, as security officer, opened my eyes even more, because the first time I was abroad at the West I was so surprised.

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All my life I had heard and read how the West, how capitalistic society is degenerating and going down and decaying and I have seen, first my trip was in England, seeing the contrary, they are prospering. I talked once in England the first time I talked with a driver of a bus. I asked how much he is making, how he is living, and what I compared, in Soviet Union even engineer is not living in conditions what living the driver of the bus. Well, these trips also helped me.

What I meant to say, it is the whole process. I cannot tell you what directly but the whole, these things, it was growing feeling, more and more dissatisfaction in the country



where I was living.

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There is one more thing. Maybe it is not sounds important, but I think it is important for me. You see, I was born in Ukraine. I am Ukrainian by nationality. But when I was about six and a half, seven years, I moved from the Ukraine to Russian part, Leningrad and later Moscow. What I mean, I being very small kid, I didn't accumulated the feeling to my Ukraine. I was too small.

When I started in school in Leningrad and Moscow, I always felt myself as a stranger because they have also certain nicknames to different nationalities and nationalistic feeling very sharp in the Soviet Union. I always was called such a name, you know, derogatory. I felt a stranger there; that is why I never accumulated love to the Soviet, to the Russian part. You. see, what I mean, this helped me later. I didn't ever have any nostalgic feeling to the Soviet Union, to Russia itself. I tried for several years, for several years I tried to be I made my attempts on the first, my trip to England. approached. I knew that among those British who were covering the Soviet delegation with which I was in London, the residentura KGB in London they told me that they have certain materials, that he is an officer of MI-5, British counterintelligence. I him in the evening for a beer, talk how I liked England, how I liked London. I was a young officer. Then I was scared on I wanted to be approached. "I was thinking that he

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understand that I, who was undercover of Deputy Chief of
Delegation, I am the only one who is going from hotel alone in
embassy, from embassy back in hotel alone, not as delegation
member. They are always in groups.

Employees of Soviet Embassy in London are coming to visit

me. I have some talkings. I was thinking that they would under
stand there is something funny here; it must be KGB guy. That

is why I approached to the guy who on whom they have materials,

that he is from British Intelligence. When I talked with him,

telling how I enjoyed London, how I enjoy my trip and being here

in England, I was thinking that he will start to get, or try

to get from me some feelings, nothing.

The next day then I again approached him. I brought in Soviet Embassy several cans of caviar and said to him, "Sir, I want to give you a small present, is black caviar. I enjoyed our last evening going in pub, through a spirit of the British pub, I enjoyed talking with you."

Now, I am thinking he must report to the chiefs, "Listen, the Soviets tried to bribe me." They must make some decision.

Well, I am waiting. The next day he approached me and telling Mr. Nicolai -- I was under false name on this trip as Nikolaev, not Nosenko -- Mr. Nikolaev, I want to talk with you. I am thinking, now it is coming. He approached me. I want to give you a present. He give me a present, a beer mug. This is how my first attempt to approach the British Intelligence went, in

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
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Well, there were other attempts and nothing happened. In 1962, being on Disarmament Conference, I simply in open, not in open, I tried several different also tricks; nothing happened. After this I approached to member of American mission in Geneva who a year before left Moscow but when he was in Moscow for four years it was known to the KGB in process of their work that if he is not an officer of the CIA, he at least must be cooperating with CIA because it was registered a couple of times his participationg in intelligence mission. One of them was mailing letter.

I approached to him and I said, "Sir, I would like to see you privately anytime today." We arranged a meeting. I said, "It is strictly between us." I met him and I said, "Sir, I am officer of the KGB. I accompany the delegation as security officer, but I want you to help me to have a contact with the CIA."

Here I make a lie. I didn't tell that my approachment is strictly on ideological basis. Why? Because it is known in KGB in quite a few cases when the Soviet and KGB or intelligence officer, trying to approach American intelligence they were rejected.

By the way, Colonel Penkovsky, the first time made an attempt to be recruited, not recruited, tried to cooperate with Americans, when he was working as assistant of Army attache in



the Soviet Embassy in Turkey, and he was rejected by American intelligence, later this man has enough courage to repeat his attempts and made approachment to British Intelligence who started to work with him.

Surely then American intelligence also started. Well, it was known several cases when it was rejected people. I knew it I was afraid that if I said on an ideological basis, plus my father was a member of the Soviet Government, he is buried in the Kremlin wall -- that in Nikolayev there is shipbuilding plant of his name, they will never believe me, plus my growth in positions in the Seventh Department, Second Chief Directorate, that is why I decided I wanted to say, I simply need some money. I want to sell a couple pieces of information, \$500. But this was my approachment and when I approached them, the only one condition I told them in the beginning -- and I met them quite a few times in Geneva in '62 -- I said, "Under no conditions I won't go on any meeting with you in Moscow or the Soviet Union because hoo, hoo, I working in counterintelligence; I know that one meeting, but the second, that is all, it goes away. No, I will not agree to meet you. Only when I will come next time abroad I will contact you."

Mr. Klein. When you defected in 1964, did you leave behind a wife and child?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Now, in intelligence circles, if a defector

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TOP SECTE

is legitimate, they use the term "bona fide" to describe him?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. If a defector is sent by a foreign intelligence agency, do they use the term "dispatched" to describe him?

Have you heard that term, "dispatched"?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klien. Are you a bona fide defector or a dispatched defector?

Mr. Nosenko. I am bona fide.

Mr. Klein. Is your defection in any way part of a KGB plan?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. How long after your defection in 1964 was it before you were brought to the United States?

Mr. Nosenko. I come in January 1964 in Geneva. On the second day I sent a cable which I had addressed, and in two days I knew by prearranged in 1962, I knew in a certain place I will be met. I appeared in this place on the day before, for checking for security purposes. The street was very, it wasn't main street, not many people. I know the time when I must meet. I was at the same time but the day before simply to check this area. It was very ideal conditions and exactly at a certain time when I appeared, two minutes before the appropriate time — of course, two or three hours spent before checking that I am don't have any tail, I do not have any tail, I

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appeared and at exactly the appropriate time appeared a person 2 3 5 6

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
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by the way, on the street there wasn't a soul; there were a couple of cars, which I checked before; they were empty; no There wasn't a soul. Then appeared gentleman with hat absolutely covering his face, with big, dark glasses -- it was dark because it was evening -- some kind of false beard, a moustache, and passing by me he put in my pocket a little note.

I left immediately the place and after spending some time checking that I don't have again no tail, I approached the public phone, the telephone booth, read the note, that it was phone, where to give a call. I give a call. There was voice of an officer whom I had seen in '62 said, "George, welcome. This-and-this address." I said, "Okay." I left. I checked. When I seen it was clear, I took taxi, arrived. arrived after it took place about forty minutes. Forty minutes later this officer who passed me a note arrived. He was still circling and checking. I told him from the first day, "Gentlemen, this time I am not returning back. I want to start procedures on my defection."

A day is passing, two, three, four. There were certain conditions when I went. First of all, the condition was that I was being deputy Chief of the Department, I can get recalled anytime for preparation of All Union Conference on Tourism which must take place April or May. Under this agreement, I



was allowed to go abroad on a short time.

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
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Second, the Chief of the whole Counterintelligence Service,

General Gribanov, which I found out two or three days before
leaving in Geneva, himself went abroad; very unusual case; he
went to Austraia and after Austria, France, Paris, and on the
way back he must stop in Geneva; and time coming any day he can
stop in Geneva. Surely he will see me and say, "What in the
world are you doing here, Deputy Chief of Department, for security
purposes with such small delegation."

He will say, "Let us go back home." Of course, when decision was made, when is going on, they told me procedures is going on, surely I was nervous, and the last straw happened the third of February, 1964. The head of the Soviet delegation on Disarmament Conference, Mr. Tsazapkin, said that next day I want all delegation to put in one place. Soviet mission in Geneva has one building where we will put everyone. We have part living in one hotel, part in another hotel, and himself, the head of the delegation, and his deputy, was living in the Soviet mission. We were splitted. "I want eveyrone the next day to move. We will be all in one building." For me, it would be difficult every day; every day I was going and visiting officers from CIA. I felt that some kind that was going on, you know, foul play or whatever you say. They are not in a hurry. It passed over ten days more and they are not telling when it will be. I said, "When will we start to





move." After this last straw when Jsazapkin announced that the delegation must be living in one building, the next day, morning, I left, suitcase and everything. I took only small, small briefcase and directly wnet to the secret address. I said, "Gentlemen, I am not returning." "Why? We are not ready." I said, "Uh-uh." I said, "I am not going. I cannot." "No, no, no, we are not ready." I said, "No, gentlemen, there has come a recall telegram: -- it was a false statement; it wasn't true -- "but, gentlemen, I don't know how long to continue this game."

They didn't even started anything to do. I simply pushed them on this. I made a false statement about the recall telegram which didn't come. It could be, but there wasn't. This night, on the 4th, by midnight, I was transferred to Germany, Frankfurt, where I was staying up to the 12th of February. On the 12th of February I arrived in the United States of 1964.

Mr. Klein. Upon your arrival in the U.S. in February of 1964, did there begin an investigation of your bona fides by the FBI and the CIA?

Mr.Nosenko. Right.

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Mr. Klein. Were you questioned by the FBI?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Were you questioned by the CIA?

Mr. Nosenko. There were questions but it was not any official interrogation or investigation.

Mr. Klein. You were questioned by the CIA agents beginning in 1964, were you not?

