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ANALYSIS OF THE SUPPORT PROVIDED TO THE  
WARREN COMMISSION BY THE CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Staff Report  
of the  
Select Committee on Assassinations  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Ninety-fifth Congress  
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## I. FOREWORD

(1) The Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) performance in providing support to the Warren Commission has been a source of public concern during the past 15 years. Critics have repeatedly charged that the CIA participated in a conspiracy to suppress information relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy. During 1976, these critics' assertions were the subject of official inquiry by the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations (SSC). The SSC, in its report regarding "The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies," reached the following findings:

The committee emphasizes that it has not uncovered any evidence sufficient to justify a conclusion that there was a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy.

The committee has, however, developed evidence which impeaches the process by which the intelligence agencies arrived at their own conclusions about the assassination, and by which they provided information to the Warren Commission. This evidence indicates that the investigation of the assassination was deficient and that facts which might have substantially affected the course of the investigation were not provided the Warren Commission or those individuals within the FBI and the CIA, as well as other agencies of Government, who were charged with investigating the assassination.(1)

(2) The committee sought to examine in greater detail the general findings of the SSC. It particularly focused its attention on the specific issue of whether the CIA or any employee or former employee of the CIA misinformed or withheld information relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy from the Warren Commission. In addition, the Committee attempted to determine whether, if the Warren Commission were misinformed or not made privy to information relevant to its investigation, it was because of conscious effort by the Agency or its employees.

(3) In investigating this matter, the committee reviewed a 1977 task force report by the CIA (1977 TFR).(2) This report was highly critical of the SSC's findings pertaining to the AMLASH operation\* and asserted that the SSC's Final Report conveyed the mistaken impression that the CIA had made a limited effort to assist the Warren Commission. The 1977 TFR disagreed with this characterization and noted that the "CIA did seek and collect information in support of the Warren Commission. Additionally, it conducted studies and submitted special analyses and reports."(4)

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\*The AMLASH operation was characterized by the SSC as one of the CIA's Castro assassination plots.(3)

(4) In order to demonstrate further the scope of support provided by the CIA to the Warren Commission, the 1977 TFR contained a comprehensive listing of CIA-generated material made available to both the U.S. intelligence community and the Warren Commission regarding the assassination of President Kennedy. In this respect, the evidence supports the 1977 TFR, in which it is stated that:

This compilation [of CIA-generated material] is appropriate to consideration of the extent of the CIA effort, to the extent that it reveals something of the results of that effort. (5)

(5) In its examination of the Agency's comprehensive listing of CIA-generated material, the committee followed the organization of these materials by the 1977 TFR. The 1977 TFR detailed four inter-related categories of Kennedy assassination material:

- (6) (1) Agency information disseminated to the intelligence community (formal and informal disseminations);
- (7) (2) Material disseminated to the Warren Commission;
- (8) (3) Information disseminated to the FBI et al. regarding rumors and allegations regarding President Kennedy's assassination; and
- (9) (4) Memorandum submitted by the CIA to the Warren Commission on rumors and allegations relating to the President's assassination.

(10) In reviewing these categories, the committee concentrated its focus upon those CIA materials that the 1977 TFR documented as having been made available in written form to the Warren Commission.

(11) During the course of this study, additional Agency files were reviewed in an effort to resolve certain issues that arose during the review of the 1977 TFR materials. Where apparent gaps existed in the written record, files were requested and reviewed in an effort to resolve those gaps. Where significant substantive issues arose related to the kind and quality of information provided the Warren Commission, files were requested and reviewed in an effort to resolve these issues.\* In the end, approximately 30 files, comprising an approximate total of 90 volumes of material, were examined and analyzed in preparation of this staff report.

(12) The evidence set forth here must be qualified. During the course of the past 15 years, the CIA has generated massive amounts of information related to the assassination of President Kennedy. Certain documents requested by the committee for study and analysis were not located. Whether these documents were merely filed incorrectly or actually destroyed, gaps in the written record still exist.

(13) Second, due to dissimilar standards with respect to the relevancy of materials to the committee's investigation adopted by the CIA and the committee, certain files requested by the committee for review were made available to the committee in redacted form or were with-

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\*E.g.: CIO JFK assassination materials provided the Rockefeller Commission; CIA materials pertaining to Luisa Calderon Curallero; AMLASH; CIA "Soft Files" pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald; CIA materials generated by Warren Commission but carrying Agency classification.

held.\* The evidence collected in this staff report is based on the evidence *available* to the committee, which might not have been all the relevant evidence to which the Agency had access.

(14) Due consideration, moreover, must be given to the role that oral discussions and briefings between the Warren Commission and CIA representatives may have played in the supply of assassination-related information. The subject and substance of these discussions and briefings may not always be reflected by the written record reviewed in this study. Consequently, the committee conducted interviews, depositions, and executive session hearings with key Warren Commission staff and members and former or present CIA representatives in an effort to resolve questions that were not addressed by the written record.

(15) This staff report examines the following subjects generated by the committee's study in the following order:

- (16) (1) The organization of the CIA's investigation of President Kennedy's assassination;
  - (17) (2) The working relationship of the Warren Commission staff and those CIA representatives concerned with Warren Commission inquiry;
  - (18) (3) The standards of investigative cooperation that the Warren Commission staff believed governed the quality and quantity of information supplied by the CIA to the Commission;
  - (19) (4) The CIA's responsibility for protection of its sensitive sources and methods and the effects of the responsibility on the Warren Commission investigation; and
  - (20) (5) The substance and quality of information concerning Luisa Calderon passed on to the Warren Commission, the results of this committee's investigation of Calderon and her significance to the events of November 22, 1963.
- (21) The investigation by the committee of the CIA involved an extensive analysis of some of its sensitive sources and methods. Because these sources and methods are protected by law from unauthorized disclosure [see 505 U.S.C. 403(d)(3)], portions of this report have been written in a somewhat conclusory manner designed to avoid referring explicitly to such sensitive sources and methods. A classified staff report dealing explicitly with these sensitive sources and methods is in the committee's files. (6)

## II. ORGANIZATION OF THE CIA'S INVESTIGATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S ASSASSINATION

(22) In his executive session testimony before the committee, Richard Helms, the CIA's deputy director for plans during 1963, described the Agency's role in the investigation of President Kennedy's assassination as follows:

- (23) This crime was committed on United States soil. Therefore, as far as the Federal Government was concerned, the

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\*CIA files pertaining to A-1 and an Agency employee's personal safe holdings were made available to this Committee subject to Agency deletion. Because the committee's legislative mandate was limited in terms of time, H. Res. 433, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977, the policy decision was made to negotiate for documents rather than engage in time-consuming lawsuits.

primary investigating agency would have been the Federal Bureau of Investigation without any question. The role of the CIA would have been entirely supportive in the sense of what material we are [sic] able to acquire outside the limits of the United States with reference to the investigation. \* \* \* For investigative purposes, the Agency had no investigative role inside the United States at all. So when I used here the word "supportive," I meant that in the literal sense of the term. We are [sic] trying to support the FBI and support the Warren Commission and be responsive to their requests, but we were not initiating any investigations of our own or, to my recollection, were we ever asked to. (7)

(24) On November 23, 1963, Helms had called a meeting of senior-level CIA officials to outline the Agency's investigative responsibility vis-a-vis the assassination. (8) At that time, Helms placed John Scelso, a desk officer in the Western Hemisphere Division and headquarter's Mexico branch chief, in charge of the Agency's initial investigative efforts. (9)

(25) Scelso testified before the committee that he was given charge of the Agency's investigation on the basis of two considerations: (1) his prior experience in conducting major CIA security investigations; and (2) the observation of Oswald in Mexico (Scelso's headquarters responsibility) reported to the CIA less than 2 months prior to the assassination. (13) Scelso also noted that during the course of his investigative efforts, Helms did not pressure him to adopt specific investigative theories nor reach conclusions within a set period of time. (14)

(26) Scelso described in detail to the committee the manner in which he conducted the Agency's investigation:

\* \* \* practically my whole branch participated in the thing. We dropped almost everything else and I put a lot of my officers to work in tracing names, analyzing files.

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\*During the course of the Agency's investigation, liaison with the FBI was handled for the CIA by a former FBI agent who was chief of the Special Investigations Group of the CIA's Counter-Intelligence Staff. (10) He characterized his functions with respect to the Agency as follows:

I knew that we [at CIA] did not have the basic responsibility for investigating the assassination of the President. If there was a crime committed in the course of this activity, it belonged to the FBI. I recognized that it was our responsibility to give the fullest cooperation to the FBI to protect the Agency with regard to any aspects of our operations, you understand, and at the same time giving them cooperation, and I was in close contact with Mr. Sam Papich [of the FBI], and always fully cooperated, and he always fully cooperated with me. (11)

[This officer] noted that his office (CI/SIG), at the direction of the Chief of Counterintelligence, James Angleton, was designated the central point for collection of assassination-related information made available to the FBI. (12)

\*\*Raymond Rocca, chief of research and analysis for CIA's Counterintelligence staff, characterized Scelso's responsibility not as a mandate to investigate, but rather to "coordinate traffic (code facilitation, telegram or telegraphic consideration) for working with the DDP with respect to what was being done over the whole world. . . ." (15) Rocca referred to this phase of CIA activity by a cryptonym. (16)

We were flooded with cable traffic, with reports, suggestions, allegations from all over the world, and these things had to be checked out. We were checking out just dozens and dozens of people all the time.(17)

