

Assassination Records Review Board

Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10110-10005
RECORD SERIES : SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 014719

February 18, 1997

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 0

Number of Postponements: 18

Postponement # 1 (Page 10):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 2 (Page 10):

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Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 3 (Page 12):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

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Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 4 (Page 13):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

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Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 5 (Page 13):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

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Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 6 (Page 13):

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Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 7 (Page 14):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

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Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 8 (Page 14):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

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Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 9 (Page 14):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

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Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 10 (Page 14):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 11 (Page 14):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 12 (Page 15):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

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Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 13 (Page 47):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.

The postponed information will be opened in full on either May 1, 2001, or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever occurs first.

Release Date: 05/2001

Postponement # 14 (Page 52):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Surveillance Activities

Release Date: 10/2017

Postponement # 15 (Page 84):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it reveals the identity of an intelligence agent that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act. The Board is awaiting additional evidence from the CIA, at which time it will reconsider the postponement

Substitute Language: CIA Employee

Review Date: 05/1997

Postponement # 16 (Page 136):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Crypt

Release Date: 09/2006

Postponement # 17 (Page 136):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Crypt

Release Date: 09/2006

Postponement # 18 (Page 137):

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it discusses sources and methods that properly may be withheld under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act.

Substitute Language: Crypt

Release Date: 09/2006

Board Review Completed: 09/27/96

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10110-10005
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AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 014719

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
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DATE : 08/09/78
PAGES : 198
SUBJECTS : CIA, METHODOLOGY

OSWALD, LEE, POST-RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL, TRIP TO
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Box 2.

JFK ASSASSINATION COLLECTION
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AS SANITIZED

Agency: HSCA 180-10110-10005
Record Number:

Record Series: SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY

Agency File Number: 014719

Originator: HSCA

From: Helms, Richard R

To: R

Title: Deposition of Richard McGarrah Helms R

Date: 8/9/78

Pages: 198

Subjects:

1. CIA, methodology R
2. LHO, Post-Russian Period, Travel, Trip to Russia R
3. Nosenko, Yuri R
4. WC R
5. Helms, Richard, testimony before the committee R
6. R

Document Type : transcript

Classification: U C S (T)

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WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1978

U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Assassination
of John F. Kennedy of the
Select Committee on Assassina-
tions,

Washington, D.C.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:25 a.m. in
room 340, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Richardson Preyer
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Preyer, Burke, Dodd, Devine and
Sawyer.

Also present: E. Berning; L. Svendsen; C. Berk; M. Gold-
smith; B. Genzman; J. Blackmer; J. McDonald; G. R. Blakey;
O. Wagner; B. Wolf; W. H. Cross.

Mr. Preyer. The Committee will come to order.

The Chair recognizes the Clerk of the Committee to read
those who are officially designated to be on the Subcommittee
today.

The Clerk. You, Mrs. Burke, Mr. Sawyer and Mr. Thone are
regular members of the Kennedy Subcommittee. Mr. Devine will
be substituting for Mr. Dodd.

Mr. Preyer. The Chair at this time will entertain a motion
that today's hearings and one subsequent day of hearings be held

1 in Executive Session since, on the basis of information obtained
2 by the Committee, the Committee believes that the evidence or
3 testimony may tend to defame, degrade or incriminate people
4 and consequently Section 2(k) (5) of Rule 11 of the Committee
5 rules would apply.

6 Mrs. Burke. I so move.

7 Mr. Preyer. Thank you.

8 You have heard the motion. All those in favor will answer
9 as the roll is called.

10 The Clerk. Mr. Preyer?

11 Mr. Preyer. Aye.

12 The Clerk. Mr. Devine?

13 Mr. Devine. Aye.

14 The Clerk. Mr. Thone?

15 (No response)

16 The Clerk. Mrs. Burke?

17 Mrs. Burke. Aye.

18 The Clerk. Mr. Sawyer?

19 (No response)

20 The Clerk. Three ayes, Mr. Chairman.

21 Mr. Preyer. Thank you.

22 The Committee will go into Executive Session at this time
23 and we will ask all those who are not members of the Committee,
24 all witnesses to please leave the room at this time.

25 (Pause)

1 Mr. Preyer. We will now proceed in Executive Session.

2 The Chair will ask the witness if he will be sworn at this
3 time.

4 Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to
5 give this Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth and
6 nothing but the truth, so help you God?

7 Mr. Helms. I do, Mr. Chairman.

8 Mr. Preyer. You may be seated.

9 As we do to all witnesses, the Chair will give a brief
10 statement concerning the subject of the investigation.

11 House Resolution 222 mandates the Committee to conduct a
12 full and complete investigation and study of the circumstances
13 surrounding the assassination and death of President John F.
14 Kennedy including determining whether the existing laws of the
15 United States concerning the investigation of the President
16 and the investigatory jurisdiction and capability of agencies
17 and departments are adequate in their provisions and enforce-
18 ment and there is full disclosure of evidence and information
19 among agencies and departments of the United States government,
20 and whether any evidence or information not in the possession
21 of an agency or department would have been in assistance in
22 investigating the assassination, and why such information was
23 not provided by such agency or department; and to make recom-
24 mendations to the House, if the Select Committee deems it
25 appropriate, for amendment of existing legislation or the

1 enactment of new legislation.

2 Mr. Helms, are you represented by counsel?

3 Mr. Helms. Yes. I have with me, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Gregory
4 B. Craig who is my counsel on this occasion.

5 Mr. Preyer. Thank you.

6 Mr. Craig. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.

7 Mr. Preyer. The Chair will recognize Mr. Goldsmith at this
8 time to begin the questioning.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD MC GARRAH HELMS

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, for the record will you state your name and address?

Mr. Helms. My name is Richard McGarrah Helms, and for the benefit of the Reporter, the middle name is spelled M-c G-a-r-r-a-h.

I live at 4649 Garfield Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20007.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you previously served as the Director of the Central Intelligence?

Mr. Helms. Yes, I have.

Mr. Goldsmith. During what years did you serve in that capacity?

Mr. Helms. I served from 1966 to 1973.

Mr. Goldsmith. Prior to that time, how many years have you been associated with the CIA?

Mr. Helms. Since the doors opened in 1947.

Mr. Goldsmith. As a part of your association with the CIA, were you required to execute a secret^{oath} seal?

Mr. Helms. I was.

Mr. Goldsmith. At this time I would like, Mr. Ambassador, to present what has been marked as JFK Exhibit No. 94.

Mr. Helms. I have it in front of me. I have identified it as a document that I read earlier.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, Mr. Chairman, JFK Exhibit

1 No. 94 is a letter from Acting Director Carlucci to the
2 Chairman of this Committee which was written for the purpose
3 of authorizing present and former agency employees to testify
4 fully and truthfully before this Committee and to respond to
5 questions that are within the scope of the Committee's mandate.

6 At this time, I would like the Ambassador to be given a
7 letter, or a copy of a letter, from Mr. Carlucci to the
8 Ambassador dated July 27, 1978. I would request that this
9 item be introduced into evidence as Exhibit No. 125, JFK
10 Exhibit 125.

11 (The document referred
12 to was marked JFK Exhibit
13 No. 125 for identification.)

14 Mr. Helms. I would identify this letter as one I received
15 in the mail.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand the contents of this
17 letter and the previous letter that you were shown, JFK No.
18 94?

19 Mr. Helms. I believe I do.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. In addition, Mr. Ambassador, I would like you
21 to examine JFK Exhibit 126, which is a letter dated 8 August
22 1978 to Mr. G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director of this
23 Committee.

24 Part of that exhibit consists of a letter from Mr. Scott
25 Breckinridge of the CIA and another consists of a letter to

1 Mr. Blakey sent by Mr. Anthony Lampvan, General Counsel of
2 the CIA.

3 I request that ^(H) be introduced into evidence as JFK Exhibit
4 126.

5 Mr. Preyer. Without objection, so ordered.

6 (The document referred to
7 was marked JFK Exhibit No.
8 126 for identification.)

9 Mr. Helms. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I read this letter before
10 the meeting started this morning.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand the contents of that
12 letter

13 Mr. Helms. I do.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Finally, I have one more letter to intro-
15 duce in the record, a letter from Mr. Blakey to Mr. Breckin-
16 ridge dated 4 August 1978 which was sent to Mr. Breckinridge
17 at the request of Mr. Gregory Craig, counsel for the Ambassador.

18 At this time, I request that that letter be introduced
19 into the record as Exhibit 127.

20 Mr. Helms. Yes, I have seen this letter on another
21 occasion.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Chairman, I request that this letter
23 be introduced into the record as JFK No. 127.

24 Mr. Preyer. Without objection, so ordered.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

(The document referred
to was marked JKF Exhibit
No. 127 for identification.)

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, what was your position in
1963 when you were with the CIA?

Mr. Helms. In 1963, I had the title Deputy Director for
Plans.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you explain to the Committee what
the organization^d function of the Deputy Director for Plans was
in 1963?

Mr. Helms. In 1963, the Deputy Director for Plans was
the Deputy Director who was in charge of -- I guess the simplest
term is overseas operations. This entity of the CIA received
its mandate from two documents, one known as MSC No. 5 and
the other CID/2 or M-12.

In any event, the responsibility of this unit was to
conduct espionage and counter-espionage and covert action out-
side the continental limits of the United States.

Mr. Goldsmith. Can you describe generally what your
responsibilities were as head of that unit?

Mr. Helms. I was, in fact, in charge of the unit. In
other words, I was under the aegis of the Director of Central
Intelligence, to whom I reported. I was in charge of overseas
operations.

Mr. Goldsmith. What role, if any, did the CIA have in the

1 investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy?

2 Mr. Helms. After this tragedy occurred and the Warren
3 Commission was formed, there was every effort made in the
4 Central Intelligence Agency to be as responsive as possible
5 to request from the FBI who was conducting the investigation
6 or a major portion of it, and the staff and members of the
7 Warren Commission.

8 I would like to take this occasion to say we were all, I
9 think, in this country equally struck with the tragic circum-
10 stances and we all felt, in the Agency, that we should do what
11 we could to be as supportive as we possibly could of these
12 other entities that had the lead in this investigation.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Am I correct in assuming that -- and under-
14 stand, your testimony to be -- that the basic role of the Agency
15 at that time was to lend support to the FBI and to the Warren
16 Commission?

17 Mr. Helms. Yes.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Functioning in that capacity, how was the
19 CIA's investigation organized?

20 Mr. Helms. This is a long time ago that these events took
21 place. I guess it is all of 15 years.

22 I do not recall that, at the outset, that there was any
23 formal organizational change made to accommodate this investi-
24 gation. My recollection is that we figured that most of our
25 contribution would focus on what had occurred in Mexico City --

1 in other words, Oswald's activity prior to the assassination
2 in Mexico City.

3 It is my recollection that the individual who was sort of
4 designated to help out from the Headquarters standpoint was
5 the man who had the desk there in Mexico City. My recollection,
6 his name was [SCELSO]

7 Mr. Goldsmith. [John SCELSO]

8 Mr. Helms. I think so. That is my recollection.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. What were your responsibilities with regard
10 to the investigation that was undertaken by the Agency?

11 Mr. Helms. My recollection is that I felt my responsibility
12 to be as responsive to whatever requests came from the FBI or
13 the Warren Commission as we could. I, therefore, tried to see
14 to it that these requests were fulfilled and that we made the
15 requisite inquiry or whatever else would be required under the
16 circumstances.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Who, if anyone, was primarily responsible
18 for coordinating the flow of information within the CIA to you
19 and then from you to the Warren Commission?

20 Mr. Helms. Mr. Goldsmith, I do not recall, at this late
21 date, anyway, any particular flow of information. An inquiry
22 would come over. We would attempt to satisfy it and we would
23 attempt to respond to it. But these inquiries came in individual
24 bits and pieces or as individual items, and my recollection
25 would be that it would be hard to describe this flow of

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1 material. Each individual item that came along we took care
2 of as best as we could.

3 As the weeks turned into months, we found that we were
4 looking into matters overseas in Europe and various places,
5 trying to run down individuals, identify bits and pieces
6 that the Warren Commission was trying to clarify, and as a
7 result of this, it was necessary to deal through all the area
8 divisions of the so-called Operations Director, or Plans
9 Director, at that time.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Which staff or unit, if any, within the
11 CIA was given primary responsibility for coordinating the
12 investigation?

13 Mr. Helms. My recollection is that after the Warren
14 Commission was established and it got its work underway that
15 this was put into the counter-intelligence staff.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you explain to the Committee what
17 the organizational function or purpose of the counter-intelli-
18 gence staff was?

19 Mr. Helms. Under the National Security Council intelli-
20 gence directive, NSCID No. 5, there was a provision, a special
21 provision in that document which dealt with counter-intelligence.
22 I say a special provision, because in the area of positive
23 intelligence the Agency's charter was to collect raw informa-
24 tion and then pass it to the various other interested agencies
25 of government.

1 Whereas, in the counter-intelligence field, it had a
2 mandate to maintain counter-intelligence files and also to do
3 counter-intelligence evaluations.

4 To be more specific about this, if there was an allegation
5 from the FBI that a spy at the United Nations had been trans-
6 ferred to some unit in Paris and it was the Agency's job, then,
7 to try to see what that agent was up to. It was also the
8 Agency's job to make an evaluation of whether he, indeed,
9 was working for the Russians or the French or whatever the
10 case might be.

11 Therefore, the counter-intelligence staff did have an
12 evaluation function which the foreign intelligence staff, or
13 the positive intelligence staff, did not.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Is that why the CI staff was given primary
15 responsibility for coordinating the investigation?

16 Mr. Helms. Mr. Goldsmith, I do not recall any longer what
17 considerations went into giving this job to the counter-
18 intelligence staff. I think it is logical to agree with what
19 you say, but I do not recall any longer as it having been
20 or what the controlling reasons were.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. You made reference earlier to [John SCHELSON]
22 who originally was given responsibility to coordinating aspects
23 of the investigation. Do you recall how long he retained this
24 responsibility?

25 Mr. Helms. It is not only my recollection but in an effort

1 to clear my mind in preparation for this hearing, I did some
2 checking with some former colleagues, and my recollection is
3 that he sort of had the labor for only a couple of months;
4 after that, the job was turned over to the Counter-Intelligence
5 Staff.

6 Do you recall why the transition was made from [SCELSO] to
7 the CI staff?

8 Mr. Helms. I think, if recollection serves, that we could
9 see that this investigation was broadening far beyond Mexico
10 City and it did not make much sense to have it in the hands
11 of a man who was running the Mexico City desk.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. When Mr. [SCELSO] was originally given the
13 responsibility for coordinating the investigation, was he ever
14 told by you that he would have exclusive control of the
15 investigation?

16 Mr. Helms. I have no such recollection. I would see no
17 reason to give him -- in fact, I could not see why it would
18 have occurred to me to want to say that to him.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether Mr. [SCELSO] ever
20 discussed with you problems that he was having with Mr. Angle-
21 ton's in some way interfering with the investigation?

22 Mr. Helms. No, I do not recall this. He might have. Today,
23 I do not recall this.

24 If you could identify what the troubles were, it might
25 refresh my memory.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. [SCELSO] has testified before the
2 Committee in a deposition, and at that time he indicated that
3 he was initially given responsibility for the investigation and
4 was told more or less that he would be given free rein as to
5 coordinating the information, and, I guess, sending it to the
6 Warren Commission.

7 He indicated to us that Mr. Angleton was in some way inter-
8 fering with his function as coordinator of the investigation
9 and that at some time the investigation was turned over from
10 [SCELSO] to Angleton. Does that refresh your memory at all?

11 Mr. Helms. It does not, and may I say, I do not mean
12 to add to the questions I have not been asked, but I cannot
13 imagine giving anybody the kinds of assurances which Mr. [SCEL-
14 SO] claims that he was given. We did not operate that way.
15 Nobody had those assurances for anything, including me.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Your position would be that the primary
17 reason, as you recall it, for the investigation's being taken
18 from [SCELSO] in a sense, and given to the CI staff was because
19 the investigation began to undertake broader tones than was
20 initially anticipated?

21 Mr. Helms. Yes. That is not only my recollection, but
22 also it would seem to be in the year 1978, to have been a
23 rather sensible thing to have done under the circumstances.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. [SCELSO] also testified before the
25 Committee that Mr. Angleton was talking to the FBI without

1 receiving authorization from anyone. Do you recall whether
2 or not that was a problem at any time?

3 Mr. Helms. Well, Mr. Angleton was responsible for the
4 liaison of the Plans Director for the FBI and consequently he
5 talked to the FBI liaison man and other FBI people every day
6 of the week and probably several times a day.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. He was never, after the assassination,
8 instructed not to talk to the FBI while Mr. [SCELSO] was coordi-
9 nating the investigation?

10 Mr. Helms. Certainly not. We were doing our best to be
11 as supportive and helpful as we could to the FBI.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you serve as a point of contact between
13 the Commission and the Agency, or was that responsibility given
14 to someone else?

15 Mr. Helms. I do not know that anyone in the Agency was
16 ever designated as point of contact. I had dealings with the
17 Commission because I had the part of the Agency that was doing
18 most of the work for the Commission. This was a situation
19 indicated by the display of forces and activity rather than by
20 anything else. I do not recall having been designated as a
21 particular point of contact. I do not recall anyone else's
22 having been designated as a point of contact.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what responsibilities, if
24 any, were given to Mr. Raymond Rocca?

25 Mr. Helms. I think in the counter-intelligence staff when

1 they took over this responsibility, if you want to call it
2 that, I believe he was the man in the counter-intelligence
3 staff that was responsible for pulling things together there.

4 In other words, these Warren Commission queries would go
5 to his desk, and the replies would come back from his desk.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. What role, if any, did Mr. McCone have
7 in the investigation?

8 Mr. Helms. As the Director of the Agency, he had a very
9 important role. Everything we did was on his say-so and there
10 was a constant traffic between him and me about what we were
11 doing with the Warren Commission, how we were handling these
12 various matters. I believe Mr. McCone testified at the
13 Warren Commission at one time. We would have had to brief
14 him in preparation for his testimony and prepare the papers
15 and so forth. He had a very real role.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. He was actually apprised of the develop-
17 ments and what was being given to the Warren Commission?

18 Mr. Helms. Literally not on a day to day basis, but he
19 was kept informed in general terms and specific terms if
20 necessary.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall how many times a week you
22 would meet with Mr. McCone and discuss with ^{him} ~~them~~ the develop-
23 ments with regard to the investigation of the assassination?

24 Mr. Helms. I am sorry, I do not. In the Agency procedure,
25 there was a morning meeting with the Director every day, five

1 days a week, and I was at those meetings. What transpired at
2 those meetings plus what transpired in his office in private
3 meetings, I could not conceivably give you any idea.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, you would say that Mr. McCone
5 was actively apprised and was not on the periphery of the
6 developments?

7 Mr. Helm. Certainly not. He was actively apprised. He
8 was very much interested, and we were all very much interested.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. You made reference earlier to the division of
10 responsibility in essence between the FBI and the CIA with
11 regard to the investigation. Would you go into somewhat more
12 detail as to the relationship between the CIA and FBI at that
13 time?

14 Mr. Helms. This crime was committed on United States soil.
15 Therefore, as far as the Federal government was concerned, the
16 primary investigating agency would have been the Federal
17 Bureau of Investigation without any question. The role of
18 the CIA would have been entirely supportive and it would have
19 been supportive in the sense of what material we are able
20 to acquire outside the continental limits of the United States
21 with reference to the investigation.

22 This was the division of labor between the FBI and the CIA.
23 The CIA's mandate started at the ocean front. Or, to put it
24 another way, the FBI's mandate started as soon as you crossed
25 into the continental limits of the United States. For

1 investigative purposes, the Agency had no investigative role
2 inside the United States at all. So when I used here the
3 word "supportive," I meant that in the literal sense of the
4 term. We are trying to support the FBI and support the
5 Warren Commission and be responsive to their requests, but we
6 were not initiating any investigations of our own or, to my
7 recollection, were we ever asked to.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. In your opinion, was that division of
9 responsibility satisfactory?

