February 18, 1997

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 0

Number of Postponements: 18

Postponement # 1 (Page 10):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 2 (Page 10):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001
Postponement # 3 (Page 12):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 4 (Page 13):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 5 (Page 13):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 6 (Page 13):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.
Postponement # 7 (Page 14):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Postponement # 8 (Page 14):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Postponement # 9 (Page 14):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Postponement # 10 (Page 14):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.
Postponement # 11 (Page 14):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 12 (Page 15):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 13 (Page 47):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001
Postponement # 14 (Page 52):
Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.
Substitute Language: Surveillance Activities
Release Date: 10/2017

Postponement # 15 (Page 84):
Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act. The Board is awaiting additional evidence from the CIA, at which time it will reconsider the postponement.
Substitute Language: CIA Employee
Review Date: 05/1997

Postponement # 16 (Page 136):
Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.
Substitute Language: Crypt
Release Date: 09/2006

Postponement # 17 (Page 136):
Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.
Substitute Language: Crypt
Release Date: 09/2006

Postponement # 18 (Page 137):
Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.
Substitute Language: Crypt
Release Date: 09/2006
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: HSCA
RECORD NUMBER: 180-10110-10005
RECORDS SERIES: SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 014719

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: HSCA
FROM: [RESTRICTED]
TO: [RESTRICTED]
TITLE: [RESTRICTED]
DATE: 08/09/78
PAGES: 198
SUBJECTS: CIA, METHODOLOGY

OSWALD, LEE, POST-RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL, TRIP TO RUSSIA

[RESTRICTED]

WC

[RESTRICTED]

DOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS: 3
CURRENT STATUS: RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/27/96
OPENING CRITERIA:
COMMENTS: Two duplicates follow in next two folders and Box 3.
           Box 2.
Agency: HSCA 180-10110-10005
Record Number:

Record Series: SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY

Agency File Number: 014719

Originator: HSCA

From: Helms, Richard

To: 

Title: Deposition of Richard McGarrah Helms

Date: 8/9/78

Pages: 198

Subjects:
1. CIA, methodology
2. Lito, Post Russian Period, Travel Trip to Russia
3. Nosenko, Yuri
4. WC
5. Helms, Richard, testimony before the committee
6. 

Document Type: transcript

Classification: U C S T

Restrictions: Open 1A 1B 1C 2 3 4 5 D

Current Status: 0 X

Date of Last Review: / /93

Opening Criteria:

Comments: Two duplicates follow in next two folders and box 5.

Box #: 2  Folder Title:
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1978

U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Assassination
of John F. Kennedy of the
Select Committee on Assassinations,
Washington, D.C.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:25 a.m. in
room 340, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Richardson Preyer
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Preyer, Burke, Dodd, Devine and
Sawyer.

Also present: E. Berning; L. Svendsen; C. Berk; M. Gold-
smith; B. Genzman; J. Blackmer; J. McDonald; G. R. Blakey;
O. Wagner; B. Wolf; W. H. Cross.

Mr. Preyer. The Committee will come to order.

The Chair recognizes the Clerk of the Committee to read
those who are officially designated to be on the Subcommittee
today.

The Clerk. You, Mrs. Burke, Mr. Sawyer and Mr. Thone are
regular members of the Kennedy Subcommittee. Mr. Devine will
be substituting for Mr. Dodd.

Mr. Preyer. The Chair at this time will entertain a motion
that today's hearings and one subsequent day of hearings be held
in Executive Session since, on the basis of information obtained by the Committee, the Committee believes that the evidence or testimony may tend to defame, degrade or incriminate people and consequently Section 2(k)(5) of Rule 11 of the Committee rules would apply.

Mrs. Burke. I so move.

Mr. Preyer. Thank you.

You have heard the motion. All those in favor will answer as the roll is called.

The Clerk. Mr. Preyer?

Mr. Preyer. Aye.

The Clerk. Mr. Devine?

Mr. Devine. Aye.

The Clerk. Mr. Thone?

(No response)

The Clerk. Mrs. Burke?

Mrs. Burke. Aye.

The Clerk. Mr. Sawyer?

(No response)

The Clerk. Three ayes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Preyer. Thank you.

The Committee will go into Executive Session at this time and we will ask all those who are not members of the Committee, all witnesses to please leave the room at this time.

(Pause)
Mr. Preyer. We will now proceed in Executive Session.

The Chair will ask the witness if he will be sworn at this time.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give this Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Helms. I do, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Preyer. You may be seated.

As we do to all witnesses, the Chair will give a brief statement concerning the subject of the investigation.

House Resolution 222 mandates the Committee to conduct a full and complete investigation and study of the circumstances surrounding the assassination and death of President John F. Kennedy including determining whether the existing laws of the United States concerning the investigation of the President and the investigatory jurisdiction and capability of agencies and departments are adequate in their provisions and enforcement and there is full disclosure of evidence and information among agencies and departments of the United States government, and whether any evidence or information not in the possession of an agency or department would have been in assistance in investigating the assassination, and why such information was not provided by such agency or department; and to make recommendations to the House, if the Select Committee deems it appropriate, for amendment of existing legislation or the
enactment of new legislation.

Mr. Helms, are you represented by counsel?

Mr. Helms. Yes. I have with me, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Gregory B. Craig who is my counsel on this occasion.

Mr. Preyer. Thank you.

Mr. Craig. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Preyer. The Chair will recognize Mr. Goldsmith at this time to begin the questioning.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD MC GARRAH HELMS

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, for the record will you state your name and address?

Mr. Helms. My name is Richard McGarrah Helms, and for the benefit of the Reporter, the middle name is spelled M-c G-a-r-r-a-h.

I live at 4649 Garfield Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20007.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you previously served as the Director of the Central Intelligence?

Mr. Helms. Yes, I have.

Mr. Goldsmith. During what years did you serve in that capacity?


Mr. Goldsmith. Prior to that time, how many years have you been associated with the CIA?

Mr. Helms. Since the doors opened in 1947.

Mr. Goldsmith. As a part of your association with the CIA, were you required to execute a secret seal?

Mr. Helms. I was.

Mr. Goldsmith. At this time I would like, Mr. Ambassador, to present what has been marked as JFK Exhibit No. 94.

Mr. Helms. I have it in front of me. I have identified it as a document that I read earlier.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, Mr. Chairman, JFK Exhibit
No. 94 is a letter from Acting Director Carlucci to the Chairman of this Committee which was written for the purpose of authorizing present and former agency employees to testify fully and truthfully before this Committee and to respond to questions that are within the scope of the Committee's mandate.

At this time, I would like the Ambassador to be given a letter, or a copy of a letter, from Mr. Carlucci to the Ambassador dated July 27, 1978. I would request that this item be introduced into evidence as Exhibit No. 125, JFK Exhibit 125.

(The document referred to was marked JFK Exhibit No. 125 for identification.)

Mr. Helms. I would identify this letter as one I received in the mail.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand the contents of this letter and the previous letter that you were shown, JFK No. 94?

Mr. Helms. I believe I do.

Mr. Goldsmith. In addition, Mr. Ambassador, I would like you to examine JFK Exhibit 126, which is a letter dated 8 August 1978 to Mr. G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director of this Committee.

Part of that exhibit consists of a letter from Mr. Scott Breckinridge of the CIA and another consists of a letter to
Mr. Blakey sent by Mr. Anthony Lampvan, General Counsel of the CIA.

I request that be introduced into evidence as JFK Exhibit 126.

Mr. Preyer. Without objection, so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked JFK Exhibit No. 126 for identification.)

Mr. Helms. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I read this letter before the meeting started this morning.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand the contents of that letter?

Mr. Helms. I do.

Mr. Goldsmith. Finally, I have one more letter to introduce in the record, a letter from Mr. Blakey to Mr. Breckinridge dated 4 August 1978 which was sent to Mr. Breckinridge at the request of Mr. Gregory Craig, counsel for the Ambassador.

At this time, I request that that letter be introduced into the record as Exhibit 127.

Mr. Helms. Yes, I have seen this letter on another occasion.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Chairman, I request that this letter be introduced into the record as JFK No. 127.

Mr. Preyer. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.
Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, what was your position in 1963 when you were with the CIA?

Mr. Helms. In 1963, I had the title Deputy Director for Plans.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you explain to the Committee what the organization function of the Deputy Director for Plans was in 1963?

Mr. Helms. In 1963, the Deputy Director for Plans was the Deputy Director who was in charge of -- I guess the simplest term is overseas operations. This entity of the CIA received its mandate from two documents, one known as MSC No. 5 and the other CID/2 or M-12.

In any event, the responsibility of this unit was to conduct espionage and counter-espionage and covert action outside the continental limits of the United States.

Mr. Goldsmith. Can you describe generally what your responsibilities were as head of that unit?

Mr. Helms. I was, in fact, in charge of the unit. In other words, I was under the aegis of the Director of Central Intelligence, to whom I reported. I was in charge of overseas operations.

Mr. Goldsmith. What role, if any, did the CIA have in the
investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. Helms. After this tragedy occurred and the Warren Commission was formed, there was every effort made in the Central Intelligence Agency to be as responsive as possible to request from the FBI who was conducting the investigation or a major portion of it, and the staff and members of the Warren Commission.

I would like to take this occasion to say we were all, I think, in this country equally struck with the tragic circumstances and we all felt, in the Agency, that we should do what we could to be as supportive as we possibly could of these other entities that had the lead in this investigation.

Mr. Goldsmith. Am I correct in assuming that -- and understand your testimony to be -- that the basic role of the Agency at that time was to lend support to the FBI and to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Functioning in that capacity, how was the CIA's investigation organized?

Mr. Helms. This is a long time ago that these events took place. I guess it is all of 15 years.

I do not recall that, at the outset, that there was any formal organizational change made to accommodate this investigation. My recollection is that we figured that most of our contribution would focus on what had occurred in Mexico City —
in other words, Oswald's activity prior to the assassination
in Mexico City.

It is my recollection that the individual who was sort of
designated to help out from the Headquarters standpoint was
the man who had the desk there in Mexico City. My recollection,
his name was [SCELSO]

Mr. Goldsmith. [John Scelso]

Mr. Helms. I think so. That is my recollection.

Mr. Goldsmith. What were your responsibilities with regard
to the investigation that was undertaken by the Agency?

Mr. Helms. My recollection is that I felt my responsibility
to be as responsive to whatever requests came from the FBI or
the Warren Commission as we could. I, therefore, tried to see
to it that these requests were fulfilled and that we made the
requisite inquiry or whatever else would be required under the
circumstances.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who, if anyone, was primarily responsible
for coordinating the flow of information within the CIA to you
and then from you to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms. Mr. Goldsmith, I do not recall, at this late
date, anyway, any particular flow of information. An inquiry
would come over. We would attempt to satisfy it and we would
attempt to respond to it. But these inquiries came in individual
bits and pieces or as individual items, and my recollection
would be that it would be hard to describe this flow of
material. Each individual item that came along we took care
of as best as we could.

As the weeks turned into months, we found that we were
looking into matters overseas in Europe and various places,
trying to run down individuals, identify bits and pieces
that the Warren Commission was trying to clarify, and as a
result of this, it was necessary to deal through all the area
divisions of the so-called Operations Director, or Plans
Director, at that time.

Mr. Goldsmith. Which staff or unit, if any, within the
CIA was given primary responsibility for coordinating the
investigation?

Mr. Helms. My recollection is that after the Warren
Commission was established and it got its work underway that
this was put into the counter-intelligence staff.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you explain to the Committee what
the organizational function or purpose of the counter-intelli-
gence staff was?

Mr. Helms. Under the National Security Council intelli-
gence directive, NSCID No. 5, there was a provision, a special
 provision in that document which dealt with counter-intelligence.
I say a special provision, because in the area of positive
intelligence the Agency's charter was to collect raw informa-
tion and then pass it to the various other interested agencies
of government.
Whereas, in the counter-intelligence field, it had a mandate to maintain counter-intelligence files and also to do counter-intelligence evaluations.

To be more specific about this, if there was an allegation from the FBI that a spy at the United Nations had been transferred to some unit in Paris and it was the Agency's job, then, to try to see what that agent was up to. It was also the Agency's job to make an evaluation of whether he, indeed, was working for the Russians or the French or whatever the case might be.

Therefore, the counter-intelligence staff did have an evaluation function which the foreign intelligence staff, or the positive intelligence staff, did not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is that why the CI staff was given primary responsibility for coordinating the investigation?

Mr. Helms. Mr. Goldsmith, I do not recall any longer what considerations went into giving this job to the counter-intelligence staff. I think it is logical to agree with what you say, but I do not recall any longer as it having been or what the controlling reasons were.

Mr. Goldsmith. You made reference earlier to [John Scelso] who originally was given responsibility to coordinating aspects of the investigation. Do you recall how long he retained this responsibility?

Mr. Helms. It is not only my recollection but in an effort
to clear my mind in preparation for this hearing, I did some checking with some former colleagues, and my recollection is that he sort of had the labor for only a couple of months; after that, the job was turned over to the Counter-Intelligence Staff.

Do you recall why the transition was made from the CI staff?

Mr. Helms. I think, if recollection serves, that we could see that this investigation was broadening far beyond Mexico City and it did not make much sense to have it in the hands of a man who was running the Mexico City desk.

Mr. Goldsmith. When Mr. [Scels] was originally given the responsibility for coordinating the investigation, was he ever told by you that he would have exclusive control of the investigation?

Mr. Helms. I have no such recollection. I would see no reason to give him -- in fact, I could not see why it would have occurred to me to want to say that to him.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether Mr. [Scels] ever discussed with you problems that he was having with Mr. Angleton's in some way interfering with the investigation?

Mr. Helms. No, I do not recall this. He might have. Today, I do not recall this.

If you could identify what the troubles were, it might refresh my memory.
Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. [SCESLO] has testified before the Committee in a deposition, and at that time he indicated that he was initially given responsibility for the investigation and was told more or less that he would be given free rein as to coordinating the information, and, I guess, sending it to the Warren Commission.

He indicated to us that Mr. Angleton was in some way interfering with his function as coordinator of the investigation and that at some time the investigation was turned over from [SCESLO] to Angleton. Does that refresh your memory at all?

Mr. Helms. It does not, and may I say, I do not mean to add to the questions I have not been asked, but I cannot imagine giving anybody the kinds of assurances which Mr. [SCESLO] claims that he was given. We did not operate that way. Nobody had those assurances for anything, including me.

Mr. Goldsmith. Your position would be that the primary reason, as you recall it, for the investigation's being taken from [SCESLO] in a sense, and given to the CI staff was because the investigation began to undertake broader tones than was initially anticipated?

Mr. Helms. Yes. That is not only my recollection, but also it would seem to be in the year 1978, to have been a rather sensible thing to have done under the circumstances.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. [SCESLO] also testified before the Committee that Mr. Angleton was talking to the FBI without
receiving authorization from anyone. Do you recall whether
or not that was a problem at any time?

Mr. Helms. Well, Mr. Angleton was responsible for the
liaison of the Plans Director for the FBI and consequently he
talked to the FBI liaison man and other FBI people every day
of the week and probably several times a day.

Mr. Goldsmith. He was never, after the assassination,
instructed not to talk to the FBI while Mr.[SCRLSO] was coordi-
nating the investigation?

Mr. Helms. Certainly not. We were doing our best to be
as supportive and helpful as we could to the FBI.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you serve as a point of contact between
the Commission and the Agency, or was that responsibility given
to someone else?

Mr. Helms. I do not know that anyone in the Agency was
ever designated as point of contact. I had dealings with the
Commission because I had the part of the Agency that was doing
most of the work for the Commission. This was a situation
indicated by the display of forces and activity rather than by
anything else. I do not recall having been designated as a
particular point of contact. I do not recall anyone else's
having been designated as a point of contact.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what responsibilities, if
any, were given to Mr. Raymond Rocca?

Mr. Helms. I think in the counter-intelligence staff when
they took over this responsibility, if you want to call it
that, I believe he was the man in the counter-intelligence
staff that was responsible for pulling things together there.

In other words, these Warren Commission queries would go
to his desk, and the replies would come back from his desk.

Mr. Goldsmith. What role, if any, did Mr. McCone have
in the investigation?

Mr. Helms. As the Director of the Agency, he had a very
important role. Everything we did was on his say-so and there
was a constant traffic between him and me about what we were
doing with the Warren Commission, how we were handling these
various matters. I believe Mr. McCone testified at the
Warren Commission at one time. We would have had to brief
him in preparation for his testimony and prepare the papers
and so forth. He had a very real role.

Mr. Goldsmith. He was actually apprised of the develop-
ments and what was being given to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms. Literally not on a day to day basis, but he
was kept informed in general terms and specific terms if
necessary.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall how many times a week you
would meet with Mr. McCone and discuss with him the develop-
ments with regard to the investigation of the assassination?

Mr. Helms. I am sorry, I do not. In the Agency procedure,
there was a morning meeting with the Director every day, five
days a week, and I was at those meetings. What transpired at those meetings plus what transpired in his office in private meetings, I could not conceivably give you any idea.

Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, you would say that Mr. McCon- was actively apprised and was not on the periphery of the developments?

Mr. Helm. Certainly not. He was actively apprised. He was very much interested, and we were all very much interested.

Mr. Goldsmith. You made reference earlier to the division of responsibility in essence between the FBI and the CIA with regard to the investigation. Would you go into somewhat more detail as to the relationship between the CIA and FBI at that time?

Mr. Helm. This crime was committed on United States soil. Therefore, as far as the Federal government was concerned, the primary investigating agency would have been the Federal Bureau of Investigation without any question. The role of the CIA would have been entirely supportive and it would have been supportive in the sense of what material we are able to acquire outside the continental limits of the United States with reference to the investigation.