(27) Scelso stated during his testimony that CIA field stations worldwide were alerted to the Agency's investigation "and the key stations were receiving tips on the case, most of which were phony. We did not send out instructions saying everybody participate in the investigation."(18) It was his recollection, however, that throughout his tenure as coordinator of the Agency's investigation, the Mexican branch was the only CIA unit directly involved in investigatory activities related to President Kennedy's assassination.\*(19)

(28) Scelso effectively coordinated a voluminous flow of cable traffic related to the assassination. During the first half of December, he issued a summary report that described Oswald's activities in Mexico City from September 26, 1963, to October 3, 1963. Scelso characterized the summary report as incomplete by comparison to assassination-related information then available to the FBI but not provided to the CIA until late December 1963.\*\* (20)

(29) Following issuance of this report, Helms shifted responsibility for the CIA's investigation to the Counterintelligence Staff.(22) He testified that this shift was a logical development because the investigation had begun to take on broader tones.(23)

(30) Helms' reasoning was expanded upon by Raymond Rocca, chief of research and analysis for the CIA's Counterintelligence Staff, who testified before the Committee that the shift in responsibility described by Helms was caused in part by the establishment of the Warren Commission.(24) Rocca added:

(31) It was entirely appropriate in the [initial] phase that he [Scelso] would have that [responsibility for the Agency investigation.] But the minute you had a commission set up outside, the line obviously had to be the Director, and from the Director to his Chief of Operations overseas, because the spread involved then all of the divisions. Here you had Mr. [Scelso] being asked to sign off on cables that had to do with [other international concerns,] and it would have seemed to me utterly administratively simply a hybrid monster.(25)

(32) James Angleton, chief of the Counterintelligence Staff supported Rocca's belief that "the spread [of investigative responsibility] involved . . . all of the [CIA] divisions." Angleton testified to this committee that the Agency's efforts to gather and coordinate information related to the assassination underwent a metamorphic transition. Initially, Angleton noted, the Director, Deputy Director, Division Chiefs and Case Officers approached the Warren Commission's requirements

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\*The CIA does not agree with this statement. According to the Agency, all of its branches were tasked immediately after the assassination. Subsequently, 10 of its stations were tasked to pursue investigative leads.

\*\*Approximately 2 days after President Kennedy's assassination, Scelso prepared a summary report, provided to President Johnson by Helms. This report stated that Oswald probably was a lone assassin who had no visible ties to Soviet or Cuban intelligence though such ties could not be excluded from consideration.(21)

in a piecemeal fashion. Eventually Angleton testified, the Agency was able to focus its resources to avoid duplication of effort and provide a system for the central referencing of assassination-related information as such information was developed. (26)

(33) The record reveals that during this second phase of CIA information collection efforts in support of the Warren Commission investigation, the concentration of Agency resources shifted in emphasis from exploration of Oswald's activities in Mexico City to his residency in the Soviet Union during 1959-62 and possible association with the Soviet intelligence apparatus. (27) Rocca commented that during this phase, primary interest in support of the Warren Commission was to pursue Soviet leads:

\* \* \* on the assumption that a person who spends four years \* in the Soviet Union, under his circumstances, had to be of specific interest to Soviet State security and their collateral authorities. (28)

(34) Rocca concluded that the areas on which the CIA tended to concentrate concerned the Soviets:

(35) \* \* \* because the people he [Oswald] was in touch with in Mexico had traces, prior traces, as KGB people. They were under consular cover and obviously could have been doing and were undoubtedly doing a consular job in those earlier contacts. (29)

(36) Nevertheless, Rocca did indicate that Cuban aspects of the CIA investigation were not ignored "because there was a lot of material that came through and went to the Commission that concerned the Cubans." (30)

(37) Helms also testified that the possibility of Cuban involvement was a source of deep concern within the Agency. (31) He added, however, that development of information pertaining to Cuban knowledge of or participation in the assassination was very difficult to obtain. (32)

(38) Angleton was in agreement with Rocca's analysis that during the second phase of the Agency's effort the CIA concentrated its resources on exploring possible Soviet influence on Oswald. (33) He indicated that in part, this simply reflected inadequate CIA resources:

(39) I personally believe that the United States intelligence services did not have the capabilities to ever come to an adjudication [of the Cuban aspect]. I don't think the capabilities were there. (34)

(40) As noted above, the counterintelligence Staff was given responsibility in late December 1963-early January 1964 for the coordination of CIA efforts to assist the Warren Commission in its investigation. At that time, Raymond Rocca was designated point of contact with the Commission. (35) Rocca's research and analysis component was concerned with:

(41) analytical intelligence, analytical brainpower, which meant all source, all overt source comprehension; a study of cases

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\* In fact, Oswald spent 2 years, eight months in the Soviet Union.



that had ceased to occupy operational significance, that is, closed cases, to maintain the ongoing record of overall quality and quantity of counterintelligence being performed by the entire DDP operational component; \*\*\* the Deputy Director for Plans.(36)

(42) Rocca testified that assassination-related information generated by CIA components was directed to his staff (as designated point of contact with the Warren Commission) in the normal flow of day-to-day work.(37)

This information was then reviewed by Rocca or his assistants, who included [Agency employee] (Soviet Expert), [Agency employee] (general research and document search man for the U.S. intelligence community and its resources), and [Agency employee] (who had transferred to the CIA from the FBI a number of years prior to the assassination).(38) During the course of the Warren Commission investigation, [this group] worked with those CIA divisions that were producing substantive information related to the assassination.(39) Rocca and his group effectively coordinated the large volume of cable traffic available to them pertaining to the assassination.

(43) Rocca testified that even though the Counterintelligence/Research and Analysis Unit was the Agency's point of reference with regard to the Warren Commission, neither his staff nor the counterintelligence staff in general displaced the direct relations of Helms or any other concerned Agency official with the Warren Commission.(40) Rocca indicated that in some instances J. Lee Rankin of the Warren Commission would go directly to Helms with requests; in other instances, David Slawson, a Commission staff counsel, conferred directly with [Agency employee] of Rocca's staff.\*(41)

(44) The record reveals that on certain issues of particular sensitivity, Rocca was not permitted to act as the Agency's point of contact with the Warren Commission. He testified that "compartmentalization was observed notwithstanding the fact that I was the working level point of contact." (44) Rocca cited by way of example the case of the Soviet defector Yuri Nosenko. Rocca testified that he did not attend any of the Agency discussions pertaining to Nosenko's case. (45) Rather, responsibility for the case was assigned to the Chief of Soviet Russian Division, in addition to Helms.(46)

(45) Rocca described the counterintelligence Staff mail intercept program, HT-Lingual, as a second example of an Agency matter about which he had no knowledge nor input vis-a-vis the Agency's support role to the Warren Commission.(47) Rather, Angleton and [Agency employee] handled the disposition of this particular material.(48)

(46) In summary, it was Rocca's testimony that an internally decentralized information reporting function, coordinated by the

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\*Although James Angleton functioned as Rocca's direct superior during the course of the Warren Commission investigation, he did not participate on a regular basis in the Agency's efforts to supply substantive information to the Warren Commission, nor did he deal on a direct basis with Warren Commission representatives, excepting Allen Dulles on an unofficial basis.(42) Nonetheless, Angleton testified to this committee that he did attempt to keep apprised of developments as the investigation progressed through consultation with Rocca.(43)

Counterintelligence staff, best characterized the organization of this second phase of the Agency's investigative efforts to assist the Warren Commission. (49)

### III. THE WARREN COMMISSION-CIA WORKING RELATIONSHIP

#### A. OPINIONS OF WARREN COMMISSION AND CIA REPRESENTATIVES REGARDING THE WARREN COMMISSION-CIA RELATIONSHIP

(47) The Warren Commission was created on November 29, 1963, by Executive Order No. 11130. Pursuant to that order, the Commission was in part empowered "\* \* \* to evaluate all the facts and circumstances surrounding such assassination \* \* \*." In addition, the order made clear that "all executive departments and agencies are directed to furnish the Commission with such facilities, services and cooperation as it may request from time to time."

(48) The committee contacted both members of the Warren Commission staff and those representatives of the CIA who played significant roles in providing CIA-generated information to the Commission. The general consensus of these people was that the Commission and the CIA enjoyed a successful working relationship during the course of the Commission's investigation. (50) William Coleman, a senior staff counsel for the Warren Commission who worked closely with Warren Commission staff counsel W. David Slawson on matters that involved the CIA's resources, characterized the CIA representatives with whom he dealt as highly competent, cooperative and intelligent. (51) Slawson expressed a similar opinion regarding the Agency's cooperation and quality of work. (52)

(49) J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel for the Warren Commission, testified that the Warren Commission and its staff were assured by the CIA that the Agency would cooperate in the Commission's work. (53) John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence at the time of President Kennedy's assassination and during the Warren Commission's investigation, supported Rankin's testimony in this regard by characterizing the CIA's work vis-a-vis the Warren Commission as both responsive and comprehensive. (54) (McCone had been responsible for insuring that all relevant matters were conveyed by the CIA to the Commission.) (55) McCone testified that:

(50) The policy of the CIA was to give the Warren Commission everything that we had. I personally asked Chief Justice Warren to come to my office and took him down to the vault of our building where our information is microfilmed and stored and showed him the procedures that we were following and the extent to which we were giving him—giving his staff everything that we had, and I think he was quite satisfied. (56)

(51) Rocca likewise characterized the Agency's role as one of full support to the Commission. He stated under oath that Helms had given the following directive:

(52) All material bearing in any way that could be of assistance to the Warren Commission should be seen by CI staff and R and A and marked for us. He issued very, very

strictly worded instructions—they were verbal in so far as I know—that we were to leave no stone unturned. (57)

(53) Rocca added that, to his knowledge, Helms' orders were followed to the letter by all CIA employees. (58) He concluded that on this basis "the CIA was to turn over and to develop any information bearing on the assassination that could be of assistance to the Warren Commission." (59)

(54) A different view of the CIA's role regarding the supply of CIA's information to the Commission was offered by Helms. Helms, who served as the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans during the Warren Commission investigation, was directly responsible for the Agency's investigation of President Kennedy's assassination and the establishment of CIA policy vis-vis the Warren Commission. (60) He testified to the committee that the CIA made every effort to be as responsive as possible to Warren Commission requests. (61) He added further details regarding the manner in which the CIA provided its information to the Commission:

(55) An inquiry would come over [from the Warren Commission]. We would attempt to respond to it. But these inquiries came in individual bits and pieces or as individual items \* \* \* Each individual item that came along we took care of as best we could. (62)

(56) It was Helms' recollection that the CIA provided information to the Warren Commission primarily on the basis of the Commission's specific requests. He said:

STAFF COUNSEL. In summary, is it your position that the Agency gave the Warren Commission information only in response to specific requests by the Warren Commission?