10 Mr. Helms. It was law. It was not a question of whether
11 it was satisfactory or not; it was law.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that. One of the purposes
13 of this investigation is to examine the state of the law at
14 that time and the manner in which the Agency has gone about
15 investigating the death of the President. So, at this time,
16 I am asking you whether in your opinion that statement of
17 facts was satisfactory towards conducting the investigation
18 that was involved?

19 Mr. Helms. I do not know, Mr. Goldsmith, whether on such
20 short notice I would want to make such a serious judgment as
21 that. It does seem to me in any investigation that one
22 organization has to have the primary role, otherwise you have
23 a great deal of confusion. I think it was proper that the
24 FBI should have the primary role in this case. I do not
25 recall ever having felt disadvantaged in any way in the CIA

1 by the position we had of supporting these efforts, and that
2 is the best answer I can give you on such short notice.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether there were any
4 problems between the Agency and the Bureau in conducting the
5 investigation?

6 Mr. Helms. The only matter that comes readily to mind was
7 the difference in the evaluation of the material of the
8 Soviet defector named Nosenko gave. My recollection is that
9 what this man had to say when he arrived in the United States
10 around the time of the assassination was passed by the FBI
11 to the Warren Commission exactly as he said it.

12 The CIA was responsible for handling defectors after they
13 came to the United States and did not feel that the bona fides
14 or the good faith and credibility of this defector had been
15 established at this stage of the game, and the Central
16 Intelligence Agency felt it necessary to make that known to
17 the Warren Commission.

18 There, indeed, there was a difference between the two
19 agencies.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Aside from that substantive disagreement
21 in the day-to-day relationship of the Bureau, can you recall
22 whether there were problems in terms of coordinating the
23 investigation?

24 Mr. Helms. I do not recall any other problems.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Was information freely passed between the

1 CIA and the FBI? By that, I mean the way the scenario is
2 right now, the CIA is acting in a support function to the FBI.
3 Was the FBI giving information to the CIA?

4 Mr. Helms. My best recollection is that there were not
5 difficulties between the two agencies over this. As I said
6 at the outset, we were doing our best to be supportive. We
7 were passing along, I believe, everything that was relative.

8 I do recall when we got into certain sensitive areas a
9 couple of times during the investigation, if we felt we could
10 not pass a piece of paper to the Warren Commission, for
11 example, we would go down and talk to the staff man to try
12 to apprise them orally of what our predicament was.

13 In other words, I assure you, Mr. Goldsmith, that the whole
14 thrust of the Agency was to be as helpful as we possibly could
15 and to go over the edge, if necessary.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. I understand. In this case, my question
17 was whether the FBI was also sending information to the Agency?
18 In other words, was the FBI sharing information for your pur-
19 poses?

20 Mr. Helms. I do not recall any complaints on those grounds.
21 Maybe they were and maybe they were not. It is a little bit
22 difficult, sometimes, to know whether you are getting something
23 the existence of which you have never heard.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency's investigation reflect any
25 working hypotheses? By that, did the Agency give any particular

1 emphasis to ^{any} the particular areas, geographic areas?

2 Mr. Helms. I think that the entire United States govern-
3 ment, not only the CIA, was very concerned as to whether there
4 would be evidence of some foreign conspiracy to assassinate
5 President Kennedy. They were concerned whether the Soviets
6 were involved in this. They were concerned whether the Cubans
7 were involved in this. They were concerned that somebody may
8 have been involved in it.

9 I think we were all preoccupied with this. There is hardly
10 any question there was more discussed during those days as to
11 who was behind Lee Harvey Oswald, if indeed he was the man who
12 was responsible, what had affected his life, why had he done
13 the things he had done, and so forth.

14 So there was a great deal of conjecturing going on. I
15 think if the Chair would indulge me a minute, I would like
16 to make a comment about the various investigations into the
17 assassination of President Kennedy based on the long years I
18 have spent in the intelligence business, and that is, until the
19 day that the KGB in Moscow or the Cuban intelligence in Havana
20 is prepared to turn over their files to the U.S. as to what
21 their relationships to these various people were, it is going
22 to be extraordinarily difficult to tidy up this case, finally,
23 and conclusively.

24 A great deal of investigation can be done, and has been
25 done. It has been done conscientiously. I think people have

1 tried over the years their very best to resolve a host of
2 differences. I recognize also that allegations have been made
3 that certain areas have not been as aggressively investigated
4 as they might have been. That all may be true.

5 But it really does not make any difference what is done in
6 this connection until you can get those governments to lay
7 before you their records of how they dealt with Lee Harvey
8 Oswald, or anybody else who is relevant in this case.

9 And, based on past experience, I doubt very much whether
10 you are going to get the compliance of the Soviets or the
11 Cuban government.

12 But I want to make this comment, because it is extremely
13 important and very relevant, that these cases are untidy. It
14 is only in books that they end up with all the little things
15 worked out at the end and tied off neatly.

16 This aura of suspicion and all the rest of it hangs in the
17 air. Undoubtedly that is why this Committee was formed, so
18 undoubtedly this could be put to rest. I promise you, there
19 is this one last step and until it can be taken, this is never
20 going to be laid to rest.

21 Mr. Devine. Do you agree, Mr. Helms, that the likelihood
22 of that happening is remote?

23 Mr. Helms. Remote. Yes, sir, I agree with that.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Helms, I believe my question was --

25 Mr. Helms. Excuse me, Mr. Goldsmith. I did not mean to

1 digress. I thought that I would like to get this off my chest.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. I understand.

3 My question was, what areas received primary emphasis. I
4 think your answer, in part, was the area of foreign conspiracy.

5 Are you able to give any more detail on what aspects of
6 the foreign conspiracy question were investigated?

7 Mr. Helms. I think we were very concerned about the Soviet
8 aspects of this, primarily. Why? Because Lee Harvey Oswald
9 had spent time in the Soviet Union, time which never had been
10 satisfactorily explained as far as we knew.

11 Nosenko arrives as a defector. There were a lot of very
12 suspicious circumstances surrounding the whole way and timing
13 of his defection. So that there were several areas there
14 that seemed to require not only investigation but thought and
15 analysis and everything else that could be given to it.

16 I would like to say here that when a tragedy of the magni-
17 tude of President Kennedy's assassination occurs in this
18 country, it is at this point that in our international relations
19 we have to suddenly become very careful, because accusing a
20 foreign government of having been responsible for this act
21 is tearing the veil about as nastily as one can, and this can
22 lead to a whole series of counter-actions which might be very
23 unpleasant.

24 I think all of us were keenly aware of this. It was not
25 only true of the Soviet Union, but also true of Cuba, that

1 President Kennedy's whole approach to the Cuban government
2 of Fidel Castro.

3 So that we were treading very lightly, but I am sure that
4 we were very concerned at the time as to what we might end up
5 with. And this was not improved or our mood about this was
6 not improved when Khrushchev runs to Drew Pearson in Egypt when
7 they were visiting there and tells Pearson that the Soviets,
8 that this was a conspiracy of the right to assassinate Presi-
9 dent Kennedy. Why does he make this remark to Drew Pearson?
10 What is his purpose? What was behind this?

11 Is it a smoke screen to cover up his own complicity?

12 The air was full of these things. Therefore, we were
13 very conscious of it and we were doing what we could to make
14 sense out of it.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Helms, was all information pertinent
16 to the Warren Commission's work promptly given to the Warren
17 Commission?

18 Mr. Helms. As far as I know. If there are indications
19 or evidence that it was not, I do not recall having been aware
20 of any sins of omission at the time.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. On the average, would you be able to tell
22 us how much time passed from the moment that information was
23 received by the Agency until it went to the Commission?

24 Mr. Helms. My recollection is that as soon as we were
25 able to satisfy an inquiry, we sent the reply back. And some

1 of these inquiries obviously took longer than others.

2 For example, some might involve checking a file which was
3 in Washington. Other inquiries might involve trying to see if
4 we could locate somebody in some overseas country.

5 Obviously, one takes longer to perform, one act takes longer
6 to perform than the other.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. As a general rule, did you wait to receive
8 an inquiry from the Commission prior to giving the Commission
9 information?

10 Mr. Helms. Yes, I did, as I recall it.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. As a general rule, did you wait to receive
12 an inquiry from the FBI prior to giving the FBI information?

13 Mr. Helms. That is my recollection.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, was any member of the
15 Warren Commission or staff informed by the CIA of the CIA's
16 anti-Castro assassination plots?

17 Mr. Helms. I do not know. Let's clear this up right now.
18 There is no sense in your going on asking a whole series of
19 questions on this. I am glad to tell you what I know about
20 it.

21 In the first place, Mr. Allen Dulles who had about -- maybe
22 a few months before, anyway -- ceased being Director of
23 Central Intelligence and was replaced by Mr. McCone, was a
24 member of the Warren Commission. I do not know what he said
25 to the members of the Warren Commission.

1 Mr. McCone testified before the Warren Commission. I
2 believe I was with Mr. McCone the day he testified, although I
3 do not even have a clear recollection of that anymore, and I
4 have not refreshed my memory from the Warren Commission Report.

5 These so-called assassination plots I believe if I may put
6 it this way -- a sloppy term which has come to cover some
7 devices which the Church Committee found evidence that the
8 Agency had on its drawing board, if you want to put it that
9 way -- the only assassination plot that had any even semblance
10 or substance to it was one involving a couple of Mafia chief-
11 tains and which were supposed to have taken place before the
12 Bay of Pigs invasion.

13 I guess you could call that an assassination plot.

14 As far as the AMLASH business was concerned, I had a great
15 deal to do with the AMLASH operation and, as has been publicly
16 stated before and I will publicly state it again, that was not
17 an assassination plot. The effort of working with AMLASH was
18 to see if we could find a political alternative to Castro and
19 a man who was prepared to lead a revolt against Castro in
20 political and military terms, inside Havana.

21 The assassination aspects of this which have been so
22 highly publicized was an issue that Mr. Cubella himself kept
23 raising, which was the simplest way to perform his mission was
24 to try to get rid of Castro physically. But he never attempted
25 it, as far as I know, and President Kennedy had been assassinated

1 before there was any possibility of his having attempted it,
2 at least with the connivance of the Agency.

3 I think if one reads the record carefully of these various
4 facts, you will find what I say is supported by the record.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Was Mr. Cubella given any support by the
6 Agency with regard to his desire to assassinate Fidel Castro?

7 Mr. Helms. In the end he was not, as far as I know.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Before the end, was he at any time given
9 any support?

10 Mr. Helms. No.

11 There is the famous story of the poison pen but he did not
12 take the poisen pen. He simply returned it to the case officer
13 who offered it to him. There was no other device given to
14 him, as far as I am aware.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. You made reference earlier to Mr. Dulles'
16 being on the Commission. Do you know whether Mr. Dulles actually
17 knew about the so-called anti-Castro assassination plots?

18 Mr. Helms. He certainly knew about the Mafia one that I
19 mentioned. I think there is abundant evidence that he did know
20 it. I do not have that firsthand, because that particular
21 operation was being handled by Mr. Bissell and Colonel Edwards
22 with Mr. Dulles and General Cabell and I was not brought in on
23 it.

24 At the time I was not a party to it.

25 This is all secondhand information I am giving you, based

1 on what came out of the Church Committee hearings.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Mr. McCone knew of
3 the plots against Castro?

4 Mr. Helms. Yes, I think he did. Well, eventually he did.
5 I do not know exactly at what juncture he was informed about
6 them.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, did you at any time inform
8 the Warren Commission about these plots?

9 Mr. Helms. I did not talk to the Warren Commission about
10 them.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Would your position be that the anti-
12 Castro plots were not relevant to the Warren Commission's
13 investigation?

14 Mr. Helms. I would not put it that way, Mr. Goldsmith.
15 I would not like to agree with that statement.

16 Perhaps they were relevant. I think that is a matter of
17 opinion.

18 What I would like to say, however, is I have noted in the
19 last two or three years that various witnesses have come
20 forward to various Congressional Committees saying if they had
21 known this or known that or known something else their
22 investigation, their attitude, their handling of the matter
23 would have been entirely different. But how it would have
24 been different is not really explained anyplace that I can
25 find.

1 I would like, Mr. Chairman, to make another comment, if
2 I may, please. In 1962, in October, we had the Cuban missile
3 crisis and to recall and refresh your memory, this was the
4 occasion on which Fidel Castro and Khrushchev connived to put
5 intermediate range ballistic missiles on Cuban soil which had
6 a range which could fire into the United States at least to
7 the middle of the country, if not all the way through to
8 California.

9 If Khrushchev had been able to pull off this trick, it
10 would have been the military coup of the century. The Russians
11 would, in the military sense, achieve what, up to that time,
12 they had not been able to achieve otherwise -- to hold the
13 United States hostage.

14 At that time, the Soviets did not have intercontinental
15 ballistic missiles with the range or the accuracy to fire
16 from Soviet soil to the United States. They have since
17 achieved this capability but they did not have it in 1963,
18 I believe the military evidence will show.

19 Obviously, President Kennedy through some good intelligence
20 was provided, and by handling the situation with great skill
21 able to get those missiles withdrawn and also the bombers,
22 the IL-28's which came with them. But I do not think that
23 this operation endeared Fidel Castro to John F. Kennedy.

24 That was in October. In December the brigade which had
25 gone assure at the Bay of Pigs, the brigade of Cuban exiles

1 referred to as No. 2506, was finally gotten out of Cuban jails
2 as a result of an exchange organized by Attorney General
3 Robert Kennedy of payments of medical supplies and pharmaceu-
4 ticals and so forth. And this group came back and they were
5 brought together in the Orange Bowl in Miami and President
6 Kennedy addressed him.

7 On that occasion, he said words to the effect that I will
8 return this flag to this brigade in a free Hananna. I think
9 those words are unambiguous.

10 So in this period of the months prior to his assassination,
11 there certainly was bad blood between President Kennedy and
12 Fidel Castro. This was known to everybody. Whether this blood
13 was made worse, or not made worse, by so-called assassination
14 plots which maybe Castro knew about, or maybe he did not know
15 about, I am unable to say.

16 But I think there has been a gross exaggeration which has
17 taken place about the role that the so-called assassination
18 plots might have played in the Warren Commission investigation.

19 Ladies and gentlemen, what different conclusion would you
20 suggest that the Warren Commission should have come to?

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Helms, I take it from your testimony
22 that your position is that the anti-Castro plots, in fact,
23 were relevant to the Warren Commission's work; and, in light
24 of that, the Committee would like to be informed as to why
25 the Warren Commission was not told by you of the anti-Castro

1 assassination plots.

2 Mr. Helms. I have never been asked to testify before the
3 Warren Commission about our operations.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. If the Warren Commission did not know
5 of the operation, it certainly was not in a position to ask
6 you about it.

7 Is that not true?

8 Mr. Helms. Yes, but how do you know they did not know
9 about it? How do you know Mr. Dulles had not told them? How
10 was I to know that?

11 And besides, I was not the Director of the Agency and in
12 the CIA, you did not go traipsing around to the Warren
13 Commission or to Congressional Committees or to anyplace else
14 without the Director's permission.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever discuss with the Director
16 whether the Warren Commission should be informed of the anti-
17 Castro assassination plots?

18 Mr. Helms. I did not, as far as I recall.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you know, in 1963, what consideration
20 if any the Warren Commission was giving to the theory that
21 the Kennedy assassination was part of a Cuban conspiracy, a
22 Castro conspiracy?

23 Mr. Helms. I do not know what consideration was given to
24 it.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Prior to the issuance of the Warren

1 Commission's report, did the CIA at any time have any documents
2 or other information which indicated that Castro may have known
3 about the CIA anti-Castro's assassination plots?

4 Mr. Helms. I do not recall any, Mr. Goldstein^{with}. Maybe
5 there were, maybe there were newspaper articles. I do not have
6 any recollection of that anymore. I believe this allegation
7 has been made. I do not have any firsthand recollection.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency ever conduct an investiga-
9 tion into this issue?

10 Mr. Helms. I do not know.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. During the time that you were DCI, do you
12 know whether the Agency ever conducted an investigation into
13 this issue?

14 Mr. Helms. If it did --

15 Mr. Craig. Could I clarify what issue you are talking
16 about here?

17 Mr. Helms^{Goldsmith}. The issue I am concerned about now is whether
18 the Agency had any information that Castro may have known about
19 the assassination plots against him.

20 Mr. Craig. Whether the Agency conducted an investigation of
21 that issue?

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

23 Mr. Helms. I would have thought, Mr. Goldsmith, that since
24 the Agency was operating against Cuba not only in 1962, '63,
25 '64, probably '65, that if those allegations were made by

1 agents of the FBI or the Secret Service or the Coast Guard
2 or the Agency itself that the Agency would have, in the
3 interests of protecting its operations, would have done its
4 best to find out if this were true. It is just maybe they
5 were not able to find out. I would have thought that there
6 would have been an ongoing series of operations in this regard.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. You do not recall specifically one way or
8 another?

9 Mr. Helms. No.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the fact that the Warren Commission was
11 not told about the anti-Castro assassination plots, at least
12 by you, did that reflect a desire on your part to avoid
13 having embarrassed the Agency?

14 Mr. Helms. I do not recall ever having any thoughts of
15 that kind in regard to the investigation of the Warren Commis-
16 sion. One of the difficulties I had with this question is
17 ever since Senator Schweiker's report was made, which made a
18 great deal out of this, I have never had an opportunity to
19 talk to the people who were associated with me at the time to
20 find out just exactly who knew what about what in those days.

21 The United States, after all, is a nation of Monday morning
22 quarterbacks and it seems to me this is one of the outstanding
23 examples of Monday morning quarterbacking.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, was there any desire on your
25 part to avoid an international crisis by not telling the Warren

1 Commission about the anti-Castro assassination plots?

2 Mr. Helms. The thought never occurred to me, Mr. Goldsmith.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. In summary then, is it your position that
4 the Agency gave the Warren Commission information only in
5 response to specific requests by the Warren Commission?

6 Mr. Helms. That is correct.

7 I want to modify that by saying that memory is fallible.
8 There may have been times or circumstances under which something
9 different might have occurred, but my recollection of those
10 days is that we were attempting to be responsive and supportive
11 of the FBI and the Warren Commission. When they asked for
12 something, we gave it to them.

13 As far as our volunteering information is concerned, I have
14 no recollection of whether we volunteered it or not.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. In retrospect, do you think that was a
16 workable arrangement?

17 Mr. Helms. Yes, I thought so.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, other than the anti-Castro
19 assassination plots, was there any other information pertaining
20 to a possible ^{motive,} ~~mode~~ of means or opportunity to kill the
21 President that the Warren Commission was not told about?

22 Mr. Helms. I do not know, Mr. Goldsmith.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever inform President Johnson about
24 the anti-Castro assassination plots?

25 Mr. Helms. I do not like the term. You use it over and

1 over again. I do not like it.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, if you would give me
3 a term, I will make an effort to accommodate you.

4 Mr. Helms. That would be kind of you. I think what I
5 would like to say is that was President Johnson informed
6 of our efforts to get rid of Fidel Castro.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Will you answer that question?

8 Mr. Helms. Yes, he was informed.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. At what time?

10 Mr. Helms. At various times after he became President.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Was he told specifically about your efforts
12 to get rid of Castro prior to the assassination of President
13 Kennedy?

14 Mr. Helms. Yes, he was.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether he was specifically
16 told about the AMLASH plot?

17 Mr. Helms. I do not recall whether I ever discussed the
18 AMLASH plot, or the AMLASH operation, as such. I do not have
19 any recollection of it.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether President Johnson
21 was apprised of the involvement of some of the Mafia figures
22 in this operation?

23 Mr. Helms. He was.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall when he was so apprised?

25 Mr. Helms. I do.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you so inform the Committee?

2 Mr. Helms. Yes. I have not testified to this before
3 because I have no written documentation to support this, but
4 I reported these various matters to President Johnson on May
5 10th, I believe, 1967.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. How are you able to remember the date so
7 well at this time, Mr. Ambassador?

8 Mr. Helms. I do not like the implication of the question,
9 at this time.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I am not in a position to
11 quarrel with you over the way my questions are phrased. I
12 would like to know --

13 Mr. Helms. The implication is that I declined to identify
14 it on some previous occasion.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorry. That is not the inference I
16 was intending to suggest. My question is a very simple one: how
17 are you able to remember today the specific date?