This was the division of labor between the FBI and the CIA. The CIA's mandate started at the ocean front. Or, to put it another way, the FBI's mandate started as soon as you crossed into the continental limits of the United States. For
investigative purposes, the Agency had no investigative role inside the United States at all. So when I used here the word "supportive," I meant that in the literal sense of the term. We are trying to support the FBI and support the Warren Commission and be responsive to their requests, but we were not initiating any investigations of our own or, to my recollection, were we ever asked to.

Mr. Goldsmith. In your opinion, was that division of responsibility satisfactory?

Mr. Helms. It was law. It was not a question of whether it was satisfactory or not; it was law.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that. One of the purposes of this investigation is to examine the state of the law at that time and the manner in which the Agency has gone about investigating the death of the President. So, at this time, I am asking you whether in your opinion that statement of facts was satisfactory towards conducting the investigation that was involved?

Mr. Helms. I do not know, Mr. Goldsmith, whether on such short notice I would want to make such a serious judgment as that. It does seem to me in any investigation that one organization has to have the primary role, otherwise you have a great deal of confusion. I think it was proper that the FBI should have the primary role in this case. I do not recall ever having felt disadvantaged in any way in the CIA
by the position we had of supporting these efforts, and that is the best answer I can give you on such short notice.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether there were any problems between the Agency and the Bureau in conducting the investigation?

Mr. Helms. The only matter that comes readily to mind was the difference in the evaluation of the material of the Soviet defector named Nosenko gave. My recollection is that what this man had to say when he arrived in the United States around the time of the assassination was passed by the FBI to the Warren Commission exactly as he said it.

The CIA was responsible for handling defectors after they came to the United States and did not feel that the bona fides or the good faith and credibility of this defector had been established at this stage of the game, and the Central Intelligence Agency felt it necessary to make that known to the Warren Commission.

There, indeed, there was a difference between the two agencies.

Mr. Goldsmith. Aside from that substantive disagreement in the day-to-day relationship of the Bureau, can you recall whether there were problems in terms of coordinating the investigation?

Mr. Helms. I do not recall any other problems.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was information freely passed between the
CIA and the FBI? By that, I mean the way the scenario is right now, the CIA is acting in a support function to the FBI. Was the FBI giving information to the CIA?

Mr. Helms. My best recollection is that there were not difficulties between the two agencies over this. As I said at the outset, we were doing our best to be supportive. We were passing along, I believe, everything that was relative.

I do recall when we got into certain sensitive areas a couple of times during the investigation, if we felt we could not pass a piece of paper to the Warren Commission, for example, we would go down and talk to the staff man to try to apprise them orally of what our predicament was.

In other words, I assure you, Mr. Goldsmith, that the whole thrust of the Agency was to be as helpful as we possibly could and to go over the edge, if necessary.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand. In this case, my question was whether the FBI was also sending information to the Agency? In other words, was the FBI sharing information for your purposes?

Mr. Helms. I do not recall any complaints on those grounds. Maybe they were and maybe they were not. It is a little bit difficult, sometimes, to know whether you are getting something the existence of which you have never heard.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency's investigation reflect any working hypotheses? By that, did the Agency give any particular
emphasis to the particular areas, geographic areas?

Mr. Helms. I think that the entire United States govern-
ment, not only the CIA, was very concerned as to whether there
would be evidence of some foreign conspiracy to assassinate
President Kennedy. They were concerned whether the Soviets
were involved in this. They were concerned whether the Cubans
were involved in this. They were concerned that somebody may
have been involved in it.

I think we were all preoccupied with this. There is hardly
any question there was more discussed during those days as to
who was behind Lee Harvey Oswald, if indeed he was the man who
was responsible, what had affected his life, why had he done
the things he had done, and so forth.

So there was a great deal of conjecturing going on. I
think if the Chair would indulge me a minute, I would like
to make a comment about the various investigations into the
assassination of President Kennedy based on the long years I
have spent in the intelligence business, and that is, until the
day that the KGB in Moscow or the Cuban intelligence in Havana
is prepared to turn over their files to the U.S. as to what
their relationships to these various people were, it is going
to be extraordinarily difficult to tidy up this case, finally,
and conclusively.

A great deal of investigation can be done, and has been
done. It has been done conscientiously. I think people have
tried over the years their very best to resolve a host of differences. I recognize also that allegations have been made that certain areas have not been as aggressively investigated as they might have been. That all may be true.

But it really does not make any difference what is done in this connection until you can get those governments to lay before you their records of how they dealt with Lee Harvey Oswald, or anybody else who is relevant in this case.

And, based on past experience, I doubt very much whether you are going to get the compliance of the Soviets or the Cuban government.

But I want to make this comment, because it is extremely important and very relevant, that these cases are untidy. It is only in books that they end up with all the little things worked out at the end and tied off neatly.

This aura of suspicion and all the rest of it hangs in the air. Undoubtedly that is why this Committee was formed, so undoubtedly this could be put to rest. I promise you, there is this one last step and until it can be taken, this is never going to be laid to rest.

Mr. Devine. Do you agree, Mr. Helms, that the likelihood of that happening is remote?

Mr. Helms. Remote. Yes, sir, I agree with that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Helms, I believe my question was --

Mr. Helms. Excuse me, Mr. Goldsmith. I did not mean to
digress. I thought that I would like to get this off my chest.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand.

My question was, what areas received primary emphasis. I think your answer, in part, was the area of foreign conspiracy.

Are you able to give any more detail on what aspects of the foreign conspiracy question were investigated?

Mr. Helms. I think we were very concerned about the Soviet aspects of this, primarily. Why? Because Lee Harvey Oswald had spent time in the Soviet Union, time which never had been satisfactorily explained as far as we knew.

Nosenko arrives as a defector. There were a lot of very suspicious circumstances surrounding the whole way and timing of his defection. So that there were several areas there that seemed to require not only investigation but thought and analysis and everything else that could be given to it.

I would like to say here that when a tragedy of the magnitude of President Kennedy's assassination occurs in this country, it is at this point that in our international relations we have to suddenly become very careful, because accusing a foreign government of having been responsible for this act is tearing the veil about as nastily as one can, and this can lead to a whole series of counter-actions which might be very unpleasant.

I think all of us were keenly aware of this. It was not only true of the Soviet Union, but also true of Cuba, that
President Kennedy's whole approach to the Cuban government of Fidel Castro.

So that we were treading very lightly, but I am sure that we were very concerned at the time as to what we might end up with. And this was not improved or our mood about this was not improved when Khruschev runs to Drew Pearson in Egypt when they were visiting there and tells Pearson that the Soviets, that this was a conspiracy of the right to assassinate President Kennedy. Why does he make this remark to Drew Pearson? What is his purpose? What was behind this?

Is it a smoke screen to cover up his own complicity?

The air was full of these things. Therefore, we were very conscious of it and we were doing what we could to make sense out of it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Helms, was all information pertinent to the Warren Commission's work promptly given to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms. As far as I know. If there are indications or evidence that it was not, I do not recall having been aware of any sins of omission at the time.

Mr. Goldsmith. On the average, would you be able to tell us how much time passed from the moment that information was received by the Agency until it went to the Commission?

Mr. Helms. My recollection is that as soon as we were able to satisfy an inquiry, we sent the reply back. And some
of these inquiries obviously took longer than others.

For example, some might involve checking a file which was in Washington. Other inquiries might involve trying to see if we could locate somebody in some overseas country.

Obviously, one takes longer to perform, one act takes longer to perform than the other.

Mr. Goldsmith. As a general rule, did you wait to receive an inquiry from the Commission prior to giving the Commission information?

Mr. Helms. Yes, I did, as I recall it.

Mr. Goldsmith. As a general rule, did you wait to receive an inquiry from the FBI prior to giving the FBI information?

Mr. Helms. That is my recollection.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, was any member of the Warren Commission or staff informed by the CIA of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots?

Mr. Helms. I do not know. Let's clear this up right now. There is no sense in your going on asking a whole series of questions on this. I am glad to tell you what I know about it.

In the first place, Mr. Allen Dulles who had about -- maybe a few months before, anyway -- ceased being Director of Central Intelligence and was replaced by Mr. McCone, was a member of the Warren Commission. I do not know what he said to the members of the Warren Commission.
Mr. McConé testified before the Warren Commission. I
believe I was with Mr. McConé the day he testified, although I
do not even have a clear recollection of that anymore, and I
have not refreshed my memory from the Warren Commission Report.

These so-called assassination plots I believe if I may put
it this way -- a sloppy term which has come to cover some
devices which the Church Committee found evidence that the
Agency had on its drawing board, if you want to put it that
way -- the only assassination plot that had any even semblance
or substance to it was one involving a couple of Mafia chief-
tains and which were supposed to have taken place before the
Bay of Pigs invasion.

I guess you could call that an assassination plot.

As far as the AMLASH business was concerned, I had a great
deal to do with the AMLASH operation and, as has been publicly
stated before and I will publicly state it again, that was not
an assassination plot. The effort of working with AMLASH was
to see if we could find a political alternative to Castro and
a man who was prepared to lead a revolt against Castro in
political and military terms, inside Havanna.

The assassination aspects of this which have been so
highly publicized was an issue that Mr. Cubella himself kept
raising, which was the simplest way to perform his mission was
to try to get rid of Castro physically. But he never attempted
it, as far as I know, and President Kennedy had been assassinated
before there was any possibility of his having attempted it, at least with the connivance of the Agency.

I think if one reads the record carefully of these various facts, you will find what I say is supported by the record.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was Mr. Cubella given any support by the Agency with regard to his desire to assassinate Fidel Castro?

Mr. Helms. In the end he was not, as far as I know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Before the end, was he at any time given any support?

Mr. Helms. No.

There is the famous story of the poison pen but he did not take the poison pen. He simply returned it to the case officer who offered it to him. There was no other device given to him, as far as I am aware.

Mr. Goldsmith. You made reference earlier to Mr. Dulles being on the Commission. Do you know whether Mr. Dulles actually knew about the so-called anti-Castro assassination plots?

Mr. Helms. He certainly knew about the Mafia one that I mentioned. I think there is abundant evidence that he did know it. I do not have that firsthand, because that particular operation was being handled by Mr. Bissell and Colonel Edwards with Mr. Dulles and General Cabell and I was not brought in on it.

At the time I was not a party to it.

This is all secondhand information I am giving you, based
on what came out of the Church Committee hearings.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Mr. McConne knew of the plots against Castro?

Mr. Helms. Yes, I think he did. Well, eventually he did. I do not know exactly at what juncture he was informed about them.

Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, did you at any time inform the Warren Commission about these plots?

Mr. Helms. I did not talk to the Warren Commission about them.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would your position be that the anti-Castro plots were not relevant to the Warren Commission's investigation?

Mr. Helms. I would not put it that way, Mr. Goldsmith. I would not like to agree with that statement.

Perhaps they were relevant. I think that is a matter of opinion.

What I would like to say, however, is I have noted in the last two or three years that various witnesses have come forward to various Congressional Committees saying if they had known this or known that or known something else their investigation, their attitude, their handling of the matter would have been entirely different. But how it would have been different is not really explained anyplace that I can find.
I would like, Mr. Chairman, to make another comment, if I may, please. In 1962, in October, we had the Cuban missile crisis and to recall and refresh your memory, this was the occasion on which Fidel Castro and Khruschev connived to put intermediate range ballistic missiles on Cuban soil which had a range which could fire into the United States at least to the middle of the country, if not all the way through to California.

If Khruschev had been able to pull off this trick, it would have been the military coup of the century. The Russians would, in the military sense, achieve what, up to that time, they had not been able to achieve otherwise -- to hold the United States hostage.

At that time, the Soviets did not have intercontinental ballistic missiles with the range or the accuracy to fire from Soviet soil to the United States. They have since achieved this capability but they did not have it in 1963, I believe the military evidence will show.

Obviously, President Kennedy through some good intelligence was provided, and by handling the situation with great skill able to get those missiles withdrawn and also the bombers, the IL-28's which came with them. But I do not think that this operation endeared Fidel Castro to John F. Kennedy.

That was in October. In December the brigade which had gone assure at the Bay of Pigs, the brigade of Cuban exiles
referred to as No. 2506, was finally gotten out of Cuban jails as a result of an exchange organized by Attorney General Robert Kennedy of payments of medical supplies and pharmaceuticals and so forth. And this group came back and they were brought together in the Orange Bowl in Miami and President Kennedy addressed him.

On that occasion, he said words to the effect that I will return this flag to this brigade in a free Hananna. I think those words are unambiguous.

So in this period of the months prior to his assassination, there certainly was bad blood between President Kennedy and Fidel Castro. This was known to everybody. Whether this blood was made worse, or not made worse, by so-called assassination plots which maybe Castro knew about, or maybe he did not know about, I am unable to say.

But I think there has been a gross exaggeration which has taken place about the role that the so-called assassination plots might have played in the Warren Commission investigation.

Ladies and gentlemen, what different conclusion would you suggest that the Warren Commission should have come to?

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Helms, I take it from your testimony that your position is that the anti-Castro plots, in fact, were relevant to the Warren Commission's work; and, in light of that, the Committee would like to be informed as to why the Warren Commission was not told by you of the anti-Castro
assassination plots.

Mr. Helms. I have never been asked to testify before the Warren Commission about our operations.

Mr. Goldsmith. If the Warren Commission did not know of the operation, it certainly was not in a position to ask you about it.

Is that not true?

Mr. Helms. Yes, but how do you know they did not know about it? How do you know Mr. Dulles had not told them? How was I to know that?

And besides, I was not the Director of the Agency and in the CIA, you did not go traipsing around to the Warren Commission or to Congressional Committees or to anyplace else without the Director's permission.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever discuss with the Director whether the Warren Commission should be informed of the anti-Castro assassination plots?

Mr. Helms. I did not, as far as I recall.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know, in 1963, what consideration if any the Warren Commission was giving to the theory that the Kennedy assassination was part of a Cuban conspiracy, a Castro conspiracy?

Mr. Helms. I do not know what consideration was given to it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Prior to the issuance of the Warren
Commission's report, did the CIA at any time have any documents or other information which indicated that Castro may have known about the CIA anti-Castro's assassination plots?

Mr. Helms. I do not recall any, Mr. Goldstein. Maybe there were, maybe there were newspaper articles. I do not have any recollection of that anymore. I believe this allegation has been made. I do not have any firsthand recollection.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency ever conduct an investigation into this issue?

Mr. Helms. I do not know.

Mr. Goldsmith. During the time that you were DCI, do you know whether the Agency ever conducted an investigation into this issue?

Mr. Helms. If it did --

Mr. Craig. Could I clarify what issue you are talking about here?

Mr. Helms. The issue I am concerned about now is whether the Agency had any information that Castro may have known about the assassination plots against him.

Mr. Craig. Whether the Agency conducted an investigation of that issue?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Helms. I would have thought, Mr. Goldsmith, that since the Agency was operating against Cuba not only in 1962, '63, '64, probably '65, that if those allegations were made by
agents of the FBI or the Secret Service or the Coast Guard
or the Agency itself that the Agency would have, in the
interests of protecting its operations, would have done its
best to find out if this were true. It is just maybe they
were not able to find out. I would have thought that there
would have been an ongoing series of operations in this regard.

Mr. Goldsmith. You do not recall specifically one way or
another?

Mr. Helms. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the fact that the Warren Commission was
not told about the anti-Castro assassination plots, at least
by you, did that reflect a desire on your part to avoid
having embarrassed the Agency?

Mr. Helms. I do not recall ever having any thoughts of
that kind in regard to the investigation of the Warren Commiss-
ion. One of the difficulties I had with this question is
ever since Senator Schweiker's report was made, which made a
great deal out of this, I have never had an opportunity to
talk to the people who were associated with me at the time to
find out just exactly who knew what about what in those days.

The United States, after all, is a nation of Monday morning
quarterbacks and it seems to me this is one of the outstanding
examples of Monday morning quarter backing.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, was there any desire on your
part to avoid an international crisis by not telling the Warren
Commission about the anti-Castro assassination plots?

Mr. Helms. The thought never occurred to me, Mr. Goldsmith.

Mr. Goldsmith. In summary then, is it your position that the Agency gave the Warren Commission information only in response to specific requests by the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms. That is correct.

I want to modify that by saying that memory is fallible. There may have been times or circumstances under which something different might have occurred, but my recollection of those days is that we were attempting to be responsive and supportive of the FBI and the Warren Commission. When they asked for something, we gave it to them.

As far as our volunteering information is concerned, I have no recollection of whether we volunteered it or not.

Mr. Goldsmith. In retrospect, do you think that was a workable arrangement?

Mr. Helms. Yes, I thought so.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, other than the anti-Castro assassination plots, was there any other information pertaining to a possible mode of means or opportunity to kill the President that the Warren Commission was not told about?

Mr. Helms. I do not know, Mr. Goldsmith.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever inform President Johnson about the anti-Castro assassination plots?

Mr. Helms. I do not like the term. You use it over and
over again. I do not like it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, if you would give me a term, I will make an effort to accommodate you.

Mr. Helms. That would be kind of you. I think what I would like to say is that was President Johnson informed of our efforts to get rid of Fidel Castro.

Mr. Goldsmith. Will you answer that question?

Mr. Helms. Yes, he was informed.

Mr. Goldsmith. At what time?

Mr. Helms. At various times after he became President.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was he told specifically about your efforts to get rid of Castro prior to the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. Helms. Yes, he was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether he was specifically told about the AMLASH plot?

Mr. Helms. I do not recall whether I ever discussed the AMLASH plot, or the AMLASH operation, as such. I do not have any recollection of it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether President Johnson was apprised of the involvement of some of the Mafia figures in this operation?

Mr. Helms. He was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall when he was so apprised?

Mr. Helms. I do.
Mr. Goldsmith. Would you so inform the Committee?

Mr. Helms. Yes. I have not testified to this before because I have no written documentation to support this, but I reported these various matters to President Johnson on May 10th, I believe, 1967.