Mr. Nosenko. In general, sometimes they would come and talk, nothing was recorded. Like for example, the FBI, several persons were coming in daily. We would start in session at 10:00, let us say, 9:30. We would break for lunch, then continue further.

Mr. Klein. But you spoke with agents from both the FBI and the CIA?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. When you were questioned in 1964 by the FBI and the CIA, was the subject of Lee Harvey Oswald one of the things they both spoke to you about?

Mr. Nosenko. As I remember rightly, there arrived an agent from the FBI who said that he has some connection with the Warren Commission and he was asking me questions concerning Oswald, whatever I knew. After that -- it was recorded. After that -- I had seen him second time -- his conversation was transcribed. I read it with him and I signed it.


But later I was interrogated by CIA concerning Oswald.

I mean in the second part of 1964.

Mr. Klein. Prior to your defection, did you expect that you would be questioned by the FBI and the CIA about what you knew of Lee Harvey Oswald. Before you defected?

Mr. Nosenko. Surely, I did not know everything, and I told

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them what I knew.

Mr. Klein. What I am saying is, prior to the time you defected -- you were still in Russia -- did you know that the question of what Lee Harvey Oswald did in Russia was a very important question in the United States, that Americans were interested in that?

Mr. Nosenko. Honestly, I didn't have such a thought, because he didn't do anything there which indicated that he was involved in intelligence work, and at the same time the KGB did not do anything concerning him in approachment or recruitment him. But the fact, surely, what I knew of him, I told but it didn't come to me any such importance of this question in those days even when I come in 1964 because we didn't notice the KGB working against Oswald, didn't notice anything in his behavior indicated that he has a certain mission intelligence.

And at the same time, KGB, because of a certain number of things, completely crossed the question concerning use of him.

Mr. Klein. When you came to the United States in 1964, the FBI and the CIA began to speak to you and asked you questions about Lee Harvey Oswald. Did you then realize that that was an important subject to the Americans?

Mr. Nosenko. Surely, surely. It is an important question.

I understand even there that it is important, but simply I

tried to tell you that there wasn't anything done by the KGB

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of vital importance -- recruitment, approachment to him, and there wasn't by KGB anything noticed in his behavior indicated that he has come with purpose of, let us say, some espionage activity.

Mr. Klein. I understand you are saying that the KGB did not take any action with regard to Oswald. What I am asking you is, the CIA or the FBI, were they very interested in finding out whether the KGB had taken any action or not with regard to Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. Gentlemen, they were interested but it was not their prime interest; prime interest was case, cases, recruitments of Americans.

Mr. Klein. When you were still in Russia, did you know that Lee Harvey Oswald was the alleged assassin of President Kennedy?


Mr. Nosenko. In 1963, two hours after it took place, was announced on radio that took place assassination of the President of the United States. Sometime later was a second announcement that the killer was Lee Harvey Oswald.

Mr. Klein. Was there an investigation by the KGB on Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Was it of great importance that the KGB investigate him?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, it was given by the KGB, by the Soviet



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Government, very great importance.

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Mr. Klein. And did it occur to you at that time that the American Government would also be very interested in what Lee Harvey Oswald did or did not do in Russia?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.


Mr. Klein. So you did know it was of great concern to Americans what Oswald did or didn't do in Russia?

Mr. Nosenko. What was concerned Americans, I did not know what concerned Americans. I could imagine but knowing that there wasn't recruitment taking place, if he was recruited, then it becomes vitally important.

Mr. Klein. Did you imagine that Americans might be very interested in whether or not he had been recruited, that the question would be something that Americans would be interested in?

Mr. Nosenko. Honestly speaking, I was thinking that their attitude would be that they would understand that he is not stable person, that he is a nut, because all his behavior shows he is a nut, not only trying to commit suicide, but he defected. He was allowed to defect, finally was allowed. How long was he there before he decided to return back? After he was back then he tried again, attempts to go again Soviet Union. He is a tumbleweed, a rolling stone.

Mr. Klein. You are talking about information which you knew as a member of the KGB, is that right?



Mr. Nosenko. Right.

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Mr. Klein. Did it occur to you that Americans, not having access to the files that you had, would be very interested to know the facts that you have given us?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, I agree.

Mr. Klein. When you spoke to the FBI and the CIA in 1964, was it apparent that they were interested in knowing?

Mr. Nosenko. Sure, they wanted to know whatever I knew, what I knew I knew.

Mr. Klein. Is it part of the duties of an intelligence officer to have a good memory?

Mr. Nosenko. Sure.

Mr. Klein. Do you have a good memory?

Mr. Nosenko. I cannot tell about myself. I don't think
I have a bad memory, but I can't say I have a good memory.
I have memory.


Mr. Klein. When you spoke to the FBI and the CIA in 1964, you told them everything you knew about Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. Were you able to remember everything that you had found out about Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, I remembered, because that is why I said to that.

Mr. Klein. You didn't have any trouble remembering what happened?



Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

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Mr. Klein. You told it all to them?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. Did you know at the time you were being interviewed bythe FBI and the CIA, did there come a time you knew that the President of the United States, President Johnson, had created a commission to investigate the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. Nosenko. Right. And for this purposes arrived agent whom I had not seen before. He talked with me; all was recorded. After that, he has come second time to me, showed me transcription, and I signed it. Later there were interrogations concerning this question, but this was in another conditions; it was absolutely hostile conditions, with threats Mr. Klein. Did you know that the information that you

Mr. Klein. Did you know that the information that you were giving the FBI at that time would go to the President's commission?

Mr. Nosenko. Surely; I understand.

Mr. Klein. Did you consider it important that you give them the correct information?

Mr. Nosenko. Absolutely.

Mr. Klein. That you give them all the information you knew?

Mr. Nosenko. All information I knew.

Mr. Klein. When you spoke to the FBI about Lee Harvey Oswald, didyou always tell them the truth?

1 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir. 2 Mr. Klein. Did you always tell them everything you knew? Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir. Mr. Klein. When you spoke to the CIA about Lee Harvey. Oswald, did you tell them the truth? Mr. Nosenko. The same; the same. Mr. Klein. Did you always tell them everything you knew? Mr. Nosenko. Absolutely. Mr. Klein. Did you think that by telling the FBI and the CIA the truth about Lee Harvey Oswald that that would help in proving to them that you were a bona fide defector? 12 Mr. Nosenko. I was approached to this question that I must 13 tell whatever I know, the truth. 14 Mr. Klein. Did you think by telling them the truth about 15 that, that that would help prove that you were a bona fide? Mr. Nosenko. I didn't have this thought because on the 17 contrary, I had the other thought. I was "tried" -- in quotation -- and convicted long before I defected, in '62. 19 Mr. Klein. You are referring to your belief that they had decided that you were a dispatched agent? 2! Mr. Nosenko. Right; they decided in '62. 22 Mr. Klein. Let me put it this way. Would it be fair to say that you knew when you spoke to the FBI about Lee Harvey

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to them that you weren't a bona fide defector?

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bswald in 1964 that if you lied to them that this would indicate

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I defected on an ideological basis; that is why my task to give whatever I know, and only in truth form whatever I know, because in this way I can say my thanks to the country which accepted me.

Mr. Klein. My question is, by telling them the truth did you feel that you were proving that you were a bona fide defector?

Mr. Nosenko. I wasn't thinking in this way. Simply, I was thinking that I must tell the truth, whatever case they ask -- Oswald, Oswald, other case, other cases.

Mr. Klein. Was telling the truth about everything,
Oswald included, the most important thing to you at that time?

Mr. Nosenko. Right. The most important for me was to cooperate on the full-scale with all my capability, all my knowledge, to give them information, whatever I knew about KGB, whatever I knew about cases. It is my contribution to the country which received me, accepted me, has given me asylum.

Mr. Klein. And was telling them about Lee Harvey Oswald part of that contribution?

Mr. Nosenko. And Lee Harvey Oswald, surely.

Mr. Klein. In all your interviews with the CIA and the FBI, did you always tell them the truth about everything?

Mr. Nosenko. The question concerning recall telegram wasn't true.

Mr. Klein. Was there anything else that wasn't true?

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Mr. Nosenko. The question concerning my rank wasn't true
Mr. Klein. You told them one rank but really you had a
lower rank?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

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Mr. Klein. Was anything else not true?

Mr. Nosenko. The only thing in the beginning, in 1962,
I did not tell them that my defection on an ideological
basis because I was afraid of to be rejected.

Mr. Klein. Did you make that lie about your rank in order to impress them and make them think you were more important?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. It wasn't only this. You see, what happened, I was appointed Deputy Chief of Seventh Department in 1962. On analogical cases was appointment of another officer, Deputy Chief in Second Department, Second Chief Directorate. Both had rank of Captain. The position of Deputy Chief of Department, Colonel. In 1963, in September, 1963, was made presentation on my next rank; my next rank was be Major but when it was all confirmed on the level of Department, on the party organization, and all papers were given for signing and further must going in Personnel Directorate, the Chief of Second Chief Directorate General Gribanov decided in my case and in the case of another Deputy Chief of the Second Department also captain himself, must be made presentation on Lieutenant Colonels, what was done in 1963. It was well known fact in Second Chief Directorate, in 1963, December, I

was sent on a short trip in Gorki district in search of former KGB officer Cherepanov, who ran away. He tried to contact Americans. He contacted them but it was unsuccessful.