18 Mr. Helms. After I returned from Tehran and had some time
19 available to me, I had an opportunity to dig back and get
20 ahold of some colleagues and talk to various people to try to
21 range in on what time period it was that these matters came up
22 and how they were dealt with, the so-called IG Report that I
23 asked to have done at the Agency.

24 Therefore I wanted to try to specify the date on which I
25 reported to President Johnson about this IG Report. I was able

1 to relate it to another matter I discussed with him on that
2 occasion, and therefore I was able to specify the date.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, what effect, if any, did
4 the CIA's concern with protecting sources and methods as
5 provided by law have on the information that was provided to
6 the Warren Commission?

7 Mr. Preyer. This is the second bell on the vote. Before
8 we go into that answer, the Committee will stand in recess for
9 about ten minutes.

10 (A brief recess was taken.)

11 Mr. Preyer. The Committee will resume its hearing.

12 I understand that it is agreeable with you to proceed at
13 this time, even in the absence of a quorum.

14 Mr. Helms. Certainly, Mr. Chairman.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I repeat the question that
16 I asked you prior to the brief recess. What effect, if any,
17 did the agency's concern for protecting sensitive sources and
18 methods have on the information that it provided to the Warren
19 Commission?

20 Mr. Helms. Mr. Goldsmith, I cannot recall any specific
21 circumstances if there were any where this question of protec-
22 ting sensitive sources and methods caused us difficulty.

23 As I said earlier this morning, somewhere in the back of
24 my mind there may have been an instance or two where we did not
25 particularly want to put something in writing to the Warren

1 Commission so that it would come to reside in our files,
2 become a part of the permanent record.

3 But in a couple of those cases -- and I believe there were --
4 someone went down and talked to a member, a couple of members
5 of the Warren Commission staff so that they would be privy to
6 the information without necessarily having it in writing.

7 I do want to repeat what I said earlier, that we were
8 doing our level best to be responsive and we were bending over
9 backward or frontward, any way you like, to be as responsive
10 as we could, even when sensitive sources and methods were
11 involved.

12 I think that you will find, if I just might add this, that
13 we turned over to the FBI, for example, material from a mail-
14 ordering operation which the Agency was conducting in those
15 days which was considered about as sensitive as anything that
16 we were doing.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. When the Warren Commission staff or members
18 were informed about information that either reflected a sensi-
19 tive agency method or information that came from a sensitive
20 agency source, was the source of that information actually
21 given to the Warren Commission?

22 Mr. Helms. I do not know. I am sorry, I do not know.

23 We very seldom gave the names of sources to anybody, under
24 any circumstances. We usually tried to describe the source in
25 some fashion which would be helpful in evaluating the material.

1 But we practically never gave the names of individuals who
2 were informants or agents or anything of that kind.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you telling the Committee, then, while
4 the Warren Commission might be told about the substance of
5 the information generated from a sensitive source or method
6 of operation that the specific source and method would not
7 necessarily be disclosed?

8 Mr. Helms. Not necessarily, but I do not know what happened
9 in every instance. I am really trying to give you what was
10 the normal operating procedure.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. At this time, Mr. Ambassador, I would like
12 you to refer to what has been marked as CIA Document No. 1907.
13 For your reference purposes, I would like to indicate that you
14 have been given a series of volumes of materials, materials
15 containing CIA documents.

16 The Agency has numbered those documents for the Committee.

17 You will note if you open up, in this case, volume number
18 two, on the lower right-hand corner of each page, it states
19 page 1 of -- in this case, 212.

20 There are 212 pages in this volume. That is not the
21 document number I am referring to. Immediately above that on
22 each page there is another number of four digits -- for example,
23 1874 appears on page 1.

24 When I say CIA Document No. 1907, that would refer to
25 what appears on page 1034 of 212. For the future, I will be

1 referring only to the CIA identification number.

2 Mr. Helms. All right.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. That is the practice we have been utilizing
4 throughout ⁱⁿ the hearing ^{and} ~~in~~ depositions.

5 CIA 1907 is a brief for presentation to the President's
6 Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy and I would
7 ask you to look at CIA No. 1910 and read to yourself paragraph
8 E.

9 Mr. Helms. Paragraph E.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

11 (Pause)

12 Mr. Helms. All right.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, does this paragraph
14 accurately reflect the Agency's attitude towards sensitive
15 sources and methods and the way in which information touching
16 upon sensitive sources and methods was handled with the Warren
17 Commission?

18 Mr. Helms. I believe so. I do not believe any reason to
19 quarrel with what is in that paragraph.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. In the last sentence of this paragraph, there
21 is a reference to channels and procedures that have functioned
22 very well between the Commission and the Agency. Would you
23 apprise the Committee as to specifically which channels and
24 procedures were established in communicating this information
25 to the Warren Commission?

1 Mr. Helms. I would assume, Mr. Goldsmith, that what they
2 are attempting to say here is certain individuals who are
3 familiar with the question at issue were authorized to sit
4 down and talk with the Warren Commission staff members about
5 the operation or about the information.

6 I do not recall there was any structured way that this was
7 taken care of. I think it was.

8 If you were the individual most conversant with the problem,
9 you might be authorized to go down, or maybe your Chief would
10 be authorized to go down and explain it and sit down with them
11 and go over it.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Did anyone from the Warren Commission or
13 its staff express its concern to you that sources and methods
14 by virtue of not being provided to the Warren Commission
15 specifically were causing a problem to the Commission or its
16 staff?

17 Mr. Helms. I do not recall this, Mr. Goldsmith.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to another area now, are you able
19 to state whether Mr. Dulles played any special role in the
20 Warren Commission in so far as the Agency was concerned.

21 Mr. Helms. I am not able to make any comment about it
22 at all.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you able to state, for example, whether
24 Mr. Dulles represented the interests of the CIA while on the
25 Warren Commission?

1 Mr. Helms. I do not know, Mr. Goldsmith. I do not know
2 what interests he represented. Having known Mr. Dulles for
3 many, many years, I would have thought that he would have
4 acted very responsively as a member of the Commission and
5 tried to represent the United States' interests.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mr. Dulles ever pass on to you Warren
7 Commission-related information?

8 Mr. Helms. Not that I recall. In fact, I do not remember
9 having seen Mr. Dulles at all during this period. If I did,
10 it must have been on very rare occasions.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. For example, Mr. Dulles, never briefed you
12 or any Agency personnel on Warren Commission matters?

13 Mr. Helms. I did not say that he did not talk to anyone
14 else in the Agency. I do not recall his ever briefing me.
15 He was a very responsible individual, Mr. Dulles. I cannot
16 imagine his doing anything that he would have felt was
17 improper.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I am going
19 to move on to another line of inquiry unless you or any other
20 members have any questions.

21 Mr. Preyer. Mrs. Burke?

22 Mrs. Burke. No.

23 Mr. Preyer. I have no questions at this time, Mr. Gold-
24 smith. You may proceed.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, what role, if any, did the

1 Mexico City Station have in the Agency's investigation of
2 the assassination?

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Well, I believe that the Mexico City
4 station had a rather key role at the outset because it was
5 the Mexico City station that produced the information prior to
6 President Kennedy's assassination that a fellow named Oswald
7 had indeed visited the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico
8 City and this had been made a matter of record in the United
9 States government.

10 So I think it was in this context that the Mexico City
11 station obviously after the assassination was being asked
12 about the circumstances surrounding this report and what
13 additional information they had and was it indeed Lee Harvey
14 Oswald.

15 And then I believe there was a great to-do about the fact
16 that his name was slightly wrong in the telegram, or the
17 dissemination that was made.

18 All of these things I have heard in recent times. But
19 his having been to the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico
20 City, obviously was a very important part of the initial
21 impressions one had that it was Oswald that had committed the
22 assassination.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Is it appropriate to say, relative to the
24 roles played by other overseas stations, the Mexico City
25 Station played a greater role in the Agency's mission?

Investigation

1 Mr. Helms.. I think that is a fair statement.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall who the Chief of Station was
3 in Mexico City? To refresh your memory, was it Mr. Winn Scott?

4 Mr. Helms. Yes, that is correct.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you able to give the Committee an
6 assessment of Mr. Scott's competence as the Chief of Station?

7 Mr. Helms. Well, in the first place, Mr. Scott came to
8 the CIA after having been an agent for some years of the FBI.
9 He was a man of experience. He served a long time in Mexico
10 City, or a comparative long time if you look at these overseas
11 assignments in terms of a tour of duty of two or three years.

12 He spoke Spanish, and he was regarded as one of our more
13 competent station chiefs.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether or not Mr. Scott
15 maintained an adequate system of records and files in the
16 Mexico City station?

17 Mr. Helms. I do not have any recollection of this. In
18 fact, I do not recollect this having been an issue.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Mr. Scott had a
20 personal safe?

21 Mr. Helms. No.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Is it customary for agency chiefs of station
23 to maintain a personal safe?

24 Mr. Helms. I do not know. I would have thought that that
25 was entirely up to them, if they wanted a personal safe or if

1 they did not want a personal safe. I see nothing about it
2 one way or the other.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. After Mr. Scott's death in '70 or '71, do
4 you know why Mr. James Angleton went to Mexico City and removed
5 documents from Mr. Scott's personal safe?

6 Mr. Helms. No, I do not.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mr. Angleton ever get materials from
8 Mr. Scott's safe to you?

9 Mr. Helms. I do not recall ever having seen them. This
10 was in 1971, you say?

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

12 Mr. Helms. I do not recall having seen them, Mr. Goldsmith.
13 In fact, I do not recall the trip. I am not for a moment
14 implying it did not take place, I just do not recall it at
15 all. I just knew that Mr. Scott died suddenly, I believe of
16 a heart attack. But he had left the Agency at that time, I
17 believe. Is that correct?

18 Mr. Goldsmith. He had retired.

19 Mr. Helms. Retired and living in Mexico City?

20 Mr. Goldsmith. That is also correct.

21 Mr. Helms. Right. I do not know what Mr. Angleton took.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. You never sent Mr. Angleton to Mexico City
23 to remove materials from his safe?

24 Mr. Helms. I may have authorized the trip on the basis of
25 what I was told at the time. In 1978, I do not remember the

1 trip.

2 Let me just say here that this is not solid information
3 I am giving you, but there may have been some concern that
4 maybe Scott had something in his safe that might affect the
5 Agency's work and the Agency just wanted to double check and
6 be sure there was not anything of that kind there. I think
7 that would be a normal practice, particularly if a fellow
8 died so suddenly and there we were.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know Ann Goodpasture?

10 Mr. Helms. Ann Goodpasture, yes.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. In what capacity did you know her?

12 Mr. Helms. She was a staffer of the Agency and I believe
13 she served in Mexico City for a time.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether during her stay in
15 Mexico City she was commonly known as Winn Scott's righthand
16 person?

17 Mr. Helms. I do not recall in that connection, but I
18 believe she was there quite some time.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. After the assassination, Mr. Ambassador,
20 did you review the cable and dispatch traffic that flowed
21 between the Mexico City station and headquarters?

22 Mr. Helms. After the assassination?

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Helms. I certainly saw some of the cables. I am simply
25 incapable of saying today of what I saw, how many of them I saw,

1 because I think, in some circumstances, I would have been
2 briefed, I would have been told here are the circumstances,
3 what should we do?

4 But I do not know whether I reviewed individual cables
5 or whether I did not.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Who was primarily responsible for reviewing
7 the cable traffic and dispatch traffic between the Mexico
8 City station and headquarters, specifically with regard to the
9 assassination?

10 Mr. Helms. I think in regard to the assassination the
11 branch that ran or had the control or support of the Mexico
12 City station, the Chief of the Western Hemisphere division,
13 the staff chiefs who are responsible for various aspects of
14 the operation like positive intelligence and counter-intelli-
15 gence, I undoubtedly read a number of them myself. I just
16 do not know which ones anymore.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Earlier we made reference to Mr. [SCELSO]
18 being responsible for reviewing cable traffic pertaining to
19 the assassination. After the responsibility for the investiga-
20 tion was given to the CI staff, do you know whether anyone
21 on the CI staff was given the responsibility for reviewing
22 the cable traffic that flowed from the Mexico City station and
23 headquarters?

24 Mr. Helms. No, I do not know that this responsibility was
25 given specifically, but I would have thought that if Mr. Rocca,

1 whom you mentioned earlier this morning, were handling Mexico
2 City matters, he would have wanted to review the traffic.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Mexico City station have any
4 surveillance operations in effect in 1963 against the Cuban
5 and Soviet embassy and consulates?

6 Mr. Helms. My recollection was during that period they not
7 only had photographic surveillance of both of the embassies,
8 but they also had telephonic or wiretaps on both of the
9 embassies.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Was information related to Oswald obtained
11 as a result of these operations?

12 Mr. Helms. Yes, it was.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what information was obtained?

14 Mr. Helms. My impression is that when he called one or
15 the other of the embassies that this was picked up and trans-
16 cribed and it was in that way that they found out that there
17 was a fellow named Oswald who had called.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether there was any other
19 information obtained regarding Oswald as a result of these
20 surveillance operations?

21 Mr. Helms. I do not recall anymore. It seems to me that
22 there was a great controversy back at that time over the
23 photograph of an individual.

24 (Pause)

25 Mr. Goldsmith. I will repeat my question.

1 Other than the information that was obtained concerning
2 Oswald as a result of the telephonic surveillance operation,
3 was any other information obtained about him as a result of
4 the surveillance operations that you had in Mexico City?

5 Mr. Helms. I am sorry. I do not remember. I remember,
6 obviously, the telephone thing because that became such a key
7 issue later on. I do not remember whether they had other
8 information on them or not.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission given information
10 on Oswald's contact with the embassies?

11 Mr. Helms. As far as I know, it was.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall at that time whether the
13 Commission was specifically told about the source of the
14 information?

15 Mr. Helms. I believe this is what this must refer to here.
16 When you are asking me to read paragraph E, that I would have
17 assumed that the technical questions involved here was those
18 surveillance devices.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall when the Warren Commission
20 was told about the specific surveillance operations?

21 Mr. Helms. No.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I would ask you to refer
23 to CIA document number 2144 which also appears in Volume 2.

24 Mr. Helms. My volume 2 only goes up to 2071.-

25 Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorry. I stand corrected. It is in

1 Volume 3.

2 Mr. Helms. Fine.

3 2144?

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Helms. Right. I have got it.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Please read the first paragraph.

7 (Pause)

8 For the record, this is a cable dated 20 December 1963 to
9 Mexico City from the Director.

10 Mr. Helms. All right.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Paragraph 1 makes reference to the Agency's
12 intention to eliminate mention of the telephone taps in dealing
13 with the Warren Commission. Do you recall how long the Agency's
14 plan to eliminate mention of these taps in communicating
15 with the Warren Commission remained in effect?

16 Mr. Helms. I have no idea.

17 I am sorry. I have no information whatever.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you certain, however, that the Warren
19 Commission was told specifically about the telephone operations?

20 Mr. Helms. No, I am not. I just assumed that it was at
21 some point.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Again, to what extent, if any, did the
23 Agency's concern for protecting under the law sensitive sources
24 and methods interfere with the information that was being given
25 to the Warren Commission?

1 Mr. Helms. I am sorry. I cannot answer the question.

2 I have been doing the best I can. It was my impression at
3 the time that one way or another staff members of the Commis-
4 sion were informed of the fact of the way the information had
5 been acquired because it was rather central to the investiga-
6 tion.

7 If this is not correct, then I am wrong. It was my
8 impression that at some time or other this was made clear
9 to them, I assume off the record.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I want to clarify, for
11 purposes of this record, that I have shown you just one cable
12 dated December 20th. Subsequently, the Warren Commission was
13 given information.

14 I do not want to suggest to you that the information was
15 not given and the specific sources were not made available
16 to the Warren Commission.

17 The Committee, at this point, is concerned with what
18 appears to be an early plan not to make reference of these
19 sources and methods, but I do not want you to think that you
20 are being shown exhibits out of context.

21 Mr. Helms. I do not know whether it has been made, the
22 Committee has been made aware of the fact that the reason for
23 the sensitivity of these telephone taps and the surveillance
24 was not only because it was sensitive from the Agency's stand-
25 point, but the telephone taps were running in conjunction with

1 the [] and therefore, if this had become
2 public knowledge, it would have caused very bad feelings
3 between Mexico and the United States, and that was the
4 reason.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. At this time, I would ask that you refer
6 to CIA No. 177 which appears in Volume 1. For the record,
7 that is a cable dated October 9, 1963 to the Director from the
8 Mexico City station.

9 Mr. Helms. Do you want me to read the cable?

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Please read it to yourself, sir.

11 (Pause)

12 Mr. Helms. I have read it.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. In the first paragraph of this cable,
14 it refers to LIENVOY. Is that a reference to the telephonic
15 surveillance operation?

16 Mr. Helms. I do not recall anymore anything about these
17 cryptonyms. My assumption in reading this would be that
18 probably it did. I do not know for sure.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. From the context of the second paragraph
20 which makes reference to the source being ^{EMPHY} LIANPY, would you
21 say that that, in all likelihood, refers to the photo operation?

22 Mr. Helms. ^{EMPHY} LIANPY?

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

24 Mr. Helms. I assume so. I do not recall any more.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Does paragraph 2 contain a description of

1 someone that the Mexico City Station thought was Oswald?

2 Mr. Helms. I guess it was. That is the only assumption
3 I can make based on the context of the telegram.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. The description of the individual involved
5 is not an accurate description of Oswald, is it?

6 Mr. Helms. Not based on what I have learned about Oswald
7 since.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know how this individual mistakenly
9 was linked to Oswald?

10 Mr. Helms. No, I do not.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Mexico City Station ever asked
12 to explain why it thought that the individual referred to in
13 paragraph 2 was, in fact, Lee Harvey Oswald?

14 Mr. Helms. I have a general impression that there was a
15 great effort made to clarify who this man was. Is this the
16 fellow they have never identified? This photograph has been
17 kicking around for years.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. Let me show you that photograph now
19 to refresh your memory.

20 For the record, this corresponds with Exhibit No. 1 of
21 the Warren Commission.

22 Mr. Helms. Thank you, Mr. Goldstein. That is the
23 photograph I recollect as being the one that every effort was
24 being made to find out who that man was. Has he ever been
25 identified?

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Helms, that was my next question.
2 Was the Agency ever able to identify this individual?

3 Mr. Helms. Not to the best of my knowledge.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Mexico City Station ever explain
5 to Headquarters how this individual was linked to Oswald?

6 Mr. Helms. If they did, I was never made privy to it. I
7 think it was obviously a mistake of some sort.

8 All I recall is that a valiant effort was made to find
9 out who this fellow was.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Was consideration ever given to the
11 possibility that this person may have been an Oswald imposter?

12 Mr. Helms. I do not know. I do not recall the circum-
13 stances anymore. I am sorry.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, it seems to me that the
15 question of whether this individual was an Oswald imposter
16 presents a significant issue. By virtue of you not being able
17 to recall whether or not this was examined, is it fair to say
18 that it probably was not considered?

19 In other words, I am suggesting that, because the issue
20 is a significant one, had it been considered, you would remember
21 it.

22 Mr. Helms. You see, Mr. Goldsmith, I can see the signi-
23 ficance of the issue, but if we do not know who the man was,
24 we do not know where he was. How were we going to investigate
25 this. If I may submit, in fairness, we did not have access to

1 the Cuban authorities to go to their embassy and say, who is
2 this fellow seen coming out of your embassy. We did not have
3 it with the Russians either. Where were we to go to investi-
4 gate this matter?

5 Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, you do not recall whether
6 this issue was investigated?

7 Mr. Helms. No, I do not, but I do not know how it would
8 have been investigated.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. When was the Warren Commission told about
10 the picture to which reference is made in paragraph 3 of this
11 cable?

12 Mr. Helms. I have no idea.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission ever told about
14 the specific connection between the picture and the cable
15 reporting Oswald's contact with the Embassy?

16 Mr. Helms. I would have imagined that the Agency did
17 everything that it could to work with the Warren Commission
18 staff in trying to find out who this man was, what his signi-
19 ficance might be. I cannot imagine that this was not thoroughly
20 gone into.