Mr. Goldsmith. How are you able to remember the date so well at this time, Mr. Ambassador?

Mr. Helms. I do not like the implication of the question at this time.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I am not in a position to quarrel with you over the way my questions are phrased. I would like to know --

Mr. Helms. The implication is that I declined to identify it on some previous occasion.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorry. That is not the inference I was intending to suggest. My question is a very simple one: how are you able to remember today the specific date?

Mr. Helms. After I returned from Tehran and had some time available to me, I had an opportunity to dig back and get ahold of some colleagues and talk to various people to try to range in on what time period it was that these matters came up and how they were dealt with, the so-called IG Report that I asked to have done at the Agency.

Therefore I wanted to try to specify the date on which I reported to President Johnson about this IG Report. I was able
to relate it to another matter I discussed with him on that occasion, and therefore I was able to specify the date.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, what effect, if any, did the CIA's concern with protecting sources and methods as provided by law have on the information that was provided to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Preyer. This is the second bell on the vote. Before we go into that answer, the Committee will stand in recess for about ten minutes.

(A brief recess was taken.)

Mr. Preyer. The Committee will resume its hearing.

I understand that it is agreeable with you to proceed at this time, even in the absence of a quorum.

Mr. Helms. Certainly, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I repeat the question that I asked you prior to the brief recess. What effect, if any, did the agency's concern for protecting sensitive sources and methods have on the information that it provided to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms. Mr. Goldsmith, I cannot recall any specific circumstances if there were any where this question of protecting sensitive sources and methods caused us difficulty.

As I said earlier this morning, somewhere in the back of my mind there may have been an instance or two where we did not particularly want to put something in writing to the Warren
Commission so that it would come to reside in our files, become a part of the permanent record.

But in a couple of those cases — and I believe there were — someone went down and talked to a member, a couple of members of the Warren Commission staff so that they would be privy to the information without necessarily having it in writing.

I do want to repeat what I said earlier, that we were doing our level best to be responsive and we were bending over backward or forward, any way you like, to be as responsive as we could, even when sensitive sources and methods were involved.

I think that you will find, if I just might add this, that we turned over to the FBI, for example, material from a mail-ordering operation which the Agency was conducting in those days which was considered about as sensitive as anything that we were doing.

Mr. Goldsmith. When the Warren Commission staff or members were informed about information that either reflected a sensitive agency method or information that came from a sensitive agency source, was the source of that information actually given to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms. I do not know. I am sorry, I do not know.

We very seldom gave the names of sources to anybody, under any circumstances. We usually tried to describe the source in some fashion which would be helpful in evaluating the material.
But we practically never gave the names of individuals who were informants or agents or anything of that kind.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you telling the Committee, then, while the Warren Commission might be told about the substance of the information generated from a sensitive source or method of operation that the specific source and method would not necessarily be disclosed?

Mr. Helms. Not necessarily, but I do not know what happened in every instance. I am really trying to give you what was the normal operating procedure.

Mr. Goldsmith. At this time, Mr. Ambassador, I would like you to refer to what has been marked as CIA Document No. 1907. For your reference purposes, I would like to indicate that you have been given a series of volumes of materials, materials containing CIA documents.

The Agency has numbered those documents for the Committee. You will note if you open up, in this case, volume number two, on the lower right-hand corner of each page, it states page 1 of -- in this case, 212.

There are 212 pages in this volume. That is not the document number I am referring to. Immediately above that on each page there is another number of four digits -- for example, 1874 appears on page 1.

When I say CIA Document No. 1907, that would refer to what appears on page 1034 of 212. For the future, I will be
referring only to the CIA identification number.

Mr. Helms. All right.

Mr. Goldsmith. That is the practice we have been utilizing throughout the hearing and depositions.

CIA 1907 is a brief for presentation to the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy and I would ask you to look at CIA No. 1910 and read to yourself paragraph E.

Mr. Helms. Paragraph E.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

(Pause)

Mr. Helms. All right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, does this paragraph accurately reflect the Agency's attitude towards sensitive sources and methods and the way in which information touching upon sensitive sources and methods was handled with the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms. I believe so. I do not believe any reason to quarrel with what is in that paragraph.

Mr. Goldsmith. In the last sentence of this paragraph, there is a reference to channels and procedures that have functioned very well between the Commission and the Agency. Would you apprise the Committee as to specifically which channels and procedures were established in communicating this information to the Warren Commission?
Mr. Helms. I would assume, Mr. Goldsmith, that what they are attempting to say here is certain individuals who are familiar with the question at issue were authorized to sit down and talk with the Warren Commission staff members about the operation or about the information.

I do not recall there was any structured way that this was taken care of. I think it was.

If you were the individual most conversant with the problem, you might be authorized to go down, or maybe your Chief would be authorized to go down and explain it and sit down with them and go over it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did anyone from the Warren Commission or its staff express its concern to you that sources and methods by virtue of not being provided to the Warren Commission specifically were causing a problem to the Commission or its staff?

Mr. Helms. I do not recall this, Mr. Goldsmith.

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to another area now, are you able to state whether Mr. Dulles played any special role in the Warren Commission in so far as the Agency was concerned.

Mr. Helms. I am not able to make any comment about it at all.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you able to state, for example, whether Mr. Dulles represented the interests of the CIA while on the Warren Commission?
Mr. Helms. I do not know, Mr. Goldsmith. I do not know what interests he represented. Having known Mr. Dulles for many, many years, I would have thought that he would have acted very responsively as a member of the Commission and tried to represent the United States' interests.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mr. Dulles ever pass on to you Warren Commission-related information?

Mr. Helms. Not that I recall. In fact, I do not remember having seen Mr. Dulles at all during this period. If I did, it must have been on very rare occasions.

Mr. Goldsmith. For example, Mr. Dulles, never briefed you or any Agency personnel on Warren Commission matters?

Mr. Helms. I did not say that he did not talk to anyone else in the Agency. I do not recall his ever briefing me. He was a very responsible individual, Mr. Dulles. I cannot imagine his doing anything that he would have felt was improper.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I am going to move on to another line of inquiry unless you or any other members have any questions.

Mr. Preyer. Mrs. Burke?

Mrs. Burke. No.

Mr. Preyer. I have no questions at this time, Mr. Goldsmith. You may proceed.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, what role, if any, did the
Mexico City Station have in the Agency's investigation of the assassination?

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, I believe that the Mexico City station had a rather key role at the outset because it was the Mexico City station that produced the information prior to President Kennedy's assassination that a fellow named Oswald had indeed visited the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City and this had been made a matter of record in the United States government.

So I think it was in this context that the Mexico City station obviously after the assassination was being asked about the circumstances surrounding this report and what additional information they had and was it indeed Lee Harvey Oswald.

And then I believe there was a great to-do about the fact that his name was slightly wrong in the telegram, or the dissemination that was made.

All of these things I have heard in recent times. But his having been to the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City, obviously was a very important part of the initial impressions one had that it was Oswald that had committed the assassination.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it appropriate to say, relative to the roles played by other overseas stations, the Mexico City Station played a greater role in the Agency's mission?
Mr. Helms. I think that is a fair statement.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall who the Chief of Station was in Mexico City? To refresh your memory, was it Mr. Winn Scott?

Mr. Helms. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you able to give the Committee an assessment of Mr. Scott's competence as the Chief of Station?

Mr. Helms. Well, in the first place, Mr. Scott came to the CIA after having been an agent for some years of the FBI. He was a man of experience. He served a long time in Mexico City, or a comparative long time if you look at these overseas assignments in terms of a tour of duty of two or three years.

He spoke Spanish, and he was regarded as one of our more competent station chiefs.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether or not Mr. Scott maintained an adequate system of records and files in the Mexico City station?

Mr. Helms. I do not have any recollection of this. In fact, I do not recollect this having been an issue.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Mr. Scott had a personal safe?

Mr. Helms. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it customary for agency chiefs of station to maintain a personal safe?

Mr. Helms. I do not know. I would have thought that that was entirely up to them, if they wanted a personal safe or if
they did not want a personal safe. I see nothing about it one way or the other.

Mr. Goldsmith. After Mr. Scott's death in '70 or '71, do you know why Mr. James Angleton went to Mexico City and removed documents from Mr. Scott's personal safe?

Mr. Helms. No, I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mr. Angleton ever get materials from Mr. Scott's safe to you?

Mr. Helms. I do not recall ever having seen them. This was in 1971, you say?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Helms. I do not recall having seen them, Mr. Goldsmith. In fact, I do not recall the trip. I am not for a moment implying it did not take place, I just do not recall it at all. I just knew that Mr. Scott died suddenly, I believe of a heart attack. But he had left the Agency at that time, I believe. Is that correct?

Mr. Goldsmith. He had retired.

Mr. Helms. Retired and living in Mexico City?

Mr. Goldsmith. That is also correct.

Mr. Helms. Right. I do not know what Mr. Angleton took.

Mr. Goldsmith. You never sent Mr. Angleton to Mexico City to remove materials from his safe?

Mr. Helms. I may have authorized the trip on the basis of what I was told at the time. In 1978, I do not remember the
trip.

Let me just say here that this is not solid information I am giving you, but there may have been some concern that maybe Scott had something in his safe that might affect the Agency's work and the Agency just wanted to double check and be sure there was not anything of that kind there. I think that would be a normal practice, particularly if a fellow died so suddenly and there we were.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know Ann Goodpasture?

Mr. Helms. Ann Goodpasture, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. In what capacity did you know her?

Mr. Helms. She was a staffer of the Agency and I believe she served in Mexico City for a time.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether during her stay in Mexico City she was commonly known as Winn Scott's righthand person?

Mr. Helms. I do not recall in that connection, but I believe she was there quite some time.

Mr. Goldsmith. After the assassination, Mr. Ambassador, did you review the cable and dispatch traffic that flowed between the Mexico City station and headquarters?

Mr. Helms. After the assassination?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, sir.

Mr. Helms. I certainly saw some of the cables. I am simply incapable of saying today of what I saw, how many of them I saw.
because I think, in some circumstances, I would have been briefed, I would have been told here are the circumstances, what should we do?

But I do not know whether I reviewed individual cables or whether I did not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who was primarily responsible for reviewing the cable traffic and dispatch traffic between the Mexico City station and headquarters, specifically with regard to the assassination?

Mr. Helms. I think in regard to the assassination the branch that ran or had the control or support of the Mexico City station, the Chief of the Western Hemisphere division, the staff chiefs who are responsible for various aspects of the operation like positive intelligence and counter-intelligence, I undoubtedly read a number of them myself. I just do not know which ones anymore.

Mr. Goldsmith. Earlier we made reference to Mr. [SCELLO] being responsible for reviewing cable traffic pertaining to the assassination. After the responsibility for the investigation was given to the CI staff, do you know whether anyone on the CI staff was given the responsibility for reviewing the cable traffic that flowed from the Mexico City station and headquarters?

Mr. Helms. No, I do not know that this responsibility was given specifically, but I would have thought that if Mr. Rocca,
whom you mentioned earlier this morning, were handling Mexico City matters, he would have wanted to review the traffic.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Mexico City station have any surveillance operations in effect in 1963 against the Cuban and Soviet embassy and consulates?

Mr. Helms. My recollection was during that period they not only had photographic surveillance of both of the embassies, but they also had telephonic or wiretaps on both of the embassies.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was information related to Oswald obtained as a result of these operations?

Mr. Helms. Yes, it was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what information was obtained?

Mr. Helms. My impression is that when he called one or the other of the embassies that this was picked up and transcribed and it was in that way that they found out that there was a fellow named Oswald who had called.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether there was any other information obtained regarding Oswald as a result of these surveillance operations?

Mr. Helms. I do not recall anymore. It seems to me that there was a great controversy back at that time over the photograph of an individual.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. I will repeat my question.
Other than the information that was obtained concerning Oswald as a result of the telephonic surveillance operation, was any other information obtained about him as a result of the surveillance operations that you had in Mexico City?

Mr. Helms. I am sorry. I do not remember. I remember, obviously, the telephone thing because that became such a key issue later on. I do not remember whether they had other information on them or not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission given information on Oswald's contact with the embassies?

Mr. Helms. As far as I know, it was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall at that time whether the Commission was specifically told about the source of the information?

Mr. Helms. I believe this is what this must refer to here. When you are asking me to read paragraph E, that I would have assumed that the technical questions involved here was those surveillance devices.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall when the Warren Commission was told about the specific surveillance operations?

Mr. Helms. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I would ask you to refer to CIA document number 2144 which also appears in Volume 2.

Mr. Helms. My volume 2 only goes up to 2071.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorry. I stand corrected. It is in
Mr. Helms. Fine.

2144?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, sir.

Mr. Helms. Right. I have got it.*

Mr. Goldsmith. Please read the first paragraph.

(Pause)

For the record, this is a cable dated 20 December 1963 to

Mexico City from the Director.

Mr. Helms. All right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Paragraph 1 makes reference to the Agency's

intention to eliminate mention of the telephone taps in dealing

with the Warren Commission. Do you recall how long the Agency's

plan to eliminate mention of these taps in communicating

with the Warren Commission remained in effect?

Mr. Helms. I have no idea.

I am sorry. I have no information whatever.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you certain, however, that the Warren

Commission was told specifically about the telephone operations?

Mr. Helms. No, I am not. I just assumed that it was at

some point.

Mr. Goldsmith. Again, to what extent, if any, did the

Agency's concern for protecting under the law sensitive sources

and methods interfere with the information that was being given

to the Warren Commission?
Mr. Helms. I am sorry. I cannot answer the question.

I have been doing the best I can. It was my impression at the time that one way or another staff members of the Commission were informed of the fact of the way the information had been acquired because it was rather central to the investigation.

If this is not correct, then I am wrong. It was my impression that at some time or other this was made clear to them, I assume off the record.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I want to clarify, for purposes of this record, that I have shown you just one cable dated December 20th. Subsequently, the Warren Commission was given information.

I do not want to suggest to you that the information was not given and the specific sources were not made available to the Warren Commission.

The Committee, at this point, is concerned with what appears to be an early plan not to make reference of these sources and methods, but I do not want you to think that you are being shown exhibits out of context.

Mr. Helms. I do not know whether it has been made, the Committee has been made aware of the fact that the reason for the sensitivity of these telephone taps and the surveillance was not only because it was sensitive from the Agency's standpoint, but the telephone taps were running in conjunction with
and therefore, if this had become public knowledge, it would have caused very bad feelings between Mexico and the United States, and that was the reason.

Mr. Goldsmith. At this time, I would ask that you refer to CIA No. 177 which appears in Volume 1. For the record, that is a cable dated October 9, 1963 to the Director from the Mexico City station.

Mr. Helms. Do you want me to read the cable?

Mr. Goldsmith. Please read it to yourself, sir.

(Pause)

Mr. Helms. I have read it.

Mr. Goldsmith. In the first paragraph of this cable, it refers to LIENVOY. Is that a reference to the telephonic surveillance operation?

Mr. Helms. I do not recall anymore anything about these cryptonyms. My assumption in reading this would be that probably it did. I do not know for sure.

Mr. Goldsmith. From the context of the second paragraph which makes reference to the source being LIANPY, would you say that that, in all likelihood, refers to the photo operation?

Mr. Helms. LIANPY?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Helms. I assume so. I do not recall any more.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does paragraph 2 contain a description of
someone that the México City Station thought was Oswald?

Mr. Helms. I guess it was. That is the only assumption I can make based on the context of the telegram.

Mr. Goldsmith. The description of the individual involved is not an accurate description of Oswald, is it?

Mr. Helms. Not based on what I have learned about Oswald since.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know how this individual mistakenly was linked to Oswald?

Mr. Helms. No, I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Mexico City Station ever asked to explain why it thought that the individual referred to in paragraph 2 was, in fact, Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Helms. I have a general impression that there was a great effort made to clarify who this man was. Is this the fellow they have never identified? This photograph has been kicking around for years.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. Let me show you that photograph now to refresh your memory.

For the record, this corresponds with Exhibit No. 1 of the Warren Commission.

Mr. Helms. Thank you, Mr. Goldstein. That is the photograph I recollect as being the one that every effort was being made to find out who that man was. Has he ever been identified?
Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Helms, that was my next question.

Was the Agency ever able to identify this individual?

Mr. Helms. Not to the best of my knowledge.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Mexico City Station ever explain to Headquarters how this individual was linked to Oswald?

Mr. Helms. If they did, I was never made privy to it. I think it was obviously a mistake of some sort.

All I recall is that a valiant effort was made to find out who this fellow was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was consideration ever given to the possibility that this person may have been an Oswald imposter?

Mr. Helms. I do not know. I do not recall the circumstances anymore. I am sorry.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, it seems to me that the question of whether this individual was an Oswald imposter presents a significant issue. By virtue of you not being able to recall whether or not this was examined, is it fair to say that it probably was not considered?

In other words, I am suggesting that, because the issue is a significant one, had it been considered, you would remember it.

Mr. Helms. You see, Mr. Goldsmith, I can see the significance of the issue, but if we do not know who the man was, we do not know where he was. How were we going to investigate this. If I may submit, in fairness, we did not have access to
the Cuban authorities to go to their embassy and say, who is this fellow seen coming out of your embassy. We did not have it with the Russians either. Where were we to go to investigate this matter?

Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, you do not recall whether this issue was investigated?

Mr. Helms. No, I do not, but I do not know how it would have been investigated.

Mr. Goldsmith. When was the Warren Commission told about the picture to which reference is made in paragraph 3 of this cable?

Mr. Helms. I have no idea.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission ever told about the specific connection between the picture and the cable reporting Oswald's contact with the Embassy?

Mr. Helms. I would have imagined that the Agency did everything that it could to work with the Warren Commission staff in trying to find out who this man was, what his significance might be. I cannot imagine that this was not thoroughly gone into.

