
POLITICS AND PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION:
THE MOTORCADE

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SUMMARY

(1) It has been suggested that the selection of a motorcade route that resulted in the passage of President John F. Kennedy's open limousine at low speed immediately below the Texas School Book Depository Building in Dallas, Tex., and in the closest possible proximity in Dealey Plaza to the grassy knoll, was probably no mere coincidence; that the use of a motorcade and the selection of its route was more likely controlled by the conspiracy that planned the President's death; and that the Secret Service, since it had responsibility for protecting the President, may have been more than simply a negligent bystander in the decisionmaking process. (1) The list of suggested conspirators who allegedly arranged this aspect of the assassination ranges from the Secret Service itself, to right-wing businessmen, and even includes the Governor of Texas, John B. Connally (2)—the Governor, perhaps, being an innocent dupe, since it is unlikely (in the extreme) that he would have wittingly arranged to have shots fired at the limousine in which he and his wife were also to ride.

(2) The results of the committee's investigation of these allegations are described in this staff report. In summary, the evidence indicates that political considerations dictated that there would be a motorcade, and what its route would be, and that the Secret Service's protective responsibilities were subordinated to those political considerations. The committee found no evidence of conspiracy in the processes that led to the use of the motorcade or the selection of its route.

(3) The political considerations that apparently led to those two fortuitously critical decisions were traditional Democratic Party politics and, as such, were characterized by a struggle between liberal and conservative wings of the party: between the conservative wing of the party in Texas led by Gov. John B. Connally, and liberal elements, including Texas Senator Ralph Yarborough, but primarily, of course, centering around the President himself. In the end, ironically, it was the tension and compromise between the two views that produced the fatal motorcade route. If either side had been able to dictate its desires without compromise, the assassination might never have occurred.

(4) On one hand, Governor Connally, who was asked by the President to arrange the trip as a means of broadening and strengthening his support among conservatives in Texas, selected the Dallas Trade Mart, a new and attractive convention hall on the Stemmons Freeway, for the luncheon site. It had the attribute of appealing to the conservative business element, but the drawback of limiting the number of guests that could be accommodated.

(5) The President, on the other hand, believed that his availability to the people by motorcade was a major factor in his successful campaign for the Presidency, (3) and since his schedule in Dallas did not involve a major public speech before a large audience, but included

only a "limited" speaking engagement before a "select group" at the Trade Mart, the President felt even more strongly that a motorcade should be used to broaden his exposure.(4) Both Governor Connally and Frank Erwin, executive secretary of the Texas State Democratic Committee, objected to the staging of a downtown motorcade.(5) Connally opposed the motorcade because the strain placed on Kennedy of "exuding enthusiasm" would have been excessive, especially in view of his tight schedule, and because he considered it a possibility that an embarrassing picket or sign might be held up before the President during the motorcade.(6) Erwin objected to a downtown motorcade because it exposed the President unnecessarily to the possibility of an embarrassing incident provoked by the right-wing element in Dallas.(7) Supporters of right-wing extremist leader Gen. Edwin Walker were feared,(8) since Lyndon Johnson and Adlai Stevenson, in 1960 and 1963, respectively, had been publicly assaulted by radical conservatives in Texas.(9) The memory of these occurrences was still vivid, and many Connally associates were still concerned that the image of Dallas would be tarnished by an incident in which the President would be publicly embarrassed.(10) Erwin was so concerned about this aspect of the trip that when he first heard that the President had been harmed, his first thought was that a right-wing extremist had been responsible.(11) In the end, President Kennedy's wishes prevailed, and there was a motorcade.(12) Its route was a simple by-product of the decision to hold the luncheon at the Trade Mart.(13)

(6) Two luncheon sites had initially been considered: the Women's Building at the fair grounds which was located in the central southern part of the city,(14) and the Dallas Trade Mart, which was located on Stemmons Freeway to the west and north of Dealey Plaza.(15)

(7) The Secret Service initially preferred the Women's Building for security reasons,(16) and the Kennedy staff preferred it for political reasons.(17) If the Women's Building had been selected, the Presidential motorcade would have entered Dealey Plaza on Main Street west of Dealey Plaza and traveled eastward on Main Street, traversing the Plaza briefly, at high speed,(18) without taking any turns in or around the Plaza.(19) Such a west-to-east route through Dealey Plaza on Main Street would have decreased the probability of the occurrence of the assassination for two reasons. First, the Presidential limousine would have presented a more difficult target at which to shoot because it would have been moving more quickly and would have been positioned one block farther away (to the south) from the assassins' locations than it was when the assassination occurred on Elm Street.(20) Second, the President, who rides in the right rear of the limousine in accord with military protocol, would have been positioned so that Mrs. Kennedy would have been seated between him and any gunfire emanating from the Texas State Book Depository (TSBD) and the grassy knoll.(21)

(8) Nevertheless, in this case the President deferred to the Governor: the Women's Building was rejected, and the Trade Mart was selected.(22) The result, then, was the deployment of the motorcade westward through downtown Dallas and, in turn, the inclusion of the turn, northward from Main Street onto Houston Street and then

westward from Houston onto Elm Street, which placed the limousine directly in front of the line of fire.

(9) The Secret Service was, in fact, a bystander in the process; its protective functions were subordinated to political considerations. The committee found no evidence indicating that a conspiracy affected either the President's decision to incorporate a motorcade into the Dallas itinerary, or the Governor's decision to insist on a Presidential appearance at the Trade Mart, or the Secret Service's acquiescence in those controlling decisions.