21 If there were any evidence not thoroughly gone into, I
22 would not understand it.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Here is an example of a situation where
24 I felt the Warren Commission, by virtue of not having known of
25 this picture or of the cable perhaps did not ask the Agency

1 about it and therefore may not have been apprised of this
2 photograph.

3 Mr. Helms. Is my recollection not accurate that we had
4 the FBI working with us to try to locate this man? It seems
5 to me that everybody we might find who might have conceivably
6 had some means of identifying him was asked about it. I do not
7 think we were making any secret of it, that we could not iden-
8 tify him. We were trying to get some help to do it.

9 I do not think this is one of these closely-guarded
10 secrets, nor did the Agency have any motive for passing that
11 along to anyone who was interested.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. For the purpose of attempting to refresh
13 your memory on this issue, the way that the Warren Commission,
14 at least in the record, was apprised of this photograph was
15 as follows: in February, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified
16 before the Commission and made reference to a photograph that
17 she had seen that purported to show Jack Ruby.

18 The photograph she was referring to was one of the
19 individuals who appears in the picture we just told you, *Odum*
20 Exhibit No. 1. That, at least in the record, is the first
21 time that the Warren Commission was told about this particular
22 photograph.

23 Is that consistent with your recollection?

24 Mr. Helms. How did Marguerite Oswald find out about the
25 photograph? Had she been shown the photograph?

1 Mr. Goldsmith. She was shown the photograph shortly
2 after the assassination.

3 Mr. Helms. By the FBI?

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

5 Mr. Helms. Begging your pardon, what was the question?

6 Mr. Goldsmith. The question is, according to the record,
7 the first time the Warren Commission was told about this photo-
8 graph in mid-February of 1964, at that time, the person who
9 informed the Commission about the photograph was Marguerite
10 Oswald, not the Agency.

11 Mr. Helms. I have no idea why the Agency had not raised
12 the question of the photograph. The only supposition I can
13 make, not knowing who it was, they did not know what to do
14 about it, and they did not know its relevance or its signifi-
15 cance.

16 Mr. Preyer. Excuse me. We have another vote on.

17 The Committee will recess for ten minutes.

18 (A brief recess was taken.)

19 Mr. Preyer. The Committee will resume its sitting.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, do you recall whether the
21 Warren Commission was dissatisfied with the explanation that
22 had been given to it concerning the photograph of the individual
23 in Mexico City that initially was linked to Oswald?

24 Mr. ^{Helms}Preyer. I do not know, Mr. Goldsmith. That would be
25 a very difficult question for me to answer. I do not recall

1 any official criticism. They may have said something to
2 members of the staff, or a member of the staff may have said
3 something to a member of the Agency about it. I do not have
4 any personal recollection of it.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Let me ^{refer to} CIA document No. 2221, which appears
6 in Volume 3.

7 Mr. Helms. Volume 3, 2221?

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, sir.

9 For the record, that is a memorandum prepared by William
10 Coleman on March 26, 1964.

11 Mr. Helms. I am having trouble finding it. I am sorry.
12 I am moving as fast as I can here. 2221?

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

14 Mr. Helms. I have it. Do you want me to read that?

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Please.

16 (Pause)

17 Mr. Helms. All right. I have read it now.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Focusing your attention on the second to
19 last paragraph in CIA 2222, that seems to suggest, does it
20 not, that at least Mr. Coleman, who was ^athe senior staff
21 counsel with the Warren Commission, was not satisfied with the
22 explanation that had been given to him by the Agency concern-
23 ing that photograph?

24 Mr. Helms. That does seem to be what he is implying.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Does that refresh your memory as to whether

1 this photograph created any controversy between the Commission
2 and the Agency?

3 Mr. Helms. I am sorry. It does not.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Is there any reason why the Commission
5 would not have been told about this photograph as early as
6 December when it was initially formed?

7 Mr. Helms. I do not have any idea why. It was later
8 than that. The photograph was brought to the Commission's
9 attention. I have no recollection of this whatsoever. My
10 recollection is confined almost entirely to the efforts made
11 at some point. I do not even know exactly what period this
12 was to try to find out who the man was.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. At this point, would you please refer to
14 CIA 2139.

15 Mr. Craig. Is that also Volume 3?

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

17 Mr. Helms. I am zeroing in on it. I have got it, 2139.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, that is an internal note
19 dated 5 March 1964 from Raymond Rocca to Dick -- I assume that
20 is Richard Helms.

21 Mr. Helms. You assume it is who?

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Richard Helms, yourself. If my assump-
23 tion is incorrect, please clarify the record.

24 (Pause)

25 Mr. Helms. I have read it.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. The reason I assumed the memo was
2 addressed to you was that someone wrote in in parentheses
3 DDP immediately above the name Dick.

4 Mr. Helms. I see that.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall ever receiving this memo?

6 Mr. Helms. No, I do not.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Drawing your attention to the second
8 paragraph of the memo, does it make reference to the famous
9 six photographs that were not of Oswald?

10 Mr. Helms. It does. It says, for example, the famous
11 six photographs that were not of Oswald. I did not realize
12 there were six photographs.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, I should indicate they
14 eventually located as many as twelve photographs of this
15 individual.

16 Drawing your attention to the second paragraph, why
17 was there a preference on the part of at least some of your
18 staff to wait out the Warren Commission with respect to,
19 among other things, these photographs?

20 Mr. Helms. I do not know. I assume it has to do with
21 the way they were taken. Is that not a reasonable inference,
22 that it was a question about wanting to put on the public
23 record the fact that we were photographing people going in and
24 out of these embassies.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. The issue here is not putting anything in

1 the public record. The issue is explaining what happened to
2 the Warren Commission.

3 Mr. Helms. I do not know if it was something else. I do
4 not have any idea what it is any longer, but I assume you have
5 had an opportunity to speak to Mr. Rocca or Mr. Angleton or
6 somebody. Maybe they have a better recollection than I. I
7 do not recall if I got this memorandum what I did about it.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. If this case involving the photograph
9 an example of a situation where the Agency's concern for
10 protecting sources and methods under the law prevented it from
11 giving the Warren Commission all of the information that the
12 Commission was asking for?

13 Mr. Helms. It may be they were not getting it promptly
14 in the form in which they wanted it. It seems to me that the
15 entire thrust of this memorandum was that they were getting
16 the information, in any event, in some form or another, by
17 some means or other.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. The Oswald contact with the Soviet Embassy,
19 turning to another issue not dealing with this document, that
20 contact was reported to Headquarters by cable, I believe the
21 cable recited earlier. Why would a cable be used to report
22 this contact as opposed to some other way of communicating
23 the information?

24 Mr. Helms. I think that since this was an American, since
25 they thought it was an American who had gone to a Soviet

1 Embassy, that they would report it by cable. That was a
2 reasonably routine way of doing it.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Does that suggest that the contact at
4 the time you would consider to be important?

5 Mr. Helms. It does not suggest to me anything like that.
6 The pouch usually took a long time. They would have thought
7 since this was an American they ought to report on it promptly.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. At the time of Oswald's contact with
9 the Soviet Embassy, was any importance attached to that
10 contact?

11 Mr. Helms. Not that I am aware of. I would have thought
12 that the evidence would have indicated to the contrary.
13 The FBI apparently paid no attention to the report.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. At this time, I would ask you to refer
15 to CIA No. 179 that appears in Volume 1; for the record, that
16 is a cable dated 10-10-63 consisting of Headquarters' response
17 to the earlier Mexico City station cable.

18 I would ask you to read through CIA 179 to 181.

19 (Pause)

20 Mr. Helms. I have read it.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. This cable contains information reporting
22 that Oswald had defected to the Soviet Union. Once this fact
23 had been realized did this in any way escalate the significance
24 of his contact with the Soviet Embassy?

25 Mr. Helms. This information? Yes. I would have thought

1 it would have escalated it quite considerably.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Would some sort of response have been
3 expected on the part of the Mexico City station, had they
4 additional information on Oswald?

5 Mr. Helms. Yes. I would have thought that the Chief
6 of the Mexico City Station, having received this telegram,
7 if he did get additional information on Oswald he would desire
8 to pass it very quickly back to Headquarters.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. For example, if the Mexico City Station
10 had information in its possession and that information had
11 already been processed to the effect that Oswald had also
12 contacted the Cuban Embassy, should that have been communicated
13 to Headquarters?

14 Mr. Helms. I would have thought so. I do not know
15 whether it was or not, but I would have thought it should have
16 been.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. The first paragraph of this cable contains
18 a correct description of Oswald, at least a description that
19 is more accurate than the one that is contained in the Mexico
20 City Station cable.

21 Upon receiving this description, did the Mexico City
22 station ever respond with respect to the discrepancy in the
23 two descriptions?

24 Mr. Helms. I do not know.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. This cable also refers to Oswald as Lee

1 Henry Oswald. I believe earlier you made reference to the
2 fact that there had been some confusion over the middle name.

3 Do you know how the name Lee Henry Oswald got into the
4 Agency's records instead of Lee Harvey Oswald?

5 Mr. Helms. I do not know.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Was that ever a source of concern to you?

7 Mr. Helms. I believe there was an effort to ascertain
8 what had caused the mistake, but I do not know whether any
9 satisfactory explanation was ever found.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether any report was
11 written reflecting that effort?

12 Mr. Helms. I would have assumed that someone would have
13 written up the work they had done in an effort to clear up
14 the discrepancy, but I do not recall the report, and I cannot
15 say from firsthand knowledge that one existed.

16 I would have assumed that a form would have required the
17 writing of such a report.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Referring to CIA No. 181, the lower left-
19 hand corner of the page, it indicates that Thomas Karamessinas
20 was the releasing officer of this cable.

21 Mr. Helms. Yes.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Why would someone as high up in the
23 Agency as Mr. Karamessinas have been the releasing officer for
24 a cable like this?

25 Mr. Helms. I do not think -- if I may suggest it, with

1 due deference, that is not really the way I would have
2 described what was happening here.

3 You see, this cable originates in the Western Hemisphere
4 Division because, not only through the Western Hemisphere
5 Division, but it also goes to various elements of the CI staff.
6 Frequently in the procedures that we used in the Agency when
7 you had both staff and various parts of the staff and the
8 division and so forth, these frequently went to the so-called
9 front office for relief, either to Karamessinas or myself.

10 Since I notice in the cable here questions of policy as
11 to where this information was going to be disseminated and
12 things of that kind, I would have found this quite a normal
13 procedure.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you, at this time, refer to CIA
15 No. 2140, Volume No. 3.

16 Mr. Preyer. We have another vote on. It is final
17 passage on the defense bill. We will recess for ten minutes.

18 (A brief recess was taken.)

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, would you refer to 2140?

20 Mr. Helms. Yes. Do you want me to read it?

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, please.

22 (Pause)

23 Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, that is a 10-10-63
24 dissemination cable sent by Headquarters to various Federal
25 agencies.

TOP SECRET

1 Mr. Helms. Yes, I have read it.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, this cable in particular
3 has sparked some controversy because it also contains an
4 indirect description of Oswald. The question I have for you
5 is why, especially in light of the earlier cable which you
6 just examined which contained a correct description, this
7 incorrect description went out in this particular cable.

8 Mr. Helms. I do not have a clue, Mr. Gold^{with}stein.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Was that issue ever raised by the Warren
10 Commission?

11 Mr. Helms. I have no recollection any longer. I assume
12 it must have been raised. I would assume this would have been
13 gone over and picked at and repicked at and every effort made
14 to find out what had happened and what had gone wrong. But
15 that is 15 years ago and I do not have any recollection of the
16 chain of events.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission ever shown these
18 specific cables?

19 Mr. Helms. I do not know. I would have thought they
20 might have been shown this dissemination. I do not think
21 there would have been any reluctance to show them that.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the CIA's Mexico City Station ever
23 obtain a tape-recording of Oswald's voice?

24 Mr. Helms. I would have assumed when this telephone
25 call -- is that what you are referring to by tape recording?

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

2 Mr. Helms. Those telephone calls were taped.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know how many tape recordings of
4 Oswald's voice the station managed to obtain?

5 Mr. Helms. No.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Were these tape recordings in existence at
7 the time of the assassination?

8 Mr. Helms. I can only assume that they were. How
9 frequently they were cleaned up after they were transcribed, I
10 do not know. I do not know anything about those procedures
11 anymore, if I ever did.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the tapes were made
13 available to the Warren Commission?

14 Mr. Helms. Whether they were made available?

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

16 Mr. Helms. I do not.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know how many tape recordings there
18 were?

19 Mr. Helms. Of Oswald's voice?

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

21 Mr. Helms. No, I do not.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Would it have been unusual for the
23 Agency not to have had tape recordings in existence in November
24 of '63, at the President's assassination?

25 Mr. Helms. I do not know how long they kept those tapes,

1 whether they simply transcribed what was on them and cleaned
2 them up and used them again, or whether they held them. I do
3 not know what they did with them.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. At this time, I would ask that the
5 Ambassador be given JFK Exhibit 128, and I would like to have
6 Exhibit 128 introduced in the record. It is a letter from
7 Mr. Hoover to Mr. Reilly of the Secret Service dated November
8 23, 1963.

9 Mr. Chairman, I request that this item be admitted as
10 an Exhibit.

11 Mrs. Burke. So ordered, without objection.

12 (The document referred to was
13 marked JFK Exhibit No. 128 for
14 identification.)

15 Mr. Goldsmith. I would ask you to read starting on page
16 4 of the last paragraph on the page.

17 Mr. Helms. Yes, I have read that document or that
18 paragraph of the document.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Hoover is referring to a tape record-
20 ing that his agent listened to. Do you know which tape
21 recording he is referring to?

22 Mr. Helms. I have no idea. I am sorry.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Was any issue ever raised in 1963 concern-
24 ing a tape recording that had been made available which purport-
25 ed to contain Oswald's voice, which in the end did not?

1 Mr. Helms. I am sorry, I cannot help you.

2 May I ask, not out of curiosity, but simply by way of
3 attempting to be helpful, is it possible that what Mr. Hoover
4 is referring to, that some FBI agent assigned to the Embassy,
5 the American Embassy in Mexico City, might have been who
6 listened to this tape recording?

7 The FBI had a large station in Mexico City. I just
8 thought that might be what he is referring to.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether the question of the
10 existence of Oswald's tapes was important in 1963?

11 For example, I raised this with you because the question
12 has arisen as to whether the person who showed up at the
13 Embassies in Mexico City was not Oswald. If you had a tape
14 recording of his voice, that could obviously be tested to
15 corroborate whether that was Oswald.

16 Do you recall whether this was an issue in 1963?

17 Mr. Helms. If it was, I do not know how it was handled.
18 I do not recall it as an issue.

19 As I say here today, I do not ever recall anybody ever
20 having said to me that it was not Lee Harvey Oswald who called
21 the Embassy.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the CIA's Mexico City Station ever
23 obtain a photograph of Oswald as a result of its photo surveil-
24 lance operation against the Soviet and Cuban Embassies and
25 consulates?

1 Mr. Helms. I do not know. My impression is that they
2 did not, but I am not sure.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. I would ask you at this time to refer to
4 CIA No. 248, which would appear in Volume No. 1.

5 Mr. Helms. All right.

6 Would you give me the number again?

7 Mr. Goldsmith. 248.

8 Mr. Helms. I have 248.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Please read that document.

10 (Pause)

11 For the record, this is a memo from Mr. Papich of the FBI
12 concerning the photo-coverage of the embassies dated 27
13 November 1963.

14 Mr. Helms. Who is this memorandum signed by, or who did
15 it originally come from? Where did it originate, so I can tell
16 what I am reading?

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I would like to answer
18 your inquiry. However, the Agency has made available to us at
19 this time just the first page of this memo so that the author
20 cannot be identified at this time.

21 Mr. Helms. Thank you.

22 I have read the page.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Is it correct to say that according to this
24 memo the CIA and the Mexico City Station at least attempted to
25 keep the Cuban and Soviet embassies and consulates under constant

1 surveillance, photographically?

2 Mr. Helms. That was certainly the object of the exercise.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. If the record -- by the record, I refer
4 to the Agency's record of Oswald's contacts with the embassies,
5 and also the Warren Commission's contacts with the embassies,
6 established that Oswald visited the Cuban and Russian embassies
7 and consulates at least five times, possibly more than six.

8 Would you regard it as unusual for the surveillance sta-
9 tion not to obtain a photograph of Oswald?

10 Mr. Helms. Yes, I thought it was unusual if he has
11 been there five or six times.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. In fact, there were, in the record, no
13 photographs of Oswald that ^{were} ~~was~~ obtained.

14 Was the Mexico City Station ever questioned as to why
15 no photograph of Oswald had been obtained?

16 Mr. Helms. I do not know firsthand if they were questioned,
17 but I would assume they were questioned in spades. I would
18 assume everyone would want to know why.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Were you specifically involved?

20 Mr. Helms. I do not remember any more.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you familiar with the cryptonym
22 AMMUG?

23 Mr. Helms. No.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether in 1963 or '64 the
25 Agency obtained information concerning Oswald from a Cuban

1 defector who defected from the DGI?

2 Mr. Helms. I do not remember.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. For purposes of refreshing your recollec-
4 tion, please refer to CIA 1879 that appears in Volume 2.

5 Mr. Helms. 1879?

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, sir.

7 Incidentally, I have been informed that the memo you were
8 just referring to, CIA 248, appears to be a blind memo, just
9 one page in length.

10 Mr. Helms. I see. Thank you.

11 (Pause)

12 All right. I have read it.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Before going into this memo in further
14 detail, I would like to know whether you think it should be a
15 source of concern for this Committee specifically, the fact
16 that, according to the Agency's record, no photograph of
17 Oswald during his visit to Mexico City was ever taken or
18 obtained.

19 Mr. Helms. I think it would be useful if I were to say
20 that using photographic surveillance of those embassies in a
21 foreign country was a very tricky matter, not only as to rela-
22 tions between the countries, but tricky as far as the public
23 is concerned, and that expecting clandestine technical devices
24 of that kind to work perfectly is quite beyond the state of the
25 art, or was in the year 1963, and there is nothing the Congress

1 can do to improve that kind of thing. Either the thing works
2 or it does not work. But there is very little point in trying
3 to follow a line of inquiry that is critical of the way the
4 Agency conducted those operations, because they were done under
5 the most difficult circumstances, not under laboratory
6 circumstances. Therefore, if they worked or did not work, it
7 was a great deal of matter of luck, often, than good technical
8 work or good judgment.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. That line of inquiry is not directed
10 specifically at any criticism of the Agency. The mode of
11 analysis goes to style.

12 Oswald makes five or six visits to the Embassy. We have
13 a situation where the record suggests that there was an attempt
14 to have continuous photographic coverage. Even if the photo-
15 graphic coverage was not 100 percent effective, one would think
16 if he visited five or six times he would be picked up at
17 least once.

18 From that, the next step would be, if there was a picture,
19 why was it not made available? And that is specifically the
20 issue with which the Committee is concerned.

21 Mr. Helms. I can understand the Committee's concern, and
22 I wish it luck solving the problem.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to this particular document, 1879,
24 is your memory now refreshed about a Cuban defector offering
25 information to the Agency concerning Oswald, concerning the

1 assassination in general?

2 Mr. Helms. My xerox is so poor here. Is this the one
3 you are referring to as AMMUD?

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

5 Mr. Helms. I had forgotten about this defector report
6 or, if I knew about it, I imagine it was brought to my atten-
7 tion at the time, certainly, I do not recall anymore.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to the middle of the page, the
9 part of the paragraph labelled as "Comment," would you tell the
10 Committee what the term WH/SA/CI?

11 Mr. Helms. SA, I am not sure anymore what that would have
12 been. I do not know if that was Special Activities or just
13 what. I am sorry. Wait a minute.

14 No, I cannot help you.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether SA referred to the
16 Cuban Task Force?

17 Mr. Helms. If it referred to the Cuban Task Force, I
18 would have thought it would have been SAS. I thought that
19 what was normally referred to, the Special Activities Staff,
20 and it was therefore referred to, or would have been referred
21 to, as WH/SAS/CI, if that is what it was.

22 Maybe this is correct. I do not want to say you are not
23 correct. Obviously, you know a great deal more about this these
24 days than I do.