If there were any evidence not thoroughly gone into, I would not understand it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Here is an example of a situation where I felt the Warren Commission, by virtue of not having known of this picture or of the cable perhaps did not ask the Agency...
about it and therefore may not have been apprised of this photograph.

Mr. Helms. Is my recollection not accurate that we had the FBI working with us to try to locate this man? It seems to me that everybody we might find who might have conceivably had some means of identifying him was asked about it. I do not think we were making any secret of it, that we could not identify him. We were trying to get some help to do it.

I do not think this is one of these closely-guarded secrets, nor did the Agency have any motive for passing that along to anyone who was interested.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the purpose of attempting to refresh your memory on this issue, the way that the Warren Commission, at least in the record, was apprised of this photograph was as follows: in February, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified before the Commission and made reference to a photograph that she had seen that purported to show Jack Ruby.

The photograph she was referring to was one of the individuals who appears in the picture we just told you, Exhibit No. 1. That, at least in the record, is the first time that the Warren Commission was told about this particular photograph.

Is that consistent with your recollection?

Mr. Helms. How did Marguerite Oswald find out about the photograph? Had she been shown the photograph?
Mr. Goldsmith. She was shown the photograph shortly after the assassination.

Mr. Helms. By the FBI?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Helms. Begging your pardon, what was the question?

Mr. Goldsmith. The question is, according to the record, the first time the Warren Commission was told about this photograph in mid-February of 1964, at that time, the person who informed the Commission about the photograph was Marguerite Oswald, not the Agency.

Mr. Helms. I have no idea why the Agency had not raised the question of the photograph. The only supposition I can make, not knowing who it was, they did not know what to do about it, and they did not know its relevance or its significance.

Mr. Preyer. Excuse me. We have another vote on.

The Committee will recess for ten minutes.

(A brief recess was taken.)

Mr. Preyer. The Committee will resume its sitting.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, do you recall whether the Warren Commission was dissatisfied with the explanation that had been given to it concerning the photograph of the individual in Mexico City that initially was linked to Oswald?

Mr. Preyer. I do not know, Mr. Goldsmith. That would be a very difficult question for me to answer. I do not recall
any official criticism. They may have said something to
members of the staff, or a member of the staff may have said
something to a member of the Agency about it. I do not have
any personal recollection of it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me CIA document No. 2221, which appears
in Volume 3.

Mr. Helms. Volume 3, 2221?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, sir.

For the record, that is a memorandum prepared by William
Coleman on March 26, 1964.

Mr. Helms. I am having trouble finding it. I am sorry.
I am moving as fast as I can here. 2221?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Helms. I have it. Do you want me to read that?

Mr. Goldsmith. Please.

(Pause)

Mr. Helms. All right. I have read it now.

Mr. Goldsmith. Focusing your attention on the second to
last paragraph in CIA 2222, that seems to suggest, does it
not, that at least Mr. Coleman, who was the senior staff
counsel with the Warren Commission, was not satisfied with the
explanation that had been given to him by the Agency concern-
ing that photograph?

Mr. Helms. That does seem to be what he is implying.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does that refresh your memory as to whether
this photograph created any controversy between the Commission and the Agency?

Mr. Helms. I am sorry. It does not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is there any reason why the Commission would not have been told about this photograph as early as December when it was initially formed?

Mr. Helms. I do not have any idea why. It was later than that. The photograph was brought to the Commission's attention. I have no recollection of this whatsoever. My recollection is confined almost entirely to the efforts made at some point. I do not even know exactly what period this was to try to find out who the man was.

Mr. Goldsmith. At this point, would you please refer to CIA 2139.

Mr. Craig. Is that also Volume 3?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Helms. I am zeroing in on it. I have got it, 2139.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, that is an internal note dated 5 March 1964 from Raymond Rocca to Dick -- I assume that is Richard Helms.

Mr. Helms. You assume it is who?

Mr. Goldsmith. Richard Helms, yourself. If my assumption is incorrect, please clarify the record.

(Pause)

Mr. Helms. I have read it.
Mr. Goldsmith. The reason I assumed the memo was addressed to you was that someone wrote in in parentheses DDF immediately above the name Dick.

Mr. Helms. I see that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall ever receiving this memo?

Mr. Helms. No, I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Drawing your attention to the second paragraph of the memo, does it make reference to the famous six photographs that were not of Oswald?

Mr. Helms. It does. It says, for example, the famous six photographs that were not of Oswald. I did not realize there were six photographs.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, I should indicate they eventually located as many as twelve photographs of this individual.

Drawing your attention to the second paragraph, why was there a preference on the part of at least some of your staff to wait out the Warren Commission with respect to, among other things, these photographs?

Mr. Helms. I do not know. I assume it has to do with the way they were taken. Is that not a reasonable inference, that it was a question about wanting to put on the public record the fact that we were photographing people going in and out of these embassies.

Mr. Goldsmith. The issue here is not putting anything in
the public record. The issue is explaining what happened to
the Warren Commission.

Mr. Helms. I do not know if it was something else. I do
not have any idea what it is any longer, but I assume you have
had an opportunity to speak to Mr. Rocca or Mr. Angleton or
somebody. Maybe they have a better recollection than I. I
do not recall if I got this memorandum what I did about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. If this case involving the photograph
an example of a situation where the Agency's concern for
protecting sources and methods under the law prevented it from
giving the Warren Commission all of the information that the
Commission was asking for?

Mr. Helms. It may be they were not getting it promptly
in the form in which they wanted it. It seems to me that the
entire thrust of this memorandum was that they were getting
the information, in any event, in some form or another, by
some means or other.

Mr. Goldsmith. The Oswald contact with the Soviet Embassy,
turning to another issue not dealing with this document, that
contact was reported to Headquarters by cable, I believe the
cable cited earlier. Why would a cable be used to report
this contact as opposed to some other way of communicating
the information?

Mr. Helms. I think that since this was an American, since
they thought it was an American who had gone to a Soviet
Embassy, that they would report it by cable. That was a reasonably routine way of doing it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does that suggest that the contact at the time you would consider to be important?

Mr. Helms. It does not suggest to me anything like that. The pouch usually took a long time. They would have thought since this was an American they ought to report on it promptly.

Mr. Goldsmith. At the time of Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy, was any importance attached to that contact?

Mr. Helms. Not that I am aware of. I would have thought that the evidence would have indicated to the contrary. The FBI apparently paid no attention to the report.

Mr. Goldsmith. At this time, I would ask you to refer to CIA No. 179 that appears in Volume I, for the record, that is a cable dated 10-10-63 consisting of Headquarters' response to the earlier Mexico City station cable.

I would ask you to read through CIA 179 to 181.

(Pause)

Mr. Helms. I have read it.

Mr. Goldsmith. This cable contains information reporting that Oswald had defected to the Soviet Union. Once this fact had been realized did this in any way escalate the significance of his contact with the Soviet Embassy?

Mr. Helms. This information? Yes. I would have thought...
it would have escalated it quite considerably.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would some sort of response have been expected on the part of the Mexico City station, had they additional information on Oswald?

Mr. Helms. Yes. I would have thought that the Chief of the Mexico City Station, having received this telegram, if he did get additional information on Oswald he would desire to pass it very quickly back to Headquarters.

Mr. Goldsmith. For example, if the Mexico City Station had information in its possession and that information had already been processed to the effect that Oswald had also contacted the Cuban Embassy, should that have been communicated to Headquarters?

Mr. Helms. I would have thought so. I do not know whether it was or not, but I would have thought it should have been.

Mr. Goldsmith. The first paragraph of this cable contains a correct description of Oswald, at least a description that is more accurate than the one that is contained in the Mexico City Station cable.

Upon receiving this description, did the Mexico City station ever respond with respect to the discrepancy in the two descriptions?

Mr. Helms. I do not know.

Mr. Goldsmith. This cable also refers to Oswald as Lee
Henry Oswald. I believe earlier you made reference to the fact that there had been some confusion over the middle name. Do you know how the name Lee Henry Oswald got into the Agency's records instead of Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Helms. I do not know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was that ever a source of concern to you?

Mr. Helms. I believe there was an effort to ascertain what had caused the mistake, but I do not know whether any satisfactory explanation was ever found.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether any report was written reflecting that effort?

Mr. Helms. I would have assumed that someone would have written up the work they had done in an effort to clear up the discrepancy, but I do not recall the report, and I cannot say from firsthand knowledge that one existed.

I would have assumed that a form would have required the writing of such a report.

Mr. Goldsmith. Referring to CIA No. 181, the lower left-hand corner of the page, it indicates that Thomas Karamessinas was the releasing officer of this cable.

Mr. Helms. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why would someone as high up in the Agency as Mr. Karamessinas have been the releasing officer for a cable like this?

Mr. Helms. I do not think — if I may suggest it, with
due deference, that is not really the way I would have described what was happening here.

You see, this cable originates in the Western Hemisphere Division because, not only through the Western Hemisphere Division, but it also goes to various elements of the CI staff. Frequently in the procedures that we used in the Agency when you had both staff and various parts of the staff and the division and so forth, these frequently went to the so-called front office for relief, either to Karamessinas or myself.

Since I notice in the cable here questions of policy as to where this information was going to be disseminated and things of that kind, I would have found this quite a normal procedure.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you, at this time, refer to CIA No. 2140, Volume No. 3.

Mr. Preyer. We have another vote on. It is final passage on the defense bill. We will recess for ten minutes.

(A brief recess was taken.)

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, would you refer to 2140?

Mr. Helms. Yes. Do you want me to read it?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, please.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, that is a 10-10-63 dissemination cable sent by Headquarters to various Federal agencies.
Mr. Helms. Yes, I have read it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, this cable in particular has sparked some controversy because it also contains an indirect description of Oswald. The question I have for you is why, especially in light of the earlier cable which you just examined which contained a correct description, this incorrect description went out in this particular cable.

Mr. Helms. I do not have a clue, Mr. Goldsmith.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was that issue ever raised by the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms. I have no recollection any longer. I assume it must have been raised. I would assume this would have been gone over and picked at and repicked at and every effort made to find out what had happened and what had gone wrong. But that is 15 years ago and I do not have any recollection of the chain of events.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission ever shown these specific cables?

Mr. Helms. I do not know. I would have thought they might have been shown this dissemination. I do not think there would have been any reluctance to show them that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the CIA's Mexico City Station ever obtain a tape-recording of Oswald's voice?

Mr. Helms. I would have assumed when this telephone call -- is that what you are referring to by tape recording?
Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Helms. Those telephone calls were taped.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know how many tape recordings of Oswald's voice the station managed to obtain?

Mr. Helms. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were these tape recordings in existence at the time of the assassination?

Mr. Helms. I can only assume that they were. How frequently they were cleaned up after they were transcribed, I do not know. I do not know anything about those procedures anymore, if I ever did.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the tapes were made available to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms. Whether they were made available?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Helms. I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know how many tape recordings there were?

Mr. Helms. Of Oswald's voice?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Helms. No, I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would it have been unusual for the Agency not to have had tape recordings in existence in November of '63, at the President's assassination?

Mr. Helms. I do not know how long they kept those tapes,
whether they simply transcribed what was on them and cleaned them up and used them again, or whether they held them. I do not know what they did with them.

Mr. Goldsmith. At this time, I would ask that the Ambassador be given JFK Exhibit 128, and I would like to have Exhibit 128 introduced in the record. It is a letter from Mr. Hoover to Mr. Reilly of the Secret Service dated November 23, 1963.

Mr. Chairman, I request that this item be admitted as an Exhibit.

Mrs. Burke. So ordered, without objection.

(The document referred to was marked JFK Exhibit No. 128 for identification.)

Mr. Goldsmith. I would ask you to read starting on page 4 of the last paragraph on the page.

Mr. Helms. Yes, I have read that document or that paragraph of the document.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Hoover is referring to a tape recording that his agent listened to. Do you know which tape recording he is referring to?

Mr. Helms. I have no idea. I am sorry.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was any issue ever raised in 1963 concerning a tape recording that had been made available which purported to contain Oswald's voice, which in the end did not?
Mr. Helms. I am sorry, I cannot help you.

May I ask, not out of curiosity, but simply by way of attempting to be helpful, is it possible that what Mr. Hoover is referring to, that some FBI agent assigned to the Embassy, the American Embassy in Mexico City, might have been who listened to this tape recording?

The FBI had a large station in Mexico City. I just thought that might be what he is referring to.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether the question of the existence of Oswald's tapes was important in 1963?

For example, I raised this with you because the question has arisen as to whether the person who showed up at the Embassies in Mexico City was not Oswald. If you had a tape recording of his voice, that could obviously be tested to corroborate whether that was Oswald.

Do you recall whether this was an issue in 1963?

Mr. Helms. If it was, I do not know how it was handled. I do not recall it as an issue.

As I say here today, I do not ever recall anybody ever having said to me that it was not Lee Harvey Oswald who called the Embassy.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the CIA's Mexico City Station ever obtain a photograph of Oswald as a result of its photo surveillance operation against the Soviet and Cuban Embassies and consulates?
Mr. Helms. I do not know. My impression is that they did not, but I am not sure.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would ask you at this time to refer to CIA No. 248, which would appear in Volume No. 1.

Mr. Helms. All right.

Would you give me the number again?

Mr. Goldsmith. 248.

Mr. Helms. I have 248.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please read that document.

(Pause)

For the record, this is a memo from Mr. Papich of the FBI concerning the photo-coverage of the embassies dated 27 November 1963.

Mr. Helms. Who is this memorandum signed by, or who did it originally come from? Where did it originate, so I can tell what I am reading?

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I would like to answer your inquiry. However, the Agency has made available to us at this time just the first page of this memo so that the author cannot be identified at this time.

Mr. Helms. Thank you.

I have read the page.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it correct to say that according to this memo the CIA and the Mexico City Station at least attempted to keep the Cuban and Soviet embassies and consulates under constant
surveillance, photographically?

Mr. Helms. That was certainly the object of the exercise.

Mr. Goldsmith. If the record -- by the record, I refer to the Agency's record of Oswald's contacts with the embassies, and also the Warren Commission's contacts with the embassies, established that Oswald visited the Cuban and Russian embassies and consulates at least five times, possibly more than six.

Would you regard it as unusual for the surveillance station not to obtain a photograph of Oswald?

Mr. Helms. Yes, I thought it was unusual if he has been there five or six times.

Mr. Goldsmith. In fact, there were, in the record, no photographs of Oswald that was obtained.

Was the Mexico City Station ever questioned as to why no photograph of Oswald had been obtained?

Mr. Helms. I do not know firsthand if they were questioned, but I would assume they were questioned in spades. I would assume everyone would want to know why.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were you specifically involved?

Mr. Helms. I do not remember any more.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you familiar with the cryptonym AMMUG?

Mr. Helms. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether in 1963 or '64 the Agency obtained information concerning Oswald from a Cuban
defector who defected from the DGI?

Mr. Helms. I do not remember.

Mr. Goldsmith. For purposes of refreshing your recollection, please refer to CIA 1879 that appears in Volume 2.

Mr. Helms. 1879?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, sir.

Incidentally, I have been informed that the memo you were just referring to, CIA 248, appears to be a blind memo, just one page in length.

Mr. Helms. I see. Thank you.

(Pause)

All right. I have read it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Before going into this memo in further detail, I would like to know whether you think it should be a source of concern for this Committee specifically, the fact that, according to the Agency's record, no photograph of Oswald during his visit to Mexico City was ever taken or obtained.

Mr. Helms. I think it would be useful if I were to say that using photographic surveillance of those embassies in a foreign country was a very tricky matter, not only as to relations between the countries, but tricky as far as the public is concerned, and that expecting clandestine technical devices of that kind to work perfectly is quite beyond the state of the art, or was in the year 1963, and there is nothing the Congress
can do to improve that kind of thing. Either the thing works or it does not work. But there is very little point in trying to follow a line of inquiry that is critical of the way the Agency conducted those operations, because they were done under the most difficult circumstances, not under laboratory circumstances. Therefore, if they worked or did not work, it was a great deal of matter of luck, often, than good technical work or good judgment.

Mr. Goldsmith. That line of inquiry is not directed specifically at any criticism of the Agency. The mode of analysis goes to style.

Oswald makes five or six visits to the Embassy. We have a situation where the record suggests that there was an attempt to have continuous photographic coverage. Even if the photographic coverage was not 100 percent effective, one would think if he visited five or six times he would be picked up at least once.

From that, the next step would be, if there was a picture, why was it not made available? And that is specifically the issue with which the Committee is concerned.

Mr. Helms. I can understand the Committee's concern, and I wish it luck solving the problem.

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to this particular document, is your memory now refreshed about a Cuban defector offering information to the Agency concerning Oswald, concerning the
assassination in general?

Mr. Helms. My xerox is so poor here. Is this the one you are referring to as AMMUD?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Helms. I had forgotten about this defector report or, if I knew about it, I imagine it was brought to my attention at the time, certainly, I do not recall anymore.

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to the middle of the page, the part of the paragraph labelled as "Comment," would you tell the Committee what the term WH/SA/CI?

Mr. Helms. SA, I am not sure anymore what that would have been. I do not know if that was Special Activities or just what. I am sorry. Wait a minute.

No, I cannot help you.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether SA referred to the Cuban Task Force?

Mr. Helms. If it referred to the Cuban Task Force, I would have thought it would have been SAS. I thought that what was normally referred to, the Special Activities Staff, and it was therefore referred to, or would have been referred to, as WH/SAS/CI, if that is what it was.

Maybe this is correct. I do not want to say you are not correct. Obviously, you know a great deal more about this these days than I do.

I can only say I thought it was usually referred to as
SAS.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what information concerning
the assassination AMMU6 provided?

Mr. Helms. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what information he provided
concerning Oswald's contacts with DGI?