Americans returned the papers, considered him a plant when he was through. He noticed the KGB working against him. He ran away. All over the Soviet Union started the search of Cherepanov. In difference places appeared signals. in Gorki district signal. I was sent because I know him. personally. I work in same department with him, and search on him in Gorki district, and when I was sent in Gorki district, they put on my travel document "Lieutenant Colonel Nosenko." was document with me when I come in January. Surely, of course, human vanity. I said I Lieutenant Colonel . wasn't true. But didn't took it from a finger.

Mr. Klein. Did there come a time in 1964 after you had defected when the CIA put you in isolation?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Approximately when was that?

Mr. Nosenko. The 4th of April, 1964.

Mr. Klein. How long were you in isolation?

Mr. Nosenko. Five years.

Mr. Klein. Five years, until 1969?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir, three and a half in extreme Spartan conditions.

Mr. Klein. It was Spartan conditions?

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Mr. Nosenko. It is what Rockefeller Commission said, nameless defector over three years in extremely Spartan conditions. Mr. Klein. Did there come a time in 1967 when you began to speak to a CIA officer named Bruce Solie? Mr. Nosenko. Right. Mr. Klein. Did he question you extensively? Mr. Nosenko. Every day, excluding Sunday. Mr. Klein. Did you always tell him the truth? Mr. Nosenko. Only the truth. Mr. Klein. Did you tell him everything you knew about the things that he asked you? Mr. Nosenko. Absolutely. Mr. Klein. Did you believe that by telling the truth to Bruce Solie, that it might get you out of isolation? Mr. Nosenko. I always believed in spite of all these years that sooner or later truth will come to an end. that I would be free. It was another thing how long it would take. Mr. Klein. Did you believe that by telling Solie the truth --Mr. Nosenko. I was also telling before Bruce Solie the truth; they didn't want to believe. Mr. Klein. You did tell him the truth at all times?

Mr. Klein. There came a time when you were taken out

Mr. Nosenko. All times.

of isolation?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Were you allowed into the mainstream of American life, allowed to walk around free?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes. I started life in April, 1969.

Mr. Klein. Did there come a time when you became a citizen of the United States?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. When was that?

Mr. Nosenko. 1974.

Mr. Klein. Today are you presently an employee of the CIA?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. How would you describe your job?

Mr. Nosenko. Consultant on KGB in main, on counterintelligence work of the KGB.

Mr. Klein. Do you recall speaking to me on May 11, 1978

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Was that the first time we met?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. Did we speak here in this CIA building in

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Langley, Virginia?

Mr. Klein. Did you voluntarily speak to me at that time?

Mr. Nosenko. Absolutely.

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1	Mr. Klein. Did you speak to me again on May 26, 1978?
2	Mr. Nosenko. Yes.
3	Mr. Klein. Was that here again at CIA?
4	Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.
5	Mr. Klein. Was that also voluntarily?
, 6	Mr. Nosenko. Yes.
7	Mr. Klein. Did you speak to me a third time on May 30?
8	Mr. Nosenko. Yes.
. 9	Mr. Klein. Was that here at the CIA?
10	Mr. Nosenko. Yes.
11	Mr. Klein. And on May 30, 1978, did you voluntarily agree
12	to give me your deposition?
13	Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.
14	Mr. Klein. A sworn statement?
15	Mr. Nosenko. Right.
16	Mr. Klein. Did you tell me the complete truth in that
.17	deposition?
18	Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.
19	Mr. Klein. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that
20	this witness certificate and this Select Committee on Assassi-
21	nations' deposition be marked for identification and shown to
22	the witness.
73	The Chairman. You may proceed.
24	(The decomposition of the read marks

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as JFK Exhibit F-1 for identification.

TUPSECHET

1	Mr Klein Mr Nosonko looking at the dammark is
	Mr. Klein. Mr. Nosenko, looking at the document that
2	you have in your hand now, the deposition, do you recognize it?
3	Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.
4	Mr. Klein. Have you seen it before?
5	Mr. Nosenko. Yes.
5	Mr. Klein. Is that the statement that you made to me, or
7	a transcription of the statement you made to me on May 30, 1978;
δ	Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.
9	Mr. Klein. Have you had an opportunity to read it?
10	Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.
11	Mr. Klein. Did you read it again today in my presence?
2	Mr. Nosenko. Yes,sir.
3	Mr. Klein. When we read it, did you go over it page by
4	page?
5	Mr. Nosenko. Page by page, line by line.
6	Mr. Klein. And tell me if there were any errors in it.
7	Mr. Nosenko. Yes, slight, little.
ь	Mr. Klein. When there was an error, did you then dictate
9	to me how it should have been?
0	Mr. Nosenko. Right, and we made corrections.
1	Mr. Klein. And we made the corrections?
2	Mr. Nosenko. Right.
3	Mr. Klein. Then did you put your initials at the end of
4	the line where we made the corrections?

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Mr. Nosenko. To each correction.

Mr. Klein. As a result of that, is that document a correct transcription of the statement you made to me on May 30, 1978?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. I draw your attention to the witness certificate. Did you sign that document?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir. I did sign it.

Mr. Klein. Does that document attest to the fact that it is a true and accurate transcription that you have before you?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Do you know the purpose, the reason this Committee was created?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Do you consider the job of this Committee to be an important job?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Doyou believe that it is important to speak to us and tell us everything that you know about Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir, only this way.

Mr. Klein. Did you speak to us in complete truth about Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Since I began speaking to you in May of 1978, has anyone from the CIA spoken to you about Lee Harvey Oswald since May 1978?



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Mr. Nosenko. No one.

Mr. Klein. Has anyone from the CIA told you what to say to this Committee?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Klein. Has anyone from the CIA told you what not to say to this Committee?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. On the contrary, before I met you,
I was told that I must tell everything, whatever questions will
be. I even asked if questions will be concerning cases, the
names, even these, whatever stuff the Committee would like,
"What you know you must answer."

Mr. Klein. Since I began speaking to you in May 1978, has anyone from the CIA shown you any documents other than the deposition which you have in front of you?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Klein. The questions I just asked you, about whether anybody gave you any instructions or anybody spoke to you about Oswald, other than the CIA, has anybody had any contact with you at all since May, 1978, about Oswald other than myself?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Klein. At this time I was going to ask you to tell us everything you know about Lee Harvey Oswald, but if anybody would like to take a break at this point, or if you would like to take a break, we can do that.

The Chairman. I suggest that we break about five minutes

TUPSLURE

and give the witness a chance to relax a little bit, and the Committee members.

(A brief recess was taken.)

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The Chairman. The Committee will come back to order.

The Chair at this time will again recognize counsel for the Committee to proceed.

Mr. Klein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Nosenko, at this time will you tell this Committee everything that you know about Lee Harvey Oswald, beginning the first time you ever heard his name and going right through the assassination and any events you know relating to Lee Harvey Oswald which happened after the assassination?

Will you try to speak slowly so that everybody can understand what you say?

Mr. Nosenko. The 1959, was rather fall or summer of 1959, was rather difficult year for the Second Chief Directorate because every department of Second Chief Directorate, besides the tasks and goals and lines of their work, were also involved in special type of work.

In 1959, in the summer opened American exhibition in Moscow and every department was involved in also this work.

Also, my Seventh Department which was working against tourists was spending a big percentage of time and effort in working against the American exhibition in Moscow. In the fall of 1959 to me approached Senior Case Officer Major Georgiy Ivanovich

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Rastrusin, R-a-s-t-r-u-s-i-n. He was responsible for counter-intelligence work against Intourist, itself. He told me that an American tourist, Lee Harvey Oswald, applied to interpreter of Intourist with request to stay in the Soviet Union. I asked him who is working against him. Nobody was working against him. What materials we have on him? He showed me several pages. One was questionnaire which every tourist before coming to the Soviet Union is filling.

There was two checkups before he arrived in the Soviet

Union, a checking in archives of KGB, one checkup in Central

Archives, and another checkup was in Archives of Intelligence

Service, because Intelligence Service has its own archives. Both
these checkups showed no exist on any materials on Oswald.

Besides that, there was made a summary, a short summary, from Intourist, based on Intourist information that Lee Harvey
Oswald arrived on such period of time and visiting this and this cities, how long he will be as a tourist in the Soviet Union.

There was also information from the agent of KGB, an interpreter of Intourist who worked with Oswald, about Oswald in general. There was written by hand of this Officer Rastrusin in a summary concerning a request of Oswald to stay in the Soviet Union. That's all. He never was before in the Soviet Union. There wasn't any material on him. The questionnaire indicated no interesting position, no interesting work. I do not remember that even there was anything where he is working.

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I went with these materials to the Chief of Section. I was

Deputy Chief of Section, working against American-British-Canadian

tourists. I went to Chief of Section and showed to him.

"Let's go to the Chief of Department, report." And I, Chief of

Section, Major Rastrusin, Case Officer, went to the Chief of

Department, showed him materials. We said, that is all that

we have, but we have such and such situation. He wants to stay

in the Soviet Union. First of all, Intourist is not dealing,

with this questions. Second, we did not see him as an

interesting target and no one had worked against him, practically.

And it was decided at this meeting with Chief of Department to make such a thing that Intourist was instructed to answer to Mr. Oswald that in accordance with all Soviet procedures, regulations, first of all, Intourist is not dealing with this question. Second, in accordance with all regulations, procedures, he must apply to the Consular Department of the Soviet Embassy in the United States and apply with this request to fill certain forms and it will go by usual, routine procedures, but not in case that tourist would like to stay. The Intourist is not dealing with this question. And in this one was given him to answer. Next I heard about him that happen when he cut his wrists. The same officer, Rastrusin, has come to me and said that an interpreter has come to him the next day and after it was announced to him that Intourist is not dealing



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with this question, he must return back in his country and apply in proper procedures to the Soviet Embassy. Next day she is come to take him on a show in Moscow. She was waiting for him in the lobby for 20 or 30 minutes, and he is not coming. Then she checked. Maybe he is not in the hotel. But when it was checked, his key wasn't -- usually anyone who is leaving hotel must leave key in the hotel on the floor where he is living -- his key was not on the floor in the hotel.