25 I can only say I thought it was usually referred to as

1 SAS.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what information concerning
3 the assassination AMMUD⁶ provided?

4 Mr. Helms. No.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what information he provided
6 concerning Oswald's contacts with DGI?

7 Mr. Helms. I do not. I just know what I have read on
8 the sheet.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. The first paragraph of the sheet indicates
10 that Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy on two or three occa-
11 sions. Then it says, before, during and after these visits,
12 Oswald was in contact with DGI, Cuban intelligence.

13 What follow-up, if any, do you recall being done with
14 this particular issue?

15 Mr. Helms. I am sorry. I do not understand.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Having received this information, what
17 was done with it?

18 Mr. Helms. I do not know. I do not know what could have
19 been done with it. So he was in touch with Cuban Intelligence.
20 What would we do about that.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission told about it?

22 Mr. Helms. I do not know. I would have thought they
23 would have been.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. Here is an example of a situation where
25 the Warren Commission maybe did not have knowledge of this

1 incident, would not have specifically asked you about it.

2 So this would be an example of the CIA's initiating information
3 to the Warren Commission.

4 Mr. Helms. It seems to me, having interrogated a defec-
5 tor and developed information on Lee Harvey Oswald and his
6 contacts with the Cubans, that the Agency would have volun-
7 teered this information to the Warren Commission if, indeed,
8 the Warren Commission was still sitting on 5 May 1964, which
9 I assume that it was.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. At this time, would you please read CIA
11 No. 1906, which is a memo dated 12 May 1964, directed to Mr.
12 Rocca from Mr. Angleton.

13 Mr. Helms. This is from Angleton to Rocca, right.

14 (Pause)

15 I have read it.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. It says, "I raised with Mr. Helms the
17 nature of the recent information you are processing that
18 originated with the sensitive Western Hemisphere source" That
19 would be AMMUD.

20 "I informed him that this would raise a number of new
21 factors with the Commission," et cetera.

22 What new factors, if any, would the AMMUD case have
23 raised with the Warren Commission?

24 Mr. Helms. I am sorry. In 1978, I haven't the foggiest
25 idea.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Was there any reluctance on the part of
2 the Agency to disclose this information to the Warren Commis-
3 sion because of the sensitivity of the source?

4 Mr. Helms. Did you not just tell me he was a defector?

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, he was a defector.

6 Mr. Helms. And was a defector at this time?

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

8 Mr. Helms. I am not entirely sure why this great question
9 of sensitivity, unless he was a secret defector and the
10 Cubans did not know he had defected. That might make it
11 sensitive.

12 I cannot figure out what else would have been sensitive
13 about it. I simply take the word of Angleton who wrote the
14 memorandum that there was something sensitive about it.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Mexico City station ever tasked
16 to pursue the leads generated by the source?

17 Mr. Helms. I do not know.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, are you familiar with the
19 case of the Soviet defector Nosenko?

20 Mr. Helms. Yes, I am.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. What role, if any, did you play with
22 regard to the handling of this case?

23 Mr. Helms. I assume -- and I have to use the word
24 assume, because my memory does not carry me this far. I assume
25 that I was, in one way or another, involved with the Nosenko

1 case from the time that contact was made with him in Geneva
2 through his defection and then through the period after he
3 defected and was held by the Agency and I was probably in and
4 out of the case -- and by in and out, I simply mean that at
5 periodic intervals I would hear some aspects of the case, or
6 about the case -- until the time that he was eventually
7 resettled.

8 In other words, by "resettled," I simply mean he was led
9 out of the Agency's custody, found a place to live. I thought
10 he was given a new identity and assumed a life in American
11 society in the public domain. But I was in and out of it all
12 the time. How many decisions I was involved in during this
13 period I do not recall anymore.

14 I do not want to duck any of them. It was an ongoing
15 case of great sensitivity, great legal complications, and that
16 is the best way I can answer your question.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. I take it that, as DDP and then DCI, you
18 were involved in the decision-making process concerning Nosenko?

19 Mr. Helms. That is right.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Have you read the three major agency
21 reports that were written in regard to the Nosenko case?
22 Specifically, there was a report in 1968 issued by the Soviet
23 Russia Division; another report later in '68 called the ^{S.I.C.} Soley
24 Report; another, a third report, in 1976 referred to as the
25 Hart Report.

1 Have you had occasion to read any of those reports?

2 Mr. Helms. It is a cinch I have not read the Hart Report
3 because I had left the Agency long before 1976. As to the
4 other two reports, I do not recall anymore whether I read them.
5 I cannot imagine that I would not have been told what was in
6 them.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. During his defection in 1964 and at his
8 arrival in the United States, was he in the custody of the CIA?

9 Mr. Helms. Yes.

10 The procedure was that Soviet defectors, or defectors
11 who were accepted by act of the Inter-Agency Defector Committee,
12 were handled by the Agency and the United States, and Nosenko
13 was no exception.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. By what legal authority do you recall was
15 Nosenko in CIA custody? You made reference to normal procedure.

16 Mr. Helms. I do not know whether the NSC directive have
17 the power of law or not. I am not a lawyer.

18 I simply know that it was an agreed-upon device in the
19 United States government for handling defectors.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. How long did Mr. Nosenko remain in CIA
21 custody?

22 Mr. Helms. Two or three years, I imagine.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. If the record would indicate that he was
24 in custody until October '69, at which point he was admitted
25 as a resident alien to the United States, would you dispute

1 that in any way?

2 Mr. Helms. I would have thought -- I see what you mean.
3 Excuse me. I do not think I understood your question properly.
4 Let me go back.

5 I have no reason to question the fact that he was in CIA
6 custody until 1969. I was referring to the fact that he was
7 under interrogation for, I think, two or three years and then
8 he was in the Agency's custody under different surroundings
9 and under different circumstances I believe.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. We understand each other.

11 What unit within the CIA had the primary responsibility
12 for handling Nosenko in 1964?

13 Mr. Helms. My recollection was that he was turned over
14 to the Director of Security as far as his handling and housing
15 and so forth was concerned; that his interrogation was handled
16 by people provided by the Soviet Russian Division, or whatever
17 the division was known as at that time.

18 The title of that division, Mr. Chairman, changed through
19 the years, and I am not sure what it was called in 1964.
20 Anyway, it was the division that was attempting to run opera-
21 tions against the Soviet Union.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you saying initially the responsibil-
23 ity for questioning Mr. Nosenko was given to personnel from
24 the Soviet Russia Division?

25 Mr. Helms. The interrogating responsibility, yes.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Did they continue to have responsibility
2 for him until he was released from CIA custody in 1969?
3 Custody in the sense that you referred to earlier?

4 Mr. Helms. We switched terminology here. The Soviet
5 Russian fellow were the interrogators. The housekeepers,
6 administrators and handlers I believe, if I am not mistaken,
7 came from the Director of Security. I believe that they con-
8 tinued this on through during the time that he was in Agency
9 custody.

10 Am I wrong about that?

11 Mr. Goldsmith. I am afraid I cannot respond to you at this
12 time concerning that. You are certainly correct in terms of
13 personnel who handled him with regard to interrogation.

14 Mr. Helms. All right. Let me just rest on what I have
15 said.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. So initially, the personnel that handled
17 the interrogations came from the S&R Branch or Division. Did
18 they continue to have this responsibility until Mr. Nosenko
19 was released from custody in 1969?

20 Mr. Helms. I thought the interrogation period was sort
21 of over when he was turned over to Bruce ^{Soley} Soley and ^{Soley} Soley
22 was the fellow who was supposed to take care of him and talk
23 to him and so forth.

24 My recollection may be wrong. It may be fuzzy. I thought
25 that there was a change there.

1 At the time that he was released from the active or hostile
2 interrogation, an effort was being made to get him adjusted so
3 he could assume some kind of life in American society.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Why was responsibility for handling
5 Nosenko in terms of questioning him transferred from the SR
6 people to Bruce ^{Soley} Soley?

7 Mr. Helms. My recollection of the circumstances was
8 I had a problem as Director and it was a serious problem --
9 that was what to do with Mr. Nosenko. After all, we held him
10 against the laws of the United States for a period of two or
11 three years. Even though we had consulted with the Deputy
12 Attorney General as to what to do about the case we got no
13 particular help from him because there was no legal precedent
14 for these things.

15 In fact, as far as I know today, there has been no effort
16 made to set up a legal context in which a case like this could
17 be held.

18 I was not interested in continuing this any longer than
19 it was felt necessary to get as best we could to the bottom of
20 the Nosenko case.

21 So after considering all the factors, the decision was
22 made to get him out of what I can only refer to as Durance
23 file and get him into different circumstances and make an
24 effort not only to resettle him, but find out whether pleasant
25 and cordial treatment he had any different things to say than

1 he had under hostile interrogation.

2 I want to emphasize the point. I am not trying to anti-
3 cipate your questions, Mr. Goldsmith; it just seems to run
4 right along here -- that my motivation as Director of the
5 Agency was to get that man into a status where he could handle
6 it in some way that was proper and legal and all of the rest
7 of it and get him out of a status where we were obviously in
8 violation of the law in holding him.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall how long a period Mr. Nosenko
10 was held in custody or confinement under violation of the law?

11 Mr. Helms. I think it was two or three years anyway.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall which individual specifically
13 had primary responsibility for interrogating him in '64? To
14 refresh your memory in part, would David Murphy have been one
15 of those individuals?

16 Mr. Helms. That sounds good.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Can you recall anyone else besides Mr.
18 Murphy?

19 Mr. Helms. I do not recall whether I recall this name
20 from my recollections as to 1964. It seems to me that Bagley
21 was another fellow involved in the interrogation of Nosenko.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorry, Mr. Helms. I do not compre-
23 hend fully your response. Another individual may have been
24 involved in the interrogation?

25 Mr. Helms. An individual knowned as Tennant Bagley.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. I understood that. The record is clear
2 on that.

3 My question now is was another individual who interroga-
4 ted Mr. Nosenko known as []?

5 Mr. Helms. That name, I am sorry, does not ring any
6 bells with me.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. What position did Mr. Bagley hold with
8 the Agency?

9 Mr. Helms. I think at that time he was in the SR Division
10 somewhere.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. How were these individuals selected for
12 handling, Mr. Nosenko? Why, in particular, were these
13 individuals chosen?

14 Mr. Helms. I do not know. I would have thought that
15 the Chief of the SR Division would pick individuals who knew
16 the most about Soviet intelligence, Soviet intelligence
17 methodology, how things were done in the Soviet Union. In
18 other words, would have provided the most expert interrogators
19 we could have.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. How much expertise, if any, did the
21 individuals have to the Oswald case?

22 Mr. Helms. I do not know.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. When Nosenko was questioned about Oswald,
24 was any effort made to have the interrogator have sufficient
25 expertise concerning Oswald and the JFK assassination?

1 Mr. Helms. I do not know. I cannot imagine he would
2 not have briefed himself on these things. In other words,
3 what would be the purpose on the part of the interrogation?
4 What we were trying to do was find out whether Nosenko was
5 telling the truth or not. This would have been an important
6 part of finding that out.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you also think that the individuals
8 involved with the questioning of Nosenko were, in fact,
9 experienced interrogators?

10 Mr. Helms. Well, I do not know what experienced interro-
11 gators are, really. In the American vernacular, a man who
12 has been doing anything for two weeks has become experienced,
13 so I do not know how you evaluate that term.

14 But people like Murphy and Bagley and so forth were
15 certainly experienced in Soviet Russian matters. Whether they
16 were experienced interrogators or not, I do not remember. The
17 word interrogator is something from World War II. If you were
18 an interrogator in a prisoner of war camp, you kind of got that
19 rubric hung around your neck and that gave you a certain status.
20 I have never quite understood why, but nevertheless it did.

21 Whether these fellows ever had that kind of interrogation
22 instruction or experience, I do not remember.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. The Nosenko case was an important one,
24 was it not?

25 Mr. Helms. Very important.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. In light of that, would it be expected
2 that the people questioning him would have had a lot of
3 experience?

4 Mr. Helms. I would have thought the agency would have
5 put the best people in it that they could find. Certainly that
6 was my intention.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Who made decisions concerning which areas
8 of inquiry were going to be addressed to Nosenko?

9 Mr. Helms. I think there was a great deal of cooperation
10 done within the DDP trying to work out the interrogation of
11 Nosenko. It was so important to us and we had him for so long
12 I am certain there there was a lot of consultation and effort
13 made to figure out ways to arrive at the truth here.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Other than the SR branch, which units would
15 have been involved?

16 Mr. Helms. I do not know who was involved. That is all
17 on the record. I think it is fine to ask me these things, but
18 fifteen years later I do not remember a whole list of names.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Part of the Committee's problem is that
20 the record is not all that clear and does contain errors.

21 Mr. Helms. The record contains errors? How does the record
22 contain errors? I am not clear.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. I am talking in a general sense. Part of
24 the problem that the Committee faces is ^(+ld) the record, in fact,
25 does not speak for itself and that records do contain errors.

1 Mr. Helms. I see.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. I make no comment one way or the other
3 whether the record contains errors in this particular case.

4 How frequently were you briefed concerning the results
5 of Nosenko's interrogation sessions?

6 Mr. Helms. I do not have any recollection whatever.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you ever recall being briefed?

8 Mr. Helms. Yes. I am sure I was asking from time to
9 time as to how we were finding out. After all, I felt I had
10 to go see Chief Justice Warren and tell him that we were not
11 able to establish Nosenko's bona fides. I obviously satisfied
12 myself before I went that we were not able to.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Did questions concerning Oswald constitute
14 a major facet of the overall inquiry that was being made of
15 Nosenko?

16 Mr. Helms. Yes. No question about it.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. In January, 1968 when the SR Division
18 Report concerning Nosenko was issued, what was the Agency's
19 position concerning Nosenko's bona fides?

20 Mr. Helms. I do not think the Agency has ever had a
21 position. The only position I know of that could be called an
22 Agency position was we did not know whether he is bona fide
23 or not. I never made a determination as to whether he was
24 bona fide or not. But I believe unless something has happened
25 that I never heard of, that it still must be an open question.

1 Or, let us put it this way, a matter of opinion.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Is it not so that the SR Report of 1968
3 indicated that in fact Mr. Nosenko was not a bona fide defector?

4 Mr. Helms. I do not remember firsthand what the thrust
5 of the report was, but obviously this is a very difficult line
6 of inquiry for me because I read the magazines and newspapers
7 and books and so forth which have appeared since, and I do not
8 know what I have read there and what I knew from that time.

9 I just judge from reading the New York magazine, for
10 example, that this is still an open question. If the New
11 York magazine is a bad source, I have nothing to add.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. In January, '68, when the --

13 Mr. Sawyer. If counsel would yield for just a moment,
14 may I ask the Ambassador, this is kind of intriguing to me,
15 we having had a rather long session with Mr. Nosenko. Do you
16 have an opinion yourself on that question?

17 Mr. Helms. No, sir, I do not, because a lot of time has
18 passed since I have been out of the Agency and a lot of the
19 factors that went into this argument and debate, I have now
20 forgotten about.

21 I have been under constant appearances in Grand Juries,
22 Congressional Committees and various investigations on all
23 kinds of subjects, so my memory is even more wonky than it
24 would be under normal conditions.

25 I do not know about Mr. Nosenko. I do know that there

1 are differing opinions, however, about him, but I do not have
2 any personal feeling myself about him.

3 I am sorry, I cannot help you. I do not know.

4 Mrs. Burke. Since Mr. Sawyer has interjected a question
5 at this time, I have a couple of questions I would like to raise
6 at this point.

7 There were many defectors from the Soviet Union and Cuba
8 during that period of time. What was the usual procedure for
9 the housing of those defectors and what was the procedure in
10 terms of their places of detention?

11 Mr. Helms. Usually, Mrs. Burke, when these men were
12 brought to the United States they are put in what is called a
13 safe house which was usually a relatively isolated residence
14 where we could control the environment around it, and they
15 were lodged there -- normally very comfortably and well-fed and
16 well-taken care of and interrogated. And the normal procedures
17 did not take terribly long, maybe a month or two or something
18 of this kind, and then they would be resettled, a new identity
19 would be given to them, or something would occur.

20 But the Nosenko case was so central to the whole problem
21 of trying to establish this relationship of the Soviet Union
22 to the assassination of President Kennedy, and since we were
23 unable to resolve the case satisfactorily to ourselves, this
24 went on far longer than any other case I have ever remembered.

25 And I must say also, because I do not want to mislead you

1 in any way, that whether or not the handling of defectors, the
2 way it was done in those days, was in compliance with all the
3 laws of the United States, I do not know. All I know was
4 inside the Executive Branch there was an Inter-Agency Committee
5 on which the FBI and the Army, Navy and State Department and
6 all these agencies sat, and they were the ones who decided what
7 was going to happen to these defectors.

8 I believe -- I am no lawyer, as I said, but I believe
9 that there is kind of a grey area in our laws as to exactly
10 what their rights are when they defect because they do sign
11 papers saying that they want asylum and all the rest of it, so
12 they do, in a sense, give up certain rights by making this
13 request.

14 Mrs. Burke. Were not some of the defectors tried in the
15 civilian courts?

16 Mr. Helms. I do not know any case of that.

17 Mrs. Burke. Not Soviet defectors? It has to be in time
18 of war?

19 Mr. Helms. I think that is right.

20 Mrs. Burke. May I inquire about how much longer does
21 counsel intend to go?

22 Mr. Goldsmith. This might be an appropriate time for the
23 luncheon break.

24 Mrs. Burke. All right.

25 Mr. Preyer had to leave. If there is no objection, his

1 suggestion was that we recess until 1:30.

2 Mr. Helms. I am at the Committee's disposal. I will be
3 back anytime you tell me.

4 Mrs. Burke. Is that convenient for everybody else?
5 Is there any particular reason why 1:30 would be inconvenient
6 for you?

7 Mr. Helms. Not for me.

8 Mrs. Burke. If there is no objection, then the Committee
9 will stand in recess until 1:30.

10 (Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the Subcommittee recessed, to
11 reconvene at 1:30 p.m. this same day.)
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AFTERNOON SESSION

(1:30 p.m.)

Mr. Preyer. The Committee will resume its session.

Mr. Goldsmith is recognized.

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TESTIMONY OF RICHARD MC GARRAH HELMS -- Resumed

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, the Committee will proceed at this point and I take it, based upon our discussion a few moments ago, you are willing to proceed this afternoon without a quorum?

Mr. Helms. Certainly.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

When we broke for lunch, you were into the area of Nosenko and specifically I want to ask you whether or not in January of '68 when the SR Division Report concerning Nosenko was issued, I asked you what the Agency's position regarding Nosenko's bona fides was.

I believe that your answer was that the Agency, in fact, had no position. Is that correct?

Mr. Helms. That is correct, Mr. Goldsmith. I do not recall there having been any necessity at that time for having to establish an agency position.

As the Director, my pre-occupation, as I mentioned earlier, was to attempt to regularize Nosenko in such a fashion that he could assume some kind of a life on the American scene. And I was most anxious, particularly, to change his method of living which, for a protracted period, as I said this morning, he was being held without the blessing of a court and I was entrusted to get him regularized in such a fashion that we could, in effect, over time, get rid of our responsibility for

1 housing him, feeding him and handling him.

2 In other words, what was known in the intelligence
3 community as getting him ready to be resettled.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. The SR Division Report, which initially
5 was issued, was approximately 900 pages in length. That report
6 did make a statement regarding Nosenko's bona fides, did it
7 not?

8 Mr. Helms. I do not know if that were the 900 page
9 report. I do recall that I did not read all of that. I was
10 just told what the general thrust of it was.

11 I believe that there was a disagreement between the SR
12 Division and the CI Staff over Nosenko's bona fides. It did
13 not seem to me at the time that it was essential that that
14 had to be 100 percent composed.

15 My problem was, as I say, was to get him resettled.

16 I believe there was a disagreement. I would not be
17 surprised -- I do not know for a fact, but I would not be
18 surprised -- if that disagreement exists to this day.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. At that time, the CI staff had not issued
20 any type of a formal report?