Mr. Helms. I do not. I just know what I have read on
the sheet.

Mr. Goldsmith. The first paragraph of the sheet indicates
that Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy on two or three occa-
sions. Then it says, before, during and after these visits,
Oswald was in contact with DGI, Cuban intelligence.

What follow-up, if any, do you recall being done with
this particular issue?

Mr. Helms. I am sorry. I do not understand.

Mr. Goldsmith. Having received this information, what
was done with it?

Mr. Helms. I do not know. I do not know what could have
been done with it. So he was in touch with Cuban Intelligence.
What would we do about that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission told about it?

Mr. Helms. I do not know. I would have thought they
would have been.

Mr. Goldsmith. Here is an example of a situation where
the Warren Commission maybe did not have knowledge of this
incident, would not have specifically asked you about it. So this would be an example of the CIA's initiating information to the Warren Commission.

Mr. Helms. It seems to me, having interrogated a defector and developed information on Lee Harvey Oswald and his contacts with the Cubans, that the Agency would have volunteered this information to the Warren Commission if, indeed, the Warren Commission was still sitting on 5 May 1964, which I assume that it was.

Mr. Goldsmith. At this time, would you please read CIA No. 1906, which is a memo dated 12 May 1964, directed to Mr. Rocca from Mr. Angleton.

Mr. Helms. This is from Angleton to Rocca, right.

(Pause)

I have read it.

Mr. Goldsmith. It says, 'I raised with Mr. Helms the nature of the recent information you are processing that originated with the sensitive Western Hemisphere source.' That would be AMMUD.

"I informed him that this would raise a number of new factors with the Commission," et cetera.

What new factors, if any, would the AMMUD case have raised with the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms. I am sorry. In 1978, I haven't the foggiest idea.
Mr. Goldsmith. Was there any reluctance on the part of the Agency to disclose this information to the Warren Commission because of the sensitivity of the source?

Mr. Helms. Did you not just tell me he was a defector?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, he was a defector.

Mr. Helms. And was a defector at this time?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Helms. I am not entirely sure why this great question of sensitivity, unless he was a secret defector and the Cubans did not know he had defected. That might make it sensitive.

I cannot figure out what else would have been sensitive about it. I simply take the word of Angleton who wrote the memorandum that there was something sensitive about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Mexico City station ever tasked to pursue the leads generated by the source?

Mr. Helms. I do not know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, are you familiar with the case of the Soviet defector Nosenko?

Mr. Helms. Yes, I am.

Mr. Goldsmith. What role, if any, did you play with regard to the handling of this case?

Mr. Helms. I assume -- and I have to use the word assume, because my memory does not carry me this far. I assume that I was, in one way or another, involved with the Nosenko
case from the time that contact was made with him in Geneva through his defection and then through the period after he defected and was held by the Agency and I was probably in and out of the case -- and by in and out, I simply mean that at periodic intervals I would hear some aspects of the case, or about the case -- until the time that he was eventually resettled.

In other words, by "resettled," I simply mean he was led out of the Agency's custody, found a place to live. I thought he was given a new identity and assumed a life in American society in the public domain. But I was in and out of it all the time. How many decisions I was involved in during this period I do not recall anymore.

I do not want to duck any of them. It was an ongoing case of great sensitivity, great legal complications, and that is the best way I can answer your question.

Mr. Goldsmith. I take it that, as DDP and then DCI, you were involved in the decision-making process concerning Nosenko?

Mr. Helms. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you read the three major agency reports that were written in regard to the Nosenko case?

Specifically, there was a report in 1968 issued by the Soviet Russia Division; another report later in '68 called the Solée Report; another, a third report, in 1976 referred to as the Hart Report.
Have you had occasion to read any of those reports?

Mr. Helms. It is a cinch I have not read the Hart Report because I had left the Agency long before 1976. As to the other two reports, I do not recall anymore whether I read them, I cannot imagine that I would not have been told what was in them.

Mr. Goldsmith. During his defection in 1964 and at his arrival in the United States, was he in the custody of the CIA?

Mr. Helms. Yes.

The procedure was that Soviet defectors, or defectors who were accepted by act of the Inter-Agency Defector Committee, were handled by the Agency and the United States, and Nosenko was no exception.

Mr. Goldsmith. By what legal authority do you recall was Nosenko in CIA custody? You made reference to normal procedure.

Mr. Helms. I do not know whether the NSC directive have the power of law or not. I am not a lawyer.

I simply know that it was an agreed-upon device in the United States government for handling defectors.

Mr. Goldsmith. How long did Mr. Nosenko remain in CIA custody?

Mr. Helms. Two or three years, I imagine.

Mr. Goldsmith. If the record would indicate that he was in custody until October '69, at which point he was admitted as a resident alien to the United States, would you dispute
that in any way?

Mr. Helms. I would have thought -- I see what you mean.

Excuse me. I do not think I understood your question properly.

Let me go back.

I have no reason to question the fact that he was in CIA custody until 1969. I was referring to the fact that he was under interrogation for, I think, two or three years and then he was in the Agency's custody under different surroundings and under different circumstances I believe.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. We understand each other.

What unit within the CIA had the primary responsibility for handling Nosenko in 1964?

Mr. Helms. My recollection was that he was turned over to the Director of Security as far as his handling and housing and so forth was concerned; that his interrogation was handled by people provided by the Soviet Russian Division, or whatever the division was known as at that time.

The title of that division, Mr. Chairman, changed through the years, and I am not sure what it was called in 1964.

Anyway, it was the division that was attempting to run operations against the Soviet Union.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you saying initially the responsibility for questioning Mr. Nosenko was given to personnel from the Soviet Russia Division?

Mr. Helms. The interrogating responsibility, yes.
Mr. Goldsmith. Did they continue to have responsibility for him until he was released from CIA custody in 1969? Custody in the sense that you referred to earlier?

Mr. Helms. We switched terminology here. The Soviet Russian fellow were the interrogators. The housekeepers, administrators and handlers I believe, if I am not mistaken, came from the Director of Security. I believe that they continued this on through during the time that he was in Agency custody.

Am I wrong about that?

Mr. Goldsmith. I am afraid I cannot respond to you at this time concerning that. You are certainly correct in terms of personnel who handled him with regard to interrogation.

Mr. Helms. All right. Let me just rest on what I have said.

Mr. Goldsmith. So initially, the personnel that handled the interrogations came from the SAF Branch or Division. Did they continue to have this responsibility until Mr. Nosenko was released from custody in 1969?

Mr. Helms. I thought the interrogation period was sort of over when he was turned over to Bruce Soley and Soley was the fellow who was supposed to take care of him and talk to him and so forth.

My recollection may be wrong. It may be fuzzy. I thought that there was a change there.
At the time that he was released from the active or hostile interrogation, an effort was being made to get him adjusted so he could assume some kind of life in American society.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why was responsibility for handling Nosenko in terms of questioning him transferred from the SR people to Bruce Soley?

Mr. Helms. My recollection of the circumstances was I had a problem as Director and it was a serious problem—that was what to do with Mr. Nosenko. After all, we held him against the laws of the United States for a period of two or three years. Even though we had consulted with the Deputy Attorney General as to what to do about the case we got no particular help from him because there was no legal precedent for these things.

In fact, as far as I know today, there has been no effort made to set up a legal context in which a case like this could be held.

I was not interested in continuing this any longer than it was felt necessary to get as best we could to the bottom of the Nosenko case.

So after considering all the factors, the decision was made to get him out of what I can only refer to as Durrence file and get him into different circumstances and make an effort not only to resettle him, but find out whether pleasant and cordial treatment he had any different things to say than
he had under hostile interrogation.

I want to emphasize the point. I am not trying to anticipate your questions, Mr. Goldsmith; it just seems to run right along here -- that my motivation as Director of the Agency was to get that man into a status where he could handle it in some way that was proper and legal and all of the rest of it and get him out of a status where we were obviously in violation of the law in holding him.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall how long a period Mr. Nosek was held in custody or confinement under violation of the law?

Mr. Helms. I think it was two or three years anyway.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall which individual specifically had primary responsibility for interrogating him in '64? To refresh your memory in part, would David Murphy have been one of those individuals?

Mr. Helms. That sounds good.

Mr. Goldsmith. Can you recall anyone else besides Mr. Murphy?

Mr. Helms. I do not recall whether I recall this name from my recollections as to 1964. It seems to me that Bagley was another fellow involved in the interrogation of Nosenko.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorry, Mr. Helms. I do not comprehend fully your response. Another individual may have been involved in the interrogation?

Mr. Helms. An individual known as Tennant Bagley.
Mr. Goldsmith. I understood that. The record is clear on that.

My question now is was another individual who interrogated Mr. Nosenko known as [ ]?

Mr. Helms. That name, I am sorry, does not ring any bells with me.

Mr. Goldsmith. What position did Mr. Bagley hold with the Agency?

Mr. Helms. I think at that time he was in the SR Division somewhere.

Mr. Goldsmith. How were these individuals selected for handling, Mr. Nosenko? Why, in particular, were these individuals chosen?

Mr. Helms. I do not know. I would have thought that the Chief of the SR Division would pick individuals who knew the most about Soviet intelligence, Soviet intelligence methodology, how things were done in the Soviet Union. In other words, would have provided the most expert interrogators we could have.

Mr. Goldsmith. How much expertise, if any, did the individuals have to the Oswald case?

Mr. Helms. I do not know.

Mr. Goldsmith. When Nosenko was questioned about Oswald, was any effort made to have the interrogator have sufficient expertise concerning Oswald and the JFK assassination?
Mr. Helms. I do not know. I cannot imagine he would not have briefed himself on these things. In other words, what would be the purpose on the part of the interrogation? What we were trying to do was find out whether Nosenko was telling the truth or not. This would have been an important part of finding that out.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you also think that the individuals involved with the questioning of Nosenko were, in fact, experienced interrogators?

Mr. Helms. Well, I do not know what experienced interrogators are, really. In the American vernacular, a man who has been doing anything for two weeks has become experienced, so I do not know how you evaluate that term.

But people like Murphy and Bagley and so forth were certainly experienced in Soviet Russian matters. Whether they were experienced interrogators or not, I do not remember. The word interrogator is something from World War II. If you were an interrogator in a prisoner of war camp, you kind of got that rubric hung around your neck and that gave you a certain status. I have never quite understood why, but nevertheless it did.

Whether these fellows ever had that kind of interrogation instruction or experience, I do not remember.

Mr. Goldsmith. The Nosenko case was an important one, was it not?

Mr. Helms. Very important.
Mr. Goldsmith. In light of that, would it be expected that the people questioning him would have had a lot of experience?

Mr. Helms. I would have thought the agency would have put the best people in it that they could find. Certainly that was my intention.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who made decisions concerning which areas of inquiry were going to be addressed to Nosenko?

Mr. Helms. I think there was a great deal of cooperation done within the DDP trying to work out the interrogation of Nosenko. It was so important to us and we had him for so long I am certain there was a lot of consultation and effort made to figure out ways to arrive at the truth here.

Mr. Goldsmith. Other than the SR branch, which units would have been involved?

Mr. Helms. I do not know who was involved. That is all on the record. I think it is fine to ask me these things, but fifteen years later I do not remember a whole list of names.

Mr. Goldsmith. Part of the Committee's problem is that the record is not all that clear and does contain errors.

Mr. Helms. The record contains errors? How does the record contain errors? I am not clear.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am talking in a general sense. Part of the problem that the Committee faces is the record, in fact, does not speak for itself and that records do contain errors.
Mr. Helms. I see.

Mr. Goldsmith. I make no comment one way or the other whether the record contains errors in this particular case.

How frequently were you briefed concerning the results of Nosenko's interrogation sessions?

Mr. Helms. I do not have any recollection whatever.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you ever recall being briefed?

Mr. Helms. Yes. I am sure I was asking from time to time as to how we were finding out. After all, I felt I had to go see Chief Justice Warren and tell him that we were not able to establish Nosenko's bona fides. I obviously satisfied myself before I went that we were not able to.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did questions concerning Oswald constitute a major facet of the overall inquiry that was being made of Nosenko?

Mr. Helms. Yes. No question about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. In January, 1968 when the SR Division Report concerning Nosenko was issued, what was the Agency's position concerning Nosenko's bona fides?

Mr. Helms. I do not think the Agency has ever had a position. The only position I know of that could be called an Agency position was we did not know whether he is bona fide or not. I never made a determination as to whether he was bona fide or not. But I believe unless something has happened that I never heard of, that it still must be an open question.
Or, let us put it this way, a matter of opinion.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it not so that the SR. Report of 1968 indicated that in fact Mr. Nosenko was not a bona fide defector?

Mr. Helms. I do not remember firsthand what the thrust of the report was, but obviously this is a very difficult line of inquiry for me because I read the magazines and newspapers and books and so forth which have appeared since, and I do not know what I have read there and what I knew from that time.

I just judge from reading the New York magazine, for example, that this is still an open question. If the New York magazine is a bad source, I have nothing to add.

Mr. Goldsmith. In January, '68, when the --

Mr. Sawyer. If counsel would yield for just a moment, may I ask the Ambassador, this is kind of intriguing to me, we having had a rather long session with Mr. Nosenko. Do you have an opinion yourself on that question?

Mr. Helms. No, sir, I do not, because a lot of time has passed since I have been out of the Agency and a lot of the factors that went into this argument and debate, I have now forgotten about.

I have been under constant appearances in Grand Juries, Congressional Committees and various investigations on all kinds of subjects, so my memory is even more wonky than it would be under normal conditions.

I do not know about Mr. Nosenko. I do know that there
are differing opinions, however, about him, but I do not have any personal feeling myself about him.

I am sorry, I cannot help you. I do not know.

Mrs. Burke. Since Mr. Sawyer has interjected a question at this time, I have a couple of questions I would like to raise at this point.

There were many defectors from the Soviet Union and Cuba during that period of time. What was the usual procedure for the housing of those defectors and what was the procedure in terms of their places of detention?

Mr. Helms. Usually, Mrs. Burke, when these men were brought to the United States they are put in what is called a safe house which was usually a relatively isolated residence where we could control the environment around it, and they were lodged there -- normally very comfortably and well-fed and well-taken care of and interrogated. And the normal procedure did not take terribly long, maybe a month or two or something of this kind, and then they would be resettled, a new identity would be given to them, or something would occur.

But the Nosenko case was so central to the whole problem of trying to establish this relationship of the Soviet Union to the assassination of President Kennedy, and since we were unable to resolve the case satisfactorily to ourselves, this went on far longer than any other case I have ever remembered.

And I must say also, because I do not want to mislead you.
in any way, that whether or not the handling of defectors, the way it was done in those days, was in compliance with all the laws of the United States, I do not know. All I know was inside the Executive Branch there was an Inter-Agency Committee on which the FBI and the Army, Navy, and State Department and all these agencies sat, and they were the ones who decided what was going to happen to these defectors.

I believe -- I am no lawyer, as I said, but I believe that there is kind of a grey area in our laws as to exactly what their rights are when they defect because they do sign papers saying that they want asylum and all the rest of it, so they do, in a sense, give up certain rights by making this request.

Mrs. Burke. Were not some of the defectors tried in the civilian courts?

Mr. Helms. I do not know any case of that.

Mrs. Burke. Not Soviet defectors? It has to be in time of war?

Mr. Helms. I think that is right.

Mrs. Burke. May I inquire about how much longer does counsel intend to go?

Mr. Goldsmith. This might be an appropriate time for the luncheon break.

Mrs. Burke. All right.

Mr. Preyer had to leave. If there is no objection, his
suggestion was that we recess until 1:30.

Mr. Helms. I am at the Committee's disposal. I will be back anytime you tell me.

Mrs. Burke. Is that convenient for everybody else? Is there any particular reason why 1:30 would be inconvenient for you?

Mr. Helms. Not for me.

Mrs. Burke. If there is no objection, then the Committee will stand in recess until 1:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the Subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 1:30 p.m. this same day.)
AFTERNOON SESSION

(1:30 p.m.)

Mr. Preyer. The Committee will resume its session.

Mr. Goldsmith is recognized.
Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, the Committee will proceed at this point and I take it, based upon our discussion a few moments ago, you are willing to proceed this afternoon without a quorum?

Mr. Helms. Certainly.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

When we broke for lunch, you were into the area of Nosenko and specifically I want to ask you whether or not in January of '68 when the SR Division Report concerning Nosenko was issued, I asked you what the Agency's position regarding Nosenko's bona fides was.

I believe that your answer was that the Agency, in fact, had no position. Is that correct?

Mr. Helms. That is correct, Mr. Goldsmith. I do not recall there having been any necessity at that time for having to establish an agency position.

As the Director, my pre-occupation, as I mentioned earlier, was to attempt to regularize Nosenko in such a fashion that he could assume some kind of a life on the American scene. And I was most anxious, particularly, to change his method of living which, for a protracted period, as I said this morning, he was being held without the blessing of a court and I was entrusted to get him regularized in such a fashion that we could, in effect, over time, get rid of our responsibility for
housing him, feeding him and handling him.

In other words, what was known in the intelligence community as getting him ready to be resettled.

Mr. Goldsmith. The SR Division Report, which initially was issued, was approximately 900 pages in length. That report did make a statement regarding Nosenko's bona fides, did it not?

Mr. Helms. I do not know if that were the 900 page report. I do recall that I did not read all of that. I was just told what the general thrust of it was.

I believe that there was a disagreement between the SR Division and the CI Staff over Nosenko's bona fides. It did not seem to me at the time that it was essential that that had to be 100 percent composed.

My problem was, as I say, was to get him resettled.

I believe there was a disagreement. I would not be surprised -- I do not know for a fact, but I would not be surprised -- if that disagreement exists to this day.

Mr. Goldsmith. At that time, the CI staff had not issued any type of a formal report?

Mr. Helms. No, but they had mouths, and they could tell the Director what they thought about the case.