I. THE ORIGINS OF THE PLAN FOR PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO VISIT TEXAS

(10) Governor John B. Connally of Texas indicated that the idea of a Presidential visit to Texas arose first in the spring of 1962, during the Texas gubernatorial campaign.⁽²³⁾ Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson approached Connally with the information that the President wished to come to Texas for the purpose of fundraising.⁽²⁴⁾ Connally was not interested at that time in attempting to coordinate such a trip for various reasons. First, he was in the midst of a campaign for Governor, was running against an incumbent, and his initial showing in voter polls had been poor.⁽²⁵⁾ Second, he became involved in a statewide campaign for the general election after winning the primary and he had doubts about the capacity of his organization both to do justice to a Presidential visit and simultaneously to run an effective campaign.⁽²⁶⁾ Nevertheless, since Connally won the gubernatorial election and apart from Vice President Johnson, was the Texan who was closest to the administration, the Vice President continued to remind him about the President's interest.⁽²⁷⁾ Connally continued to hesitate to commit himself to a specific time for the Presidential visit. As Governor, he had to prepare a legislative program for his first session with the Texas State Legislature, which was scheduled to convene on January 20, 1963. That session was to last 120 days. Nevertheless, upon its completion, Connally became willing to undertake the organization of a Presidential visit.⁽²⁸⁾

(11) It was his understanding from the beginning that the President wanted to raise money.⁽²⁹⁾ It also became apparent that the President wished to shore up his sagging popularity in a State that he considered, with Massachusetts, to be one of the two primary political objectives for the Presidential campaign of 1964.⁽³⁰⁾ In 1960, Kennedy had carried Texas by the small margin of 46,000 votes, despite Johnson, a Texan was his running mate.⁽³¹⁾ The President's legislative program had not fared well in the first year of his Presidency, and the President was concerned about the 1964 election. For these reasons, a visit to Texas had assumed great importance.⁽³²⁾

(12) Connally believed that, for specific reasons, the President wished to come to Texas under Connally's auspices rather than under the auspices of Vice President Johnson or on his own. Since a Governor of a State is the titular head of his party and sets the political tone of his State, neither Kennedy or Johnson would have considered it politically advisable to visit a State without the political support of the Governor.⁽³³⁾ And in Connally's opinion, Kennedy had another, more narrowly focused reason for wanting to come to Texas. Connally had

developed a base of support among the moderates and conservatives in the Texas Democratic Party.(34) The President hoped to obtain political benefit by associating with Connally, the leader of the moderate and conservative interests whose support Kennedy needed in Texas.(35) The liberal wing of the party still supported Kennedy; but the moderates and conservatives thought of Kennedy as anti-business.(36) The President mentioned this to Connally and said that it disturbed him because he had no intention of dismantling the free enterprise system.(37) Kennedy wanted to talk with and, he hoped, to appeal to the people who had not supported him in the Presidential campaign of 1960.(38)

(13) The first important meeting between the President and the Governor took place in El Paso, Tex., in June 1963.(39) Kennedy suggested August 27 as a possible date for the visit because that was the Vice President's birthday. The Governor objected since inclement Texas weather at that time of year resulted in the absence of many Texans from the State for vacations.(40) Apart from the President's suggestion that four or five fundraising dinners be held in the major Texas cities, no final decision was reached regarding the date for the trip or the itinerary.(41) Nevertheless, the decision to make the trip was considered final as of this time.(42)

(14) From June to early October 1963, the Governor and the Vice President intermittently discussed the objectives and format of the trip.(43) Johnson advised Connally that the President felt that four or five fundraising dinners would constitute an acceptable program. The Governor expressed the opinion that it would be a mistake so to organize the visit, Johnson responded by saying that that was what the President wanted and Connally had better have "a real good reason" for objecting.(44)

(15) In early October the President and Governor Connally met in the Oval Office. Connally told Kennedy that a Presidential visit consisting of four or five consecutive fundraising dinners would be considered by Texans as a financial rape of the State.(45) On the basis of Connally's discussions of the matter with political leaders in the State, the Governor's recommended course of action was that the President meet with moderate and conservative business and political leaders who had not supported him in 1960 and that he attempt to convert them in nonpolitical settings. The President agreed.(46)

II. THE PROCESS OF THE SELECTION OF DATES FOR THE TRIP AND THE PLANNING OF THE ITINERARY

(16) The specific dates of the trip had been resolved prior to this October meeting. Presidential advance man Jerry Bruno stated that although he was given formal notice of the Texas trip on October 21 by Presidential Appointments Secretary Kenneth O'Donnell,(47) he believed the President and O'Donnell had developed long range plans prior to the 11 State conservation tour in late September.(48) No dates for Texas were mentioned at that time, but the September 26, 1963, issue of the Dallas Morning News printed an article stating that on November 21 and 22, 1963, the President would visit several Texas cities.(49)

(17) Connally made it clear to the President that it would be Kennedy who would pick the dates of the trip. (50) Although in testimony Connally stated he had no specific recollection of having known prior to October that November 21 and 22 were the selected dates for the Texas visit, he did acknowledge that he must have known. (51)

(18) Governor Connally was careful to emphasize that the purpose of the Presidential visit was not to resolve differences within the Democratic Party of the State of Texas. (52) Appointments Secretary O'Donnell had advanced this view in his testimony before the Warren Commission. According to O'Donnell:

There were great controversies existing. There was a party problem in Texas that the President and Vice President felt he could be helpful, as both sides of the controversy were supporting President Kennedy, and they felt he could be a bridge between these two groups, and this would be helpful in the election of 1964. I think that is the major reason for the trip. (53)

As Governor Connally stated:

. . . this (the complaints that Texas liberals were not being permitted to participate in the planning of the trip or to obtain tickets to the various trip functions) raised the question that has since been discussed in great length, that the President came to Texas to resolve the differences in the Democratic Party in Texas. Nothing could be further from the truth. The two individuals who were most involved in the split in the Party were Senator Ralph Yarborough and Vice President Johnson, and both of them were in Washington, D.C. This is where the trouble was.

The trouble arose basically over Federal patronage and Federal appointees and Vice President Johnson was trying to get every Federal appointee he could get, and so was Senator Yarborough. . . .