21 Mr. Helms. No, but they had mouths, and they could tell
22 the Director what they thought about the case.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. In January of '68 --

24 Mr. Helms. I am not even sure -- excuse me for just a
25 second -- as to exactly at that time, in 1968, because I do not

1 want to mislead the Committee or you, I do not know whether
2 SR and CI saw this eye to eye and the Security Division felt
3 differently, or just who took exactly what position. I am
4 not that clear in my mind anymore.

5 I just know that there were disagreements inside the
6 Agency itself.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. What was the Agency's position in January
8 1968 with regard to the veracity of the information Nosenko had
9 provided concerning Oswald?

10 Mr. Helms. I believe that really this was a matter that
11 was at fundamental issue because if the information that
12 Nosenko had provided about Oswald was true, then it led to a
13 certain conclusion about Oswald and his relationship to the
14 Soviet authorities.

15 If it was incorrect, if he was feeding this to the United
16 States government under instructions from the Soviet service,
17 then it would have led one to an entirely different conclusion
18 about Oswald's role and the Soviet identification with it.

19 It rather strikes me that, as far as I know, to this day
20 it has never been satisfactorily resolved. What did Lee Harvey
21 Oswald represent as far as the Russians were concerned? I
22 promise you that I do not know.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. In your view of the analysis, then, is
24 the veracity of what Nosenko told the Agency about Oswald a
25 critical factor in evaluating his overall credibility, his

1 overall bona fides?

2 Mr. Helms. It is not only that, Mr. Goldsmith, but the
3 fact remains that the issue of why Oswald assassinated
4 President Kennedy has not been resolved for the satisfaction
5 of a lot of citizens of this country. I assume that that is
6 one of the reasons that you are having these hearings.

7 If one could accept at face value what exactly Nosenko has
8 said, it would lead you to one interpretation. If you cannot
9 accept it, it may lead you to another interpretation. I do
10 not know how you are going to compose the difference.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that. My question, though,
12 is, from the Agency's perspective, was the information that
13 Nosenko provided concerning Oswald a major factor in determining
14 the larger issue ~~in determining the larger issue~~ of whether
15 Nosenko was a bona fide defector?

16 Mr. Helms. It obviously played a role in it.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. A major role?

18 Mr. Helms. I do not know whether you could say it was a
19 major role or not, but it was certainly an important role, let's
20 put it that way.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. I might state at this point in the
22 record earlier you had asked me whether I knew how Nosenko was
23 handled in terms of the distribution between the Office of
24 Security and the SR Division. I wanted to clarify that.

25 In fact, according to the Committee's sources, Mr. Nosenko

1 was handled by the SR Division at the time they had the
2 responsibility of questioning him and dealing with him on an
3 everyday level. The Security Office personnel were in charge
4 of overseeing him essentially watching for Security and making
5 sure he did not go where he was supposed to go.

6 Congressman Sawyer asked you this morning about whether
7 you have any opinion about the bona fides of Nosenko. Are
8 you able to give any more specific response to the Committee
9 at this time concerning that issue?

10 Mr. Helms. No, I am sorry, Mr. Goldsmith, I am not.
11 I realize that this is a terribly important question and,
12 recognizing its importance, I am not attempting to duck or to
13 show a lack of forthrightness. I just do not know the answer
14 to the question.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. You have no opinion on it?

16 Mr. Helms. No, I do not have an opinion.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. After the SR Division issued its report
18 in 1968, was the Nosenko case reinvestigated by Bruce ^{Soley} Soley?

19 Mr. Helms. My recollection was that Bruce ^{Soley} Soley, whether
20 he did an investigation or whether he engaged in long dialogues
21 with Nosenko or just what, but I believe, at some point, ^{Soley} Soley
22 came up with his opinions about Nosenko.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Is it not also true that late in 1967
24 ^{Soley} Soley was actually given responsibility for handling Nosenko?

25 Mr. Helms. I do not remember the date unfortunately. You

1 will have to tell me what those dates were. All I know is
2 that there was a transition between the time that he was being
3 held in one situation. ^{Soley} Soley entered the picture. He was put
4 into different housing arrangements and so forth. I do not
5 know the exact date of that change.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. We will put aside for the moment
7 the question of the date, but at one point ^{Soley} Soley took over
8 the everyday handling of Nosenko -- ^{Soley} Soley was in and the SR
9 people were out. Is that correct?

10 Mr. Helms. I think by that time the SR people had had
11 their opportunities to talk to Nosenko. This had been going
12 on for months.

13 I believe at that time that ^{Soley} Soley -- the job was given
14 to Soley to handle this man, and to try to find some means of
15 resettling him.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. The SR people did not have any further
17 responsibility?

18 Mr. Helms. I think they had access if they wanted to, but
19 I do not think there was any responsibility they had.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether ^{Soley} Soley had any particu-
21 lar expertise in regards to the Oswald case?

22 Mr. Helms. No, I do not think so.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Was ^{Soley} Soley considered to be an expert in
24 interrogations?

25 Mr. Helms. No, I do not think he was. I think that he was

1 a good security officer. He was interested in the case. He
2 had become acquainted with it when the Office of Security was
3 responsible for it, and I think that he was chosen because he
4 was game to try to work with this man.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. To whom, if anyone, was ^{Soley} ~~Soley~~ directly
6 responsible during this period?

7 Mr. Helms. I think he was responsible to the Director
8 of Security and, in turn, the Director of Security would have
9 been responsible to me.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether, again, the 1968
11 investigation conducted by ^{Soley} ~~Soley~~, whether Nosenko was
12 questioned about Oswald?

13 Mr. Helms. I do not specifically, no.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Would it have been acceptable in 1968
15 if ^{Soley} ~~Soley~~ had been unable to resolve the question of Nosenko's
16 bona fides?

17 Let me rephrase that. If he had been unable to come
18 forward with a viewpoint concerning Nosenko's bona fides.

19 Mr. Helms. What was your question?

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Would it have been acceptable to the
21 Agency if ^{Soley} ~~Soley~~ had been unable to come forward with a
22 position one way or the other concerning Nosenko's bona fides?

23 Mr. Helms. I do not think by that time there was any
24 feeling that there was going to be suddenly a ray of truth
25 come through and we were going to be able to resolve the case

1 of Nosenko. The problem in those days was to deal with this
2 man. The effort was to accomplish that, and ^{Sole}SOLEY was given
3 that job.

4 Whatever Soley had come up with, if he were reasonably
5 successful in keeping the fellow contented, getting him squared
6 away, getting his English straightened out and all the rest of
7 these things, I would have thought he was doing a good job.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. In light of what appeared to be the
9 enormous consequences of the situation where Nosenko, in fact,
10 were not a bona fide defector, the consequences of that as
11 far as the American intelligence community was concerned, it
12 would appear, were quite great.

13 Mr. Helms. For the intelligence community, it would have
14 had no consequence, for the intelligence community. It would
15 have had consequences for the country.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. We will take it step by step.
17 Certainly the American intelligence community would have been
18 concerned. The entire issue of Nosenko's being a planted
19 defector, possibly, planted for the purpose of protecting other
20 Soviet ~~agencies~~ working within the American intelligence
21 community.

22 Mr. Helms. That is what I was trying to warn the Warren
23 Commission against, that possibility, that contingency, and
24 the implications of it.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. In light of the consequence of such a

1 contingency, it would appear that the Agency would very much
2 want to resolve the issue of Nosenko's bona fides and would
3 not be satisfied with the situation where you are in limbo.

4 Mr. Helms. Mr. Goldsmith, may I ask you a question?
5 How would you suggest that that be done?

6 Mr. Goldsmith. My question is, is it not true that the
7 Agency would feel compelled to try to resolve that issue?

8 Mr. Helms. We did the best we could.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. By 1968, you are saying the Agency
10 did not have a position one way or the other.

11 Mr. Helms. That is right.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. What about at the conclusion of Soley's
13 work when he issued his report? At that time, did the Agency
14 have a position with regard to Nosenko's bona fides?

15 Mr. Helms. I do not believe so. At least during my time
16 there, I do not recall us ever taking a position as an Agency.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Has the Agency ever taken a formal posi-
18 tion regarding the truthfulness of Nosenko's story on Oswald's
19 contacts or lack of contacts with the KGB?

20 Mr. Helms. That is the heart of the issue. That is why
21 I believe on that particular question, the question has never
22 been resolved, never been satisfactorily answered.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Let me ask you this. If it were clearly
24 proven that Nosenko's statements concerning Oswald were untrue
25 what significance could you attach to such a finding in so far

1 as the broader question of his overall bona fides is concerned?

2 Mr. Helms. I think that, if it were established beyond
3 any doubt that he had been lying and, by implication therefore,
4 Oswald was an agent of the KGB, I would have thought that the
5 implications of that -- not for the CIA or for the FBI, but
6 for the President of the United States and the Congress of the
7 United States would have been cataclysmic.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Could you be more specific?

9 Mr. Helms. Yes, I can be specific. In other words,
10 the Soviet government ordered President Kennedy assassinated.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Does it necessarily follow that ^(if) Nosenko
12 was lying about Oswald, and that Oswald was, in fact, an agent
13 of the KGB?

14 Mr. Helms. It does not necessarily follow. We can do
15 all kinds of syllogisms here.

16 The issue before the House is, was he or was he not an
17 employee of the KGB? It is on that that this whole thing tends
18 to turn.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. The initial issue here is the truthfulness
20 of Nosenko's statements about Oswald and essentially those
21 statements are ^(that the) KGB had no contact with Oswald.

22 If it were clearly proven that Nosenko's statement on
23 Oswald were untrue -- proven in the sense that it could not be
24 believed that Oswald did not have contacts with the KGB, but
25 not proven in the sense that Oswald was, in fact, a KGB agent,

1 if just the basic Nosenko story were fundamentally disproved,
2 without our taking the next step and saying that Oswald is
3 a KGB agent, what significance would that have on the overall
4 assessment of Nosenko's bona fides?

5 Mr. Helms. Well, if the man had been demonstrated to have
6 lied, it would have had a good deal of an effect on the estab-
7 lishment of his bona fides, I would think. . What was his
8 motive for lying? Why did he lie?

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you take the analysis so far as to
10 say if Nosenko was lying about Oswald, if it were clearly
11 proven that he were lying about Oswald, that in fact he was
12 not a bona fide defector?

13 Mr. Helms. That is one of the problems exactly; you put
14 it very well.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Is your answer to my question yes?

16 Mr. Helms. Yes.

17 Mr. Preyer. If I may ask one question on that score, of
18 key concern, of course, to the intelligence agency, was the
19 broad question of whether Nosenio was a bona fide defector or
20 a disinformation agent.

21 Is it not conceivable that he might have been a bona fide
22 agent and been basically telling the truth about that, and this
23 other information concerning other security matters would be
24 accurate? Then, on Oswald, maybe to ingratiate himself, perhaps,
25 or to convince the intelligence agencies that he was more

1 important than he really was, trying to put a little extra
2 spin on the ball, that he perhaps overspoke himself on Oswald,
3 maybe lied on that.

4 That would still not necessarily determine whether he was
5 bona fides or not?

6 Mr. Helms. I think that any of these explanations or
7 possible or conceivable or may even be the accurate one. But
8 let us not overlook, Mr. Chairman, the fact that if I were
9 down here trying to defend that thesis in front of you, I
10 think I would have a pretty rough time.

11 Mr. Preyer. Yes. I think you put it very well. Why
12 would you lie?

13 As you have made very clear, this might be a question on
14 his bona fides that we do not know how to resolve right now
15 and may never resolve unless there is a flash of truth from
16 some area.

17 Excuse me, Mr. Gold^{with}stein.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. The question that arises, Mr. Ambassador,
19 in light of your statement that the Agency did not have a
20 position regarding Nosenko's bona fides in 1968 is why, in light
21 of the absence of any position one way or another, the Agency
22 never the less paid Mr. Nosenko approximately \$80,000 after
23 taxes in 1968 and then put him on its payroll as a consultant.

24 Mr. Helms. These figures are yours, sir. I do not
25 recall any business about his being put on the Agency payroll

1 as a consultant. I thought that any monies that were paid to
2 him were in an effort to sweeten him up a little bit and get
3 him prepared to be resettled. I do not recall anybody's ever
4 telling me that he had been hired as a consultant to the
5 Agency.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. If, in fact, it were established by the
7 record that Mr. Nosenko was made a consultant and is, in fact,
8 a consultant today, would that indicate that the Agency has
9 apparently resolve the issue of his bona fides?

10 Mr. Helms. I do not know, sir. I did not know that he
11 was considered a consultant at the time that I was Director.
12 I do not recall ever signing off on any piece of paper that
13 made him a consultant.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. In order to have made Mr. Nosenko a
15 consultant, would you have had to sign off?

16 Mr. Helms. Not necessarily. I think I would have been
17 informed that this fellow is now considered to be a consultant
18 to the Agency and we are sending people down to talk to him.
19 I never agreed to any such thing.

20 I do not care what the record shows.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know to what extent, if any,
22 Nosenko's story concerning Oswald changed in 1968 from the
23 one he had given previously when he was first confined?

24 Mr. Helms. No. I do not remember those details at all.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether an independent

1 investigation ever confirmed any aspect of Nosenko's story
2 about Oswald?

3 Mr. Helms. I do not know that, either.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you aware that Mr. Nosenko was given
5 polygraph tests in 1964, 1966 and 1968?

6 Mr. Helms. That does not surprise me. I would have
7 thought he should have been.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Why would Mr. Nosenko have been given
9 three tests?

10 Mr. Helms. To find out if he was telling the truth.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you aware that Mr. Nosenko failed
12 the first two tests and passed the third?

13 Mr. Helms. I did not remember those figures, no.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you aware that Nosenko was given the
15 final polygraph test, the one that he passed, approximately
16 one month prior to the issuance of the 1968 report issued
17 by Mr. Soley which concluded that he was a bona fide defector?

18 Mr. Helms. Maybe that was a part of what Soley was going
19 on when he made that determination, the way he came through on
20 the polygraph test.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. It is also possible, however, that Mr.
22 Soley had completed his report, realized that Nosenko had
23 failed two polygraphs and decided that, prior to the issuance
24 of his report, another polygraph test would be administered.

25 Mr. Helms. I think that he would have, in those days, been

1 in a position to make those judgments or decisions. He was
2 conducting an examination of this case.

3 I would have thought that he would have liked to have had
4 another polygraph test to see if it would, in any way, support
5 the findings that he was maybe establishing in his own mind.

6 Anyway, my recollection of those days is Soley believed in
7 Nosenko.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why Nosenko was asked numerous
9 questions about Oswald on the second test, the test that he
10 failed, and was asked only two questions about Oswald on the
11 final polygraph test?

12 Mr. Helms. NO, I do not know.

13 Mr. Preyer. Mr. Goldsmith, I regret that there is another
14 vote on. We can recess for ten minutes. I will get back just
15 as fast as I can.

16 The Committee will recess for ten minutes.

17 (A brief recess was taken.)

18 Mr. Preyer. The Committee will resume its session.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, prior to taking this last
20 recess again, we were discussing, in general, the question
21 whether the Agency had a position concerning Nosenko's bona
22 fides. Perhaps you or I are defining the concept of position
23 very narrowly. By "position," I do not necessarily mean that
24 the Agency had, in writing, a specific position regarding,
25 specific posture regarding, Nosenko. By "position," I am saying

1 was there a prevailing opinion one way or the other in the
2 Agency concerning Mr. Nosenko?

3 Mr. Helms. I am sorry. I do not know the answer to that
4 question. When you say a prevailing opinion, I see what you
5 are trying to get at. Obviously, I do not know what opinion
6 prevailed.

7 Some people hued to one line, some to the other. It
8 was my impression that he hued to it with equal fervor.
9 And I do not know that this question has ever been satisfactor-
10 ily resolved. As I say, I have been away from the Agency for
11 five years and maybe some other things have happened in the
12 interim. But at least as of the time I left, I do not think
13 that the issue had ever been resolved between these conflicting
14 forces.

15 May I say when I indicate that these views are strongly
16 held, I mean it. It is like Catholics and Protestants; they
17 simply are not to be swayed.

18 I think, in order to answer your question properly, I
19 would have to say, since there was a division, it was not
20 possible to get a prevailing view, as such. Some people might
21 have said, well, I think this and I think that, without having
22 read the 900-page report, without having been thoroughly
23 conversant with the details. In other words there were not
24 many other people in a position to have a calculated, informed
25 opinion.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you saying there was no prevailing
2 opinion?

3 Mr. Helms. I do not think so. I do not know what the
4 prevailing opinion would have been.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. At the time that the responsibility for
6 handling Nosenko was initially given to the SR Branch or SR
7 Division, did the SR Division enter into the situation as
8 to a neutral party, or did the SR division pretty much think
9 from the very beginning that Nosenko was not a bona fide
10 defector?

11 Mr. Helms. I would have thought, at the beginning,
12 everybody would have entered into this with some objectivity
13 in an effort to establish the truth. As events unwound,
14 I think that this became clear to everyone involved that this
15 was a terribly important case.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. How early in this process did the SR
17 Division form its opinion that Nosenko was not a bona fide
18 defector?

19 Mr. Helms. I am sorry. I do not know.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. When Mr. Soley began his investigation,
21 did he enter the situation as a neutral, outside party, or
22 someone who represented one of the factions within the Agency
23 concerning Nosenko's bona fides?

24 Mr. Helms. I really do not know the correct answer to
25 that. It was my impression -- and I can only give it as my

1 impression -- that he had agreed to take on this case, and
2 I thought he came to it without any particular prejudice one
3 way or the other, and that he was going to attempt to form his
4 own opinion.

5 If other testimony on the record does not confirm that,
6 I do not insist on what I say. I simply give you my impression.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Earlier, you made reference to Mr. Soley
8 having a positive viewpoint on Nosenko.

9 Mr. Helms. I think he developed a positive viewpoint.
10 It was my impression.

11 I do not know how early he had it. I think he had a
12 positive viewpoing.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. How was Mr. Soley chosen for this parti-
14 cular assignment?

15 Mr. Helms. I do not remember anymore what details went
16 into this. It seemed to me Howard Osborne, Director of
17 Security, recommended that he be given charge of this case and
18 to take it over because we were trying to find a way to
19 resolve it, to resettle this man, and we were looking for a
20 way to do this.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the President ever ask you whether
22 this issue had been resolved?

23 Mr. Helms. Who?

24 Mr. Goldsmith. The President.

25 Mr. Helms. Which President?

1 Mr. Goldsmith. President Johnson.

2 Mr. Helms. Let-me answer it, no President ever asked me.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. The Agency, did the Agency ever receive
4 any pressure from above to resolve this issue?

5 Mr. Helms. Not that I recall.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. What was the Warren Commission told about
7 Mr. Nosenko?

8 Mr. Helms. Well, I do not know all the things that the
9 Commission was told about Mr. Nosenko. I know that the FBI
10 told them certain things. I believe the Agency told them
11 things. I know that I, personally, met with Chief Justice
12 Warren privately in one of the conference rooms over in the
13 building where they had their Headquarters. I do not remember
14 the date of this meeting with him, but I know I cleared it
15 with Director McCone before I went down there.

16 I believe that it was not terribly long before the
17 Warren Commission was going to conclude its hearings because
18 my point that I felt had to be made to the Warren Commission
19 was that we had not been able to establish, to our satisfac-
20 tion, the bona fides of Nosenko and that the Warren Commission
21 must take this into consideration in compiling their report.

22 And the means chosen of my going to see Chief Justice
23 Warren seemed to be the proper way to do it under the circum-
24 stances so that he could make a determination as to whether
25 he wanted the matter handled differently or whether that was

1 satisfactory to him, or what the case was.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission told anything
3 about the substance of Nosenko's story about Oswald?

4 Mr. Helms. I do not know. I do not know what details
5 wound up in the hands of the Warren Commission about Oswald.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. What other information, besides this issue
7 of the bona fides, did you convey?

8 Mr. Helms. That is what I personally talked to the Chief
9 Justice about.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. When you met with Chief Justice Warren,
11 for purpose of clarification now, did you tell him that the
12 Agency had been unable to resolve the issue of Nosenko's bona
13 fides, or did you tell him that the Agency did not think that
14 Nosenko was bona fide?