MR. HELMS. That is correct.

I want to modify that by saying that memory is fallible. There may have been times or circumstances under which something different might have occurred, but my recollection is that we were attempting to be responsive and supportive to the FBI and the Warren Commission. When they asked for something we gave it to them.

As far as our volunteering information is concerned, I have no recollection of whether we volunteered it or not. (63)

(57) Helms' characterization of fulfilling Warren Commission requests on a case-by-case basis rather than uniformly volunteering relevant information to the Warren Commission stands in direct opposition to Rankin's perception of the CIA's investigative responsibility. Rankin was asked by staff counsel whether he was under the impression that the Agency's responsibility was simply to respond to questions addressed it by the Warren Commission. In response, Rankin testified:

(58) Not at all and if anybody had told me that I would have insisted that the Commission communicate with the President and get a different arrangement because we might not ask the right questions and then we would not have the information and that would be absurd. (64)

(59) Slawson supported Rankin's position, testifying that Warren Commission requests to the CIA were rarely specific. "The request was made initially that they give us all information pertinent to the assassination investigation." (65)

**B. THE CIA'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE CIA ANTI-CASTRO ASSASSINATION PLANS TO THE WARREN COMMISSION**

(60) An unfortunate consequence of the Warren Commission's reliance on the CIA to provide the Commission with all relevant material is reflected in the subsequent exposure of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots and the Agency's failure to provide this information. (66) Rocca indicated that he had no knowledge at the time of the Warren Commission investigation of Agency efforts to assassinate Castro. (67) Consequently, he was not in position to communicate this information.

(61) The record also reveals that the CIA desk officer to whom Helms initially gave the responsibility to investigate Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy had no knowledge of such plots during his investigation. (68) Scelso testified that had he known of such assassination plots, the following actions would have been taken:

(62) We would have gone at that hot and heavy. We would have queried the agent (AMLASH) about it in great detail. I would have had him polygraphed by the best operative security had to see if he had [sic] been a double-agent, informing Castro about our poison pen things, and so on. I would have had all our Cuban sources queried about it. (69)

(63) As the record reflects, these plots were known to few within the CIA. Mr. Helms' testimony regarding these plots reveals that some Agency employees compromised the policy of its Director to supply all relevant information to the Warren Commission. The following exchange between committee counsel and Helms illustrates the extent of the Agency's compromise:

STAFF COUNSEL. Mr. Helms, I take it from your testimony that your position is that the anti-Castro plots, in fact, were relevant to the Warren Commission's work; and, in light of that, the Committee would like to be informed as to why the Warren Commission was not told by you of the anti-Castro assassination plots.

Mr. HELMS. I have never been asked to testify before the Warren Commission about our operations.

STAFF COUNSEL. If the Warren Commission did not know of the operation, it certainly was not in a position to ask you about it.

Is that not true?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, but how do you know they did not know about it? How do you know Mr. Dulles had not told them? How was I to know that? And besides, I was not the Director of the Agency and in the CIA, you did not go traipsing around to the Warren Commission or to Congressional

Committees or to anyplace else without the Director's permission.

STAFF COUNSEL. Did you ever discuss with the Director whether the Warren Commission should be informed of the anti-Castro assassination plots?

Mr. HELMS. I did not, as far as I recall. (70)

(64) McCone testified that he first became aware of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots involving CIA-Mafia ties during August 1963.\* He stated that upon learning of these plots, he directed that the Agency cease all such activities. (75) When asked whether the CIA desired to withhold information from the Warren Commission about the Agency anti-Castro assassination plots to avoid embarrassing the Agency or causing an international crisis, he gave the following response:

(65) I cannot answer that since they (CIA employees knowledgeable of the continuance of such plots) withheld the information from me. I cannot answer that question. I have never been satisfied as to why they withheld the information from me. (76)

(66) Regarding the relevancy of such plots to the Warren Commission's work, Warren Commission counsels Rankin, Slawson, and Spec-ter were in agreement that such information should have been reported to the Warren Commission. (77)

(67) Rocca testified that had he known of the anti-Castro assassination plots, his efforts to explore the possibility of a retaliatory assassination against President Kennedy by Castro would have been intensi-

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\*On August 11, 1963, a *Chicago Sun Times* article reported that the CIA had in the past been in contact with Chicago Mafia figure Sam Giancana. Upon being apprised of this article, McCone requested a report about the article from Richard Helms. The memorandum that Helms provided to McCone stated:

1. Attached is the only copy in the Agency of a memorandum on subject, the ribbon copy of which was sent to the Attorney General in May of 1962. I was vaguely aware of the existence of such a memorandum since I was informed that it had been written as a result of a briefing given by Colonel Edwards and Lawrence Houston to the Attorney General in May of last year.

2. I spoke with Colonel Edwards on the telephone last evening, and, in the absence of Mr. Bannerman on leave, I was with Colonel Edwards' assistance able to locate this copy. As far as I am aware, this is the only written information available on Agency relationships with subject. I hope this will serve your purpose.

3. I assume you are aware of the nature of the operation discussed in the attachment. (71)

Attached to the above memorandum was a May 14, 1962, memorandum from Sheffield Edwards to Attorney General Robert Kennedy which described the CIA-Giancana connection as having been terminated prior to McCone's assumption of the CIA directorship. (72) McCone concluded that the CIA-Giancana operation concerned the assassination of Fidel Castro. (73) The 1967 CIA Inspector General's Report concluded that August 1963 was:

\* \* \* The earliest date on which we have evidence of Mr. McCone's being aware of any aspect of the scheme to assassinate Castro using members of the gambling syndicate. (74)

fied. He stated that: "a completely different procedural approach probably would and should have been taken." (78)

(68) Scelso offered a highly critical appraisal of Helms' nondisclosure to the Warren Commission:

STAFF COUNSEL. Do you think Mr. Helms was acting properly when he failed to tell the Warren Commission about the assassination plots?

MR. SCELSO. No, I think that was a morally highly reprehensible act, which he cannot possibly justify under his oath of office, or any other standard of professional public service. (79)

C. AGENCY'S LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS—FACTORS AFFECTING THE CIA RESPONSE TO WARREN COMMISSION REQUESTS

(69) The length of time required by the CIA to respond to the Warren Commission's request for information was dependent on (1) the availability of information; (2) the complexity of the issues involved in the request; and (3) the extent to which the relevant information touched upon sensitive CIA sources and methods. On the first two points, Helms testified that when the CIA was able to satisfy a Commission request, it would send a reply back. With respect to timing:

(70) . . . some of these inquiries obviously took longer than others.

For example, some might involve checking a file which was in Washington. Other inquiries might involve trying to see if we could locate somebody in some overseas country.

Obviously, one takes longer to perform than the other. (80)

(71) Under law, the Director of Central Intelligence has always been required to protect sensitive sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure ([50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3)]). As a result of this responsibility, in some instances the Agency initially limited access by the Commission to CIA original source materials. (81) J. Lee Rankin expressed the opinion that on occasion, the Agency's effort to protect its sensitive sources and methods affected the quality of the information to which the Warren Commission and its staff were given access. (82)

(72) The committee was fully aware that traditional intelligence reporting procedures do not normally include revealing sources and methods. Moreover, Federal law obligates the CIA to protect its sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Had the Warren Commission investigation been conducted under normal conditions, revealing sources and methods would not have been expected, much less required. Nevertheless, it may be argued because the circumstances of this investigation were extraordinary, no possible source of relevant evidence should have been considered an unauthorized disclosure.

(73) The committee identified two related areas of concern in which the Agency's desire to protect its sensitive sources and methods may have impeded the Warren Commission's investigation. These were:

(74) —Initially not providing the Commission with original source materials pertaining to Oswald's trip to Mexico;

(75) —The Agency's reluctance to reveal the origin of a photograph of an unidentified man who had mistakenly been linked to Oswald.

(76) The CIA's concern over revealing the existence of sensitive sources and methods was evident from the inception of the Warren Commission. Scelso commented that "we are not authorized at first to reveal all our [sensitive] operations." (83) He did, however, testify that:

(77) We were going to give them intelligence reports which derived from all our sources, including [sensitive] sources, including the [sensitive sources] and the information gotten from the interrogation of Silvia Duran, for example, which corresponded almost exactly with the information from the [sensitive sources]. (84)

(78) Scelso's characterization is supported by examination of the background to the first major CIA report furnished the Warren Commission, dated January 31, 1964, regarding Oswald's trip to Mexico City. (85) Much of the information provided to the Warren Commission in this report was based on sensitive sources and methods, identification of which had been deleted completely from the report.