And indeed if the President was interested in resolving that difficulty, he had Vice President Johnson right across the street in the Old Executive Office Building, he had Senator Yarborough right here on the Hill, and he could have gotten them together in 10 minutes. But that wasn't the purpose of his trip to Texas at all, it had nothing to do with it. (54)

The Governor stated that Texas was basically a one-party State where political differences had divided liberal from conservative elements for many decades and where, throughout the Governor's political career, recurrent conflict between the two forces was considered a normal state of affairs. The Governor, recalling an incident during which fist fights broke out within the Texas delegation on the floor of the Democratic Party Convention in Chicago in 1940, stated that the President was too astute a politician to attempt to resolve the differences in the Democratic Party in the State of Texas. (55)

(19) The Governor stated that an early consensus was achieved about concluding the trip with a major fundraising dinner in Austin, an event that would have allowed the Texas Legislature a chance to meet the President. (56) The Governor understood at this point that

the visit would involve a single day.(57) To make the most of the time available, the Governor suggested to the President that he visit San Antonio, Houston, Fort Worth, Dallas, and Austin all in 1 day.(58) This itinerary is confirmed by Bruno, Kennedy's advance man, who met with Walter Jenkins, described as "Vice President Johnson's right-hand man," on October 24. Bruno's notes record that he and Jenkins discussed ". . . the proposed stops for the trip [which] were San Antonio, Houston overnight, Fort Worth, Texas Christian University, and a fundraising dinner in Austin."(59) Although the luncheon in Dallas was omitted from Bruno's original note, Dallas was always included.(60)

(20) The passage quoted above, because of its reference to an overnight stop, indicates that the 1-day tour planned by Governor Connally was modified to include a testimonial dinner for Congressman Albert Thomas of Houston on the evening of November 21, 1963.(61) Congressman Thomas, chairman of the Appropriations Committee, was considered one of the most powerful members of the House.(62) He enjoyed the support of both conservatives and liberals in his Houston Congressional District.(63) As a result of his terminal illness, and in appreciation of his distinguished career in public service, a testimonial dinner was being given for him. This occasion, along with the President's close relationship with Thomas, resulted in a Presidential decision to extend the span of his visit, adding the afternoon and evening of November 21 to the 1-day trip already planned for the 22d.(64) The San Antonio visit to inspect the new Aerospace Medical Center at Brooks Air Force Base was rescheduled for Thursday.(65) Originally, the President had planned to remain overnight in Houston, then fly to Fort Worth on the following morning in order to receive an honorary degree from Texas Christian University, and then fly to Dallas for a midday luncheon.(66) No site for the luncheon had been selected as of Bruno's arrival in Texas on October 28.(67) As late as October 30, Bruno visited Houston to finalize plans for the President's appearance at the Thomas dinner and to examine the accommodations for Kennedy and his party at the Rice Hotel.(68) The overnight stop at Houston was changed to an overnight stop at Fort Worth when Kennedy accepted an invitation to the Houston dinner.(69) In the meantime, TCU had decided not to award the President an honorary degree.(70) That change was made on November 1.(71) A breakfast with the Fort Worth Chamber of Commerce was substituted on November 1 for the canceled honorary degree ceremony.(72)

(21) Since the Governor personally emphasized the scheduling of a luncheon in Dallas.(73) and because that suggestion dovetailed conveniently with the President's insistence on the staging of a motorcade through downtown Dallas,(74) the final sequence of cities to be visited was established without opposition from any person when the overnight stop was changed from Houston to Fort Worth.(75) It was then decided that on November 21 Kennedy would dedicate the Aerospace Medical Center at Brooks AFB in San Antonio.(76) This would precede the President's appearance at the Albert Thomas testimonial dinner,(77) the event around which the Texas trip was built.(78) In Fort Worth, a prebreakfast speech in

front of the Texas Hotel(79) and Kennedy's breakfast appearance before the Chamber of Commerce filled the time gap caused by the cancellation of the ceremony at TCU.(80) The Dallas luncheon and the fundraising dinner at the Governor's mansion in Austin completed the schedule for the day.(81) It was the Governor's opinion that Austin was the best city in the State for a major fundraising affair because it was the Texas capital.(82)

III. TEXAS CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY APPEARANCE

(22) In his testimony before the committee, Governor Connally did not specify whose idea it was to have the President appear at Texas Christian University.(83) Advance man Jerry Bruno first learned of the TCU appearance when Connally associate Walter Jenkins mentioned it in their first meeting on October 24.(84) The itinerary presented to Bruno by Jenkins represented Connally's preferences.(85) Jenkins told Bruno that Connally had proposed the trip, and from this Bruno inferred that Connally had proposed the itinerary.(86)

(23) Nevertheless, Bruno's interpretation does not establish the fact that the honorary degree was Connally's idea originally, because Jenkins did not assert this, and Bruno's notes of the meeting do not record any specific information on the point.(87)

(24) The minutes of the meeting of the Board of Trustees of TCU held on November 1, 1963, did not mention this question. Those minutes record only that, "Concerning a special item presented by Chancellor E. Sadler on the recommendation of the University Council", the University would "tender its facilities to the Governor of Texas and the City of Fort Worth . . . for the purpose of extending a warm invitation to the President of the United States to speak on the TCU campus during his visit to Texas in November. Motion passed."(88) This language permits the inference that it was Chancellor Sadler's idea to invite the President, but no specific identification of the original proponents of the TCU appearance is made.

(25) A resolution of the question is offered by TCU trustee Sam P. Woodson, Jr., who was present at the November 1, 1963, trustees' meeting.(89) Although he was not able to produce any documentation to support his recollection, Woodson recalled that in late October 1963, the Governor contacted Chancellor Sadler and proposed that the President be awarded an honorary degree. Woodson's understanding at the time was either that the President "wanted an excuse to come down to Texas" or that the Governor "in some sense wanted to provide the President with such an excuse."(90) He recalled also that the chancellor thought it was appropriate and decided to introduce the matter to the board.(91)

(26) Woodson's explanation of the reasons for the board's decision not to confer the degree is as follows:

(27) University procedure required that candidates for honorary degrees be nominated from within the university and be evaluated by both the faculty senate and the student senate, this provided opportunities for approval or disapproval individual cases.(92) In Kennedy's case, because of the belief that the Governor was trying to

manipulate the board at the expense of democratic university procedures, (93) it was decided that normal procedures should be maintained because they protected the university from awarding degrees to recipients who had not been scrutinized by all concerned interests. (94) (28) On the other hand, some Board members felt that it would be disrespectful to the Office of the President to turn the President down. In such a unique case as this, no precedent that would be harmful to the university's procedures would be established. (95) Woodson himself voted in favor of the award on these grounds and believed that the trustees would have approved the award if there had been time for the proposal to go "through channels". (96)