15 Mr. Helms. I told him we were not able to resolve this,
16 my point being that, since we had not been able to resolve
17 it, that they should keep in mind the contingency that maybe
18 the statements that he had made about Oswald's having no
19 identification with the KGB were not accurate. Therefore, they
20 could not lean on them in the report and therefore they had
21 to face the implication that, if he was not bona fide and
22 come for the purpose of covering up the tracks of Soviet intel-
23 ligence, that this had implications which should be weighed
24 in the scales.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. At the time that you met with the Chief

1 Justice, I take it, in some way, you must have been apprised
2 of the basic Nosenko story concerning Oswald?

3 Mr. Helms. I believe that the basic Nosenko story con-
4 cerning Oswald was given to the Warren Commission very early
5 in its deliberations by the FBI.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. What was Chief Justice Warren's response
7 to your analysis?

8 Mr. Helms. Well, he was obviously -- he was not pleased
9 to hear it, and by that I do not mean that he expostulated,
10 or anything of that kind, but he was not pleased to hear it
11 in terms of the difficulties that it made in completing their
12 report, but that he was perfectly fair and reasonable about
13 it and accepted what I had to say and said he would report
14 it to the Commission.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Did Chief Justice Warren or any Warren
16 Commission member or staffer ever request to interview Mr.
17 Nosenko?

18 Mr. Helms. Not that I am aware of.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission informed in
20 April, 1964, that Nosenko was being placed into solitary
21 confinement?

22 Mr. Helms. The Warren Commission?

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

24 MR. Helms. I do not know what the Warren Commission knew
25 about the circumstances under which Nosenko was being

1 interrogated. I did not say anything to them about it.

2 Whether anybody else did, I do not know. But the CIA had
3 custody of Nosenko; they certainly were aware of that.

4 This was part of my statement to the Chief Justice. I
5 could not tell him that I could not resolve the bona fides
6 without explaining to him that this our responsibility.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Other than yourself, were any of the
8 other individuals responsible for handling Nosenko in contact
9 with the Warren Commission?

10 Mr. Helms. I do not know, but I would not have thought
11 so.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. If the Warren Commission had been informed
13 by the Agency that Nosenko have been placed into solitary
14 confinement, I take it that you would have been the person
15 who would have so informed them.

16 Mr. Helms. Mr. McCone might have informed them.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Or Mr. McCone.

18 Whose decision was it to place Nosenko in solitary
19 confinement?

20 Mr. Helms. I think this was a decision taken by various
21 people. We had to find a place to interrogate him. We had
22 to try and resolve the case, if we possibly could. WE spent
23 months trying to do this. And putting him into solitary
24 circumstances was just part of the effort to see if we could
25 get at the truth.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. What individuals were involved in that
2 decision-making process?

3 Mr. Helms. I do not remember who all was involved anymore.
4 I certainly was involved in it, but there were others who were
5 involved. I do not know the extent to which Mr. McCone was
6 involved. I do not recall anymore.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. What input, specifically, did you have
8 at that time?

9 Mr. Helms. By input, I assume you mean what influence
10 did I have on the decision?

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

12 Mr. Helms. I certainly agreed to the fact that this should
13 be tried. This would have been proposed to me; not something
14 that I would have proposed, because at this time someone would
15 have had to have made up their mind that the method of inter-
16 rogation that they were using was not getting anyplace.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Please describe, to the best of your
18 knowledge, the conditions under which Nosenko was placed when
19 he was put in solitary confinement.

20 Mr. Helms. He was put into a small house in the country-
21 side where he had a perfectly sanitary and satisfactory
22 living condition. They were just not particularly spacious
23 or padded, let us say. His bed was perfectly adequate, his
24 chair was perfectly adequate, the lighting was perfectly
25 adequate, but it was not particularly comfortable in the

1 normal, American sense of the terms.

2 You will recall that this question of what to do about
3 him was taken up with the Deputy Attorney General at the time,
4 Nicholas Katzenbach, at a long meeting as to how we were going
5 to continue to handle this case, and the problem before the
6 house was clear to everyone but nobody was able to come up
7 with a very satisfactory solution except that we just had to
8 go ahead and do what we were doing and see if we could even-
9 tually come up with a satisfactory resolution, and that satis-
10 factory resolution never emerged.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the CIA ever able to establish that
12 it had legal authority for placing Nosenko in solitary confine-
13 ment?

14 Mr. Helms. I do not know how you answer that question.
15 As you know, I am not a lawyer. I would say that he was there
16 without the blessing of a court. I would have thought that
17 having held him that length of time that it would have been
18 preferable if we did have a court order to hang on to him.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. YOU indicate that you consulted with Mr.
20 Katzenbach?

21 Mr. Helms. Yes.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. Were there any other government officials
23 consulted prior to taking this action?

24 Mr. Katzenbach. There were other people sitting in the
25 room with Mr. Katzenbach from the Department of Justice. I do

1 not think this was brought up with the State Department.

2 The Inter-Agency Defector Committee was aware of what was
3 going on.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Was anyone senior to Mr. Katzenbach in the
5 government apprised of this action?

6 Mr. Helms. I assume that he told the Attorney General.
7 I do not know. We went to see him in the absence of the
8 Attorney General; I think he was Acting Attorney General at
9 the time.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I would like
11 to have offered as an exhibit a notarized statement given by
12 Mr. Nosenko to this Committee on August 7, 1978.

13 Mr. Preyer. Without objection, it is so ordered.

14 (The document referred to
15 was marked JFK Exhibit No.
16 129 for identification.)

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I am going to read Mr.
18 Nosenko's statement to you for the purpose of asking you
19 whether you agree with his characterization of the conditions
20 under which he was held in solitary confinement. This is a
21 statement by Mr. Nosenko given to the Committee August 7,
22 1978.

23 "In accordance with the request of the staff of the
24 Committee, the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I make
25 the following statement describing the condition of my

imprisonment from April of 1964 until the end of 1967.

"On April 4, 1964 I was taken for a physical check-up and a test on a lie detector somewhere in a house. A doctor had given me a physical check-up and after that I was taken into another room for the test on a lie detector. After finishing the test, an officer of the CIA, John, has come in the room and talked with the technician.

"John started to shout that I was a phony and immediately several guards entered into the room. The guards ordered me to stand by the wall, to undress and check me. After that, I was taken upstairs in an attic room. The room had a metal bed attached to the floor in the center of this room.

"Nobody told me anything, how long I would be there or what would happen to me.

"After several days, two officers of CIA, John and Frank, started interrogations. I tried to cooperate and in the evening hours was writing forth on whatever I could recollect about the KGB. These officers were interrogating me about a month or two months. The tone of interrogations was hostile. Then they stopped to come and see me until the end of 1964.

"I was kept in this room until the end of 1964 and the beginning of '65. The conditions were very poor and difficult. I could have a shower once a week and once in a week I could shave. I was not given a toothbrush and toothpaste and food given to me was very poor. I did not have enough to eat and

1 was hungry all the time. I had not contact with anybody to
2 talk. I could not read. I could not smoke. I even could not
3 have fresh air or to see anything from this room. The only
4 window was screened and boarded. The only door in the room had
5 a metal screen, and outside in the corridor two guards were
6 watching me day and night.

7 "The only furniture in the room was a single bed and
8 lightbulb. The room was very, very hot in the summertime.

9 "At the end of 1964, there were started again interroga-
10 tions by several different officers. The first day, they kept
11 me under 24 hours interrogation. All interrogations were done
12 in a hostile manner.

13 "AT the end of those interrogations, when I was told it
14 was the last one and asked what I wanted to be relayed to
15 higher ups, I said I was a true defector and being under
16 arrest about 386 days, I wanted to be put on trial, if I was
17 found guilty, or released.

18 "I also asked how long I would continue. I was told that
19 I would be there 3,860 days and even more.

20 "This evening I was taken by guards, blindfolded and
21 handcuffed in a car and delivered to an airport and put into
22 a plane. I was taken to another location where I was put into
23 a concrete room with bars on the door. In the room was a
24 single steel bed with a mattress. No pillow, no sheet, no
25 blanket. During winter it was very cold, and I asked them to

1 give me a blanket, which I received after some time.

2 "Except for one day of interrogation, and one day for a
3 test on a lie detector, I have not seen anyone besides guards
4 and a doctor. Guards were not allowed to talk to me.

5 "After my constant complaint that I needed fresh air at
6 the end of 1966, I was taken almost every day for 30 minutes
7 exercise to a small area attached to the cell. The area was
8 surrounded by a chain-link fence and a fence I could not see
9 through. The only thing I could see was the sky.

10 "Being in the cell, I was watched day and night through
11 the TV camera. Trying to pass the time, a couple of times,
12 I was making for friends a chess set and every time, when I
13 finished those sets, immediately guards would enter into my
14 cell and taking them from me. I was desperately wanting to
15 read and once, when I was given toothpaste, I found in the
16 toothpaste box a piece of paper with a description of compound
17 of this toothpaste. I was trying to read it under my blanket,
18 but guards noticed it and again it was taken from me.

19 "Conditions in both first and second locations were
20 analogical. I was there until November of 1967. Then I
21 again was transferred, blindfolded and handcuffed, to another
22 location. In this new place, I had a room with much better
23 conditiions and Mr. Bruce Soley, CIA officer, started to question
24 me every day, excluding Sundays, touching all questions
25 concerning my biography, career in the KGB, and all cases of

1 the KGB known to me.

2 "I was in prison for the whole five years, and I started
3 my life in the USA in April of 1969."

4 Mr. Helms. There was a word you used there, "analogical."
5 What is that? What does that mean.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. I am only reading to you what the text
7 says. I am afraid I cannot give you a clear definition of that
8 term as it is used here.

9 Mr. Craig. Could you reread the sentence that that term
10 appears in?

11 Mr. Goldsmith. "Conditions in both (first and second
12 locations) were analogical." If you would like to examine
13 the statement --

14 Mr. Helms. No. I just do not understand what he meant
15 by analogical.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you agree with Mr. Nosenko's
17 characterization of the conditions in which he was placed or
18 held in solitary confinement?

19 Mr. Helms. I have no means for agreeing or disagreeing.
20 I did not visit him during the time that he was being held.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Is the statement consistent with reports
22 that you received concerning Mr. Nosenko's treatment?

23 Mr. Helms. I would think so, yes. I remember that
24 I had two matters of particular interest in connection of this
25 whole business. One that he should not be physically molested.

1 I wanted to be absolutely certain that that was clear to
2 everybody, and I believe that was complied with throughout.

3 Secondly, I did not want any drugs or any medicines or
4 any tricks of that kind used on him.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. That was my next question. Was Nosenko
6 ever given any drugs for the purpose of either harrassing him
7 psychologically or to compel him to tell the truth?

8 Mr. Helms. I believe not. I believe that, at one time,
9 I was asked whether this could be done and so forth, and I
10 forbade it.

11 Mr. Preyer. Mr. Goldsmith, I regret that there is another
12 vote. I think this may be the last one for some time.

13 The Committee will stand in recess.

14 (A brief recess was taken.)

15 Mr. Preyer. The Committee will resume.

16 Mr. Goldsmith?

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

18 Mr. Ambassador, I believe earlier you testified the
19 Agency did not establish or have any position one way or
20 another regarding Mr. Nosenko's bona fides?

21 Mr. Helms. Despite these efforts we have made.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. That was precisely the point I was about
23 to make, or the impression I was going to raise to you. It
24 would seem then that the Agency, without having any position
25 one way or the other, went to the trouble to keep Mr. Nosenko

1 under the conditions that he just described.

2 Mr. Helms. We did our very best to resolve this problem
3 and we certainly would not have taken these steps of putting
4 him, if you recall, in Spartan circumstances, if we had not
5 thought there was a possibility it might get us to a goal that
6 we were trying to reach. I do not think that we were trying
7 to reach.

8 I do not think that we ever under-estimated the impor-
9 tance of this case, and we did everything we could do to try
10 to resolve that, including later on giving him sweet, nice
11 treatment with money and pleasant living circumstances and all
12 of the rest of it.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Does not the fact that Mr. Nosenko was
14 kept under these conditions reflect that the Agency, in fact,
15 did have a position regarding his bona fides, and at least
16 until such time that he was released from these conditions,
17 the Agency felt that he was not a bona fide defector?

18 Mr. Helms. I think the Agency was trying to establish
19 whether or not he was a bona fide defector and it was decided
20 to use these means of interrogation. The supposition has to
21 be that the matter had not been resolved by other interroga-
22 tion means and this was going to be trying an effort, to see
23 if this would help.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. So that, for the three years Mr. Nosenko
25 was kept under these conditions, the Agency did not have a

1 position regarding his bona fides?

2 Mr. Helms. They were trying to establish his bona fides.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Your answer is, then, during those three
4 years, the Agency did not have a position regarding his bona
5 fides.

6 Mr. Helms. There may have been differing views, depending
7 on whether this view obtained or that view obtained. Different
8 people may have altered their position, but the Agency did not
9 have any position during this period. As I was saying, we were
10 trying to resolve the issue.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. You would say that this was a technique
12 in attempting to resolve the overall issue of bona fides?

13 Mr. Helms. That is exactly what I am saying.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Later, when Mr. Nosenko was given -- and
15 I think the record would demonstrate that, or corroborate that --
16 was given approximately \$80,000 after taxes and was allowed
17 to work for the Agency on a contract basis or as a consultant.
18 do those factors reflect on the part of the Agency the position
19 that, by this time, Nosenko was considered to be a bona fide
20 defector?

21 Mr. Helms. I do not want to take any position or voice
22 any opinion about anything that happened in the Agency after
23 February, 1973 when I left.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. In light of that, if the Committee is able
25 to demonstrate to you from the record that these actions

1 concerning Nosenko were taken prior to your departure as
2 DCI, would you then be willing to respond to the question?

3 Mr. Helms. No.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Even --

5 Mr. Helms. I did not know that he was a consultant at the
6 Agency or considered a consultant of the Agency. If, indeed
7 he was, I would like the word defined as to what that entails
8 and what that was supposed to signify.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. You did not know that Mr. Nosenko was
10 given approximately \$80,000?

11 Mr. Helms. You said \$8,000 and \$80,000 on another. Which
12 is the correct figure?

13 Mr. Goldsmith. I am sorry if I gave you an incorrect
14 figure. It is \$80,000.

15 Would the fact that he had been given \$80,000 after taxes
16 suggest to you that the Agency did have a position regarding
17 his bona fides?

18 Mr. Helms. I think that we were trying to resettle him.
19 I think that we recognized that he had been given a pretty
20 rough time, and I think that we were trying, through good
21 treatment and handling him properly and so forth, to not only
22 resettle him, but find out if these means would help resolve
23 the case.

24 If it has been resolved in the last five years, I am glad
25 to hear it. I know nothing about that.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. How would giving him \$80,000 and
2 resettling him further resolve the case? It would seem by that
3 point that the case has been resolved, to the best of the
4 Agency's capabilities. Certainly after you have given him
5 \$80,000 you are not providing him with any incentive to change
6 his story.

7 Mr. Helms. What would you have done with him?

8 Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you to answer my questions.

9 Mr. Helms. I think this line as inquiry has been taken
10 as far as I can take it.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. You are unable to comment, then, on the
12 significance --

13 Mr. Helms. I am unable to comment. I am trying to say
14 we were trying to resettle him.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Earlier, I asked you whether Nosenko
16 had ever been given any drugs for the purpose of harrassing
17 him psychologically or for the purpose of compelling him to
18 tell the truth.

19 Are you able to state categorically that he was not given
20 drugs for this purpose?

21 Mr. Helms. I would never state anything in this life
22 categorically, including that.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. What is the best statement you can give
24 us on that?

25 Mr. Helms. The best statement I can give you on that is

1 that I believe on one occasion some people wanted to try and
2 use aids to interrogation in the form of drugs and I said I
3 wanted none of this done. I believe my wishes were carried
4 out. I have never heard anything to the contrary, but I cannot
5 swear to it.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. When did this incident take place?

7 Mr. Helms. I do not remember.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Who were the individuals involved?

9 Mr. Helms. It seems to me that some of the interrogators
10 who were involved in talking to him wanted to try truth serums
11 or something of that kind, sodium penathol or whatever those
12 drugs are which are considered to be aids to interrogation.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Was that Mr. Bagley or Mr. Murphy? Were
14 they of the feeling that drugs should be administered?

15 Mr. Helms. I would assume it was someone like that. I
16 am not sure who brought the question to me anymore. I do have
17 in the back of my head the fact that this did come up.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. If the Agency did administer drugs to
19 Nosenko, would there have been a record of this fact?

20 Mr. Helms. I certainly would have thought so.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you dispute testimony to this
22 Committee by Mr. Nosenko that he was drugged by the CIA and
23 then interrogated?

24 Mr. Helms. He would have to demonstrate that this was
25 the case.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Would any decision concerning the use
2 of drugs necessarily involve Dave Murphy at some point?

3 Mr. Helms. It might have. You see, I do not remember
4 whether, all during this period, Murphy was in charge of the
5 SR Division or whether he was in charge for a time when someone
6 else took over. I do not have the agency --

7 Mr. Goldsmith. I believe for this entire period Mr.
8 Murphy was in charge of the SR Division.

9 Mr. Helms. He would have been involved in it. He is in
10 charge of these people in his division. He was obviously
11 attempting to counsel with them how it was to be conducted,
12 so I would have thought he would have been a party of any
13 inquiry at that time, or reference to me for permission at
14 that time.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my line of
16 inquiry with regard to this area. Do you have any questions?

17 I would defer to you.

18 Mr. Preyer. I have no questions on that area, but before
19 you recess to go on your deposition hearing, I have a couple
20 of questions in another area which I would like to ask.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

22 Mr. Craig. Before leaving that area, I might inquire,
23 you mentioned, you asked a question whether Ambassador Helms
24 would dispute any evidence to the effect that Mr. Nosenko
25 was drugged. If such evidence does exist, you might be able

1 to bring that to Mr. Helms' attention and he might be able to
2 comment on it.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. As I said, the Committee has received
4 testimony by Mr. Nosenko in which he specifically stated that
5 he was drugged and then, after being drugged, he was interro-
6 gated. That is why this is an issue before the Committee at
7 this time.

8 Mr. Craig. Thank you.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, turning to another area,
10 specifically back to Mexico City, ~~is~~ the name Luisa Calderon
11 familiar to you?

12 Mr. Helms. I just read it in one of the documents you
13 gave me here this morning.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. For purposes of refreshing your recollec-
15 tion a bit further, I would ask you to look at CIA No. 1936,
16 which appears in Volume No. 2 and specifically on pages 1950
17 through 1954.

18 Mr. Helms. You want me to go -- I have 1936.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. I want you to look at 1936, only so that
20 you would see the document that you are going to be reading
21 from, but the relevant pages are 1950 thorough 1954.

22 Mr. Helms. Just a second.

23 (Pause)

24 I see. What is the date of this document, Mr. Goldsmith?
25 Was this back at the time of the Warren Commission?

1 Mr. Goldsmith.. No. This document is a 1975 document
2 prepared by Raymond Rocca in response to a 15 April 1975
3 letter by David Belin of the Rockefeller Commission.

4 Mr. Helms. I see. That is the same David Belin that
5 was on the Warren Commission and later ghost-wrote the book
6 for President Ford about the Warren Commission?

7 Mr. Goldsmith. I do not know about the book on President
8 Ford, but it is the David Belin who was the Warren Commission
9 staffer.

10 Mr. Helms. That is the same one, then.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. I would ask you specifically to read
12 through pages 150 through 1954.

13 Mr. Helms. 1950 through 1954, all right.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Starting with paragraph number 18.

15 Mr. Helms. All right.

16 (Pause)

1 Mr. Helms. Where did you want me to stop reading?

2 Mr. Goldsmith. 1954.

3 Mr. Helms. I am sorry, I have a couple of pages to go.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Please stop once you have gotten to the end
5 of paragraph number 23.

6 Mr. Helms. Fine.

7 All right.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. After having read this document, which
9 describes the conversation involving a wman named Luisa Calderon,
10 or someone whom it appears as Luisa Calderon, is the name familiar
11 to you at all?