Mr. Goldsmith. In January of '68 --

Mr. Helms. I am not even sure -- excuse me for just a second -- as to exactly at that time, in 1968, because I do not
want to mislead the Committee or you, I do not know whether
SR and CI saw this eye to eye and the Security Division felt
differently, or just who took exactly what position. I am
not that clear in my mind anymore.

I just know that there were disagreements inside the
Agency itself.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was the Agency's position in January
1968 with regard to the veracity of the information Nosenko had
provided concerning Oswald?

Mr. Helms. I believe that really this was a matter that
was at fundamental issue because if the information that
Nosenko had provided about Oswald was true, then it led to a
certain conclusion about Oswald and his relationship to the
Soviet authorities.

If it was incorrect, if he was feeding this to the United
States government under instructions from the Soviet service,
then it would have led one to an entirely different conclusion
about Oswald's role and the Soviet identification with it.

It rather strikes me that, as far as I know, to this day
it has never been satisfactorily resolved. What did Lee Harvey
Oswald represent as far as the Russians were concerned? I
promise you that I do not know.

Mr. Goldsmith. In your view of the analysis, then, is
the veracity of what Nosenko told the Agency about Oswald a
critical factor in evaluating his overall credibility, his
overall bona fides?

Mr. Helms. It is not only that, Mr. Goldsmith, but the fact remains that the issue of why Oswald assassinated President Kennedy has not been resolved for the satisfaction of a lot of citizens of this country. I assume that that is one of the reasons that you are having these hearings.

If one could accept at face value what exactly Nosenko has said, it would lead you to one interpretation. If you cannot accept it, it may lead you to another interpretation. I do not know how you are going to compose the difference.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that. My question, though, is, from the Agency's perspective, was the information that Nosenko provided concerning Oswald a major factor in determining the larger issue of whether Nosenko was a bona fide defector?

Mr. Helms. It obviously played a role in it.

Mr. Goldsmith. A major role?

Mr. Helms. I do not know whether you could say it was a major role or not, but it was certainly an important role, let's put it that way.

Mr. Goldsmith. I might state at this point in the record earlier you had asked me whether I knew how Nosenko was handled in terms of the distribution between the Office of Security and the SR Division. I wanted to clarify that.

In fact, according to the Committee's sources, Mr. Nosenko
was handled by the SR Division at the time they had the responsibility of questioning him and dealing with him on an everyday level. The Security Office personnel were in charge of overseeing him essentially watching for Security and making sure he did not go where he was supposed to go.

Congressman Sawyer asked you this morning about whether you have any opinion about the bona fides of Nosenko. Are you able to give any more specific response to the Committee at this time concerning that issue?

Mr. Helms. No, I am sorry, Mr. Goldsmith, I am not. I realize that this is a terribly important question and, recognizing its importance, I am not attempting to duck or to show a lack of forthrightness. I just do not know the answer to the question.

Mr. Goldsmith. You have no opinion on it?

Mr. Helms. No, I do not have an opinion.

Mr. Goldsmith. After the SR Division issued its report in 1968, was the Nosenko case reinvestigated by Bruce Soley?

Mr. Helms. My recollection was that Bruce Soley, whether he did an investigation or whether he engaged in long dialogues with Nosenko or just what, but I believe, at some point, Soley came up with his opinions about Nosenko.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it not also true that late in 1967 Soley was actually given responsibility for handling Nosenko?

Mr. Helms. I do not remember the date unfortunately. You
will have to tell me what those dates were. All I know is
that there was a transition between the time that he was being
held in one situation. Soley entered the picture. He was put
into different housing arrangements and so forth. I do not
know the exact date of that change.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. We will put aside for the moment
the question of the date, but at one point Soley took over
the everyday handling of Nosenko -- Soley was in and the SR
people were out. Is that correct?

Mr. Helms. I think by that time the SR people had had
their opportunities to talk to Nosenko. This had been going
on for months.

I believe at that time that Soley -- the job was given
to Soley to handle this man, and to try to find some means of
resettling him.

Mr. Goldsmith. The SR people did not have any further
responsibility?

Mr. Helms. I think they had access if they wanted to, but
I do not think there was any responsibility they had.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Soley had any particu-
lar expertise in regards to the Oswald case?

Mr. Helms. No, I do not think so.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was Soley considered to be an expert in
interrogations?

Mr. Helms. No, I do not think he was. I think that he was
a good security officer. He was interested in the case. He
had become acquainted with it when the Office of Security was
responsible for it, and I think that he was chosen because he
was game to try to work with this man.

Mr. Goldsmith. To whom, if anyone, was Soley directly
responsible during this period?

Mr. Helms. I think he was responsible to the Director
of Security and, in turn, the Director of Security would have
been responsible to me.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether, again, the 1968
investigation conducted by Soley, whether Nosenko was
questioned about Oswald?

Mr. Helms. I do not specifically, no.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would it have been acceptable in 1968
if Soley had been unable to resolve the question of Nosenko's
bona fides?

Let me rephrase that. If he had been unable to come
forward with a viewpoint concerning Nosenko's bona fides.

Mr. Helms. What was your question?

Mr. Goldsmith. Would it have been acceptable to the
Agency if Soley had been unable to come forward with a
position one way or the other concerning Nosenko's bona fides?

Mr. Helms. I do not think by that time there was any
feeling that there was going to be suddenly a ray of truth
come through and we were going to be able to resolve the case.
of Nosenko. The problem in those days was to deal with this man. The effort was to accomplish that, and Soley was given that job.

Whatever Soley had come up with, if he were reasonably successful in keeping the fellow contented, getting him squared away, getting his English straightened out and all the rest of these things, I would have thought he was doing a good job.

Mr. Goldsmith. In light of what appeared to be the enormous consequences of the situation—where Nosenko, in fact, were not a bona fide defector, the consequences of that as far as the American intelligence community was concerned, it would appear, were quite great.

Mr. Helms. For the intelligence community, it would have had no consequence, for the intelligence community. It would have had consequences for the country.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. We will take it step by step. Certainly the American intelligence community would have been concerned. The entire issue of Nosenko's being a planted defector, possibly, planted for the purpose of protecting other Soviet agencies working within the American intelligence community.

Mr. Helms. That is what I was trying to warn the Warren Commission against, that possibility, that contingency, and the implications of it.

Mr. Goldsmith. In light of the consequence of such a
contingency, it would appear that the Agency would very much want to resolve the issue of Nosenko's bona fides and would not be satisfied with the situation where you are in limbo.

Mr. Helms. Mr. Goldsmith, may I ask you a question?

How would you suggest that that be done?

Mr. Goldsmith. My question is, is it not true that the Agency would feel compelled to try to resolve that issue?

Mr. Helms. We did the best we could.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. By 1968, you are saying the Agency did not have a position one way or the other.

Mr. Helms. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about at the conclusion of Soley's work when he issued his report? At that time, did the Agency have a position with regard to Nosenko's bona fides?

Mr. Helms. I do not believe so. At least during my time there, I do not recall us ever taking a position as an Agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. Has the Agency ever taken a formal position regarding the truthfulness of Nosenko's story on Oswald's contacts or lack of contacts with the KGB?

Mr. Helms. That is the heart of the issue. That is why I believe on that particular question, the question has never been resolved, never been satisfactorily answered.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me ask you this. If it were clearly proven that Nosenko's statements concerning Oswald were untrue what significance could you attach to such a finding in so far
as the broader question of his overall bona fides is concerned?

Mr. Helms. I think that, if it were established beyond
any doubt that he had been lying and, by implication therefore,
Oswald was an agent of the KGB, I would have thought that the
implications of that -- not for the CIA or for the FBI, but
for the President of the United States and the Congress of the
United States would have been cataclysmic.

Mr. Goldsmith. Could you be more specific?

Mr. Helms. Yes, I can be specific. In other words,
the Soviet government ordered President Kennedy assassinated.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does it necessarily follow that Nosenko
was lying about Oswald, and that Oswald was, in fact, an agent
of the KGB?

Mr. Helms. It does not necessarily follow. We can do
all kinds of syllogisms here.

The issue before the House is, was he or was he not an
employee of the KGB? It is on that that this whole thing tends
to turn.

Mr. Goldsmith. The initial issue here is the truthfulness
of Nosenko's statements about Oswald and essentially those
statements are KGB had no contact with Oswald.

If it were clearly proven that Nosenko's statement on
Oswald were untrue -- proven in the sense that it could not be
believed that Oswald did not have contacts with the KGB, but
not proven in the sense that Oswald was, in fact, a KGB agent,
if just the basic Nosenko story were fundamentally disproved, without our taking the next step and saying that Oswald is a KGB agent, what significance would that have on the overall assessment of Nosenko's bona fides?

Mr. Helms. Well, if the man had been demonstrated to have lied, it would have had a good deal of an effect on the establishment of his bona fides, I would think. What was his motive for lying? Why did he lie?

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you take the analysis so far as to say if Nosenko was lying about Oswald, if it were clearly proven that he were lying about Oswald, that in fact he was not a bona fide defector?

Mr. Helms. That is one of the problems exactly; you put it very well.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is your answer to my question yes?

Mr. Helms. Yes.

Mr. Preyer. If I may ask one question on that score, of key concern, of course, to the intelligence agency, was the broad question of whether Nosenko was a bona fide defector or a disinformation agent.

Is it not conceivable that he might have been a bona fide agent and been basically telling the truth about that, and this other information concerning other security matters would be accurate? Then, on Oswald, maybe to ingratiate himself, perhaps, or to convince the intelligence agencies that he was more
important than he really was, trying to put a little extra
spin on the ball, that he perhaps overspoke himself on Oswald,
maybe lied on that.

That would still not necessarily determine whether he was
bona fides or not?

Mr. Helms. I think that any of these explanations or
possible or conceivable or may even be the accurate one. But
let us not overlook, Mr. Chairman, the fact that if I were
down here trying to defend that thesis in front of you, I
think I would have a pretty rough time.

Mr. Preyer. Yes. I think you put it very well. Why
would you lie?

As you have made very clear, this might be a question on
his bona fides that we do not know how to resolve right now
and may never resolve unless there is a flash of truth from
some area.

Excuse me, Mr. Goldstein.

Mr. Goldsmith. The question that arises, Mr. Ambassador,
in light of your statement that the Agency did not have a
position regarding Nosenko's bona fides in 1968 is why, in light
of the absence of any position one way or another, the Agency
never the less paid Mr. Nosenko approximately $80,000 after
taxes in 1968 and then put him on its payroll as a consultant.

Mr. Helms. These figures are yours, sir. I do not
recall any business about his being put on the Agency payroll
as a consultant. I thought that any monies that were paid to him were in an effort to sweeten him up a little bit and get him prepared to be resettled. I do not recall anybody's ever telling me that he had been hired as a consultant to the Agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. If, in fact, it were established by the record that Mr. Nosenko was made a consultant and is, in fact, a consultant today, would that indicate that the Agency has apparently resolve the issue of his bona fides?

Mr. Helms. I do not know, sir. I did not know that he was considered a consultant at the time that I was Director. I do not recall ever signing off on any piece of paper that made him a consultant.

Mr. Goldsmith. In order to have made Mr. Nosenko a consultant, would you have had to sign off?

Mr. Helms. Not necessarily. I think I would have been informed that this fellow is now considered to be a consultant to the Agency and we are sending people down to talk to him. I never agreed to any such thing.

I do not care what the record shows.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know to what extent, if any, Nosenko's story concerning Oswald changed in 1968 from the one he had given previously when he was first confined?

Mr. Helms. No. I do not remember those details at all.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether an independent
investigation ever confirmed any aspect of Nosenko's story about Oswald?

Mr. Helms. I do not know that, either.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you aware that Mr. Nosenko was given polygraph tests in 1964, 1966 and 1968?

Mr. Helms. That does not surprise me. I would have thought he should have been.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why would Mr. Nosenko have been given three tests?

Mr. Helms. To find out if he was telling the truth.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you aware that Mr. Nosenko failed the first two tests and passed the third?

Mr. Helms. I did not remember those figures, no.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you aware that Nosenko was given the final polygraph test, the one that he passed, approximately one month prior to the issuance of the 1968 report issued by Mr. Soley which concluded that he was a bona fide defector?

Mr. Helms. Maybe that was a part of what Soley was going on when he made that determination, the way he came through on the polygraph test.

Mr. Goldsmith. It is also possible, however, that Mr. Soley had completed his report, realized that Nosenko had failed two polygraphs and decided that, prior to the issuance of his report, another polygraph test would be administered.

Mr. Helms. I think that he would have, in those days, been
in a position to make those judgments or decisions. He was conducting an examination of this case. 

I would have thought that he would have liked to have had another polygraph test to see if it would, in any way, support the findings that he was maybe establishing in his own mind.

Anyway, my recollection of those days is Soley believed in Nosenko.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why Nosenko was asked numerous questions about Oswald on the second test, the test that he failed, and was asked only two questions about Oswald on the final polygraph test?

Mr. Helms. No, I do not know.

Mr. Preyer. Mr. Goldsmith, I regret that there is another vote on. We can recess for ten minutes. I will get back just as fast as I can.

The Committee will recess for ten minutes.

(A brief recess was taken.)

Mr. Preyer. The Committee will resume its session.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, prior to taking this last recess again, we were discussing, in general, the question whether the Agency had a position concerning Nosenko's bona fides. Perhaps you or I are defining the concept of position very narrowly. By "position," I do not necessarily mean that the Agency had, in writing, a specific position regarding, specific posture regarding, Nosenko. By "position," I am saying
was there a prevailing opinion one way or the other in the Agency concerning Mr. Nosenko?

Mr. Helms. I am sorry. I do not know the answer to that question. When you say a prevailing opinion, I see what you are trying to get at. Obviously, I do not know what opinion prevailed.

Some people hued to one line, some to the other. It was my impression that he hued to it with equal fervor. And I do not know that this question has ever been satisfactorily resolved. As I say, I have been away from the Agency for five years and maybe some other things have happened in the interim. But at least as of the time I left, I do not think that the issue had ever been resolved between these conflicting forces.

May I say when I indicate that these views are strongly held, I mean it. It is like Catholics and Protestants; they simply are not to be swayed.

I think, in order to answer your question properly, I would have to say, since there was a division, it was not possible to get a prevailing view, as such. Some people might have said, well, I think this and I think that, without having read the 900-page report, without having been thoroughly conversant with the details. In other words there were not many other people in a position to have a calculated, informed opinion.
Mr. Goldsmith. Are you saying there was no prevailing opinion?

Mr. Helms. I do not think so. I do not know what the prevailing opinion would have been.

Mr. Goldsmith. At the time that the responsibility for handling Nosenko was initially given to the SR Branch or SR Division, did the SR Division enter into the situation as a neutral party, or did the SR Division pretty much think from the very beginning that Nosenko was not a bona fide defector?

Mr. Helms. I would have thought, at the beginning, everybody would have entered into this with some objectivity in an effort to establish the truth. As events unwound, I think that this became clear to everyone involved that this was a terribly important case.

Mr. Goldsmith. How early in this process did the SR Division form its opinion that Nosenko was not a bona fide defector?

Mr. Helms. I am sorry. I do not know.

Mr. Goldsmith. When Mr. Soley began his investigation, did he enter the situation as a neutral, outside party, or someone who represented one of the factions within the Agency concerning Nosenko's bona fides?

Mr. Helms. I really do not know the correct answer to that. It was my impression -- and I can only give it as my
impression -- that he had agreed to take on this case, and I thought he came to it without any particular prejudice one way or the other, and that he was going to attempt to form his own opinion.

If other testimony on the record does not confirm that, I do not insist on what I say. I simply give you my impression.

Mr. Goldsmith. Earlier, you made reference to Mr. Soley having a positive viewpoint on Nosenko.

Mr. Helms. I think he developed a positive viewpoint. It was my impression.

I do not know how early he had it. I think he had a positive viewpoint.

Mr. Goldsmith. How was Mr. Soley chosen for this particular assignment?

Mr. Helms. I do not remember anymore what details went into this. It seemed to me Howard Osborne, Director of Security, recommended that he be given charge of this case and to take it over because we were trying to find a way to resolve it, to resettle this man, and we were looking for a way to do this.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the President ever ask you whether this issue had been resolved?

Mr. Helms. Who?

Mr. Goldsmith. The President.

Mr. Helms. Which President?
Mr. Goldsmith. President Johnson.

Mr. Helms. Let-me answer it, no President ever asked me.

Mr. Goldsmith. The Agency, did the Agency ever receive any pressure from above to resolve this issue?

Mr. Helms. Not that I recall.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was the Warren Commission told about Mr. Nosenko?

Mr. Helms. Well, I do not know all the things that the Commission was told about Mr. Nosenko. I know that the FBI told them certain things. I believe the Agency told them things. I know that I, personally, met with Chief Justice Warren privately in one of the conference rooms over in the building where they had their Headquarters. I do not remember the date of this meeting with him, but I know I cleared it with Director McCone before I went down there.

I believe that it was not terribly long before the Warren Commission was going to conclude its hearings because my point that I felt had to be made to the Warren Commission was that we had not been able to establish, to our satisfaction, the bona fides of Nosenko and that the Warren Commission must take this into consideration in compiling their report.

And the means chosen of my going to see Chief Justice Warren seemed to be the proper way to do it under the circumstances so that he could make a determination as to whether he wanted the matter handled differently or whether that was
satisfactory to him, or what the case was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission told anything about the substance of Nosenko's story about Oswald?

Mr. Helms. I do not know. I do not know what details wound up in the hands of the Warren Commission about Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith. What other information, besides this issue of the bona fides, did you convey?

Mr. Helms. That is what I personally talked to the Chief Justice about.

Mr. Goldsmith. When you met with Chief Justice Warren, for purpose of clarification now, did you tell him that the Agency had been unable to resolve the issue of Nosenko's bona fides, or did you tell him that the Agency did not think that Nosenko was bona fide?