(29) Bruno stated that no consideration of an alternative program at TCU was given by the Presidential staff. The embarrassment to the President, were it to become known that he had been turned down for an honorary degree, eliminated the possibility of an appearance at TCU for some other purpose. (97) It is ironic that if the honorary degree ceremony at TCU had been held, especially with a subsequent reception of some kind, logistical complications might have delayed the President's arrival in Dallas and thereby interfered with the scheduled occurrence of the mid-day motorcade. If such a delay had occurred, the opportunity might have been lost for an assassin to take advantage of certain conditions that promoted Kennedy's assassination. Such conditions included the physical absence of many employees from their places of employment (such as the TSBD) during the mid-day lunch hour, and the presence of large crowds on the streets immediately after the shooting.* (98)

IV. THE POLITICAL CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THE SELECTION OF A SPEECH SITE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S APPEARANCE IN DALLAS

(30) The decision to send the motorcade in an eastward or westward direction along Main Street was dependent upon the prior selection of a site for the President's luncheon speech. (103)

(31) In Dallas, Governor Connally arranged (104) for the cosponsorship of the luncheon by several prominent civic organizations: the Dallas Citizens' Council, the Dallas Assembly, and the Graduate Research Center of the Southwest. (105) Connally indicated that such groups were chosen because they could give the occasion a nonpolitical flavor. (106)

(32) Connally's understanding of the political function of the trip—to permit the President an opportunity to meet with the constituency in Texas whose support would be indispensable during the 1964 Presi-

* An interesting subsidiary issue regarding itinerary planning and motorcade route selection is whether Oswald, when he took the job at the Depository on Oct. 15, 1963, knew President Kennedy planned to visit Dallas and that his motorcade would pass through Dealey Plaza. (99) It is, of course, possible that Oswald could have anticipated well before Oct. 16 that Dallas would be included in the Texas itinerary. The Sept. 26 issue of the Dallas Morning News printed an article stating that the President would visit major cities of the state on Nov. 21 and 22. (100) And it could be inferred that the Presidential motorcade would pass through Dealey Plaza. This is because Dealey Plaza was part of the traditional parade route through Dallas. (101) However, knowledge of an eastward versus westward direction would not have been possible before Oct. 16, since the route was not finalized until Nov. 15. (102)

dential campaign, the moderate and conservative business and financial interests—led him to conceive of the Dallas visit in limited terms. The President would arrive in Dallas, proceed directly to the Trade Mart, the city's prime commercial center, deliver a speech to the leadership of Dallas' business community, and leave the city. (106A) Frank Erwin, the executive secretary of the Texas State Democratic Committee, believed that Connally's introduction might well convince that leadership that the President was "OK" and "could be trusted" with the Presidency. (107) For Connally, the Trade Mart was the appropriate setting for the Presidential speech. Architecturally it had the style and flair of the Kennedys themselves. The building was new, convenient to reach from the Stemmons Expressway, and generally impressive. (108)

(33) Frank Erwin, who assisted Connally through the process of planning the Presidential visit, commented on Connally's relationship with big business and financial interests in Texas. In Erwin's opinion there was no possibility that the conservative, affluent supporters of Connally would have wanted to mix at a public occasion of any kind with the various elements in the liberal wing of the party. (109) Erwin stated his belief that even such high-ranking persons as the liberal Senator Ralph Yarborough of Texas and the president of the AFL-CIO were not welcome at social and political functions sponsored by Connally's conservative supporters. (110) The appearance of such liberals would have led to a walkout by the conservative Connally associates. Hence, the State democratic committee, of which Erwin was Executive Secretary, insisted that the luncheon be held at the Trade Mart. (111)

(34) The Kennedy staff, on the other hand, preferred the Women's Building, which they saw as providing a better forum for contact with liberal elements in the party. Politically, the large size of the Women's Building would have allowed 4,000 people to be admitted and would therefore have benefited Kennedy by permitting his liberal constituents to participate in the luncheon. (112) In their view, that location, in conjunction with a motorcade, would have enhanced their ability to reach the poor, the middle class, labor, and ethnic minorities. (113)

(35) The route necessitated by the Kennedy staff's preference for the Women's Building would have led eastward along Main Street toward the fair grounds, which lay to the southeast of the Main Street business district. (114) The motorcade's access to the western end of Main Street on the western side of Dealey Plaza would have been provided by a cloverleaf exit that led into the Plaza from the expressway, just west of the Dealey Plaza triple overpass. (115) After passing through the overpass, the motorcade would then have continued, at what Bruno stated was the President's customarily high rate of speed—40 or 50 miles per hour—into Main Street within Dealey Plaza. (116) The distance on Main Street from the bottom of the triple overpass to the point where crowds would be gathered (at the Houston Street intersection) would have been crossed at that speed. Deceleration of the motorcade would have commenced when the crowds were reached. (117)

V. THE ROLE OF THE SECRET SERVICE IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE SELECTION OF THE SPEECH SITE AND THE MOTORCADE ROUTE

(36) On November 4, 1963, Gerald Behn, special agent in charge (hereafter SAIC) of the White House detail of the Secret Service, telephoned Forrest Sorrels, the SAIC of the Dallas field office, stating that the President would probably be visiting Dallas "about November 21" and that two buildings had been suggested for a luncheon site. (118) One was the Trade Mart, which according to Behn's information had about 60 entrances and 6 catwalks suspended above the floor area where the luncheon was planned. The second was the Women's Building at the fair grounds, whose structure and appearance Behn did not, according to Sorrels, describe in equally complete detail. (119)

(37) On that same day, Sorrels made a survey of both locations and reported back to Behn by telephone. He stated that he and Special Agent (hereafter SA) Bob Steuart of the Dallas office had visited the Trade Mart and the Women's Building. Sorrels reported that the Women's Building was preferable from the standpoint of security because the building had only two entrances at either end, each of which was large enough to permit only one car to pass through. (120) Nevertheless, Sorrels told Behn that the Women's Building "was not satisfactory for that [Presidential] type of function" because of its low ceilings, exposed air-conditioning, and highly visible steel suspension supports. As for the Trade Mart, Sorrels told Behn that because of the many entrances and exits in the Trade Mart, there would be a problem of acquiring sufficient manpower to cover all areas securely. (121)