He was in his room. Then she went to the manager of the hotel administration and said, "Something maybe happened -- a heart attack, who knows." And administrator, and she went with administrator and somebody else from the hotel; they broke the door and they found Oswald was laying with cut wrist. Immediately was given a call for an ambulance; he was delivered to the B-o-t-k-i-n Hospital where he received a transfusion and stitches on his wrist.

But being in hospital after he was saved, he again said that "If they will not allow me to stay, I will commit suicide; I will kill myself."

Immediately again I went to the Chief of Section. We went to the Chief of Department. This and this thing happen.

"We are not interested in him. He was not presented for us a target of interest." We officers and I and the Chief of Section, Chief of the Department, we understanding what can happen if he will kill himself, it can be reaction in press

TUPSEGNE

This was the period when Khrushchev only returned from his first trip to the United States, when he had meetings with President Eisenhower and was so-called Camp David spirit, warming Soviet-American relations. And ahead there was a trip in May of 1960 of Khrushchev to Paris on meeting of leaders of big four countries. Surely this will not help to Soviet-American relations and it can hurt in any way Khrushchev's further trips.

We decided that it is necessary to report, and it was made decision that Intourist who was in those years part of Ministry of Foreign Trade, must report to the Minister of Foreign Trade, who in his turn will report to the Government. But KGB when it will be asked said we don't have any interest. Whatever we have, this is material; that's all. In this way, it was reported to Khrushchev. I do not know that Chairman of the KGB reported or not, but I know that the Soviet Government received the report and Khrushchev personally received report.

My feeling, whatever I know, that on the basis of being scared that this man can kill himself, was decided in spite of the fact that KGB is not interested, it was decided the question to allow him to stay. On the level of the government with him dealing, processing of him was done by the Red Cross, Soviet Red Cross organization.

The Government decided, allowed him to stay. At the same time the decision concerned where he will stay. It was decided



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he will stay in Minsk, capital of Byelorussia, and where it will help him with work. And Red Cross by decision, because decision of this government, had given him a pension. It was in those days 700 rubles; later because of devaluation it was 70 rubles, because they devalued one to ten.

After it was made decision of the Soviet Government to allow him to stay, immediately it was necessary to open on him file. Ontourist is not opening on every tourist a file.

There is file, let's say, American tourism in 1964, and it can be consist of 20 or 25 volumes, all in one file, consist of 20 or 25 volumes, but on special targets who are suspected belonging to intelligence, on targets of special interest to KGB for recruitment, are opened separate files on this type of tourist.

On Oswald, because he was allowed to stay and being a foreigner, was opened immediately a file. At the end of 1959 a file was opened by Officer Krupnov, and registered in Central Archives of KGB.

In 1959, the end of 1959, by December was prepared a file for sending. Whenever Oswald was leaving Moscow to go to Minsk, immediatelyffile will be sent to KGB of Minsk, and this file was accompanied with a document signed by the Chiefs of Second Chief Directoreate, what kind of work to lead against Oswald in Minsk.

Anyone who is staying in the Soviet Union, defector, will



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be always suspected maybe it is a game of American intelligence.

Maybe he is a so-called agent sleeper. Always against him will

be going watching him.

Concerning Oswald, in this document accompanying file prepared was written what to do against Oswald, to cover him with agents, net, covering him in place of his living and in place of his working, to keep him periodically under surveillance, which means for a month or month and a half he will be under surveillance, will be followed.

Then will be made break for month, two months; then again he will be taken under surveillance. This is so-called term, periodical surveillance, to keep under control his telephone conversations and to keep under control all his correspondence, which means any letter coming to him or any letter going from him in the Soviet Union, abroad, is controlled by the KGB. Under no conditions to approach to him.

Gentlemen, I am sorry, I did not mention one vitally important thing. When he was in hospital, when he cut his wrist and when he announced that he will repeat the same if they will not allow him to stay, he will kill himself, it was decided in the Seventh Department in the presence of me, Chief of Section, Chief of Department, to check him through a psychiatrist. And was given command to Officer Rastrusin to arrange it that psychiatrist of the Botkin Hospital will check him and at the same time Rastrusin was ordered to arrange another psychiatrist from another hospital, independent, and they will check him in.

different times, not together, and each one will write opinion separately.

I have seen these both reports; they were not long, page,
page and a half. I do not remember all details. The main aspect
which was important for the KGB, both their opinions coincided
that Oswald was mentally unstable. This was the reason when he
was going to Minsk that in thedocument which was accompanying
his file was said under no conditions anyone must contact him.

. This type of work was assigned to KGB of Minsk.

The only one thing for qualification I want to add, that up to September, 1963, none of the KGB's outfits in Leningrad, in Kiev, in Byelorussia, in any part of the Soviet Union, can make an approachment to any foreigner without permission of Moscow.

Only in 1963 was making special permission concerning KGB apparatus in Leningrad and only concerning Finnish tourists because a big amount of tourists were coming from Finland and not going to any part of Soviet Union, only Leningrad, and after two, three, four or five days, back to Finland. That is why it was decided to allow the KGB of Leningrad in September, 1963, to go on approachment when they consider it necessary, without asking permission of Moscow. But no one in the Soviet Union without Moscow can approach on his own to the foreigner. This is what I knew about Oswald up to 1963, because January 1960, and from January 1960 and up to the end of 1961 I was working back



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in American Department against American embassy.

I returned back in Seventh Department in January 1962. In 1963 to me has come Chief of Section, one of the sections of the Seventh Department, Lieutenant Colonel Alekseev, A-1-e-k-s-e-e-v, and told me that he received a call from First Chief Directorate, Intelligence Service, Colonel Turalin, who was working in Service No. 2 of Intelligence Service and who asked him to come visit him in his office.

This Colonel Turalin had given him a cable which only
just now has come from KGB's Residentura in Mexico City. He
brought this cable to me. I have seen it and I read it. I campot
tell you word and word but the main sense, it was a short cable,
maybe half a page, "American citizen Lee Harvey Oswald
visited Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, Consular Department of
Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and asked visa to the Soviet
Union."

For me, it was -- by the way, I didn't know that he was back in the United States-- I said, "How come? Isn't this Oswald who in 1959 cut his wrist?" "Yes, this is the same. By the way, he returned back home and he married a Soviet woman."

Well, I said, "Then I remember this took place in 1959." I went with this Lieutenant Colonel Alekseev to Chief of the Department, and said, "This is Oswald with whom we had a problem in 1959. He wants back. I didn't know he was married, that he is in the United States."

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He said, "No, under no conditions we don't want to hear anything about him." And Alekseev was told by the Chief of Department in my presence that he must come back in Intelligence Service to this Colonel Turalin and tell him that must be given an answer.

You see, in this cable the fact that he visited Soviet Embassy and at the end of this cable was asked what kind of action must be taken. Why? I assumed because Oswald when he visited consulates in Mexico City, he told them he was in the Soviet Union before, because otherwise when the person never was in the Soviet Union they will not ask even Moscow; they immediately will decide on the place, the Residentura can even not ask Moscow what to do.

And Alekseev was told to go back in Intelligence Service and to tell them that we are not interested in him and again would recommend to give him so-called soft brush, such a term it is. What does it mean? That he will be recommended, after he returned back home in the U.S., to visit the Soviet Embassy Consulate Department, where official form raised this question, fill certain forms and it will go by regulation and procedures, usual. This was what was done.

Later in 1963 there was an announcement on the Soviet radio, two hours after it took place, that the President of the United States was assassinated in Texas. I do not know how long, what period of time, but later, again there was a

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second announcement and it said that the killer was Lee Harvey Oswald.

Gentlemen, here was a chaos in KGB, surely. I received immediately a call, telephone call from Chief of Second Chief Directorate, General Gribanov. He ordered me to contact by special phone the leaders in Minsk, the Chief of KGB in Minsk, and to ask them immediately to send a file on Oswald in Moscow, all materials on him.

And Gribanov added not towait even any commercial line, plane, but to use military airplane; but the file must be in short period of time in Moscow.

The second question he ordered me to ask them, did anyone contacted him, maybe before he left Minsk? Did anyone from KGB contacted him? These questions I relayed immediately to Minsk. I wanted to speak with the Chiefs of Second Directorate, KGB, of Byelorussia. I could not catch the person whom I knew, Deputy Chief of Second Directorate, Colonel Lazyutin, L-a-z-y-u-t-i-n.

Then I invited Chief of Department of Second Directorate,

KGB, Byelorussia, Gruzdev, who I knew personally -- and this

department was responsible for foreigners when they were in

Byelorussia -- the same department was responsibles for

also Oswald. I told him, relayed the order of Gribanov.

He said it would be done. I said, "Particularly Gribanov interested, did you or your officers in any way contacted

Oswald." He said, "Surely not; we cannot, because we were



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dealing with him in accordance with your instructions how to work against him when you sent a file to Minsk." I said, "But still, maybe somebody contacted him before he left." "No one." After that, I know later, Gribanov himself Chief of Second Chief Directorate, talked with leaders of KGB of Byelorussia. I know that also Chiefs of First American Department, Second Chief Directorate, were talking also with Byelorussian KGB on this question. Well, the file on Oswald was approximately in two hours was in Moscow. One officer, Seventh Department, Second Chief Directorate, went to airport meet the officer from Minsk. He was delivered in headquarters of KGB, he arrived with suitcase. It was about seven or eight files, such thick files, on Oswald. And these files were delivered in the Office of Chief of Seventh Department where was Chief of Seventh Department, I, Officer, Krupnov and Chief of Section.