12 Mr. Helms. It doesn't bring back any memories. Just as I
13 said, I identified it from that document you showed me this
14 morning but I don't remember anything about her.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, the pages that you read pertain to a
16 conversation involving Luisa in which there is some suggestion
17 of foreknowledge on her part, foreknowledge of the assassination,
18 and, of course, the significance of that foreknowledge, the sig-
19 nificance of her statement standing alone really is not very
20 great. However, in light of the fact Luisa Calderon had connec-
21 tions or may have had connections with Cuban intelligence, the
22 significance of her statement suggests, the foreknowledge has
23 escalated.

24 Do you recall ever having had the statement brought to your
25 attention, this conversation brought to your attention?

TOP SECRET

1 Mr. Helms. I do not remember it ever having been brought
2 to my attention.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if that conversation was
4 brought to the attention of the Warren Commission.

5 I know nothing about it. To the best of my recollection
6 this is the first time I have seen reference to it.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Will you now refer to CIA 1843?

8 Mr. Helms. 1843?

9 Mr. Goldsmith. That is in volume 1.

10 Mr. Helms. Yes sir. It is in volume 1, is it? This one
11 stops at 1874. There we are.

12 Yes sir, I have that in front of me.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. I would ask you to read the handwritten
14 notation on this page.

15 Mr. Helms. Is this ICC or just CC for copy? I guess it
16 is copy. CC for copy. Original and translation sent to Galbon
17 via Kingman, nothing to Bureau yet.

18 (2), one copy original and trans to Luisa Calderon and a
19 a big P.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whose handwriting that was?

21 Mr. Helms. No, I don't.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. I indicate for the record that the
23 reference to Luisa Calderon P would probably refer to her P
24 file, which is the local file in the Mexico City station.

25 Mr. Helms. I see. I don't know whose handwriting that is.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know who Galbon or Kingman --

2 Mr. Helms. I know who Galbon is. This is Cononel J. C.
3 King. Who Kingman was I have forgotten.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why anyone would have wanted
5 this transcript from the Bureau?

6 Mr. Helms. It just says nothing to Bureau yet. I don't
7 interpret that to mean it was withheld, it just hadn't got to
8 them yet.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Your reading of that is correct, it says
10 nothing to Bureau yet. I will rephrase the question. In light
11 of that do you know why there would have been a desire to with-
12 hold this transcript even temporarily from the Bureau?

13 Mr. Helms. No, I don't. No, I don't. Over in the column
14 here it says 22 November LIN, which I assume from what we were
15 saying this morning is the cryptonym for the telephone taps,
16 Luisa Calderon and the man outside. Those would be simply
17 descriptive?

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you refer at this time to CIA number
19 1929?

20 Mr. Helms. That is in volume 2, then, isn't it?

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes sir.

22 For the record, that is a blind memo dated 10 April 1964,
23 labeled material from P 8593, shown to Warren Commission.

24 Station House --

25 Mr. Helms. Yes, I have looked at that page now.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Is there any indication from that page
2 that the Calderon conversation was shown to the Warren Commis-
3 sion staffers when they went to Mexico City?

4 Mr. Helms. English translations of calls made by Oswald to
5 the Russian Embassy; English translation of conversations
6 between Dorticos Armas. It doesn't look that way. Is there
7 something I ahve missed?

8 Mr. Goldsmith. No. At this time would you refer to CIA
9 number 2205 and 2206. That would appear in volume 3. When
10 you get to 2205 --

11 Mr. Helms. I have got 2220. I am closing in on it. That
12 goes back up again.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, I would indicate that
14 2205 is a memo for the record dated 11 April 1964, the subject
15 of which is a visit by three staff represenatives of the Warren
16 Commission. I would ask you to read paragraph 7 on page 2206.

17 Mr. Helms. All right. Somebody has slapped a reproduc-
18 tion of a prohibited stamp all over this and it makes it a
19 little hard going. If you will forgive me, I am going as fast
20 as I can.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

22 Mr. Helms. All right, I have read paragraph 7.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Having read that paragraph, is there any
24 reference in that paragraph to the Luisa Calderon conversation
25 being shown to the Warren Commission staff?

1 Mr. Helms. All it says, reviewed the tape from the tele-
2 phone taps. I assume that means for the days 27th, 28th, 1
3 Cotober, Oswald, at both Cuban and Soviet Embassies. I assume
4 those are only on Oswald's conversations since the Calderon
5 conversation you were talking about was with some unidentified
6 man. I don't know they regard that as Oswald or include it.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. It was also dated 22 November, 1963.

8 Mr. Helms. Right. Then I guess that was not included
9 here. At least I don't see any evidence in this statement.

10 Mr. Goldsmith. To your knowledge, was this transcript
11 ever given to the Warren Commission?

12 Mr. Helms. Of Calderon?

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

14 Mr. Helms. I have no idea.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think it should have been given to
16 the Warren Commission?

17 Mr. Helms. I can't see any particular rsason not to have
18 given it to the Warren Commission. I can think of no reason.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Especially in the light of the fact the
20 Agency had information that Luisa Calderon was DGI or possibly
21 connected with DGI?

22 If this material had been given to the Warrent Commission
23 -- by this term I am referring to the Calderon transcript,
24 would a record of such transmission be available anywhere?

25 Mr. Helms. I would have thought so. I thought they were

1 trying to keep reasonably careful records as to what was sent to
2 the Warren Commission. After all, the intelligence agencies
3 usually are and should be careful about what kind of documenta-
4 tion goes out of their building to anyone, and there is usually
5 a record of it, particularly if it is highly classified and
6 sensitive. So I would have thought there would be a record.

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Was Luisa Calderon connected in any way with
8 the CIA?

9 Mr. Helms. I nver heard of any connection she had with the
10 CIA. If she did it was unknown to me.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. I would ask you to refer at this time to
12 CIA number 2950. It appears in volume 3.

13 Mr. Helms. 2950, right.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. This is not a very good quality reproduc-
15 tion, so take your time reading it.

16 Mr. Helms. 2950?

17 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes sir.

18 Mr. Helms. All right, I am there now. Let me read this
19 out loud to see if I am reading the same thing that you are.

20 In paragraph 4, of the [] contact report for 17 July,
21 "attached to reference [] reported that Luisa Calderon has a
22 sister residing in someplace in Texas, married to an American
23 of Mexican descent. L-8 can further identify the sister."

24 I can't read that next word.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Domestic.

1 Mr. Helms. "Domestic Exploitation Section might be in a
2 position to follow up on this lead. Please levy this requirement
3 on[] at the next opportunity.

4 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, what is the Domestic
5 Exploitation Section?

6 Mr. Helms. Well, I don't know that I recall exactly what
7 it is, unless it was an interrogation unit that the Miami
8 station used to interrogate refugees and other people coming
9 over from Cuba. If it is not that, I don't remember what the
10 Domestic Exploitation Section was.

11 Mr. Goldsmith. Is it possible that the Domestic Exploita-
12 tion Section could have been a component within SAS?

13 Mr. Helms. Possibly. But then SAS had control over the
14 Miami station and I would have thought it was somewhere in that
15 complex.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the use of the Domestic Exploitation
17 Section in any way violate the Agency's charter?

18 Mr. Helms. Not that I ever heard of. I think the
19 Domestic Exploitation Section was there, FBI knew about it,
20 the intelligence community knew about it, it had a specific
21 purpose, I don't think there is anything about it that violated
22 the Agency charter. As far as I know I never considered it
23 in that category.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. What again was the specific purpose of this
25 section?

1 Mr. Helms. I don't know. If it is what I thought it was,
2 it was a group that interrogated refugees that came from Cuba.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Might this section have been used as a means
4 by which an effort could be made to contact Luisa Calderon
5 and take advantage of her possibilities as a CIA agent^{or} as a
6 source of information?

7 Mr. Helms. I don't understand your question. I am sorry.

8 Mr. Goldsmith. Well, could this Domestic Exploitation
9 Section have been used for the purpose of establishing a contact
10 between the Agency and Luisa Calderon so that her assistance
11 or services could be solicited for the Agency?

12 Mr. Helms. My recollection is I don't recall any Domestic
13 Exploitation SEction that was recruiting agents.

14 Mr. Goldsmith. Other than A. M. Mug, the Cuban defector
15 to whom you made reference earlier today, did the Agency obtain
16 additional information pertaining to Oswald and the assassina-
17 tion from sources or agents connected in some way with DGI?

18 Mr. Helms. I don't honestly know. I would have hoped
19 there would have been more than just one defector, but I may be
20 wrong. We were having a very difficult time getting intelli-
21 gence inside Cuba and maybe we didn't get anything from anybody
22 else. I would have hoped we would have gotten something more
23 from refugees or agents or somebody like that.

24 Mr. Goldsmith. In 1963 and 1964, did the Agency have any
25 agents or sources of information within the Cuban Embassy or

1 Consulate in Mexico City?

2 Mr. Helms. I don't know.

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Would you refer at this point to CIA
4 number 2977. That would appear in volume 3, I believe.

5 Mr. Helms. 2977?

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes sir.

7 Mr. Helms. That would be volume 2.

8 All right. Memoranda from Mr. J. Lee Rankin.

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Please skim through the memorandum and
10 then read the next page.

11 Mr. Helms. And then read the next page.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. To yourself, sir.

13 Mr. Helms. Right.

14 I have read it.

15 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, Silvia Duran, who is
16 someone of important concern to this Committee, and my question
17 here is not directed towards the substance of the memo but
18 rather to the source of the information, apparently here the
19 Agency received information concerning Duran from someone who
20 had direct personal knowledge. Do you know who the source of
21 this information was?

22 Mr. Helms. No, I don't know who the source was, Mr.
23 Goldsmith, but if you are asking my opinion in reading this,
24 I would assume this just is our way of covering up the fact
25 this came from a telephone tap.

1 Mr. Goldsmith. Right. Do you know whether or not Silvia
2 Duran at any time had any connections with ⁽⁴⁾CIA was she an agent
3 or source of information for the AGENCY?

4 Mr. Helms. Not that I have heard.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you able to refer specifically to
6 language in this memo that would indicate that the source of
7 the information was a telephone operation?

8 Mr. Helms. No, I am not. I simply was voicing the
9 opinion that when it says a reliable and sensitive source, well,
10 informed on political personalities and events in the Cuban
11 Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City, I am simply assuming that
12 in order to cover up the fact this information came from various
13 telephone conversations they simply are using this descriptive
14 rubric to cover that fact. I am not sure of this; that is
15 just my assumption.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, are you familiar with the
17 name Teresa Proenza?

18 Mr. Helms. Whom?

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Teresa Proenza, PROENZA, the Cultural
20 Attache at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City?

21 Mr. Helms. I don't recall her name, no. I think I would
22 -- Proenza Proenza.

23 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency in 1963 in Mexico City have
24 any penetration agents and sources of information within the
25 Soviet Embassy or Consulate?

1 Mr. Helms. I don't know.

2 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, are you familiar generally
3 with th- allegations that were made after the assassination
4 by a Nicaraguan named ^{Alvarado} Alarada to the effect he had witnessed
5 Oswald receive \$6500 in cash from a redheaded negro at the Cuban
6 Embassy?

7 Mr. Helms. I do recall vaguely this Alvarad^o allegation
8 and it was my impression that that all fell to pieces, that this
9 fellow was just trying to ^hsake somebody down for some money,
10 or it was self-importance, but never had been able to prove
11 that this was the case.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. I would ask you to refer now to 2101,
13 which appears in volume 4, which is a polygraph result summary
14 and rather than reading the entire document, please refer to
15 paragraph number 7.

16 Mr. Helms. I see.

17 I have read it.

18 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, paragraph number 7 indicates that this
19 allegation apparently was resolved when Alvarada admitted he
20 had made a mistake and he essentially admitted that he had
21 with respect to the polygraph devices a means of testing one's
22 truthfulness.

23 The issue which the Committee is concerned with at this
24 time, however, appears on page 2100, the top of the page, where
25 Alarada is quoted, where it is indicated to have stated, and I

1 reading now, that he wanted to protest his unjust treatment and
2 the fact he was given money since he does not believe in
3 negotiating over death.

4 Perhaps it would be good if you did read paragraph 1, so
5 we are not talking out of context here.

6 Mr. Helms. Is this Alarada we are talking --

7 Mr. Goldsmith. Pardon?

8 Mr. Helms. It says subject here. Is that Alarada?

9 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes sir. This is the Nicaraguan who made
10 the allegations concerning Oswald receiving money.

11 Mr. Helms. I see.

12 I have read it.

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Now, do you know whether Alarada was given
14 money in reference to the allegations that he was making about
15 Oswald?

16 Mr. Helms. I have no recollection of this at all. The
17 only thing that twiggged a memory cell in my head was the
18 redheaderd negro. That always seemed to be a silly story that
19 stuck in my head over all these years. The other details I
20 don't recall.

21 Mr. Goldsmith. The statement in here that is of concern
22 to the Committee is the one that suggests that either for
23 making the story for ~~at~~^{or}tracting the story Alarada^v was given
24 money. I am wondering if this issue was ever investigated by
25 the Agency?

1 Mr. Helms. I don't know. He was apparently dealing with
2 the State Department people down there, is that correct?

3 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I believe ^{OD} OSS refers to
4 the FBI. ODACID

5 Mr. Helms. State Department.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. I won't argue with you over that one, sir.
7 In any event, the record indicates that.

8 Mr. Helms. I will show you in another one of your docu-
9 ments that the FBI had a different cryptonym. If you look at
10 the document with dissemination of original Lee Harvey Oswald
11 report to local authorities, you remember the one that goes
12 back --

13 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

14 Mr. Helms. -- you will find the thing broken out and
15 you will find that, I think, in those days the FBI was known
16 as ODNV. And the State Department was ODACID.

17 Mr. Goldsmith. I believe that you are correct in that
18 score, Mr. Ambassador.

19 Mr. Helms. I don't know but that is my recollection.

20 Mr. Goldsmith. My source in this room tells me you are
21 correct.

22 In any event, do you know anything about Alarado receiving
23 money?

24 Mr. Helms. No sir, I do not, nothing whatever.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission ever told about

1 his moreorless cryptic reference to being offered money and
2 negotiating over death?

3 Mr. Helms. I don't know what they knew about the Alarado^y
4 case except from what you showed me earlier. They apparently
5 were briefed about it.

6 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Warren Commission
7 would have been given a copy of this polygraph summary?

8 Mr. Helms. I don't know. If they asked for it I suppose,
9 other wise I wouldn't have thought so. Polygraph summaries are
10 usually pretty closely held. That is not a very scientific
11 instrument.

12 Mr. Goldsmith. Again, if they had been given this
13 summary, would there be a record of that somewhere at the
14 Agency?

15 Mr. Helms. I would have thought so.

16 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know where that record would be?

17 Mr. Helms. I have no idea. Probably in the Security
18 Office somewhere.

19 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Chairman, at this time I am finished
20 with another line of inquiry. I note that it is 3:25 and
21 that we have to leave this room at 4. If you have questions
22 I would certainly defer to you at this point.

23 Mr. Preyer.

24 There is one question I wanted to ask, which isn't
25 directly related to our inquiry here, although it is indirectly

1 related to the Mexican aspects of it.

2 Recently Premier Castro made a very harsh speech attacking
3 the United States, as we have read in the paper, and over the
4 course of this Youth Festival that was held there several others
5 were brought forward. (1), the Consul in the Mexican Embassy
6 there, Mr. Azcue, apparently made a speech to the Youth Festival
7 which in effect said the man who came to the Cuban Embassy
8 in Mexico, was not Oswald, or he had questions about whether
9 it was Oswald. So for some reason, perhaps on his own or his
10 government, he has floated the idea of two Oswalds.

11 Now, whether to confuse the issue or not, I don't know.

12 I think this Committee can probably demonstrate that
13 conclusively by good hard evidence that there was only one
14 Oswald and that Mr. Azcue is wrong on that score.

15 The other point which gives me more concern is the attack
16 Mr. Castro made in his allegations that CIA in this country had
17 foreknowledge of the assassination of President Kennedy and that
18 they deliberately tried to pin the blame on the Cuban Government.
19 That apparently is the new line and he has made that charge in
20 a public forum, for all the world to hear. How much the world
21 would believe that, knowing the source it comes from, I suppose
22 is debatable, but I imagine many Marxist countries of the
23 world are taking that as gospel now.

24 So the question I wanted to ask is on the second point,
25 and it is as to his charge that the CIA had foreknowledge of

1 the assassination to pin it on the Cuban Government.

2 Do you have any comments that you would like to make on
3 that, sir?

4 Mr. Helms. Sir, the only comment I would like to make
5 on that was, or is, not was, that I never knew of anyone in
6 the CIA that alleged that he knew about President Kennedy's
7 assassination beforehand. I never heard that asserted by a
8 single soul, ever. I don't believe there was anyone in the
9 CIA who had any foreknowledge.

10 I recall personally that I was sitting having lunch with
11 Director McCone and two or three other CIA officials when his
12 Executive Assistant, Walter Elder, walked into the room and
13 said President Kennedy had been shot, and if I have ever seen
14 surprise and horror on the group of faces around me it was
15 on that occasion. So I can't conceive that either Director
16 McCone or I had ever heard of this thing and I have never heard
17 it alleged that anybody else had, and I would like to make one
18 further comment about Mr. Azcue, and that is that in a Communist
19 state individuals of the local government do not appear at
20 international conferences and make speeches (a), without speci-
21 fic authorization, and, (b), specific instructions as to what
22 they are to say and what they are to cover.

23 I found it equally interesting that Mr. Cubela, the famous
24 Mr. AMLASH, who has dotted the transcripts of lord knows how
25 many Congressional hearings, also appeared, having been released

1 from jail, as stated in the Washington Post, to assert that he
2 had never been a double agent, that he had only worked for a
3 certain period of time for the CIA. Why he was asked to make
4 the statement, why he was released from jail for the purpose
5 of doing it, I don't know. I could hazard an opinion. But I
6 can only say that these conferences are orchestrated and they
7 are orchestrated very skillfully and orchestrated for a purpose.

8 Mr. Preyer. Do you know anything of any 23 page document
9 that I understand Mr. Castro says he has outlining or substan-
10 tiating his charges?

11 Mr. Helms. No sir, I don't know anything about it.
12 Didn't he give Senator McGovern a document one time that
13 Senator brought back with him, or was it Senator Church? I saw
14 something in the newspapers about this. I have no firsthand
15 knowledge.

16 Mr. Preyer. I got the impression this was a recent com-
17 pilation.

18 Mr. Helms. I see.

19 Mr. Preyer. Probably on the order of Mr. Cubela and Mr.
20 Azcue's appearances. It always seemed to me a little surpris-
21 ing Mr. Cubela, if he was guilty of all the things alleged,
22 that he wasn't preemporily shot, rather than being in prison.

23 Well, I appreciate your comments on that. That is very
24 helpful.

25 Mr. Goldsmith. This would be an appropriate time,

1 for us to break, rather than continue getting into a new area
2 and break for the deposition, so I would recommend that at this
3 time.

4 Mr. Preyer. Very well.

5 Mr. Goldsmith. I might point out, Mr. Chairman, that if
6 we do break at this time, that under the Committee Rules, the
7 Ambassador would be entitled to make a statement at this time.
8 I would also be prepared to have the Ambassador make a state-
9 ment at the deposition.

10 Mr. Preyer. Yes. Under our rules each person who testi-
11 fies, at the conclusion of the Committee portion of the hearing
12 is entitled to make a statement of five minutes, if he cares
13 to, explaining any aspect of the testimony further, or any
14 statement he may care to make.

15 Mr. Helms. You mean if he has anything left to say?

16 Mr. Preyer. Yes.

17 Mr. Helms. Thank you very much, sir.

18 Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Ambassador Helms. We appreciate
19 very much your cooperation in this. Sorry we have interrupted
20 you a number of times today, but I hope we will be able to
21 complete the testimony.

22 Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, I would like to clarify
23 that I don't believe that the Committee will have a Notary
24 available for the deposition that is about to begin in about a
25 half an hour or so, so I would like to indicate for the record,

1 Mr. Helms, you understand you will still be under oath for the
2 deposition?

3 Mr. Helms. I understand that, certainly.

4 Mr. Preyer. The Committee stands in recess until 10:00
5 tomorrow.

6 (Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned,
7 to reconvene at 10:00 o'clock Thursday, August 10, 1978.)
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