(38) Sorrels did not say that the Trade Mart would be impossible to secure because he felt that the necessary precautions could be undertaken. (122)

(39) Prior to November 5, Bruno had returned from Dallas with photographs of the Trade Mart's interior to show Behn. These photographs revealed, in full detail, the catwalks suspended above the floor. (123) Bruno was concerned about the catwalks because of an incident involving Ambassador Adlai Stevenson. (124) Other members of the President's political staff were also well aware that, while visiting Dallas during October 1963, Stevenson had been insulted and spat upon by right-wing extremist hecklers. (125) Bruno was concerned that someone could use the catwalks as a vantage point from which to embarrass the President. (126)

(40) After Behn met with Bruno and Ken O'Donnell, Behn announced on November 5 that he favored the Women's Building. (127) According to Bruno, Behn was in charge of trip security. Therefore, Behn had instructed O'Donnell that the Women's Building was his selection. Bruno stated that O'Donnell personally confirmed this version of the course of events. (128) Behn, in his testimony before the committee, stated that O'Donnell held the power to make the ultimate decision, that Behn himself lacked such power, and that O'Donnell simply informed Behn that the Trade Mart was the final selection and ordered him to secure it. (129) Regardless of where ultimate power resided, a consensus was reached between Behn and O'Donnell. Because of the catwalks and many entrances, Behn announced to Bruno

in Washington, D.C., on November 5 his decision favoring the Women's Building. (130) It was Bruno's impression at this time that the report from the Dallas field office was neutral, since the local office was capable of securing either place. (131)

(41) For Bruno, the input of the Dallas field office was of secondary import. It has been his impression from working with Behn that he was the Secret Service official who had power, as SAIC of the White House detail, to make final decisions in matters of security. (132) The basis for this assertion by Bruno was that Bruno had personally accompanied and observed Behn during the advance work for the entirety of the President's 11-State conservation tour that had begun on September 24, 1963. He and Behn had looked at every stop on that tour.* (133)

(42) In accordance with standard operating procedure in the Secret Service, a special agent from the White House Detail went to Dallas to advance the trip and arrange for the President's security once the speech site and motorcade route were selected. (134) In this case, the White House Detail advance agent was Winston G. Lawson. (135) Lawson testified before the Warren Commission that he arrived in Dallas on November 12, and that on the morning of November 13 he visited the Trade Mart with Dallas SAIC Forrest Sorrels, Dallas SA Robert Steuart, and with Jack Puterbaugh, an advance man serving the Democratic National Committee and the White House. (136) Lawson gave Behn a positive report on the Trade Mart because of factors that Sorrels did not mention: (1) the Mart's internal security system, which barred entry to everyone but lessees of commercial space and their customers; (2) the absence of a kitchen at the Women's Building; and (3) the obstruction of proper TV coverage by the Women's Building interior. (137) Lawson agreed with Sorrels that the interior decor at the Women's Building was unseemly for a President. (138)

(43) The Warren Commission obtained no testimony or other information from Behn or Bruno about the controversy over speech site selection that was initially resolved, according to Bruno, by the selection of the Women's Building. (139) Hence, the Warren Commission evaluated Lawson's and Sorrels' testimony without reference to Bruno's perspective. Bruno's perception as of the period between November 6 and 12 was that:

We got word that the local Secret Service agents there had looked at the site [Trade Mart], and this is coming from Governor Connally, and they saw no reasons not to go there. (140)

(44) Apparently, by "local agents," Bruno was referring to Sorrels and the special agents under his supervision in the Dallas field office. Bruno stated that the local agents in Dallas had decided to withdraw

*In his 1978 deposition (p. 35), Bruno stated that Behn disclosed to Bruno that Behn, implicitly having ultimate power to decide where to send the Presidential motorcade, chose the Women's Building, and in the Nov. 6, 1963, entry in Bruno's typewritten notes (p. 8), Bruno indicated that the decision favoring the Women's Building was reached on Nov. 5. In contradiction of his 1978 deposition, however, the entry of November 6, 1963 clearly stated that O'Donnell held and exercised the power to make the final decision and accordingly gave orders to Bruno and Behn to implement the decision. See references at footnotes 130, 133.

their earlier objections to the Trade Mart, and instead recommended it. If any local agent did in fact make such recommendations despite Behn's prior decision on November 6 favoring the Women's Building, this would have presented a clear case of a subordinate agent contradicting the SAIC of the White House detail. (141) Bruno insisted that this in fact took place:

Jerry [Behn] got word that the local agents claim that they could secure it [the Trade Mart] and we were going to have to go with that. (142)

(45) Apart from Bruno's assertion, the committee found no record of any such communication from any local agent. Sorrels was not asked by the Warren Commission whether he made any recommendations to Behn, or had any contact with Behn about speech site security, after November 4; nor did Sorrels inform the Committee that any such contact between himself and Behn took place. Hence, it is largely speculative as to whether Sorrels or any Dallas agent had any impact subsequent to Behn's November 6 selection of the Women's Building. (144) Further, Lawson could not recall for the Warren Commission whether his oral report of November 13 was made to Behn or to one of his assistants. (145) Lawson had "no idea" whether Behn had made any recommendations. (146) Lawson was not sure how much weight his opinion carried in such situations. All he knew was that the decision about the motorcade was made in Washington, and that he assumed that it was made by the White House. (147) His statement to the committee added to his Warren Commission testimony only the information that the selection of the speech site and motorcade route involved Behn and O'Donnell "at very least." (148)

(46) Bruno's explanation of how the matter was finally resolved is found in his journal in the entries of November 14 and 15, 1963:

November 14—The feud became so bitter that I went to the White House to ask Bill Moyers, then Deputy Director of the Peace Corps, and close to both Connally and Johnson, if he would try to settle the dispute for the good of the President and his party. On this day, Kenney O'Donnell decided that there was no other way but to go to the mart.