And we immediately paid attention on the first volume, because whatever important documents are in file, they must be in first section or first volume, where are going all plans, any contacts, any summaries on file in first section. This is the important documents.

We went page by page in spite of the fact that we received all talking that nobody contacted. Still we were working, maybe somebody talked with him. There isn't any indication that anyone talked with him.

By this time we were understood that we must prepare a

resume on the whole file which must be reported to the Chief of Second Chief Directorate who in his turn must report to the Chairman of KGB and Chairman of the KGB must report to Khrushchev.

It took us about hour, hour and a half. We were looking only this first section. There wasn't any indication. And in the final summary on the whole file, when it was closed after he left. At this moment appeared Deputy Chief of First American Department of Second Chief Directorate, Colonel Matveev, M-a-t-v-e-e-v. He has come with a couple of officers and said Gribanov ordered to them to review the file and prepare the resume. That is understandable. The most prestigious department in the whole Second Chief Directorate is American Department, First Department, surely. They took all materials and we never have seen them and they prepared a resume immediately, which was reported up.

The only one another thing I know about Oswald, that two, three, four or five days later, that Gribanov sent a group of four or five officers from Second Chief Directorate for investigation in Minsk. A man of those four or five officers was one of my friend, Officer Krivosheev, K-r-i-v-o-s-h-e-e-v. He told me privately that he talked with several people, with workers in the plant where Oswald was working. Oswald was working in the plant and he belonged to a little circle, chess playing circle, can be check players circle, you know, hunting circle. He was belonging to the hunting circle. He went a number

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of times with group of workers of the plant who belonged to the circle on hunting trips. Usually it was supplied a van by the administration of the plant and they were taken for hunting.

The interesting point what he stressed, and it was surprise for me, he told that Oswald was a very poor shot. Why I was surprised, because, you see, you are hunting rabbits, ducks; it is not a rifle; it is a shotgun; it is pellets with big circle. It is not a single place. He even could not shoot a rabbit. On several occasions the workers who went with him hunting were giving him a rabbit to return with something back a result of his huntinging.

These all things which I know concerning Oswald.

Mr. Klein. You have testified that Rastrusin was the one who came to you and told you that Oswald wanted to defect?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. Where were you when the conversation took place?


Mr. Nosenko. I was sitting in the room. I was Deputy

Chief of Section. With me were three or four officers in the

same room.

Mr. Klein. And was it your office?

Mr. Nosenko. We were sitting those days in rather stranded conditions. I was Deputy Chief of Section; it was not big deal.



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Mr. Klein. Was it your office where the conversation took place?

Mr. Nosenko. Sure.

Mr. Klein. Do you recall the names of any of the people present when you first learned about Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. I cannot tell you who was present or who was not. I can tell who was sitting in this room, other officers who worked in this room.

Mr. Klein. Was Krupnov present at that time?

Mr. Nosenko. No, Krupnov appeared later.

Mr. Klein. You told us that there followed an investigation of Oswald to find out who he was and what you knew about him.

Who was the one that actually did that work? Who would that be?

Mr. Nosenko. Rastrusin found on him materials what we had, which I told you what kind of materials we had.

Mr. Klein. And did he find these materials before he had come to you or was that after speaking to you that he went and found those materials?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, he has come and reported me the case concerning application or request of Oswald to stay in the Soviet Union. I asked immediately what we have. He said, "Just a second." He went and bring me this questionnaire, two checkups, information from interpreter, then written information from Intourist, how long his tour in the Soviet Union, and written by Rastrusin personally by hand, his summary on why

the requests of Oswald to stay in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Klein. And he brought that all to you right away?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. Did anyone else do any work investigating Oswald? Was that all done by Rastrusin?

Mr. Nosenko. You see, nobody was working against him. As

I told you, Seventh Department work against tourists is not

covering even 70 percent of tourists, a small percentage. I

must add that every tourist will be checked on. On him will be

questionnaire, how long his tour and checkups in archives on any

existing material, but it does not mean work against him. Why

If he is not an interesting target, it is laying materials, it

will be gathered and go in files.

Mr. Klein. Other than the materials which Rastrusin had that day, did you ever see any other materials on Oswald as part of the investigation to find out --

Mr. Nosenko. No, later it was document. Again, Rastrusin supplied document on what took place in the hospital. No, first what took place in cutting wrist, then later in hospital, then

MR, Klein. Prior to the time he cut his wrist?

Mr. Nosenko. No other materials we had on him, excluding those which I indicated.

Mr. Klein. All of them were brought to you by Rastrusin?
Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. Do you remember sitting there with the other

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officers and did anybody make any comments about Oswald, about what to do with him at that time?

Mr. Nosenko. Nobody was making comments. The reason. every room there is a senior officer. If it is not Deputy Chief of Section -- we had only two Deputy Chief of Section -- there is a senior case officer and if somebody has come to me reporting nobody interrupted, they are doing their work.

Mr. Klein. You remember them doing their work?

No. I know that officers were present, but Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember, let's say, what Sakharov was doing, what was another officer, Belikov, was doing, I cannot tell you.

Mr. Klein. Do you know if those two officers you named were actually in the room at the time that Rastrusin told you about Oswald?

There were several officers there, seating Mr. Nosenko. in this room.

Mr. Klein. Do you know which one?

I cannot tell you who exactly was present Mr. Nosenko. No. or not because it will be trying to guess.

Mr. Klein. But you recall that Krupnov was not present at that time?

Krupnov was not, because Krupnov appeared Mr. Nosenko. a little bit later in the Seventh Department.

Mr. Klein. He wasn't in the Department at that time? Mr. Nosenio. He wasn't even in the Seventh Department.

68 wasn't working. He appeared in a month after it took place he 2 was transferred in Second Chief Directorate in Seventh Department. 3 Mr. Klein. From the time that Rastrusin told you about Oswald until the time that you made the decision, as you told us it was made, not to allow him to defect, did any KGB officer ever speak to Oswald? Mr. Nosenko. Nobody was speaking from the KGB with Oswald The decision was done on the level of Chief of Department with, of course, opinions, mine, Rastrusin, Chief of Section. Mr. Klein. But nobody spoke to Oswald? Nosenko. No, nobody from KGB, nobody went to speak with Oswald.

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Mr. Klein. And exactly why did no KGB officer ever speak to Oswald before they made the decision about whether to let him defect?

Mr. Nosenko. We didn't consider him an interesting target Mr. Klein. Was that the only reason, that he was not an interesting target?

Mr. Nosenko. Later, when he tried to kill himself, it was of course, another reason that he is mentally unstable.

Mr. Klein. I am talking about before.

Mr. Nosenko. Before it he did not present an interest for the KGB, in the eyes of the Seventh Department.

Mr. Klein. You talked about the great amount of work that the Second Department had due to the American

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Oswald --

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exhibition which was taking place in the fall of 1959? Summer and fall of 1959. Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Klein. Were a lot of the KGB officers in the Seventh Department working on tourists and people who were visiting? Mr. Nosenko. At the same time they were all responsible for certain work against American exhibition in Moscow. Mr. Klein. Approximately how many tourists and people were working at the exhibition that gave this new caseload of people at that time? 9 Mr. Nosenko. You see, it is a rather difficult approachment. Ninety percent of all employees on American exhibition were considered in connection with intelligence community by 12 the KGB because 90 percent of them were speaking Russian 13 If they were not officers, they must be contacts of 14 intelligence community of the U.S. 15 Mr. Klein. When the exhibition was over, did things get 16 back to normal in the Second Department? 17 Mr. Nosenko. Surely. 18 Mr. Klein. Had Oswald come after the exhibition, might 19 he then have been spoken to? 20 It was one of the reasons but it would Mr. Nosenko. No. 21 be the same attitude. Mr. Klein. So then what was different in this treatment of 73

> The difference was that nobody even was Mr. Nosenko.

1 responsible for him, it was simply laying material, checkups, but nobody was working actively against him. If he had come when the exhibition had ended. would then somebody have at least been working actively on õ him? Mr. Nosenko. It is possible that he would be paid more attention. It is possible but he did not present an interest for the Seventh Department. Mr. Klein. You testified that a file was later opened on Oswald and it was opened at the time he was allowed to stay; is 10 that correct? 11 Mr. Nosenko. Right. 12 Mr. Klein. It was opened by Krupnov? 13 Krupnov. Mr. Nosenko. 14 Mr. Klein. What was in the file, what kind of documents? 15 Will you describe as best you can what was in them? 15 Mr. Nosenko. Only those documents which I told you and 17 whatever else I have seen is the only documents which prepared 13 by Krupnov which must accompany the file of Oswald to Minsk. 19 That is all what I have seen. 20 Mr. Klein. That is the letter that Krupnov sent to 21 Minsk? 22 Mr. Nosenko. Right. 3

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on entering the country, was that in that file?

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Mr. Klein. Was the questionnaire that Oswald filled out

Mr. Nosenko. Sure.

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Mr. Klein. Did you see it?

Mr. Nosenko. I have seen it before. I have seen it when Rastrusin has come to me and showed materials.

Mr. Klein. Can you tell us anything about the questionnaire?