(79) The CIA policy limiting Warren Commission knowledge of CIA sources and methods was articulated as early as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was sent from CIA headquarters to a [foreign country] station. The cable stated:

(80) Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of [sensitive sources and methods] in order to protect [\* \* \*] continuing ops. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet consular file which Soviets gave [State Department]. (86)

(81) The basic policy articulated in the December 20, 1963, cable, as it specifically concerned the CIA's relations with the FBI, is also set forth in a CIA memorandum of December 10, 1963. (87) In that memorandum, [an Agency employee] of the CIA Counterintelligence Staff, Special Investigations Group, wrote that he had been advised by Sam Papich, FBI liaison to the CIA, that the FBI was anticipating a request from the Warren Commission for copies of the FBI's materials which supported or complemented the FBI's five volume report of December 9, 1963, that had been submitted to the Warren Commission. Papich provided [the Agency employee] with this report, which indicated that some U.S. agency was conducting a sensitive operation abroad and asked him whether the FBI could supply the Warren Commission with the source of this operation. The [Agency employee] memorandum shows that he discussed this matter with Scelso. After a discussion with Helms, Scelso was directed by Helms to prepare CIA material to be passed to the Warren Commission. The [Agency employee] then made the following notation regarding sensitive sources and methods:

(82) He [Scelso] was quite sure it was not the Agency's desire to make available to the Commission at least in this manner—via the FBI—sensitive information which could relate to sensitive sources and methods \* \* \* [The] Agency desired to establish some other policy with regard to meeting the needs of the Commission.\* (88)

(83) The CIA policy of eliminating reference to Agency sensitive sources and methods is further revealed by examination of an Agency cable, dated January 29, 1964, sent from CIA headquarters to a CIA [unit]. (91) This cable indicated that knowledge of Agency sources and techniques was still being withheld from the Warren Commission, and stated that on Saturday, February 1, 1964, the CIA was to present a report on Oswald's Mexico City activities to the Warren Commission that would be in a form protective of the CIA sources and techniques. (92)

(84) On February 1, 1964, Helms appeared before the Commission. It is likely that he discussed the CIA memorandum to the Warren Commission of January 31, 1964.\*\* (93) On February 10, 1964, Rankin wrote Helms in regard to that CIA memorandum. (94) A review of Rankin's letter indicates that as of his writing, the Warren Commission had no information pertaining to CIA's [sensitive sources and methods] that had generated the information on Oswald.

(85) Rankin inquired in the February 10, 1964, letter whether Oswald's direct communication with employees of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City (as stated in paragraph 1 of the January 31 memorandum) had been obtained by [sensitive source and methods] or by interview. Manifestly, had the Warren Commission been informed of

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\* The opinion expressed by Scelso as of December 20, 1963, was set forth on January 14, 1964, in a formalized fashion when Helms expressed his concern regarding exposure by the FBI of Agency sources to the Warren Commission. Helms wrote that the CIA had become aware that the FBI had already:

called to the attention of the Commission, through its attorney, that we have information [as determined from Agency sources] coinciding with dates when Oswald was in Mexico City and which may have some bearing on his activities while in that area. (89)

Helms further indicated that the CIA might be called upon to provide additional information acquired from checks of CIA records and agency sources. He suggested that certain policies be employed to enable CIA to work cooperatively with the Commission in a manner which would protect CIA information, sources and methods. Among the policies articulated were two which Helms claimed would enable the Agency to control the flow of Agency originated information. In this way the CIA could check the possibility of revealing its sources and methods inadvertently. The policies articulated were:

(1) Your Bureau not disseminate information received from this Agency without prior concurrence.

(2) In instances in which this Agency has provided information to your Bureau and you consider that information is pertinent to the Commission's interest, and/or complements (or otherwise is pertinent to information developed or received by your Bureau through) other sources and is being provided by you to the Commission, you refer the Commission to this Agency. In such cases it will be appreciated if you will advise us of such referral in order that we may anticipate the possible further interest of the Commission and initiate action preparatory to meeting its needs. (90)

\*\*See paragraphs 78.



the sensitive source and method, this inquiry by Rankin would not have been made.

(86) Nevertheless, it was Rocca's recollection that during the time period of January 1964–April 1964, Warren Commission representatives had visited the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Va., and had been shown the original source materials derived from sensitive CIA sources and methods.(95) Rocca, however, did not personally make this material available to Commission representatives and was not able to state under oath precisely the point in time at which the Warren Commission first learned of these operations.(96)

(87) On February 19, 1964, the CIA responded to Rankin's inquiry of February 10.(97) The Agency response indicated that Oswald had contacted the Soviet consulate and was also interviewed at the consulate. Nevertheless, the Agency still did not explicitly reveal the source of this information.(98)

#### D. WARREN COMMISSION KNOWLEDGE OF CIA SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS

(88) During the period of March–April 1964, David Slawson drafted a series of memorandums that, among other issues, concerned Warren Commission knowledge of and access to the material derived from relevant CIA sensitive operations. CIA headquarters had obtained the raw data generated by these sensitive operations almost immediately after the assassination.(99) A review of these memorandums tends to support the belief that the Warren Commission, through Messrs. Slawson, Coleman and Willens, did not obtain access to CIA [original source] materials until April 9, 1964.(100) On that date, Coleman, Slawson and Willens met with a CIA [representative] who provided them with [raw data] derived from [sensitive operations].\*

(89) It appears doubtful that the Commission had been given direct access to this material prior to April 9. Nevertheless, by March 12, 1964, the record indicates that the Warren Commission had at least become aware of the CIA [sensitive operations] that had generated information concerning Oswald.(102) Slawson's memorandum of March 12 reveals that the Warren Commission had learned that the CIA possessed information concerning conversations between the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Hernandez Armas, and Cuban President Dorticos.\*\* The Dorticos-Armas conversations, requested by the Warren Commission representatives at a March 12 meeting with CIA officials, including Richard Helms, concerned Silvia Duran's arrest and interrogation by the Mexican Federal Police.(104) Helms responded to the Commission's request for access that he would attempt to arrange for the Warren Commission's representatives to review this material.(105)

(90) Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25, 1964, concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. Slawson wrote that the tentative conclusions he had reached concerning Oswald's Mexico trip were derived

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\* Slawson, when interviewed by this committee, stated that he became aware of the *existence* of CIA [sensitive operations] probably prior to his April 9, 1964, trip to Mexico City and no later than during his visit to Mexico City.(101)

\*\*These conversations had been summarized in the CIA's January 31, memorandum concerning Oswald's activities while in Mexico City.(103)

from CIA memorandums of January 31, 1964, and February 19, 1964, and, in addition, a Mexican Federal Police summary of interrogations with Silvia Duran, her brother Ruben, husband Horacio, and a handful of friends, conducted shortly after the assassination. (106)

(91) Slawson said:

A large part of it [the summary report] is simply a summation of what the Mexican police learned when they interrogated Mrs. Silvia Duran, an employee of the Cuban consulate in Mexico City, and is therefore only as accurate as Mrs. Duran's testimony to the police. (107)

(92) These comments indicate that Slawson placed qualified reliance on the Mexican police summary. Moreover, there is no indication that Slawson had been provided the [raw data] pertaining to Duran that had been obtained by means of [sensitive CIA sources and methods]. In fact, by virtue of Slawson's comments concerning the Mexican police report, it would appear that the Warren Commission, as of March 25, had been provided little substantive information pertaining to Silvia Duran. As Slawson revealed, the Commission had been forced to rely upon the two memoranda that did not make reference to the [sensitive operations], and a summary report issued by the Mexican Federal Police. Thus, the Agency had for over 3 months precluded exposing [raw data] generated by its [sensitive operations] to the actual review and analysis of the Warren Commission. (108)

(93) The evidence indicates that Slawson had not been given access to the [raw data] pertaining to Duran that had been generated by CIA [sensitive operations.] This is further supported by his memorandum of March 27, 1964, in which he states his conclusion that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy at least twice and probably on three occasions. (109) This conclusion, he again wrote, was based upon an analysis of Silvia Duran's testimony before the Mexican police. This memorandum bears no indication that he had reviewed any [raw data] pertaining to this issue.

(94) The record supports the judgment that as of April 2, 1964, the Warren Commission, although aware of their existence, had still not been given access to the above-referenced series of [original source materials]. A memorandum of that date by Coleman and Slawson posed one question to the CIA and made two requests for information from the Agency: (110)

(95) (1) What is the information source referred to in the November 28 telegram that Oswald intended to settle down in Odessa;

(96) (2) We would like to see copies of the [raw data] in all cases where the [raw data] refer to the assassination of related subjects;

(97) (3) We would especially like to see the [raw data] in which the allegation that money was passed at the Cuban Embassy is discussed. (111)

(98) The question initially posed by (item 1) in the above-referenced memorandum of April 2 concerns a [sensitive CIA operation]. (112) Obviously, if Slawson found it necessary to request the source of the

information, he had not as yet been provided access to the original material by the CIA.

(99) Item No. 2 of the above listing tends to show that the Commission had not been given access to certain [sensitive raw data] concerning the assassination.

(100) Item No. 3 of the above listing reveals that the [sensitive raw data] pertaining to the Dorticos-Armas conversation of November 22, 1964, in which the passing of moneys was discussed, had not, as of April 2, been provided to the Commission, despite the Commission's having specifically requested this information at a March 12, 1964, meeting between Commission representatives and Agency representatives. (113)

(101) On April 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson expressed their concern about getting complete access to all materials relevant to Oswald's Mexico City trip:

(102) The most probable final result of the entire investigation of Oswald's activities in Mexico is a conclusion that he went there for the purpose of trying to reach Cuba and that no bribes, conspiracies, etc. took place.