Mr. Helms. I told him we were not able to resolve this, my point being that, since we had not been able to resolve it, that they should keep in mind the contingency that maybe the statements that he had made about Oswald's having no identification with the KGB were not accurate. Therefore, they could not lean on them in the report and therefore they had to face the implication that, if he was not bona fide and come for the purpose of covering up the tracks of Soviet intelligence, that this had implications which should be weighed in the scales.

Mr. Goldsmith. At the time that you met with the Chief
Justice, I take it, in some way, you must have been apprised
of the basic Nosenko story concerning Oswald?

Mr. Helms. I believe that the basic Nosenko story con-
cerning Oswald was given to the Warren Commission very early
in its deliberations by the FBI.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was Chief Justice Warren's response
to your analysis?

Mr. Helms. Well, he was obviously — he was not pleased
to hear it, and by that I do not mean that he expostulated,
or anything of that kind, but he was not pleased to hear it
in terms of the difficulties that it made in completing their
report, but that he was perfectly fair and reasonable about
it and accepted what I had to say and said he would report
it to the Commission.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Chief Justice Warren or any Warren
Commission member or staffer ever request to interview Mr.
Nosenko?

Mr. Helms. Not that I am aware of.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission informed in
April, 1964, that Nosenko was being placed into solitary
confinement?

Mr. Helms. The Warren Commission?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

MR. Helms. I do not know what the Warren Commission knew
about the circumstances under which Nosenko was being
interrogated. I did not say anything to them about it. Whether anybody else did, I do not know. But the CIA had custody of Nosenko; they certainly were aware of that.

This was part of my statement to the Chief Justice. I could not tell him that I could not resolve the bona fides without explaining to him that this was our responsibility.

Mr. Goldsmith. Other than yourself, were any of the other individuals responsible for handling Nosenko in contact with the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms. I do not know, but I would not have thought so.

Mr. Goldsmith. If the Warren Commission had been informed by the Agency that Nosenko have been placed into solitary confinement, I take it that you would have been the person who would have so informed them.

Mr. Helms. Mr. McCone might have informed them.

Mr. Goldsmith. Or Mr. McCone.

Whose decision was it to place Nosenko in solitary confinement?

Mr. Helms. I think this was a decision taken by various people. We had to find a place to interrogate him. We had to try and resolve the case, if we possibly could. We spent months trying to do this. And putting him into solitary circumstances was just part of the effort to see if we could get at the truth.
Mr. Goldsmith. What individuals were involved in that decision-making process?

Mr. Helms. I do not remember who all was involved anymore. I certainly was involved in it, but there were others who were involved. I do not know the extent to which Mr. McCone was involved. I do not recall anymore.

Mr. Goldsmith. What input, specifically, did you have at that time?

Mr. Helms. By input, I assume you mean what influence did I have on the decision?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Helms. I certainly agreed to the fact that this should be tried. This would have been proposed to me; not something that I would have proposed, because at this time someone would have had to have made up their mind that the method of interrogation that they were using was not getting anywhere.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please describe, to the best of your knowledge, the conditions under which Nosenko was placed when he was put in solitary confinement.

Mr. Helms. He was put into a small house in the countryside where he had a perfectly sanitary and satisfactory living condition. They were just not particularly spacious or padded, let us say. His bed was perfectly adequate, his chair was perfectly adequate, the lighting was perfectly adequate, but it was not particularly comfortable in the
normal, American sense of the terms.

You will recall that this question of what to do about him was taken up with the Deputy Attorney General at the time, Nicholas Katzenbach, at a long meeting as to how we were going to continue to handle this case, and the problem before the house was clear to everyone but nobody was able to come up with a very satisfactory solution except that we just had to go ahead and do what we were doing and see if we could eventually come up with a satisfactory resolution, and that satisfactory resolution never emerged.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the CIA ever able to establish that it had legal authority for placing Nosenko in solitary confinement?

Mr. Helms. I do not know how you answer that question. As you know, I am not a lawyer. I would say that he was there without the blessing of a court. I would have thought that having held him that length of time that it would have been preferable if we did have a court order to hang on to him.

Mr. Goldsmith. You indicate that you consulted with Mr. Katzenbach?

Mr. Helms. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were there any other government officials consulted prior to taking this action?

Mr. Katzenbach. There were other people sitting in the room with Mr. Katzenbach from the Department of Justice. I do
not think this was brought up with the State Department.

The Inter-Agency Defector Committee was aware of what was going on.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was anyone senior to Mr. Katzenbach in the government apprised of this action?

Mr. Helms. I assume that he told the Attorney General. I do not know. We went to see him in the absence of the Attorney General; I think he was Acting Attorney General at the time.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I would like to have offered as an exhibit a notarized statement given by Mr. Nosenko to this Committee on August 7, 1978.

Mr. Preyer. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked JFK Exhibit No. 129 for identification.)

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I am going to read Mr. Nosenko's statement to you for the purpose of asking you whether you agree with his characterization of the conditions under which he was held in solitary confinement. This is a statement by Mr. Nosenko given to the Committee August 7, 1978.

"In accordance with the request of the staff of the Committee, the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I make the following statement describing the condition of my
imprisonment from April of 1964 until the end of 1967.

"On April 4, 1964 I was taken for a physical check-up and a test on a lie detector somewhere in a house. A doctor had given me a physical check-up and after that I was taken into another room for the test on a lie detector. After finishing the test, an officer of the CIA, John, has come in the room and talked with the technician.

"John started to shout that I was a phony and immediately several guards entered into the room. The guards ordered me to stand by the wall, to undress and check me. After that, I was taken upstairs in an attic room. The room had a metal bed attached to the floor in the center of this room.

"Nobody told me anything, how long I would be there or what would happen to me.

"After several days, two officers of CIA, John and Frank, started interrogations. I tried to cooperate and in the evening hours was writing forth on whatever I could recollect about the KGB. These officers were interrogating me about a month or two months. The tone of interrogations was hostile. Then they stopped to come and see me until the end of 1964.

"I was kept in this room until the end of 1964 and the beginning of '65. The conditions were very poor and difficult. I could have a shower once a week and once in a week I could shave. I was not given a toothbrush and toothpaste and food given to me was very poor. I did not have enough to eat and
was hungry all the time. I had not contact with anybody to talk. I could not read. I could not smoke. I even could not have fresh air or to see anything from this room. The only window was screened and boarded. The only door in the room had a metal screen, and outside in the corridor two guards were watching me day and night.

"The only furniture in the room was a single bed and lightbulb. The room was very, very hot in the summertime.

"At the end of 1964, there were started again interrogations by several different officers. The first day, they kept me under 24 hours interrogation. All interrogations were done in a hostile manner.

"At the end of those interrogations, when I was told it was the last one and asked what I wanted to be relayed to higher ups, I said I was a true defector and being under arrest about 386 days, I wanted to be put on trial, if I was found guilty, or released.

"I also asked how long I would continue. I was told that I would be there 3,860 days and even more.

"This evening I was taken by guards, blindfolded and handcuffed in a car and delivered to an airport and put into a plane. I was taken to another location where I was put into a concrete room with bars on the door. In the room was a single steel bed with a mattress. No pillow, no sheet, no blanket. During winter it was very cold, and I asked them to
give me a blanket, which I received after some time.

"Except for one day of interrogation, and one day for a test on a lie detector, I have not seen anyone besides guards and a doctor. Guards were not allowed to talk to me.

"After my constant complaint that I needed fresh air at the end of 1966, I was taken almost every day for 30 minutes exercise to a small area attached to the cell. The area was surrounded by a chain-link fence and a fence I could not see through. The only thing I could see was the sky.

"Being in the cell, I was watched day and night through the TV camera. Trying to pass the time, a couple of times, I was making for friends a chess set and every time, when I finished those sets, immediately guards would enter into my cell and taking them from me. I was desperately wanting to read and once, when I was given toothpaste, I found in the toothpaste box a piece of paper with a description of compound of this toothpaste. I was trying to read it under my blanket, but guards noticed it and again it was taken from me.

"Conditions in both first and second locations were analogical. I was there until November of 1967. Then I again was transferred, blindfolded and handcuffed, to another location. In this new place, I had a room with much better conditions and Mr. Bruce Soley, CIA officer, started to question me every day, excluding Sundays, touching all questions concerning my biography, career in the KGB, and all cases of
the KGB known to me.

"I was in prison for the whole five years, and I started
my life in the USA in April of 1969."

Mr. Helms. There was a word you used there, "analogical."

What is that? What does that mean.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am only reading to you what the text
says. I am afraid I cannot give you a clear definition of that
term as it is used here.

Mr. Craig. Could you reread the sentence that that term
appears in?

Mr. Goldsmith. "Conditions in both (first and second
locations) were analogical." If you would like to examine
the statement --

Mr. Helms. No. I just do not understand what he meant
by analogical.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you agree with Mr. Nosenko's
characterization of the conditions in which he was placed or
held in solitary confinement?

Mr. Helms. I have no means for agreeing or disagreeing.
I did not visit him during the time that he was being held.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is the statement consistent with reports
that you received concerning Mr. Nosenko's treatment?

Mr. Helms. I would think so, yes. I remember that
I had two matters of particular interest in connection of this
whole business. One that he should not be physically molested.
I wanted to be absolutely certain that that was clear to everyone, and I believe that was complied with throughout.

Secondly, I did not want any drugs or any medicines or any tricks of that kind used on him.

Mr. Goldsmith. That was my next question. Was Nosenko ever given any drugs for the purpose of either harassing him psychologically or to compel him to tell the truth?

Mr. Helms. I believe not. I believe that, at one time, I was asked whether this could be done and so forth, and I forbade it.

Mr. Preyer. Mr. Goldsmith, I regret that there is another vote. I think this may be the last one for some time.

The Committee will stand in recess.

(A brief recess was taken.)

Mr. Preyer. The Committee will resume.

Mr. Goldsmith?

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

Mr. Ambassador, I believe earlier you testified the Agency did not establish or have any position one way or another regarding Mr. Nosenko's bona fides?

Mr. Helms. Despite these efforts we have made.

Mr. Goldsmith. That was precisely the point I was about to make, or the impression I was going to raise to you. It would seem then that the Agency, without having any position one way or the other, went to the trouble to keep Mr. Nosenko
under the conditions that he just described.

Mr. Helms. We did our very best to resolve this problem and we certainly would not have taken these steps of putting him, if you recall, in Spartan circumstances, if we had not thought there was a possibility it might get us to a goal that we were trying to reach. I do not think that we were trying to reach.

I do not think that we ever under-estimated the importance of this case, and we did everything we could do to try to resolve that, including later on giving him sweet, nice treatment with money and pleasant living circumstances and all of the rest of it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does not the fact that Mr. Nosenko was kept under these conditions reflect that the Agency, in fact, did have a position regarding his bona fides, and at least until such time that he was released from these conditions, the Agency felt that he was not a bona fide defector?

Mr. Helms. I think the Agency was trying to establish whether or not he was a bona fide defector and it was decided to use these means of interrogation. The supposition has to be that the matter had not been resolved by other interrogation means and this was going to be trying an effort, to see if this would help.

Mr. Goldsmith. So that, for the three years Mr. Nosenko was kept under these conditions, the Agency did not have a
position regarding his bona fides?

Mr. Helms. They were trying to establish his bona fides.

Mr. Goldsmith. Your answer is, then, during those three years, the Agency did not have a position regarding his bona fides.

Mr. Helms. There may have been differing views, depending on whether this view obtained or that view obtained. Different people may have altered their position, but the Agency did not have any position during this period. As I was saying, we were trying to resolve the issue.

Mr. Goldsmith. You would say that this was a technique in attempting to resolve the overall issue of bona fides?

Mr. Helms. That is exactly what I am saying.

Mr. Goldsmith. Later, when Mr. Nosenko was given -- and I think the record would demonstrate that, or corroborate that was given approximately $80,000 after taxes and was allowed to work for the Agency on a contract basis or as a consultant. Do those factors reflect on the part of the Agency the position that, by this time, Nosenko was considered to be a bona fide defector?

Mr. Helms. I do not want to take any position or voice any opinion about anything that happened in the Agency after February, 1973 when I left.

Mr. Goldsmith. In light of that, if the Committee is able to demonstrate to you from the record that these actions
concerning Nosenko were taken prior to your departure as DCI, would you then be willing to respond to the question?

Mr. Helms. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Even —

Mr. Helms. I did not know that he was a consultant at the Agency or considered a consultant of the Agency. If, indeed he was, I would like the word defined as to what that entails and what that was supposed to signify.

Mr. Goldsmith. You did not know that Mr. Nosenko was given approximately $80,000?

Mr. Helms. You said $8,000 and $80,000 on another. Which is the correct figure?

Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorry if I gave you an incorrect figure. It is $80,000.

Would the fact that he had been given $80,000 after taxes suggest to you that the Agency did have a position regarding his bona fides?

Mr. Helms. I think that we were trying to resettle him. I think that we recognized that he had been given a pretty rough time, and I think that we were trying, through good treatment and handling him properly and so forth, to not only resettle him, but find out if these means would help resolve the case.

If it has been resolved in the last five years, I am glad to hear it. I know nothing about that.
Mr. Goldsmith. How would giving him $80,000 and resettling him further resolve the case? It would seem by that point that the case has been resolved, to the best of the Agency's capabilities. Certainly after you have given him $80,000 you are not providing him with any incentive to change his story.

Mr. Helms. What would you have done with him?

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you to answer my questions.

Mr. Helms. I think this line as inquiry has been taken as far as I can take it.

Mr. Goldsmith. You are unable to comment, then, on the significance --

Mr. Helms. I am unable to comment. I am trying to say we were trying to resettle him.

Mr. Goldsmith. Earlier, I asked you whether Nosenko had ever been given any drugs for the purpose of harassing him psychologically or for the purpose of compelling him to tell the truth.

Are you able to state categorically that he was not given drugs for this purpose?

Mr. Helms. I would never state anything in this life categorically, including that.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the best statement you can give us on that?

Mr. Helms. The best statement I can give you on that is
that I believe on one occasion some people wanted to try and use aids to interrogation in the form of drugs and I said I wanted none of this done. I believe my wishes were carried out. I have never heard anything to the contrary, but I cannot swear to it.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did this incident take place?

Mr. Helms. I do not remember.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who were the individuals involved?

Mr. Helms. It seems to me that some of the interrogators who were involved in talking to him wanted to try truth serums or something of that kind, sodium penathol or whatever those drugs are which are considered to be aids to interrogation.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was that Mr. Bagley or Mr. Murphy? Were they of the feeling that drugs should be administered?

Mr. Helms. I would assume it was someone like that. I am not sure who brought the question to me anymore. I do have in the back of my head the fact that this did come up.

Mr. Goldsmith. If the Agency did administer drugs to Nosenko, would there have been a record of this fact?

Mr. Helms. I certainly would have thought so.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you dispute testimony to this Committee by Mr. Nosenko that he was drugged by the CIA and then interrogated?

Mr. Helms. He would have to demonstrate that this was the case.
Mr. Goldsmith. Would any decision concerning the use of drugs necessarily involve Dave Murphy at some point?

Mr. Helms. It might have. You see, I do not remember whether, all during this period, Murphy was in charge of the SR Division or whether he was in charge for a time when someone else took over. I do not have the agency --

Mr. Goldsmith. I believe for this entire period Mr. Murphy was in charge of the SR Division.

Mr. Helms. He would have been involved in it. He is in charge of these people in his division. He was obviously attempting to counsel with them how it was to be conducted, so I would have thought he would have been a party of any inquiry at that time, or reference to me for permission at that time.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my line of inquiry with regard to this area. Do you have any questions?

I would defer to you.

Mr. Preyer. I have no questions on that area, but before you recess to go on your deposition hearing, I have a couple of questions in another area which I would like to ask.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Mr. Craig. Before leaving that area, I might inquire, you mentioned, you asked a question whether Ambassador Helms would dispute any evidence to the effect that Mr. Nosenko was drugged. If such evidence does exist, you might be able
to bring that to Mr. Helms' attention and he might be able to comment on it.

Mr. Goldsmith. As I said, the Committee has received testimony by Mr. Nosenko in which he specifically stated that he was drugged and then, after being drugged, he was interrogated. That is why this is an issue before the Committee at this time.

Mr. Craig. Thank you.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, turning to another area, specifically back to Mexico City, is the name Luisa Calderon familiar to you?

Mr. Helms. I just read it in one of the documents you gave me here this morning.

Mr. Goldsmith. For purposes of refreshing your recollection a bit further, I would ask you to look at CIA No. 1936, which appears in Volume No. 2 and specifically on pages 1950 through 1954.

Mr. Helms. You want me to go -- I have 1936.

Mr. Goldsmith. I want you to look at 1936, only so that you would see the document that you are going to be reading from, but the relevant pages are 1950 through 1954.

Mr. Helms. Just a second.

(Pause)

I see. What is the date of this document, Mr. Goldsmith?

Was this back at the time of the Warren Commission?
Mr. Goldsmith. No. This document is a 1975 document prepared by Raymond Rocca in response to a 15 April 1975 letter by David Belin of the Rockefeller Commission.

Mr. Helms. I see. That is the same David Belin that was on the Warren Commission and later ghost-wrote the book for President Ford about the Warren Commission?

Mr. Goldsmith. I do not know about the book on President Ford, but it is the David Belin who was the Warren Commission staffer.

Mr. Helms. That is the same one, then.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would ask you specifically to read through pages 150 through 1954.

Mr. Helms. 1950 through 1954, all right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Starting with paragraph number 18.

Mr. Helms. All right.

(Pause)
Mr. Helms. Where did you want me to stop reading?

Mr. Goldsmith. 1954.