November 15—The White House announced that the Trade Mart had been approved. I met with O'Donnell and Moyers who said that Connally was unbearable and on the verge of cancelling the trip. They decided they had to let the Governor have his way. (149)

(47) If Bruno's assertions are true, the role of the Secret Service is clear: Although security considerations were taken into account, in the end political considerations prevailed. The determinative factor was the desire of President Kennedy and Mr. O'Donnell not to place the President in the untenable position of appearing unable to lead the party in solving party disputes and of appearing weak in the South. (150)

(48) Moyers' recollection about these matters was less than clear. He could not recall whether it was ever questionable that a motorcade

would occur in Dallas. (151) He could not recall whether there had been a debate about the selection of the speech site. (152) He could recall no discussion with Governor Connally about the site for the President's luncheon, (153) but instead said his discussions involved "who was participating and the necessity of cooperation." (154) In fact, he could not remember whether he had even visited Dallas. (155)

(49) Moyers did confirm one aspect of Bruno's November 14-15 entries, however. He stated that the Presidential staff would overrule the Secret Service when "overriding political considerations were paramount." (156) O'Donnell would listen to the Secret Service, but not always accept their suggestions. (157) None of the President's political advisers "ever let [the Secret Service] have the last word" because the advisers' interest in the President's political welfare outweighed security factors. (158) Moyers characterized the reaction of the Secret Service when being overruled as that of "good soldiers," that is, "loyal to their obligation, but they accepted the fact that the President of the United States is also the chief political figure of our society." (159) This seems consistent with Bruno's statement that, when faced with the political dilemma of how to react to Connally's insistence on the Trade Mart, the President and O'Donnell made a decision based on political concerns. (160) The Secret Service was powerless to comment at that point, much less to intervene.

(50) In his testimony before the committee, Governor Connally recalled that the issue of having a motorcade was not resolved until the week of the assassination, as Bruno had stated. (161) But with respect to the problem of choosing a speech site, Connally stated that he was largely ignorant of any controversy. (162) Connally's version of the decisionmaking process was that whenever such problems could not be resolved on the staff level, he would "just make a decision we are going to do thus and so," or sometimes "call somebody at the White House and get it worked out." (163) With respect to the interrelationship between the speech site and the motorcade route, Connally did acknowledge that "if the Women's Building had been chosen, the motorcade could have gone another route and probably would have." (164)

(51) Bruno indicated that Moyers was asked to visit Texas on behalf of the President to settle the conflict over the speech site and motorcade route. (165) Moyers indicated that both O'Donnell and Kennedy asked him to smooth over the differences between different Democratic Party factions. (166) Moyers at first objected on the grounds that as Department Director of the Peace Corps, his presence in Texas would involve that agency in partisan politics. The President overrode Moyers' objection by saying that Moyers, a Texan with close personal and professional ties to Vice President Johnson and good professional relations with Connally, should go to Texas and permit the President to worry about the Peace Corps. (167)

VI. THE PUBLICATION IN DALLAS NEWSPAPERS OF THE MOTORCADE ROUTE

(52) One function Moyers performed, as a representative of the President, was to insist that the motorcade route be published. (168) Moyers coordinated the President's visit to Texas from Austin. He

worked the Dallas situation by phone through his Dallas representative, Ms. Elizabeth Harris. (169) He had chosen Ms. Harris because she was a Dallas native, had been married to a prominent Dallas person, and had been an associate of Moyers in the Peace Corps. (170) (53) Moyers stated that the only "major decision" he made with respect to Dallas was that:

. . . some 24 hours before the President arrived, there was a dispute as to whether or not to print in the newspapers the route, and Betty Harris called me . . . and said they were not going to print the route of the . . . [motorcade] procession and I said, "Oh, yes they are. He's not coming down here to hide. He's coming down here to get a public reaction, and the decision is to print the route of the President's procession," and I don't know what Betty did after that, but the route was printed. (171)

Moyers later amended his recollection of when this decision occurred.

I think it was the second night before his—preceding his arrival . . . and we were printing the route in the other papers, and I couldn't see why an exception should be made in Dallas. (172)

(54) Moyers was in contact with the Secret Service at this time, and was aware of the security implications of printing the motorcade route. He recalled asking the Secret Service agent stationed with him in Austin, whom Moyers characterized as having been "in charge of the Dallas trip," whether there was any reason why the route should not be printed. Moyers believed the agent agreed with him that the route should be published. (173)

(55) In Dallas, Ms. Harris was working directly with the Connally representatives and the Secret Service. Her conception of the "basic problem", as she defined it for Moyers over the telephone, was that the conservative city fathers of Dallas did not want to do anything for the liberal Democrats, who were led by Senator Ralph Yarborough. The two groups were fighting both about the distribution of tickets for the luncheon and also about the publicity to be given about the motorcade. The conservative faction wanted it to look like Kennedy was not popular in Dallas, and hence frowned upon publication of the route because that would draw crowds. (174) The matter of popularity was of special significance because at that time the polls reflected a decline in the President's popularity on the national political scene. (175)

(56) Ms. Harris distinctly recalled a meeting that occurred on either the Monday or Tuesday prior to the assassination. She described this as a "confrontation meeting" that was attended by Governor Connally, Robert Strauss (a Connally associate), Sam Bloom, a Dallas advertising man in charge of publicity for Connally, and Winston Lawson of the Secret Service, whom she described as "totally neutral". (176) She recalled that she took one side of the argument regarding publication of the motorcade route and that Sam Bloom and Strauss took the other. (177) During this meeting, she used "pressure"—an appeal for the status and prestige of the office of the Presidency—to persuade Bloom to publish the route not on Friday morning, November 22, but a few days earlier. (178) Her purpose in having

it published ahead of time was to help "get the crowd out." (179) Hence, the route was published in the Dallas Times Herald on Wednesday afternoon and the Dallas Morning News on Thursday morning. (180)

(57) Ms. Harris' perception of the role of Secret Service Agent Lawson during the controversy was that he seemed concerned primarily about route selection because of the time factor and only secondarily about the security factors. (181) Lawson did not seem to "get too much into the political aspect;" "he was a nuts and bolts man" who worked closely with the local police "to make sure that all of the arrangements were as his superiors in Washington wanted to have them." (182)