(103) \* \* \* *In order to make such a judgment (that all reasonable lines of investigation that might have uncovered other motivations or possible conspiracies have been followed through with negative results), we must become familiar with the details of what both the American and Mexican investigatory agencies there have done. This means reading their reports, after translation, if necessary, and in some cases talking with the investigators themselves.* [Emphasis added.] (114)

(104) Nevertheless, as the record tends to show, Coleman's and Slawson's desire for a thorough investigation was subject to the limitations imposed by the CIA's concern for protecting its sources and methods from disclosure. Given the gravity and significance of the Warren Commission's investigation, the Agency's initial withholding of original source material from the Commission staff may have impeded its ability to reach accurately reasoned conclusions with respect to Oswald's activities while in Mexico City.

(105) On April 8, 1964, Slawson, Willens, and Coleman flew to Mexico City, Mexico, to meet with the representatives of the State Department, FBI, CIA, and the Government of Mexico. (115) The group was met by U.S. Ambassador Freeman, Claire Boonstra of the State Department, Clark Anderson of the FBI and a [CIA representative]. (116) That same day, the [CIA representative] made available the [raw data] concerning Oswald and Duran that the Agency had [collected]. (117) In addition, he provided the group with photographs for the time period covered by Oswald's visit. (118) David Slawson wrote:

(106) \* \* \* The [CIA representative] stated at the beginning of his narrative that he intended to make a complete disclosure of all facts, including the sources of his information, and that he understood that all three of us had been cleared for Top Secret and that we would not disclose beyond the

confines of the Commission and its immediate staff the information we obtained through him without first clearing it with his superiors in Washington. We agreed to this. (119)

(107) The [CIA representative] described to the Commission staff members the CIA's course of action directly following the assassination, indicating that his staff immediately began to compile dossiers on Oswald, Duran and everyone else throughout Mexico whom the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald. (120) He revealed that all known Cuban and Russian intelligence agents had quickly been put under surveillance. Slawson concluded:

(108) The [CIA representative's] narrative plus the material we were shown disclosed immediately how incorrect our previous information had been on Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and Mexican (sic) Embassies.\* Apparently the distortions and omissions to which our information had been subjected had entered some place in Washington, because *the CIA information that we were shown by the [CIA representative] was unambiguous on almost all the crucial points.* We had previously planned to show the [CIA representative] Slawson's reconstruction of Oswald's probable activities at the embassies to get the [CIA representative's] opinion, but once we saw how badly distorted our information was we realized that this would be useless. Therefore, instead, we decided to take as close notes as possible from the original source materials at some later time during our visit. (121)\*\*

(109) It may be that the "informational distortions" that Slawson notes were merely the product of Slawson's mistaken analysis of the CIA material provided to him. The record does reflect that Slawson had reviewed the CIA's January 31 memorandum that accurately summarized all of the [raw data] in question. (123) Nevertheless, as the result of his direct review of the active [raw data] derived from the original source material, Slawson was able to clarify substantially his analysis of Oswald's activities while in Mexico City. (124)

(110) It may be argued therefore that the CIA's reluctance to provide the Warren Commission with its original source material may have hampered the efficiency of the Commission's investigation of Oswald's Mexico City activities. In the process, the CIA's reluctance conflicted with President Johnson's Executive order that the executive agencies:

(111) \* \* \* furnish the Commission with such facilities, services and cooperation as it may request from time to time. (125)

#### E. THE PHOTOGRAPH OF AN UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUAL

(112) On November 23, 1963, an FBI Special Agent showed Marguerite Oswald a photograph of a man. (126) This photograph had been supplied to the FBI on November 22 by the CIA. (127) It had

\*The reference should be to the Cuban Embassy.

\*\*A separate Slawson memorandum of Apr. 21, 1964, records the results of his notetaking from original source materials following the [CIA representative's] disclosures. These notes dealt exclusively with the [sensitive raw data] pertaining to Duran and Oswald for the period September 27 to October 1, 1963. (122)

been obtained in early October 1963 and at that time had been linked by some [Agency employees] to Lee Harvey Oswald. (128) The subject of the photograph, however, bore no resemblance to Lee Harvey Oswald.

(113) On February 10, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified before the Warren Commission and recounted the circumstances under which she was shown the photograph. (129) Mrs. Oswald testified that she believed this photograph to have been of Jack Ruby. (130)

(114) Thereafter, on February 12, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote to Thomas Karramesines, assistant deputy director for plans (DDP), requesting both the identity of the individual in the photograph and an explanation of the circumstances by which the photograph had been obtained by CIA. (131)

(115) On that same day, in a separate letter, Rankin wrote to McCone regarding materials that the CIA had disseminated since November 22, 1963, to the Secret Service, but not to the Warren Commission. He requested copies of these materials, which included three CIA cables concerning the photograph of the individual originally identified by some [Agency employees] as Lee Harvey Oswald and thereafter shown by the FBI to Oswald's mother. (132)

(116) John Scelso testified about the reasons why the CIA did not explain to the Commission the origin of the photograph:

(117) We did not initially disclose to the Warren Commission all of our [sensitive] operations. In other words, we did not initially disclose to them that we had [such operations] because the November photo we had [of the unidentified man] was not of Oswald. Therefore it did not mean anything, you see? (133)

STAFF COUNSEL. \* \* \* So the Agency was making a unilateral decision that this was not relevant to the Warren Commission. (134)

Mr. SCELSO. Right, we were not authorized, at first, to reveal all our [sensitive] operations. (135)

(118) On March 5, 1964, Rocca wrote in an internal memorandum to Helms that "we have a problem here for your determination." (136) Rocca first outlined Angleton's desire not to respond directly to Rankin's request of February 12 regarding the CIA material forwarded to the Secret Service since November 23, 1964. (137) Rocca then stated:

(119) "Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would prefer to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by paragraph 2 [of the above-referenced February 12 letter to McCone requesting access to CIA reports provided the Secret Service after November 22, 1963]. If they come back on this point he feels that you, or someone from here, should be prepared to go over to show the Commission the material rather than pass it to them in copy. Incidentally, none of these items are of new substantive interest. We have either passed the material in substance to the Commission in response to earlier levies or the items refer to aborted leads, for example, the famous six photographs which are not of Oswald . . ." (138)

(120) On March 12, 1964, representatives of the Warren Commission and the CIA conferred regarding the February 12 request for the materials forwarded to the Secret Service by the Agency. (139) The record indicates that the Commission at the March 12 meeting pressed for access to the Secret Service materials. (140) Rankin wrote to Helms on March 16 that it was his understanding that the CIA would supply the Commission with a paraphrase of each report or communication pertaining to the Secret Service materials

with all indications of your confidential communications techniques and confidential sources deleted. You will also afford members of our staff working in this area an opportunity to review the actual file so that they may give assurance that the paraphrases are complete. (141)

(121) Rankin further indicated that the same procedure was to be followed regarding any material in the possession of the CIA prior to November 22, 1963, which had not as yet been furnished because it concerned sensitive sources and methods. (142)

(122) Helms responded to Rankin's March 16 letter on March 24 with two separate communications. (143) The initial letter of response provided the Commission with a copy of the October 10, 1963, CIA dissemination to the FBI, State Department, Immigration and Naturalization Service and Navy Department (and to the Secret Service on November 22) regarding Lee Harvey Oswald and his presence at the Soviet Consulate in Mexico City. The response revealed that on October 23, 1963, the CIA had requested from the Navy two copies of the most recent photograph of Oswald in order to check the identity of the person believed to be Oswald in Mexico City. (144) The CIA stated that it had determined at some unspecified time that the photograph earlier obtained by a [sensitive source]\* and shown to Marguerite Oswald on November 22, 1963, was not Lee Harvey Oswald. (145) The Agency explained that it had checked the photograph against the press photographs of Oswald generally available on November 23, 1963. (146)

(123) The second letter from Helms revealed that on November 22, 1963, immediately following the assassination, and on November 23, 1963, three cabled reports were received at CIA headquarters regarding photographs of an unidentified man who had visited the Cuban and Soviet Embassies during October and November 1963. (147) Paraphrases of these cables, which did not reveal sensitive sources and methods, were attached to the second letter. (148) The Agency wrote that the subject of the photograph referenced in these cables was not Oswald. It was further stated that:

(124) In response to our meeting of 12 March and your memo of 16 March, we will arrange for Mr. Stern and Mr. Willens to review at Langley the original copies of these three disseminations to the Secret Service and the cables on which they were based, as well as the photographs of the unidentified man. (149)

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\*This should not be confused with the two Navy photographs.