Mr. Helms. I am sorry, I have a couple of pages to go.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please stop once you have gotten to the end of paragraph number 23.

Mr. Helms. Fine.

All right.

Mr. Goldsmith. After having read this document, which describes the conversation involving a woman named Luisa Calderon, or someone whom it appears as Luisa Calderon, is the name familiar to you at all?

Mr. Helms. It doesn't bring back any memories. Just as I said, I identified it from that document you showed me this morning but I don't remember anything about her.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, the pages that you read pertain to a conversation involving Luisa in which there is some suggestion of foreknowledge on her part, foreknowledge of the assassination, and, of course, the significance of that foreknowledge, the significance of her statement standing alone really is not very great. However, in light of the fact Luisa Calderon had connections or may have had connections with Cuban intelligence, the significance of her statement suggests the foreknowledge has escalated.

Do you recall ever having had the statement brought to your attention, this conversation brought to your attention?
Mr. Helms. I do not remember it ever having been brought to my attention.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if that conversation was brought to the attention of the Warren Commission.

I know nothing about it. To the best of my recollection this is the first time I have seen reference to it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Will you now refer to CIA 1843?

Mr. Helms. 1843?

Mr. Goldsmith. That is in volume 1.

Mr. Helms. Yes sir. It is in volume 1, is it? This one stops at 1874. There we are.

Yes sir, I have that in front of me.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would ask you to read the handwritten notation on this page.

Mr. Helms. Is this ICC or just CC for copy? I guess it is copy. CC for copy. Original and translation sent to Galbon via Kingman, nothing to Bureau yet.

(2), one copy original and trans to Luisa Calderon and a big P.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whose handwriting that was?

Mr. Helms. No, I don't.

Mr. Goldsmith. I indicate for the record that the reference to Luisa Calderon P would probably refer to her P file, which is the local file in the Mexico City station.

Mr. Helms. I see. I don't know whose handwriting that is.
Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know who Galbon or Kingman --

Mr. Helms. I know who Galbon is. This is Colonel J. C. King. Who Kingman was I have forgotten.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why anyone would have wanted this transcript from the Bureau?

Mr. Helms. It just says nothing to Bureau yet. I don't interpret that to mean it was withheld, it just hadn't got to them yet.

Mr. Goldsmith. Your reading of that is correct, it says nothing to Bureau yet. I will rephrase the question. In light of that do you know why there would have been a desire to withhold this transcript even temporarily from the Bureau?

Mr. Helms. No, I don't. No, I don't. Over in the column here it says 22 November LIN, which I assume from what we were saying this morning is the cryptonym for the telephone taps, Luisa Calderon and the man outside. Those would be simply descriptive?

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you refer at this time to CIA number 1929?

Mr. Helms. That is in volume 2, then, isn't it?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes sir.

For the record, that is a blind memo dated 10 April 1964, labeled material from P 8593, shown to Warren Commission.

Station House --

Mr. Helms. Yes, I have looked at that page now.
Mr. Goldsmith. Is there any indication from that page that the Calderon conversation was shown to the Warren Commission staffers when they went to Mexico City?

Mr. Helms. English translations of calls made by Oswald to the Russian Embassy; English translation of conversations between Dorticos Armas. It doesn't look that way. Is there something I have missed?

Mr. Goldsmith. No. At this time would you refer to CIA number 2205 and 2206. That would appear in volume 3. When you get to 2205 --

Mr. Helms. I have got 2220. I am closing in on it. That goes back up again.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, I would indicate that 2205 is a memo for the record dated 11 April 1964, the subject of which is a visit by three staff representatives of the Warren Commission. I would ask you to read paragraph 7 on page 2206.

Mr. Helms. All right. Somebody has slapped a reproduction of a prohibited stamp all over this and it makes it a little hard going. If you will forgive me, I am going as fast as I can.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

Mr. Helms. All right, I have read paragraph 7.

Mr. Goldsmith. Having read that paragraph, is there any reference in that paragraph to the Luisa Calderon conversation being shown to the Warren Commission staff?
Mr. Helms. All it says, reviewed the tape from the telephone taps. I assume that means for the days 27th, 28th, 29th of October, Oswald, at both Cuban and Soviet Embassies. I assume those are only on Oswald's conversations since the Calderon conversation you were talking about was with some unidentified man. I don't know they regard that as Oswald or include it.

Mr. Goldsmith. It was also dated 22 November, 1963.

Mr. Helms. Right. Then I guess that was not included here. At least I don't see any evidence in this statement.

Mr. Goldsmith. To your knowledge, was this transcript ever given to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms. Of Calderon?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Helms. I have no idea.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think it should have been given to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms. I can't see any particular reason not to have given it to the Warren Commission. I can think of no reason.

Mr. Goldsmith. Especially in the light of the fact the Agency had information that Luisa Calderon was BGI or possibly connected with BGI?

If this material had been given to the Warren Commission -- by this term I am referring to the Calderon transcript, would a record of such transmission be available anywhere?

Mr. Helms. I would have thought so. I thought they were
trying to keep reasonably careful records as to what was sent to the Warren Commission. After all, the intelligence agencies usually are and should be careful about what kind of documentation goes out of their building to anyone, and there is usually a record of it, particularly if it is highly classified and sensitive. So I would have thought there would be a record.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was Luisa Calderon connected in any way with the CIA?

Mr. Helms. I never heard of any connection she had with the CIA. If she did it was unknown to me.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would ask you to refer at this time to CIA number 2950. It appears in volume 3.

Mr. Helms. 2950, right.

Mr. Goldsmith. This is not a very good quality reproduction, so take your time reading it.

Mr. Helms. 2950?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes sir.

Mr. Helms. All right, I am there now. Let me read this out loud to see if I am reading the same thing that you are.

In paragraph 4, of the contact report for 17 July, "attached to reference reported that Luisa Calderon has a sister residing in someplace in Texas, married to an American of Mexican descent. L-8 can further identify the sister."

I can't read that next word.

Mr. Goldsmith. Domestic.
Mr. Helms. "Domestic Exploitation Section might be in a position to follow up on this lead. Please levy this requirement on [ ] at the next opportunity.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, what is the Domestic Exploitation Section?

Mr. Helms. Well, I don't know that I recall exactly what it is, unless it was an interrogation unit that the Miami station used to interrogate refugees and other people coming over from Cuba. If it is not that, I don't remember what the Domestic Exploitation Section was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it possible that the Domestic Exploitation Section could have been a component within SAS?

Mr. Helms. Possibly. But then SAS had control over the Miami station and I would have thought it was somewhere in that complex.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the use of the Domestic Exploitation Section in any way violate the Agency's charter?

Mr. Helms. Not that I ever heard of. I think the Domestic Exploitation Section was there, FBI knew about it, the intelligence community knew about it, it had a specific purpose, I don't think there is anything about it that violated the Agency charter. As far as I know I never considered it in that category.

Mr. Goldsmith. What again was the specific purpose of this section?
Mr. Helms. I don't know. If it is what I thought it was, it was a group that interrogated refugees that came from Cuba.

Mr. Goldsmith. Might this section have been used as a means by which an effort could be made to contact Luisa Calderon and take advantage of her possibilities as a CIA agent as a source of information?

Mr. Helms. I don't understand your question. I am sorry.

Mr. Goldsmith. Well, could this Domestic Exploitation Section have been used for the purpose of establishing a contact between the Agency and Luisa Calderon so that her assistance or services could be solicited for the Agency?

Mr. Helms. My recollection is I don't recall any Domestic Exploitation Section that was recruiting agents.

Mr. Goldsmith. Other than A. M. Mug, the Cuban defector to whom you made reference earlier today, did the Agency obtain additional information pertaining to Oswald and the assassination from sources or agents connected in some way with DGI?

Mr. Helms. I don't honestly know. I would have hoped there would have been more than just one defector, but I may be wrong. We were having a very difficult time getting intelligence inside Cuba and maybe we didn't get anything from anybody else. I would have hoped we would have gotten something more from refugees or agents or somebody like that.

Mr. Goldsmith. In 1963 and 1964, did the Agency have any agents or sources of information within the Cuban Embassy or
Consulate in Mexico City?

Mr. Helms. I don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you refer at this point to CIA number 2977. That would appear in volume 3, I believe.

Mr. Helms. 2977?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes sir.

Mr. Helms. That would be volume 2.

All right. Memoranda from Mr. J. Lee Rankin.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please skim through the memorandum and then read the next page.

Mr. Helms. And then read the next page.

Mr. Goldsmith. To yourself, sir.

Mr. Helms. Right.

I have read it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, Silvia Duran, who is someone of important concern to this Committee, and my question here is not directed towards the substance of the memo but rather to the source of the information, apparently here the Agency received information concerning Duran from someone who had direct personal knowledge. Do you know who the source of this information was?

Mr. Helms. No, I don't know who the source was, Mr. Goldsmith, but if you are asking my opinion in reading this, I would assume this just is our way of covering up the fact this came from a telephone tap.
Mr. Goldsmith. Right. Do you know whether or not Silvia Duran at any time had any connections with CIA was she an agent or source of information for the Agency?

Mr. Helms. Not that I have heard.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you able to refer specifically to language in this memo that would indicate that the source of the information was a telephone operation?

Mr. Helms. No, I am not. I simply was voicing the opinion that when it says a reliable and sensitive source, well informed on political personalities and events in the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City, I am simply assuming that in order to cover up the fact this information came from various telephone conversations they simply are using this descriptive rubric to cover that fact. I am not sure of this; that is just my assumption.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, are you familiar with the name Teresa Proenza?

Mr. Helms. Whom?

Mr. Goldsmith. Teresa Proenza, Proenza, the Cultural Attache at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City?

Mr. Helms. I don't recall here name, no. I think I would -- Proenza Proenza.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency in 1963 in Mexico City have any penetration agents and sources of information within the Soviet Embassy or Consulate?
Mr. Helms. I don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, are you familiar generally with the allegations that were made after the assassination by a Nicaraguan named Alvarada to the effect he had witnessed Oswald receive $6500 in cash from a redheaded negro at the Cuban Embassy?

Mr. Helms. I do recall vaguely this Alvarada allegation and it was my impression that that all fell to pieces, that this fellow was just trying to sake somebody down for some money, or it was self-importance, but never had been able to prove that this was the case.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would ask you to refer now to 2101, which appears in volume 4, which is a polygraph result summary and rather than reading the entire document, please refer to paragraph number 7.

Mr. Helms. I see.

I have read it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, paragraph number 7 indicates that this allegation apparently was resolved when Alvarada admitted he had made a mistake and he essentially admitted that he had with respect to the polygraph devices a means of testing one's truthfulness.

The issue which the Committee is concerned with at this time, however, appears on page 2100, the top of the page, where Alarada is quoted, where it is indicted to have stated, and I
reading now, that he wanted to protest his unjust treatment and
the fact he was given money since he does not believe in
negotiating over death.

Perhaps it would be good if you did read paragraph 1, so
we are not talking out of context here.

Mr. Helms. Is this Alarada we are talking --

Mr. Goldsmith. Pardon?

Mr. Helms. It says subject here. Is that Alarada?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes sir. This is the Nicaraguan who made
the allegations concerning Oswald receiving money.

Mr. Helms. I see.

I have read it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, do you know whether Alarada was given
money in reference to the allegations that he was making about
Oswald?

Mr. Helms. I have no recollection of this at all. The
only thing that twigged a memory cell in my head was the
redheaded negro. That always seemed to be a silly story that
stuck in my head over all these years. The other details I
don't recall.

Mr. Goldsmith. The statement in here that is of concern
to the Committee is the one that suggests that either for
making the story for extracting the story Alarada was given
money. I am wondering if this issue was ever investigated by
the Agency?
Mr. Helms. I don't know. He was apparently dealing with the State Department people down there, is that correct?

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I believe OSS refers to the FBI.

Mr. Helms. State Department.

Mr. Goldsmith. I won't argue with you over that one, sir. In any event, the record indicates that.

Mr. Helms. I will show you in another one of your documents that the FBI had a different cryptonym. If you look at the document with dissemination of original Lee Harvey Oswald report to local authorities, you remember the one that goes back --

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Helms. -- you will find the thing broken out and you will find that, I think, in those days the FBI was known as ODNV. And the State Department was ODACID.

Mr. Goldsmith. I believe that you are correct in that score, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. Helms. I don't know but that is my recollection.

Mr. Goldsmith. My source in this room tells me you are correct.

In any event, do you know anything about Alarada receiving money?

Mr. Helms. No sir, I do not, nothing whatever.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission ever told about
his more or less cryptic reference to being offered money and negotiating over death?

Mr. Helms. I don't know what they knew about the Alarad case except from what you showed me earlier. They apparently were briefed about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Warren Commission would have been given a copy of this polygraph summary?

Mr. Helms. I don't know. If they asked for it I suppose, otherwise I wouldn't have thought so. Polygraph summaries are usually pretty closely held. That is not a very scientific instrument.

Mr. Goldsmith. Again, if they had been given this summary, would there be a record of that somewhere at the Agency?

Mr. Helms. I would have thought so.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know where that record would be?

Mr. Helms. I have no idea. Probably in the Security Office somewhere.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Chairman, at this time I am finished with another line of inquiry. I note that it is 3:25 and that we have to leave this room at 4. If you have questions I would certainly defer to you at this point.

Mr. Preyer.

There is one question I wanted to ask, which isn't directly related to our inquiry here, although it is indirectly
related to the Mexican aspects of it.

Recently Premier Castro made a very harsh speech attacking the United States, as we have read in the paper, and over the course of this Youth Festival that was held there several others were brought forward. (1), the Consul in the Mexican Embassy there, Mr. Azcue, apparently made a speech to the Youth Festival which in effect said the man who came to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico, was not Oswald, or he had questions about whether it was Oswald. So for some reason, perhaps on his own or his government, he has floated the idea of two Oswalds.

Now, whether to confuse the issue or not, I don't know.

I think this Committee can probably demonstrate that conclusively by good hard evidence that there was only one Oswald and that Mr. Azcue is wrong on that score.

The other point which gives me more concern is the attack Mr. Castro made in his allegations that CIA in this country had foreknowledge of the assassination of President Kennedy and that they deliberately tried to pin the blame on the Cuban Government. That apparently is the new line and he has made that charge in a public forum, for all the world to hear. How much the world would believe that, knowing the source it comes from, I suppose is debatable, but I imagine many Marxist countries of the world are taking that as gospel now.

So the question I wanted to ask is on the second point, and it is as to his charge that the CIA had foreknowledge of
the assassination to pin it on the Cuban Government.

Do you have any comments that you would like to make on that, sir?

Mr. Helms. Sir, the only comment I would like to make on that was, or is, not was, that I never knew of anyone in the CIA that alleged that he knew about President Kennedy's assassination beforehand. I never heard that asserted by a single soul, ever. I don't believe there was anyone in the CIA who had any foreknowledge.

I recall personally that I was sitting having lunch with Director McCone and two or three other CIA officials when his Executive Assistant, Walter Elder, walked into the room and said President Kennedy had been shot, and if I have ever seen surprise and horror on the group of faces around me it was on that occasion. So I can't conceive that either Director McCone or I had ever heard of this thing and I have never heard it alleged that anybody else had, and I would like to make one further comment about Mr. Azcue, and that is that in a Communist state individuals of the local government do not appear at international conferences and make speeches (a), without specific authorization, and, (b), specific instructions as to what they are to say and what they are to cover.

I found it equally interesting that Mr. Cubela, the famous Mr. AMLASH, who has dotted the transcripts of lord knows how many Congressional hearings, also appeared, having been released
from jail, as stated in the Washington Post, to assert that he had never been a double agent, that he had only worked for a certain period of time for the CIA. Why he was asked to make the statement, why he was released from jail for the purpose of doing it, I don't know. I could hazard an opinion. But I can only say that these conferences are orchestrated and they are orchestrated very skillfully and orchestrated for a purpose.

Mr. Preyer. Do you know anything of any 23 page document that I understand Mr. Castro says he has outlining or substantiating his charges?

Mr. Helms. No sir, I don't know anything about it.

Didn't he give Senator McGovern a document one time that Senator brought back with him, or was it Senator Church? I saw something in the newspapers about this. I have no firsthand knowledge.

Mr. Preyer. I got the impression this was a recent compilation.

Mr. Helms. I see.

Mr. Preyer. Probably on the order of Mr. Cubela and Mr. Azcue's appearances. It always seemed to me a little surprising Mr. Cubela, if he was guilty of all the things alleged, that he wasn't preemingly shot, rather than being in prison.

Well, I appreciate your comments on that. That is very helpful.

Mr. Goldsmith. This would be an appropriate time,
for us to break, rather than continue getting into a new area
and break for the deposition, so I would recommend that at this
time.

Mr. Preyer. Very well.

Mr. Goldsmith. I might point out, Mr. Chairman, that if
we do break at this time, that under the Committee Rules, the
Ambassador would be entitled to make a statement at this time.
I would also be prepared to have the Ambassador make a state-
ment at the deposition.

Mr. Preyer. Yes. Under our rules each person who testi-
fies, at the conclusion of the Committee portion of the hearing
is entitled to make a statement of five minutes, if he cares
to, explaining any aspect of the testimony further, or any
statement he may care to make.

Mr. Helms. You mean if he has anything left to say?

Mr. Preyer. Yes.

Mr. Helms. Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Ambassador Helms. We appreciate
very much your cooperation in this. Sorry we have interrupted
you a number of times today, but I hope we will be able to
complete the testimony.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, I would like to clarify
that I don't believe that the Committee will have a Notary
available for the deposition that is about to begin in about a
half an hour or so, so I would like to indicate for the record,
Mr. Helms, you understand you will still be under oath for the deposition?

Mr. Helms. I understand that, certainly.

Mr. Preyer. The Committee stands in recess until 10:00 tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene at 10:00 o'clock Thursday, August 10, 1978.)