(58) Ms. Harris and Lawson were not oblivious to the threat of right-wing extremism. They did not consider it when planning the publicity and motorcade route. Ms. Harris stated that, in the case of the Adlai Stevenson incident, "he had been spat upon . . . I was aware of that. We knew that." (183) As to the Edwin Walker assassination attempt, "We did know he had been shot at;" "Lawson and I were very well aware of it because I saw Lawson quite often and we worked late. . . . I knew that he was working with Curry on getting a fix on the known troublemakers." (184) But nothing Ms. Harris learned about right-wing extremism caused her to reduce the pressure she put on Bloom to publish the route earlier than November 22:

You got (sic) to remember that in 1963, it was very hard for anybody to recognize that anything worse than a spitting incident would occur. I was extremely anxious and Moyers and I frequently discussed this. We wanted to bend over backwards to avoid another Stevenson episode because it had gotten tremendous publicity, and we felt it would not at all be in the interests—in Kennedy's interests for a thing like that to happen. Except for the kooks that might go out with a gun, I can't say that it ever occurred to any of us that there was—that death would occur. We were worried about appearances. (185)

(59) Before the Warren Commission, Lawson stated that at a meeting in Dallas on November 18, he announced that the routes had been finalized "unless it was changed later." (186) This remark implied that he did not have control over the final determination of the route, and that such a decision might well be made by civilian political persons. (187) He recalled (from reading the paper the following day) that the route was published on November 19; but at the time he did not know who announced it. (188) It thus seems clear that communication with the Secret Service about publication of routes was minimal.

VII. THE RESIDUAL ROLE OF THE SECRET SERVICE IN MOTORCADE PLANNING

(A) THE MAIN STREET-HOUSTON-ELM TURN

(60) As the Dallas SAIC Forrest Sorrels told the Warren Commission, he selected the Main-Houston-Elm turn through Dealey Plaza because it was the "most direct" route to the Trade Mart. (189) Sor-

rels' questioning by Warren Commission staff counsel Samuel M. Stern, however, prevented a total picture of motorcade route logistics from emerging. Stern asked Sorrels why the expressway was approached from the Elm Street ramp instead of from Main Street just beyond the triple overpass at the western boundary of Dealey Plaza. Sorrels explained that the size and cumbersomeness of the motorcade, along with the presence of a raised divider separating the Main Street lane from the Elm Street lane at the foot of the ramp up to the expressway, deterred him from trying to route the motorcade under and through the overpass on Main Street. Such a route would have assigned the drivers in the motorcade the almost impossible task of making a reverse S-turn in order to cross over the raised divider to get from the Main Street lane into the Elm Street lane. (190) However, this question-and-answer process failed to make clear that the Trade Mart was accessible from beyond the triple overpass in such a way that it was not necessary to enter the Elm Street ramp to the expressway. The motorcade could have progressed westward through Dealey Plaza on Main Street, passed under the overpass, and then proceeded on Industrial Boulevard to the Trade Mart. (191)

(61) George L. Lumpkin, assistant police chief in Dallas in 1963, was consulted by the Secret Service about the motorcade aspect of security planning. (192) Lumpkin explained that the alternate route, continuing straight on Main through and beyond Dealey Plaza and thereby reaching the Trade Mart on Industrial Boulevard, was rejected because the neighborhood surrounding Industrial Boulevard was "filled with winos and broken pavement." (193) Additionally, Lumpkin stated that Kennedy wanted exposure and that there would have been no crowds on Industrial Boulevard. (194)

(62) Advance Agent Lawson informed committee investigators that he had nothing to do with the selection of the Main-Houston-Elm turn before November 14, since only Main Street, not Dealey Plaza, had been selected for the motorcade at that time. He did not specify the exact date on which the turn was selected nor did he identify the person selecting the turn. (195) Sorrels stated that he and Lawson did drive the entire route together, but did not specify when this occurred. (196)

(63) Sorrels' Warren Commission exhibit No. 4 suggested that both men drove the entire route on November 18. (197) It is not certain that both men knew about the turn earlier than this date.

(B) THE PROTECTIVE RESEARCH SECTION

(64) In making a determination as to whether the advance agents for the Texas trip, as well as local field agents, were duly informed of any potential problems that might occur, a thorough review of the function of the Secret Service Protective Research Section was conducted. The Protective Research Service (PRS) was meant to function both as repository of information about threats to the security of Secret Service protectees and as a provider of such information to agents in all types of assignments. It acquired and made available information received from its own agents and from other sources. (198)

(65) In 1963, information acquired from any source external to the

Secret Service, when presented informally to a local Secret Service office, was relayed by the local office of PRS headquarters in Washington. (199) What was not set forth in the Warren Commission report was a description of how threat information was processed and analyzed by PRS and of how the results of its analysis were communicated to local field offices. Lawson's Warren Commission testimony suggested that the Washington, D.C. office would ordinarily provide agents with information about Presidential trips within that city, and that PRS seldom provided advance agents with threat information before their departure. But nothing more specific was given. (200).

(66) Roy Kellerman was the special agent in charge of the Texas trip. Since that assignment required him to travel with Kennedy, (201) he was removed from active investigation in Dallas concerning evidence that suggested danger to the President. Nevertheless, his testimony is important due to his account of breakdowns in Presidential security during the Texas visit.

(67) Secret Service procedure required an inquiry to be made of the PRS about one week before a trip was assigned. Kellerman testified that he received the assignment to coordinate the Texas trip on November 17, 1963, and that by custom the check with PRS was made a week ahead of that date (on or about November 10). (202) Kellerman was not sure who made the check but believed it was either Gerald Behn, Chief of the Secret Service White House Detail, Floyd Boring, Assistant Chief, or one other agent whose name he could not recall. (203) He further stated that he received no information, and that he considered this "unusual." (204) By comparison, Winston Lawson, advance agent for Dallas, knew of his role in the Dallas trip no later than November 8, (205) 9 days before Kellerman, his supervisor who ostensibly had the "overall" responsibility, (206) began to undertake basic trip planning.