Mr. Nosenko. The usual form, typographically done in the Soviet Union, which all Soviet embassies have, and also the tourists who are not applying directly to the Soviet Embassy abroad but making arrangement to visit Soviet Union through tourist firms who have contract with Intourist, they also fill in this questionnaire which tourist firm then supplies to the Soviet Embassy. The same.

Mr. Klein. You remember that there was a file created.

Do you remember ever seeing this file? Do you have a recollection of seeing a file on Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. No, only when there has come a return from '63 from Minsk.

Mr. Klein. Did you see the file in '59?

Mr. Nosenko. No, the accompanying document, which was reported.

Mr. Klein. But you never saw the file itself?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. You don't know how many pages were in the file?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. Who told Krupnov to open the file on Oswald?

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Mr. Nosenko. The Chief of Section ordered him. Because
must be more material before file went in Minsk. I have not seen
them. Materials which KGB must receive from Red Cross, materials
concerning what I knew only orally about the decision of the
Soviet Government, must be more, but I have not seen them.

Mr. Klein. Did you see the Intourist report written about Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. Only the first information from interpreter; later when he cut his wrist, and later concerning his behavior in the hospital and tried to kill himself.

Mr. Klein. Did you see any other reports on Oswald at that time?

Mr. Nosenko. I have not seen anything, excluding the document which was prepared to accompany the file of Oswald.

Mr. Klein. In 1959 did you know at the time the decision was made not to allow Oswald to defect, at that time did you know that Oswald had been in the United States Marines?

Mr. Nosenko. No. It was known he was in the Marines, yes

Mr. Klein. How did you know that?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not know how I know. It was reported to me or something in the file. It was known that he served in the Marines. Interpreter put in her information, must be.

Mr. Klein. The last part?

Mr. Nosenko. I said, must be an interpreter had it in her information supplied to KGB that he served in Marines. He must

1 tell her because it was known that he served in the Marines. Mr. Klein. Do you recall reading it in the interpreter's 2 3 report. Mr. Nosenko. It must be I have read, because it was known that he served in the Marines. 5 Mr. Klein. Do you have any recollection of what document 6 you read it in? 7 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. 8 Mr. Klein. But you know you read it in some document? 9 Mr. Nosenko. I told you what I knew, what I had seen. 10 Mr. Klein. Did you also read what his job was when he was 11 in the Marines? 12 Mr. Nosenko. No. 13 Mr. Klein. Did you read where he had served in the Marines? 14 Mr. Nosenko. No. 15 Mr. Klein. What you read was that he had been in Marines. 16 There was indication that he served Mr. Nosenko. Yes. .17 in Marines. 18 Mr. Klein. Did you read what his rank was in the Marines? 19 Mr. Nosenko. He served. He wasn't an officer; he was 20 drafted, was served in the Marines. That is all. 21 Mr. Klein. You say he wasn't an officer. Whatever 22 document you read, did it tell you what his rank was? 23 Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I don't remember the details. 24 telling only what I remember.

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Mr. Klein. Do you recall discussing with any members of the Seventh Department the fact that he had been in the Marines?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. At the meeting that you had that you described to us when it was determined that he would not be allowed to defect, was it discussed that he was in the Marines?

Mr. Nosenko. He did not present an interest.

Mr. Klein. Did somebody say "this guy is a Marine" and somebody else said "It doesn't matter"?

Mr. Nosenko. It doesn't matter, sure.

Mr. Klein. My question is, was it at least discussed or mentioned?

Mr. Nosenko. No, it was read, it was mentioned in the papers that he served in Marines; that is all. But we didn't pay attention.

Mr. Klein. I understand it was mentioned in the paper.

But what I am asking you is do you have a recollection at that meeting when they decided not to allow him to defect, do you have a recollection of them talking about the fact that he was in the Marines?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. We didn't discuss the question. We didn't consider it is important.

Mr.Klein. You said there was a meeting between Rastrusin, the Chief of Section, the Chief of Department, and yourself, at which time it was determined that he would not be allowed

to defect?

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Mr. Nosenko. It was not determined that he would not be allowed to defect; it was decided that he doesn't present for us interest and that is why we would recommend to Intourist to answer him, if he wants to defect he must apply in accordance with the Soviet procedures, apply to the Soviet embassy in the country where he is living, but not to use for these purposes the channel of tourism.

Mr. Klein. You decided to recommend to Intourist to turn him down?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. Where was that meeting that you had with these three other people?

Mr. Nosenko. In the office of Chief of the Seventh Department.

Mr. Klein. You said that there was a discussion. He asked you what information you knew about Oswald and you told him?

Mr. Nosenko. We showed the papers what we had. He also read the same papers what I read, what Chief of Section read and Chief of Department read. "What is interesting?"

"I don't see. Do you see?" "No, I don't see anything."

Mr. Klein. How long did the whole meeting take place?

Mr. Nosenko. It is difficult to say; ten minutes, twelve,

fifteen. I cannot tell exactly.



Mr. Klein. It was as a result of this meeting that Intourist was told to tell him he could not defect; is that right?

Intourist was ordered to tell him that --Mr. Nosenko. first of all, Intourist himself is never dealing with questions of who stay in Soviet Union, who would like to stay, because it is a business organization; their task is to get foreign currency; that is all, to give them service for what they paid. KGB is controlling it. KGB is telling them what is KGB's interest.

Mr. Klein. My question is, after the four of you met in the office of the Chief of Seventh Department, you looked at the paper and said nothing is interesting. Then the Chief said, "Tell him to go back to the United States". Is that right? Is that what happened?

Mr. Nosenko. The Chief said, "Let us make him the so-called soft brush. "

Mr. Klein. In effect, that is when the decision was made, in that office?

Mr. Nosenko. Absolutely, right.

You were there? Mr. Klein.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

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Mr. Klein. And it took about ten minutes?

Mr. Nosenko. Ten or fifteen minutes.

Was the First Chief Directorate, that's the Mr. Klein. Intelligence Section, were they informed that an American named

Oswald wanted to defect?

Mr. Nosenko. No, they were not informed.

Mr. Klein. Was the First Department of the Second Chief Directorate, the American Department, were they informed that this American named Oswald wanted to defect?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. Was there any discussion at this meeting that you were at about whether you should inform the First Chief Directorate or the First Department?

Mr. Nosenko. No, it was only to our judgment; if we had seen that he presents an interest. Let us say Oswald was a teacher in college, let us say somewhere teaching one of the Russian disciplines, Russian economy or whatever it would be.

Surely he is interesting; surely we will report, we will talk with First Chief Directorate, we will talk maybe with American Department. It is what we will decide. But in this case we didn't see any necessity.

Mr. Klein. So no other departments were informed?
Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. Did everybody agree -- of the four people,
did you all agree he was uninteresting?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Were there any other reasons discussed other than the fact he was not interesting?

Mr. Nosenko. No. Can I clarify one question? Gentlemen,



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In the process of discussing the first question by CIA, FBI, you,

I feel that you are thinking that there are certain procedures,

certain rules, how to act with defectors. There are no such

rules and regulations. If you will look back on the

history, 20 or 25 years, how many Americans defected to the

Soviet Union. You can count on your fingers; it is rare

occasion. How many Soviet defect to the West? It is a big

number. Of course, at the west, it is understood and the special
ists are thinking there must be certain rules and procedures

like maybe exist in the United States, in Great Britain. There

isn't such rules. There were not rules in Second Chief Director
ate because it very rare occasion when it happened, very rare

occasion, that American decided to stay. That's one thing.

The second thing is necessary to point out, that Intelligence Service, the First Chief Directorate, whatever they are doing, it is absolutely different from whatever is done by Second Chief Directorate, counterintelligence. Whatever concerns any foreigner on the territory of the Soviet Union it is only what Second Chief Directorate will decide.

And if, let us say, Intelligence Service has an interest in any foreigner, he arrives in the Soviet Union, Intelligence Service, even if it is their source and agent, cannot meet him without discussing the question with second Chief Directorate. What I want to tell, the big boss, the true hand at the territory over the Soviet Union, Second Chief Directorate.

You told us that Rastrusin is the one that told 1 Mr. Klein. you that Oswald had cut his wrist. Is that correct? Mr. Nosenko. Right. 3 Mr. Klein. Who was present when he told you this? Mr. Nosenko. Say it again, it was in my room, I cannot 5 tell you who was present. ó Mr. Klein. Was Krupnov present? 7 Mr. Nosenko. No. Krupnov appeared later. He wasn't 3 even working in the Seventh Department when it happened. 9 Mr. Klein. Were you surprised to learn that Oswald had 10 cut his wrist? Mr. Nosenko. Pardon me? 12 Mr. Klein. Were you surprised to learn that Oswald had cut 13 his wrist? Mr. Nosenko. Surely. 15 Mr. Klein. Had he done or said anything that you knew 16 about before this to indicate that he might do something like that? 18 Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, no indication. 19 Mr. Klein. Did you discuss the fact that he cut his wrist 20 with the other people in the room? 21 Mr. Nosenko. Immediately when it was reported, immediately 22 went to Chief of Section and we went to the Chief of Department; 73 Was he surprised? Mr. Klein. 24

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Mr. Nosenko. We were not discussing surprise; what we must

do.

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Mr. Klein. But no one had expected thatto happen?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. And it was after this that you began to think Oswald might not be normal?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. Before the wrist incident?

Mr. Nosenko. No indication. We didn't have any knowledge

Mr. Klein. He seemed as normal as.anybody, before?

Mr. Nosenko. In accordance with what we had on him, there wasn't any indication.