(125) On March 26, William Coleman wrote in a memorandum for the record:

(126) The CIA directed a memorandum to J. Lee Rankin (Commission Document No. 631) in which it set forth the dissemination of the information on Lee Harvey Oswald. I realize that this memorandum is only a partial answer to our inquiry to the CIA dated March 16, 1964 and I hope that the complete answers will give us the additional information we requested. (150)

Coleman went on to state:

As you know, we are still trying to get an explanation of the photograph which the FBI showed Marguerite Oswald soon after the assassination. I hope that paragraph 4\* of the memorandum of March 24, 1964 [CD 631] sent Mr. Rankin by the CIA is not the answer which the CIA intends to give us as to this inquiry. (151)

(127) The following day, as agreed by Warren Commission and Agency representatives, Samuel Stern of the Commission visited CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. (152)

(128) Sterns' memorandum of his visit reveals that he reviewed Oswald's file with Rocca. (153) Stern indicated that Oswald's file contained those materials furnished previously to the Warren Commission by the CIA. (154) The file also contained:

(129) Cable reports from the CIA of November 22 and 23, 1963, of a person who had visited the Cuban and Soviet Embassies during October and November [sic] 1963; and reports on these cables furnished on November 23, 1963, by CIA to the Secret Service. (155)

(130) Stern noted that these messages were accurately paraphrased in the attachments to CD 674 provided the Warren Commission on March 24, 1964. (156) Stern also reviewed the October 9, 1963, cable from a CIA unit to CIA headquarters reporting Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. (157) In addition, Stern examined the October 10, 1963 cable from CIA headquarters reporting background information on Oswald. (158) Stern recorded that these messages were accurately reported in the CIA's January 31 memorandum to the Warren Commission reporting Oswald's Mexico City trip. (159)

(131) Last, Stern noted that Rocca provided him for his review a computer printout of the references to Oswald-related documents located in the Agency's electronic data storage system. (160) He stated "there is no item listed [ . . . ] which we [the Warren Commission] have not been given either in full text or paraphrased." (161)

(132) Thus, by March 27, a Warren Commission representative had been apprised of the circumstances surrounding the mysterious photograph.\*\*

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\*Paragraph 4 of CD 631 stated that CIA concluded, based upon press photographs of Oswald generally available on November 23, 1963, that the photograph of the unidentified individual was not of Oswald.

\*\*Helms, in a sworn affidavit before the Warren Commission, stated that the photograph shown to Marguerite Oswald had been taken outside of the continental United States sometime during the period July 1, 1963, to November 23, 1963. (162)

## F. LUISA CALDERON CARRALERO

(133) The committee devoted considerable attention to the following memorandum that was obtained as a result of a review of the Oswald file: (163)

(134) Subject: Comments of Luisa Calderon Carralero

1. A reliable source reported that on 22 November 1963, several hours after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, Luisa Calderon Carralero, a Cuban employee of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, and believed to be a member of the Cuban Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI), discussed news of the assassination with an acquaintance. Initially, when asked if she had heard the latest news, Calderon replied, in what appeared to be a joking manner, "Yes, of course, I knew almost before Kennedy."

2. After further discussion of the news accounts about the assassination, the acquaintance asked Calderon what else she had learned. Calderon replied that they [assumed to refer to personnel of the Cuban Embassy] learned about it a little while ago.

(135) Rocca, in response to a 1975 Rockefeller Commission request for information on a possible Cuban conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy, wrote regarding Calderon's comments:

(136) Latin hyperbole? Boastful ex post facto suggestion of foreknowledge. This is the only item in the [sensitive operation] coverage of the Cubans and Soviets after the assassination that contains the suggestion of foreknowledge or expectation.\* (165)

(137) Standing by themselves, Luisa Calderon's cryptic comments may not have merited serious attention. Her words may indeed have indicated foreknowledge of the assassination but may equally be interpreted without such a sinister implication. Nevertheless, the committee determined that Luisa Calderon's case merited serious attention in the months following the assassination.

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\* Regarding the issue of whether Calderon's comments could reasonably be interpreted to indicate possible foreknowledge, the CIA position is as follows:

During the Rockefeller Commission inquiry, Calderon's conversation was identified as a possible item of information from the Agency's Cuban and Soviet [sensitive sources] that might suggest foreknowledge of a plot to assassinate the American President. This involves a faulty translation \* \* \* [Calderon's statement]. In answer to \* \* \* [a] \* \* \* question as to whether she had heard the latest news, Calderon said: "Si, claro, me enteré casantes que Kennedy." The verb *enteré* is mistranslated. *Me enteré* (the first person of the verb *enterarse*, past tense) should be translated as "I found out (or I learned) [about it—the assassination] almost before Kennedy [did]." In other words, Calderon was saying she heard about the shooting of Kennedy almost at the time the event took place. . . . (164)

The narrow interpretation of Calderon's comments assigned by the Agency is not the only reasonable one. The translation of *me enteré* as either "I found out" or "I learned about" does not foreclose interpretation of Calderon's comments as a suggestion on her part of possible foreknowledge of President Kennedy's assassination. The interpretation, in any event, should have been left to the judgment of the Warren Commission, not the CIA.



(138) Luisa Calderon's name first surfaced in connection with the assassination, on November 27, 1963, in a cable sent by then-Ambassador Mann to the State Department. (166)

(139) In that cable, Mann stated:

. . . Washington should urgently consider feasibility of requesting Mexican authorities to arrest for interrogation: Eusebio Azcue, Luisa Calderon and Alfredo Mirabal. The two men are Cuban national and Cuban consular officers. Luisa Calderon is a secretary in Cuban Consulate here. (167)

(140) This cable does not state the basis for arresting Calderon.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, the CIA's copy of this cable bears a handwritten notation on its routing page. That notation states: "Info from Amb Mann for Sec. Rusk re: . . . persons involved with Oswald in Cuban Embassy." Mann went on to state in urgent terms: "They may all quickly be returned to Havana in order to eliminate any possibility that Mexican government could use them as witnesses." (169)

(141) According to CIA files, Calderon made reservations to return to Havana on Cubana Airlines on December 11, 1963, less than 4 weeks after the assassination. (170)

(142) Calderon, Azcue and Mirabal were not arrested nor detained for questioning by the Mexican Federal Police.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, Silvia Duran, a friend and associate of Calderon's and the one person believed to have had repeated contact with Oswald while he was in Mexico City, was arrested and questioned by the Mexican police on two separate occasions. (172)

(143) During her second interrogation, Duran was questioned regarding her association with Calderon. There is no indication in the reinterrogation report accounting for the questioning of Duran about Calderon. (173) The information regarding Duran's interrogation was passed by CIA to the Warren Commission on February 21, 1964, more than 2 months after Calderon had returned to Cuba. (174)

(144) During May 1964, information from a Cuban defector tying Luisa Calderon to the Cuban Intelligence apparatus was reported to the CIA. The defector, [A-1], was himself a Cuban intelligence officer who supplied valuable and highly reliable information to the CIA regarding Cuban intelligence operations. (175) At that time, Joseph Langosch, Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs Staff,<sup>3</sup> reported the results of his debriefing of the Cuban defector, [A-1]. Langosch's memorandum stated that [A-1] had no direct knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald or his activities but was able to provide items of interest based upon the comments of certain Cuban intelligence service officers. (176) Specifically, [A-1] was asked if Oswald was known

<sup>1</sup> Although Mann could not recall his motivation when interviewed by the committee staff, Mann was prompted to request the arrest of Calderon on the basis of [an] allegation that Calderon was present at the Cuban Embassy when Oswald was allegedly given a sum of money, presumably to carry out the assassination of President Kennedy. (Pp. 28-30, 40-43.) (168)

<sup>2</sup> Azcue could not have been arrested because he had left Mexico for Cuba on November 18, 1963. (171)

<sup>3</sup> The Special Affairs Staff was a CIA component concerned with Cuban operations.

to the Cuban intelligence services before November 23, 1963. [A-1] told Langosch:

Prior to October 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. Before, during, and after these visits, Oswald was in contact with the Direccion General De Inteligencia (DGI), specifically with Luisa Calderon, Manuel Vega Perez, and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez. (177)

(145) Langosch thereafter wrote that Calderon's precise relationship to the DGI was not clear. As a comment on this statement, he set forth the CIA cable and dispatch traffic that recorded her arrival in Mexico during January 1963 and departure for Cuba within 1 month after the assassination. (178)

(146) On May 7, 1964, Langosch recorded additional information he had elicited from [A-1] regarding Oswald's possible contact with the DGI. (179) Paragraph 3 of this memorandum, stated in part:

(147) a. Luisa Calderon, since she returned to Cuba has been paid a regular salary by the DGI even though she has not performed any services. Her home is in the Vedado section where the rents are high. b. Source [A-1] has known Calderon for several years. Before going to Mexico, she worked in the Ministry of Exterior Commerce in the department which was known as the "Empresa Transimport." Her title was Secretary General of the Communist Youth in the department named in the previous sentence. (180)

(148) On May 8, Langosch further disclosed [A-1's] knowledge of the Oswald case. (181) He paraphrased [A-1] knowledge of Calderon as follows:

(149) I thought that Luisa Calderon might have had contact with Oswald because I learned about 17 March 1964, shortly before I made a trip to Mexico, that she had been involved with an American in Mexico. The information to which I refer was told to me by a DGI case officer . . . I had commented to (him) that it seemed strange that Luisa Calderon was receiving a salary from the DGI although she apparently did not do any work for the Service. (The case officer) told me that hers was a peculiar case and that he himself believed that she had been recruited in Mexico by the Central Intelligence Agency although Manuel Pineiro, the Head of the DGI, did not agree. As I recall, (the case officer) had investigated Luisa Calderon. This was because, during the time she was in Mexico, the DGI had intercepted a letter to her by an American who signed his name OWER (phonetic) or something similar. As you know, the pronunciation of Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in Spanish so I am not sure of how the name mentioned by [the Cuban case officer] should be spelled. It could have been "Howard" or something different. As I understand the matter, the letter from the American was a love letter but indicated that there was a clandestine professional relationship between the writer and Luisa Calderon. I also understand from (the case officer)

that after the interception of the letter she had been followed and seen in the company of an American. I do not know if this could have been Oswald. . . .(182)

(150) On May 11, 1964, Rocca wrote a memorandum to Helms regarding the information Langosch had elicited from [A-1].(183) Rocca proposed that

The DDP in person or via a designee, preferably the former, discuss the [A-1] situation on a very restricted basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience either at the Agency or at the Commission headquarters. Until this takes place, it is not desirable to put anything in writing.(184)

(151) On May 15, 1964, Helms wrote Rankin regarding [A-1's] information about the DGI, indicating its sensitivity and operational significance. (185) Attached to Helms' communication was a paraphrased accounting of Langosch's May 5 memorandum.(186) In that attachment, the intelligence associations of two Cuban diplomatic employees, Manuel Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez, were set forth. Nevertheless, that attachment made no reference whatsoever to Luisa Calderon.