Mr. Klein. Whose idea was it to have a psychiatrist examine Lee Harvey Oswald? Who actually thought of it?

Mr. Nosenko. I cannot tell you. When we reported to the Chief of Department, then in the office was taken decision, of course was approved by the Chief of Department, to check him from psychiatrist. It was decided, let's check him independently through two specialists.

Mr. Klein. You said the Chief of Section and the Chief of Department and yourself were present when you decided?

Mr. Nosenko. And Rastrusin was.

Mr. Klein. And Rastrusin.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. Did everybody agree that you should have a psychiatrist check him?



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1	Mr. Nosenko. We didn't make any vote.
2	Mr. Klein. Did anybody say, "No, we should not do this"?
3	Mr. Nosenko. No.
4	Mr. Klein. Where did you discuss it?
5	Mr. Nosenko. In the office of Chief of Seventh Department
6	Colonel Dubas, D-u-b-a-s.
7	Mr. Klein. Was there a discussion? Tell us what happene
3 <u> </u>	in the office.
9	Mr. Nosenko. Well, in KGB is military discipline.
10	Officers has rank. You are reporting. The Chief will ask you
11	what do you think. You are tell him. What proposals? You are
12	tell him. No propose, he decides.
13	Mr. Klein. Did you agree that it should be done?
14	Did you think it was a good idea?
- 15	Mr. Nosenko. To check? Yes, to check psychiatrist, yes.
16	Mr. Klein. Do you recollect him asking you whether
.17	Mr. Nosenko. No, I cannot recollect.
13	Mr. Klein. Did you tell him it was a good idea, that you
19	believe it to be a good idea?
. 20	Mr. Nosenko. No. They asked me, did I believe. Sure, I
21	believed it was a good idea.
22	Mr. Klein. How long were you in the office when that
73	decision was made to have the two psychiatrists check him?
21	Mr. Nosenko. Twenty minutes, half an hour.

Mr. Klein. Do you recall the name of the psychiatrists who

checked him?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever personally speak to the psychiatrists who checked him?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. You testified that you read their reports and the reports both said "mentally unstable"?

Mr. Nosenko. Mentally unstable.

Mr. Klein. You testified it was a page or page and a half?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. Were they typed reports or written?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, it was typed.

Mr. Klein. Who brought these reports to you?

Mr. Nosenko. Rastrusin, because he was ordered to arrange this psychiatrists checkup through administration of one hospital and through another clinical hospital.

Mr. Klein. Where were you when he brought the reports to you?

Mr. Nosenko. I don't remember. I must have been in my room, in my office where I was working.

Mr. Klein. Did you discuss the reports with anybody?

Mr. Nosenko. No. We received them and immediately went to the Chief of Section. He read it and we all went to the Chief of Department.

Mr. Klein. At any time did you discuss what you had read



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in the report?

Mr. Nosenko. When I read I went to Chief of Section, surely, we were talking concerning this report. Surely we discussed that he is not mentally stable, and here, both psychiatrists coincided opinions who checked him separately, independently after the fact of cutting wrist, and then still continuing to press and telling he will kill himself if he will not be allowed.

Mr. Klein. Did you discuss it with Rastrusin, the report?
Mr. Nosenko. I must be, what he showed me.

Mr. Klein. Had you ever done anything like this, having two psychiatrists examine any other American defector or potential defector?

Mr. Nosenko. No, this is the first time in my experience.

Mr. Klein. Is that why you remember it so well, because

Mr. Nosenko. It was so unusual; man cut wrist, then still continuing and pressing, threatening to kill himself,

Mr. Klein. After that --

it was the first time?

Mr. Nosenko. I never heard another case like this.

Mr. Klein. After that, did you ever hear of a case where they had psychiatrists examine an American defector like this?

Mr. Nosenko. No. There was another case where an American,

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surely.

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but it was arrangement made from Far East, I think, country. He was delivered in Soviet Union. He was mentally unstable and there participated psychiatrist around him. I was not involved this case, I only heard.

Mr. Klein. You were never involved in any other case --

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Mr. Nosenko. I wasn't involved. I heard simply about case.

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Mr. Klein. You were never involved in another case where they had a psychiatrist examine somebody, like this case?

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Mr. Nosenko. No, no.

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Mr. Klein. Is that why you recall it, because it was the only time it ever happened?

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Mr. Nosenko. It was the only another time I heard a psychiatrist around foreigner. It was another case, and it was communications.

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Mr. Klein. Did anybody in the Seventh Department brief the psychiatrists about what you people knew about Oswald?

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Mr. Nosenko. No. It must be -- just a second. I do

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not know. I can assume, that when Officer Rastrusin was

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arranging the checkup of psychiatrist, he must tell that there

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is an American tourist who cut his wrist and threatening to

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kill himself. He must said such thing.

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Mr. Klein. You testified that the KGB, in your words, washed its hands of Oswald after he cut his wrist; is that

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correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Pardon me?

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Mr. Klein. You testified that the KGB washed its hands of Oswald after he cut his wrist; they did not want anything to do with him?

Mr. Nosenko. Absolutely, right.

Mr. Klein. To your knowledge, was the KGB consulted when the final decision was made to allow Oswald to remain in the Soviet Union?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not know. But I assume that the Chairman of KGB must reporting to the Soviet Government, to Khrushchev.

Mr. Klein. Were you consulted by the people who made the final decision?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Klein. Was rastrusin spoken to?

Mr. Nosenko. As far as I know, no.

Mr. Klein. Was the Chief of your section spoken to?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not know.

Mr. Klein. Was it unusual for the KGB people involved not to have been consulted in the decision?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not know this part, but I can tell you I assumed that when it was made, decision in the Government, the Chairman of the KGB must be asked, he must report to the government.

Mr. Klein. What would the KGB's position have been?

Mr. Nosenko. That KGB does not have any interest in this person.

Mr. Klein. To your knowledge, did the KGB inform the people who made the decision about the two psychiatrists who examined Oswald and found him mentally unstable? Mr. Nosenko. It is, again, assumption, Mr. Klein. doubt when Chairman of the KGB was reporting to the Soviet Government, to Khrushchev, he must mention that he was checked by psychiatrists and this is their opinion. Mr. Klein. You have no personal knowledge of that? Mr. Nosenko. Personal knowledge, no. Mr. Klein. You testified that he was sent to Minsk. Who decided that Oswald should be sent to Minsk? Mr. Nosenko. It was on the level of government I cannot tell you.

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Mr. Klein. Do you know where he worked in Minsk? Mr. Nosenko. He worked on the Plant factory, making radios.

Mr. Klein. Do you know who decided that?

Mr. Nosenko. You see how it happens -- when it was decided that it will be allowed to stay, the Red Cross was ordered to make a processing of him and surely people from Red Cross who talked with him, they asked what he can do. again, I cannot tell you exactly this I have seen, this I know exactly. It is an assumption.

Mr. Klein. Was KGB consulted as to whether --Mr. Nosenko. I do not know, sir.



Mr. Klein. How did you learn he was sent to Minsk and worked in a radio factory?

Mr. Nosenko. It was when Krupnov was preparing the document which was sent with file, what kind of work must be done against Oswald in Minsk.

Mr. Klein. Are there any kinds of criteria that you know of for determining what type of work a defector should be given?

I don't know. In accordance with what Mr. Nosenko. he can do, in accordance with his profession, how he can be used.

Mr. Klein. Now, when it was determined that Oswald was going to be allowed to stay in the Soviet Union and live in Minsk, did any KGB officer speak to him at that time?

Mr. Nosenko. No. As far as my knowledge, nobody was speaking with him.

Mr. Klein. Why didn't the KGB speak to him then?

Mr. Nosenko. KGB once said, "We don't have interest." The same was reported to the Government, must be by the Chairman, that the KGB doesn't have interest. KGB didn't wanted to be involved.

Mr. Klein. Who made the decision that nobody should speak to Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. The fact that Seventh Department from the beginning had an opinion he doesn't present interest, this was

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prevailing fact. That is why not talk with.

Mr. Klein. You told us that the letter was written to Minsk telling them not to speak to Oswald. Who told Krupnov to write that letter?

Mr. Nosenko. Must be Chief of Section who possibly talked this question with Chief of Department. I have seen only when Krupnov prepared this document.

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. Are defectors sometimes used for propaganda statements?

Mr. Nosenko. They can be, but I don't know of example.

Mr. Klein. Who determines if a defector will be used for a propaganda statement?

Mr. Nosenko. It is difficult to say. If KGB has any interest in defector, they are working with defector, can be born idea in the KGB in the appropriate department which is dealing with this defector. It can be, let's say, come request from the Central Committee, from the Department of Propaganda who of foreigners can be used for the purpose of propaganda, like was used in early 1950s on AnnabellalBucar. ...

Mr. Klein. To your knowledge, was it ever considered whether to use Oswald for any propaganda?


Mr. Nosenko. No, I never heard about using him for the purposes of propaganda.



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1 Mr. Klein. How long was the letter that was written to 2 Minsk by Krupnov? 3 Mr. Nosenko. About two pages. Mr. Klein. Was it typed? 5 Mr. Nosenko. Yes. Mr. Klein. To whom was the letter sent? 6 Mr. Nosenko. On the name of Chairman, KGB, of Byelorussia. Mr. Klein. You had an opportunity to read the letter; 8 is that correct? 10 Mr. Nosenko. Yes. Mr. Klein. Now, you have told us that the letter stated 11 there should be periodic physical surveillance of Oswald and also 12 technical surveillance, tapping his phone; is that correct? 13 Mr. Nosenko. Right, control of correspondence, coverage of 14 Oswald by agents, informants. 15 Mr. Klein. Were the details of such technical and physical 16 surveillance in the letter that you saw? 17 Mr. Nosenko. Pardon me? 18 Mr. Klein. Were the details of the technical and 19 physical surveillance in the letter? 20 Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir, in the letter it was simply by points, 21 coverage by agents in place of his work, in place of his living 22 periodical coverage of Oswald by surveillance, control of his 23 correspondence, control of his telephone conversations. 24

Mr. Klein. Why did you read the letter?