(152) Howard Willens of the Warren Commission requested, as a followup to the May 15 memorandum access to the questions used in Langosch's interrogation of [A-1].(187) On June 18, 1964, an [Agency employee] of Rocca's Counterintelligence Research and Analysis Group took the questions and [A-1's] responses to the Warren Commission's office for Willens' review. The only mention of Calderon Willens found in the May 5 memorandum was as follows: "The precise relationship of Luisa Calderon to the DGI is not clear. She spent about six months in Mexico from which she returned to Cuba early in 1964."(188) Willens was not shown Langosch's memorandum of May 7 and May 8, 1964, that contained much more detailed information on Luisa Calderon, including [A-1's] report of her possible association with Lee Harvey Oswald and/or American intelligence.\*(189)

(153) The evidence indicates that the CIA did not provide a report of Calderon's conversation of November 22 to the Warren Commission. Consequently, even though the Warren Commission was aware that Calderon reportedly had connections to intelligence work, as did other Cuban Embassy officers, the vital link between her background and her comments was never established for the Warren Commission by the CIA. The agency's omission in this regard may have foreclosed the Commission's actively pursuing a lead of great significance.

(154) In an effort to determine the manner in which the CIA treated the Calderon conversation, this committee posed the following questions to the CIA :

(155) 1. Was the Warren Commission or any Warren Commission staff member ever given access to the [raw data] of Calderon's con-

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\*It should be noted that these memoranda of May 5, 7, 8, 11 and June 19 with attachments are not referenced in the Calderon 201 file. (See CIA [list] of Calderon 201 file). Their existence was determined by the committee's independent review of other agency files.

versation dated November 22, 1963? . . . If so, please indicate when this report was provided to the Warren Commission or its staff, which CIA official provided it, and which Warren Commission members or staff reviewed it.

(156) 2. Was the Warren Commission or any member of the Warren Commission or any Warren Commission staff member ever informed orally or in writing of the substance of the above-referenced conversation of November 22, 1963? If so, please indicate when and in what form this information was provided, and which CIA official provided it. (190)

(157) The CIA responded by memorandum:

Although the [Mexican unit] considered the conversation of sufficient possible interest to send a copy to headquarters, the latter apparently did nothing with it, for there appears to be no record in the Oswald file of such action as may have been taken. A review of those Warren Commission documents containing information provided by the agency and still bearing a Secret or Top Secret classification does not reveal whether the conversation was given or shown to the Commission.\* (191)

(158) The available evidence thus supports the conclusion that the Warren Commission was never given the information nor the opportunity by which it could evaluate Luisa Calderon's significance to the events surrounding President Kennedy's assassination. Had the Commission been expeditiously provided with this evidence of her intelligence background, association with Silvia Duran, and her comments following the assassination, it may well have given more serious investigative consideration to her potential knowledge of Oswald and the Cuban Government's possible involvement in a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy.

(159) Two difficult issues remain that were raised by the evidence. First, why did the Agency not provide the Calderon conversation to the Warren Commission? Second, why did the Agency not reveal to the Warren Commission its full knowledge of Calderon's intelligence background, her possible knowledge of Oswald and her possible connection to the CIA?

(160) The first question can be explained in neutral terms. It is reasonably possible that by sheer oversight, the report of conversation was filed away and not recovered or recollected until after the Warren Commission had completed its investigation and published its report.\*\*

(161) As for the Agency's failure to provide information concerning Calderon's intelligence background, the record reflects that the Commission was merely informed that Calderon may have been a member of the DGI. (193) The memoranda that provided more extensive examination of her intelligence background were not made available for the Commission's review. Significantly, the May 8 memorandum written by Joseph Langosch following his debriefing of [A-1] indicated that

\*The committee also questioned J. Lee Rankin about the Calderon conversation. Rankin did not recall that the Warren Commission had ever been told about Calderon's comments. (192)

\*\*See above CIA explanation at paragraph 157.

[A-1] and a second Cuban Intelligence officer believed Calderon to be a CIA operative. (194) Nevertheless the evidence would seem to indicate that this information was not provided the Warren Commission because there was no basis in fact for the allegation.

(162) The committee sought to determine whether Calderon had any possible association with the CIA. Agency files reviewed and interviews with Agency personnel reveal no connection between Calderon and the CIA. (195)

#### IV. BALANCE OF THE EVIDENCE

(163) As this staff report indicates, the Warren Commission and the CIA struggled with serious issues bearing on President Kennedy's assassination and the protection of national security. In most instances, the evidence indicates that the CIA acted in a responsible and professional manner. Nevertheless, the evidence does show at least three separate instances of deficiencies in the reporting of information to the Warren Commission.

(164) The first instance—the Agency's failure to report the anti-Castro assassination plots to the Warren Commission has been explained in terms of the Commission's failure to request this information (implicit in this logic is the argument that the plots were not relevant to the Commission's investigation). The evidence, however, shows that these plots were in fact highly relevant and should, therefore, have been reported to the Warren Commission. Moreover, as the Commission was apparently unaware of the plots, it presumably was not in a position specifically to request this kind of information.

(165) The second instance—stemming from the CIA's legal responsibility to protect its sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure—resulted in delayed access by Warren Commission staff members to original source materials. Although the CIA exhibited high standards in reporting to the Warren Commission information derived from sensitive sources and methods, the evidence indicates that the Commission's investigation might have been added had such sources and techniques been directly available.

(166) Finally, the evidence shows that Luisa Calderon's comments expressing possible foreknowledge of President Kennedy's assassination should have been reported to the Warren Commission. Her known association with Cuban diplomatic personnel in Mexico City and reported association with the DGI add to the force of the facts. Had her comments been reported to the Warren Commission, they might have merited the Commission's serious attention. In this regard, the Commission did not have the opportunity to make its own judgment.

Submitted by:

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- (1) The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, book V, final report, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence, 94th Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 6-7 (Senate Report 94-755) (hereinafter cited as SSC, book V).

(2) CIA Classified Document 1977 Task Force Report, Introduction to tab E (hereinafter cited as 1977 TFR).

(3) See ref. 1, SSC, book V, pp. 67-75.

(4) See ref. 2, 1977 TFR.

(5) Ibid.

(6) Classified Staff Report, "HSCA Investigation of CIA Support to the Warren Commission," Dec. 10, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK classified document 015036).

(7) Executive Session Testimony of Richard Helms, Aug. 9, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 17-18 (JFK classified document 014719) (hereinafter Helms Executive Session Testimony).

(8) See ref. 1, SSC, book V, p. 25.

(9) Deposition of John Scelso, May 16, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 111-112 (JFK classified document 014728) (hereinafter Scelso Deposition); see ref. 6, Helms Executive Session Testimony, p. 10.

(10) Deposition of [Agency Employee], June 20, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 7 and 52 (JFK classified document 014735); see ref. 9, Scelso Deposition, p. 80.

(11) Id. at p. 52.

(12) Id. at pp. 52-53.

(13) See ref. 1, SSC, book V, p. 25; see ref. 9, Scelso Deposition, pp. 111-112.

(14) See ref. 9, Scelso Deposition, p. 112.

(15) Deposition of Raymond Rocca, July 17, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 9 (JFK classified document 014718) (hereinafter Rocca Deposition).

(16) Ibid.

(17) See ref. 9, Scelso deposition, p. 131.

(18) Id. at p. 133.

(19) Id. at p. 134.

(20) Id. at pp. 114-115; CIA report by John Scelso to chief/counterintelligence, Dec. 13, 1963.

(21) See ref. 9, Scelso deposition, p. 114.

(22) Ibid., Scelso deposition, p. 136; see also ref. 15, Rocca deposition, in which Rocca stated that responsibility shifted from Scelso to CI staff on January 12, 1964.

(23) See ref. 6, Helms executive session testimony, p. 14; see also Scelso deposition, p. 138.

(24) See ref. 15, Rocca deposition, pp. 12-13.

(25) Id. at p. 12.

(26) Deposition of James Angleton, Oct. 5, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 76-77 (JFK classified document 014720) (hereinafter Angleton deposition); see also ref. 15, Rocca deposition, p. 23.

(27) Id. at pp. 32-33 and 44; see ref. 6, Helms executive session testimony, p. 23.

(28) See ref. 15, Rocca deposition, pp. 32-33.

(29) Id. at p. 33.

(30) Id. at p. 44.

(31) See ref. 6, Helms executive session testimony, p. 21.

(32) Id. at p. 138.

(33) See ref. 26, Angleton deposition, p. 86.

(34) Id. at p. 93.

(35) Ibid.

(36) See ref. 15, Rocca deposition, p. 7; see also ref. 26, Angleton deposition, p. 77.

(37) Id. at pp. 16-17.

(38) Id. at p. 17.

(39) Ibid.

(40) Ibid.; Rocca testified that neither CI staff nor his staff displaced the CIA's Soviet Division (represented by [Agency employee] Chief of the Soviet Russian division and his assistant, [Agency employee] in its contact with the Commission; nor did counterintelligence/research and analysis displace Scelso in his contact with the Warren Commission).

(41) Id. at p. 36.

(42) See ref. 15, Rocca deposition, pp. 17-18. See ref. 26, Angleton deposition, p. 78.