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Mr. Nosenko. You see, officers prepared the documents. He is not going himself reporting to Chief of Section. He is coming to Deputy Chief of Section and giving it to Deputy Chief of Section who in his turn reporting it to the Chief of Section for signature.

That is why I was simply seeing it, being in line.

Mr. Klein. You told us that the physical surveillance involved people following Oswald around for a period of time?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. How long?

Mr. Nosenko. A month, month and a half; then will be break for two months, month and a half, can be three months, then again take him under surveillance, or can be less. Let's say in this period of time they finished surveillance against him, they made the break, but the telephone tapping is continued and telephone showed that he arranged -- wants to meet somebody. They can put immediately surveillance because here a period signal with whom he is meeting. What is it? Who is this But periodical it means not constant from the day he is person? starting living Minsk until he left Minsk. It is not constant surveillance but from time to time.

In KGB such term is used "periodical" surveillance.

Mr. Klein. Did the letter specify how long a time it would be on?

Mr. Nosenko. No, periodical. It means month, month and a



half, something around this. Usually this is done by this way.

Mr. Klein. When you had this kind of physical surveillance, when it is on, how many agents would be following him?

Mr. Nosenko. I assume it would be the usual brigade; they are called a team, brigade of surveillance; it can be three, four.

Mr. Klein. They would be following him every day for a month or month and a half?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

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Mr. Klein. When they see him meet somebody, do they then attempt to find out the name of the person he meets?

Mr. Nosenko. Sure. After he met somebody and they parted, part of the brigade will follow with target, let us say, with Oswald, and part, one, two person, will follow this person whom he met. They will lead him where he will come. He returns to the place of living, in this house, in what apartment? Then they check through administration of the house, who is living in this apartment, plus they will make photo picture in process of leading surveillance of this person. When they check where he is living, find his name, every person, every year living in the apartment houses is presenting such kind of document from his place of work. They know where he is working. They can check also in place of his working, what position, because here in the apartment house it will be known that he is working on such plant, such factory.



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They know in what factory he is working; the surveillance continues to check what position he has in this plant. After that the information this material is send to officer responsible for the target, for Oswald. Surely officer who receive such information immediately will starting to check this Soviet, let's say Soviet, who had a meeting, acquaintance with Oswald.

The officer responsible for target for Oswald receiving information that such meeting took place, who this person, where he is living, where he is working, immediately filling up checkups in archives of the KGB Byelorussia. Besides another form he is immediately filling a form to make — to find out about this character in place of his living, in place of his working. An appropriate department in surveillance responsible for this will start to check through agents' net in place of his living of thisSoviet, in place of his working, what kind of person he is, what his moods, how patriotic he is, how good he is a loyal citizen, and et cetera, et cetera.

The KGB officer who is responsible for Oswald will check out any Soviet who had contact with Oswald.

Mr. Klein. The KGB would have lists of the people who were acquainted?

Mr. Nosenko. Every person, not lists; that's why was a file so think, on every his acquaintances; must be quite a lot of material. All these checkups.

Mr. Klein. You mean the file you saw in 1963, one of the

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reasons it was so thick --

Mr. Nosenko. So thick because of different materials, checkups, his connections, acquaintances.

Mr. Klein. Would this type of physical surveillance, would it go on indefinitely?

Mr. NOsenko. Sureviellance, I told you, it is periodical.

Mr. Klein. I understand that, but you say on a month, off a month, on a month. Would that pattern go on indefinitely?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir, because he always will be suspected as a possible agent, agent sleeper.


Mr. Klein. You told us that there was technical surveillance in that they tapped his phone?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. When they tapped his phone, did they make recordings of the conversations?

Mr. Nosenko. Usually tapping telephone on tape recorder; then it is transcribed; next day officer receiving all his conversation of previous day. If he was talking with somebody, he had given a call, they would indicate he talked with such and such a telephone number and if was any names mentioned, they would put. Again, officer starting check up this person and starts work against this person with whom he talked.

Mr. Klein. This also would continue indefinitely, this tapping of his phone?



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Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sure.

Mr. Klein. How many agents would be involved in that?

Mr. Nosenko. One officer is responsible; but an officer maybe himself, has, let us say, ten or 12 or 15 agents around him; but it can be agents and other officers. Because there is somebody who isresponsible for this plant where he was working. It means the officer responsible for Oswald will be in contact with officer responsible for this factory where Oswald was working, and asking him whatever new there is through your met of agents concerning Oswald.

Mr. Klein. Was it normal that this physical; and technical surveillance should be used on an American defector?

Mr. Nosenko. Used this type always, not against foreigners, against who KGB working, and also against Soviet citizen.

Mr. Klein. I am sorry --

Mr. Nosenko. This is the work of KGB; this is how they work in controlling people and watching.

Mr. Klein. I understand, but I am saying, other American defectors, did they have similar surveillance?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, it continued on all other defectors, even though it may be another defector that KGB be in contact they would still continue to watch him.

Mr.Klein. In the surveillance you told us about, when
Marina Oswald began to see Lee Harvey Oswald, the surveillance

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would have picked her up?

Mr. Nosenko. If in this moment there was surveillance, sure, they would immediately pick her up.

Mr. Klein. And if she made a phone call to him, they would pick it up?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Do you recall when you saw the file --


Mr. Nosenko. I know, sir, that there were materials on Marina Oswald. Whatever materials they had, checkups on her, whatever they found out, whatever documents concerns her appeared after she acquainted with Oswald were in the file, but I didn't have time to pass for the whole file. As I told you, I have seen only this first section of first volume, what is the most important documents, where there was mentioned he married Marina, who she is, et cetera, as a resume. But there were materials, it was seven or eight thick volumes.

Mr. Klein. As an experienced intelligence officer, if
he met Marina Oswald on March 17 -- how long would you estimate
it would take before this type of surveillance, physical,
technical checking of the people at his plant, how long do you
estimate it would take before the KGB would know about her?

If he met her, say, on March 17th?

Mr. Nosenko. In the same March they would have quite a big batch of material on her.

Mr. Klein. They would have to know about her before?



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Mr. Nosenko. Right. Where she was working, where she was living, where she was studying.

Mr. Klein. You told us that you learned from Alekseev that Oswald wanted a visa to travel from Mexico City to the Soviet Union, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

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Mr. Klein. You told us that there was a cable that you read which was sent from the Mexico City Residentura to the First Chief Directorate, is that right?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. How long was the cable.

Mr. Nosenko. It was a half page.

Mr. Sawyer. Mr. Chairman, you know we are going tediously over and over and over details that this man has already covered. I personally object to sitting here and having the same things repeated in minutiae that he has already answered. He said there was a half page along about an hour ago.

The Chairman. Counsel will take note of the member's concern and govern himself accordingly.

Mr. Klein. Do you recall who was present when you read the cable?

Mr. Nosenko. Alekseev who brought it to me. Nobody
else because I was sitting in my office; I was sitting alone;
I was Deputy Chief of Department. After I read it, I told him
that I didn't know that he married; I didn't know that he left

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Soviet Union because my knowledge was by 1959 then; that is all.

Mr. Klein. Mr. Chairman, I have a few more questions, but possibly this would be a good point to break.

The Chairman. The Chair notes that it is now five to 11:00. Counsel has indicated some additional questions that he has prior to turning the witness over to the members of the Committee.

It would be the suggestion of the Chair that we recess for this evening and we continue these hearings tomorrow evening.

Is there any discussion?

Mr. Dodd. What is that program, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. The Chair suggests that we recess for this evening and that we reconvene tomorrow evening, for the second session, unless there is some desire to continue on this evening.

Mr. Dodd. How much longer do we have? Maybe we can finish up with counsel's questions.

The Chairman. Will counsel advise the Member of that?

Mr. Klein. I don't have too much more. I have ten

minutes.

Mr. Dodd. Why don't we take a five minute break?
Mrs. Burke. Let him go on and finish.

The Chairman. What is the pleasure of the Members?

Mr. DeVine. I think the attention span of the Members is probably exhausted at this point, as well as the witness, and

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the stenographer. It seems to me it would be wise to take a break and let the counsel have the first ten minutes tomorrow, and go from there.

Mr. Sawyer. I may say, too, based on conversations in our van, a couple of the Members had about two hours sleep last night.

The Chairman. Any further comments?

Mr. Preyer?

Mr. Preyer. I would think that we might do well to adjourn at thistime and get a fresh start tomorrow. I see desperate signals coming up from the court reporter.

The Chairman. Mr Dodd, anything further?

Mr. Dodd. I will agree with that. Let us quit tonight and start again tomorrow.

The Chairman. There might be some possibility, in light of the fact that the House is not in session tomorrow, that we could start a little earlier. If that is agreeable with Members, we will try to work out a little earlier time and advise your office.

If there is nothing further at this time, the Chair will recess this hearing pending a time to be set for tomorrow evening.

(Whereupon, at 11:00 o'clock p.m., the Committee recessed, to reconvene on Tuesday, June 20, 1978, at a time to be determined.)

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