- (43) Id. at p. 81.
- (44) See ref. 15, Rocca deposition, p. 18.
- (45) Ibid.
- (46) Ibid.
- (47) Id. at pp. 19-20.
- (48) See ref. 9, Scelso deposition, p. 113, in which Scelso stated that counter-intelligence staff, including [Agency employee], was repository of HT-Lingual intercepts; but see also deposition of [Agency employee], HSCA, July 20, 1978, pp. 83-84 (JFK classified document 014735), in which [Agency employee] stated that he did not know whether the Warren Commission had knowledge of the HT-Lingual program because it was not his responsibility to provide the Commission with material derived from the HT-Lingual program.
- (49) See ref. 15, Rocca deposition, p. 10; ref. 26, Angleton deposition, pp. 75, 80; see also CIA document, Raymond Rocca memorandum for the record, April 1, 1975, re: Conversation with David W. Belin, April 1, 1975; in which it is stated that Helms remained the senior official in charge of the overall investigation, with counterintelligence staff acting as a coordinator and repository of information collected.
- (50) See ref. 15, Rocca deposition, p. 18; see also ref. 6, Helms executive session testimony, pp. 9 and 24.
- (51) Staff interview of William Coleman, Aug. 2, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations.
- (52) Executive session testimony of W. David Slawson, Nov. 15, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 17 (JFK document 008625) (hereinafter Slawson executive session testimony); see also JFK exhibit 23, hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), vol. 1, p. 190 (hereinafter HSCA-JFK hearings).
- (53) Deposition of J. Lee Rankin, August 7, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 4 (JFK Classified Document 014874) (hereinafter Rankin Deposition); see also deposition of John McCone, August 17, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 9 (JFK Classified Document 014729) (hereinafter McCone deposition).
- (54) See ref. 53, McCone deposition, p. 5.
- (55) Id. at pp. 5-6.
- (56) Id. at p. 9.
- (57) See ref. 15, Rocca deposition, p. 14.
- (58) Id. at p. 24.
- (59) Id. at p. 26.
- (60) Id. at p. 23.
- (61) See ref. 6, Helms executive session testimony, p. 10.
- (62) Id. at pp. 10-11.
- (63) Id. at p. 34.
- (64) See ref. 53, Rankin deposition, p. 4.
- (65) See ref. 52, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 29.
- (66) See ref. 1, SSC, book V; see also Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Operations, S. Rep. No. 94-465, 94th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975 (hereinafter cited as SSC, Alleged Plots)).
- (67) See ref. 15, Rocca, p. 50.
- (68) See ref. 9, Scelso deposition, pp. 73 and 142-143.
- (69) Id. at p. 166.
- (70) See ref. 6, Helms executive session testimony, pp. 30-31.
- (71) Memorandum to Director of Central Intelligence, re: Sam Giancana, from Richard Helms, August 16, 1963, in SSC Alleged Plots, p. 107 (see ref. 66).
- (72) Id. at pp. 107-108.
- (73) Ibid.
- (74) CIA Inspector General's report, p. 70.
- (75) See ref. 53, McCone deposition.
- (76) Ibid.
- (77) See ref. 53, Rankin deposition, pp. 61-63; ref. 52, Slawson executive session testimony, p. 27; executive session testimony of Arlen Specter, November 8, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 45-46 (JFK document 013094) (hereinafter Specter executive session testimony); but see also executive

session testimony of Wesley Liebler, November 15, 1977, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 71 (JFK Document 008625) (hereinafter Liebler executive session testimony).

- (78) See ref. 15, Rocca deposition, p. 45.
- (79) See ref. 9, Scelso deposition, p. 153.
- (80) See ref. 6, Helms executive session testimony, p. 25.
- (81) See ref. 9, Scelso deposition, p. 158.
- (82) See ref. 53, Rankin deposition, pp. 22-23; see ref. 9, Scelso deposition 158.
- (83) Ibid.
- (84) Ibid.
- (85) CIA FOIA Document No. 509-803.
- (86) Classified CIA Document, December 20, 1963, DIR. 90466.
- (87) CIA memorandum for file, December 20, 1963, CI Soft File.
- (88) Ibid.
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- (90) Ibid.
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- (92) Ibid.
- (93) CIA FOIA Document No. 509-803; CIA FOIA Document 498-204.
- (94) Letter from J. Lee Rankin to Richard M. Helms, February 10, 1964 (JFK Document 003872).
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- (96) Ibid.
- (97) Letter from Richard M. Helms to J. Lee Rankin, February 19, 1964, CIA FOIA Document No. 553-808A.
- (98) Ibid.
- (99) See classified staff study, "Lee Harvey Oswald, the CIA and Mexico City," House Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 178-185.
- (100) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson, April 22, 1964, p. 22.
- (101) Staff interview with W. David Slawson, August 11, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, p. 3 (JFK Document 010623).
- (102) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson, Mar. 12, 1964.
- (103) CIA FOIA Document No. 509-803.
- (104) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson, Apr. 22, 1964, pp. 3, 19, and 45-46.
- (105) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson, Mar. 12, 1964, p. 6.
- (106) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson, Mar. 25, 1964, p. 20.
- (107) Ibid.
- (108) See refs. 73-75 and accompanying text in this report.
- (109) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson, Mar. 27, 1964, p. 2.
- (110) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of William Coleman and W. David Slawson, Apr. 2, 1964.
- (111) Ibid.
- (112) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson, Apr. 21, 1964, p. 1.
- (113) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson, Mar. 12, 1964.
- (114) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of William Coleman and W. David Slawson, Apr. 3, 1964, p. 11.
- (115) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson, Apr. 22, 1964, p. 1.
- (116) See ref. 100, Slawson memorandum, pp. 9-10.
- (117) Ibid.
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- (120) Ibid.
- (121) Id. at p. 24.
- (122) Warren Commission classified document of W. David Slawson, Apr. 21, 1964.
- (123) See ref. 100, Slawson memorandum, pp. 52-54.



- (124) *Id.* at p. 24.
- (125) Executive Order No. 11130, Nov. 29, 1963.
- (126) Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 364 (hereinafter cited as the Warren Report).
- (127) CIA classified document, Mar. 24, 1964, DDP4-1555, Warren Commission document 64.
- (128) *Ibid.*
- (129) Warren Report, Vol. I, p. 153.
- (130) *Ibid.*
- (131) Letter from J. Lee Rankin to Thomas Karrassesines, Mar. 12, 1964 (JFK Document 003872).
- (132) Letter from J. Lee Rankin to John McCone, Mar. 12, 1964 (JFK Document 003872).
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- (134) *Ibid.*
- (135) *Ibid.*
- (136) CIA FOIA document No. 579-250.
- (137) *Ibid.*
- (138) See ref. 26, Angleton deposition, pp. 131-132, in which Angleton stated that the only reason for not providing the Warren Commission with access to (these materials) was due to the Agency's concern for protecting its sources and methods.
- (139) Letter from J. Lee Rankin to Richard Helms, Mar. 16, 1964 (JFK Document 003872); Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of W. David Slawson, Mar. 12, 1964.
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- (141) Letter from J. Lee Rankin to Richard Helms, Mar. 16, 1964 (JFK Document 003872).
- (142) *Ibid.*
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- (144) See ref. 143, CD 631.
- (145) *Ibid.* (See also testimony of Marguerite Oswald, I Warren Commission Hearings, 152.)
- (146) *Ibid.*
- (147) See ref. 143, CD 674.
- (148) *Ibid.*
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- (150) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of William Coleman, Mar. 24, 1964.
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- (152) Warren Commission classified document, memorandum of Samuel Stern, Mar. 27, 1964.
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- (163) This memorandum paraphrased the original source materials. See JFK Exhibit F-518, HSCA-JFK hearings.
- (164) CIA document memorandum regarding Luisa Calderon conversation, undated 1979, p. 1.
- (165) CIA classified document, memorandum of Raymond Rocca, May 23, 1975, p. 15.
- (166) CIA FOIA document No. 138-598.
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- (168) See ref. 1, SSC, Book V, pp. 28-30 and 40-43.

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- (170) CIA classified document, Apr. 26, 1965.
- (171) CIA FOIA document No. 717-312, attachment C.
- (172) CIA FOIA document No. 98-137. CIA FOIA document 34-595.
- (173) CIA FOIA document No. 559-243.
- (174) Ibid.
- (175) CIA classified document, memorandum of Joseph Langosch, June 23, 1964.
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- (177) Ibid.
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- (180) Ibid.
- (181) Ibid., attachment 4.
- (182) Ibid.
- (183) CIA FOIA document 687-295.
- (184) Id. at p. 2.
- (185) CIA FOIA document 697-294.
- (186) Ibid., attachment.
- (187) CIA FOIA document 739-316.
- (188) Ibid.
- (189) Ibid.
- (190) Classified letter from HSCA to CIA, August 28, 1978.
- (191) CIA classified document, memorandum regarding Luisa Calderon conversation, Aug. 28, 1978, p. 8.
- (192) See ref. 53, Rankin deposition, pp. 18-19.
- (193) CIA classified document, memorandum of Joseph Langosch, May 5, 1964.
- (194) CIA FOIA document No. 687-295, attachment 4.
- (195) See ref. 6, Helms executive session testimony, p. 136; see ref. 15, Rocca deposition, p. 148; classified staff summary of interview of former CIA employee, Joseph Langosch, Aug. 21, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK classified document); classified staff summary of interview with CIA employee, Aug. 11, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK classified document 014740). Further details analyzing this issue are set forth in the classified HSCA staff report upon which this study is based. Classified staff report, "HSCA Investigation of CIA Support to the Warren Commission," House Select Committee on Assassinations, Dec. 10, 1978 (JFK classified document 015036).
- (196) See ref. 2, 1977 TFR, p. 10.