(68) On November 8, Lawson checked with PRS at the Executive Office Building, learning that there were no active subjects in the Dallas area and that no JFK file existed. (207) Further comparison discloses that by November 13, Lawson was in Dallas and in contact with local Secret Service Agents Sorrels and John Joe Howlett, with whom he met concerning protective investigations of local anti-JFK suspects. (208)

(69) Kellerman also testified about an inquiry in Dallas which was conducted prior to November 22, in order to locate anti-JFK subjects. When asked specifically about right-wing individuals, scurrilous literature, and extremist groups known to be in Dallas, he claimed virtually total ignorance. (209) He insisted that no one told him anything about an investigation of threat information submitted to the Secret Service in Dallas on November 21 and 22 by the FBI. (210) Additionally, Kellerman observed that it was strange that among five cities in one State and despite the anti-Adlai Stevenson demonstration in Dallas on October 1963, no information about suspects was forthcoming and nothing had been given him. (211)

(70) The Secret Service final report for the November 21 trip to Houston mentioned two active subjects. (212) Both individuals had made specific threats in Houston. (213) Nevertheless, Kellerman was not questioned about Houston. (214)

(71) However, without being questioned about the San Antonio leg of the Texas strip, Kellerman did recall the receipt of PRS information prior to November 21 regarding anti-Presidential picketing that did in fact occur in San Antonio on that date. (215)

(72) The importance of Kellerman's testimony is that, as the one agent who was in direct contact with Kennedy and his innermost circle of advisers, and who was therefore ideally placed to relay information that provided cause for alarm, he was effectively sealed off from the information that he needed to perform with maximum protective effort.

(73) As regards SAIC Sorrels' role, both Sorrels and Howlett cooperated with the special services bureau of the Dallas Police Department, the police in Denton, Tex., Felix McKnight of the Dallas Times-Herald, and the FBI. (216) The FBI was interested in a Ku Klux Klan suspect from a neighboring area. (217) Additionally on November 21, Dallas field office FBI agent James Hosty informed the local Secret Service office of a handbill accusing Kennedy of being a traitor. (218)

(74) The results of these investigations indicated that there were no known, periodically checked PRS subjects; that no formerly institutionalized persons were out on release; and that neither the DPD nor the Secret Service could link anyone with the "traitor" handbill. (219)

(75) White House Detail agent Lawson's position was that the responsibility for any investigation was that of the PRS or Sorrels, and was not his. (220) Although Secret Service procedure allowed him to investigate or not, on the basis of discretion, he did not because he knew that the Service preferred to have the local agents, who have to work with the police on a daily basis, maintain liaison and conduct investigations. (221) Secret Service procedure would not necessarily require him to receive information solely from the local office. It could come from Washington PRS as well. In his opinion, the handbill presented no "direct threat" to John Kennedy. (222)

(76) When interviewed by the committee, Sorrels stated that in November 1963 all known PRS subjects within the jurisdiction of the Dallas field office were in mental hospitals. Hence, he was surprised when he heard about the circulation of the "JFK—Wanted for Treason" handbills. His reaction was to determine who the printer was, bring him in, and interview him. (223) Sorrels stated that the standard procedure for the White House Detail advance agents and the field office SAIC was to become familiar with the entire threat profile before endeavoring to contact the local police department. (224)

(77) When interviewed by the committee, Lawson said that as a White House Detail agent, his duties were limited to shift work and advances, and that in effect, he was not encouraged to participate in the process of investigating threats at the local level and referring them back to PRS. (225) Lawson's only recollection concerning PRS procedures was that when PRS received information about a threat subject from a local agent or a White House detail agent making an advance, the subject was given a file number. "In the old days," files consisted of a folder containing 3 by 5 cards and PRS had the job of coordinating what were called "collateral" investigations in the same or an adjacent district. (226) At no time while he was in Dallas did

Lawson receive information about threats to the President made in other regions. (227)

(78) White House Detail SAIC Gerald Behn described to the committee the procedures in use in PRS at this time. He disclosed the great extent to which the PRS was the central focus of protective operations. Information from the field about active or potential threats to the President were referred to PRS directly from the local office before they were referred to the Chief of the White House Detail. The SAIC of the White House Detail (Behn) would receive reports from the field only from White House Detail advance agents. He and the SAIC of the PRS (Robert I. Bouck) would then discuss the matter with the overall Chief of the Secret Service, Mr. James Rowley. (228)

(79) Behn did not recall whether PRS distributed information to Winston Lawson about the October 1963 heckling and harassment of Adlai Stevenson in Dallas, Tex. Nor could he recall whether any information was distributed prior to the November 21 Texas trip about Dallas area right-wing extremist Edwin Walker. Behn specifically stated, as to the availability to him of information about both Walker and Stevenson, that "no one in PRS passed it on." (229) When asked if he himself warned any agents about either one of those subjects, he said that he did "not remember any discussion with any agent." (230)

(C) PHYSICAL PROTECTION ALONG THE MOTORCADE ROUTE

(80) In reviewing the performance of the Secret Service, consideration must be given to the Dallas Police Department also, since the agency defined and supervised the functions of the police during Kennedy's visit. The activities of the Secret Service, in collaboration with the DPD, covered many areas of security apart from PRS activities.

(81) Arrangements made by the Dallas police included provisions for traffic control to contain the crowd; followup assignments for each officer directing him to subsequent stations after the motorcade has passed his post; assigning at least two officers to each intersection, one to cover traffic primarily, the other to control the crowd; and the stationing of officers at all over- and underpasses. (231) The Secret Service notified the DPD frequently about their joint responsibility for crowd control and crowd observation, but no followup instructions were made in writing nor did Lawson, as the Dallas advance agent, make any written checklist of such instructions. Lawson indicated that it was not normal for there to be such written directions. (232)

(82) At Love Field, the DPD put men on the roofs of buildings surrounding the landing area. Detectives mingled with the crowd, while officers patrolled both sides of a chain-link barricade fence. One of the two service roads linking two general public areas were closed off for motorcade use. The danger from rooftops was not great, since no building faced the side of the plane where the President disembarked. The next most adjacent building was only one story and was blanketed by crowds. Nevertheless, officers were placed on top of this building as well as on the ones adjacent, but there was no check made of offices providing vantage points overlooking the area where the President's plane would land. (233)

(83) Advance agent Lawson testified in 1964 that the Secret Service did not check buildings along a motorcade route except under three circumstances: Presidential inaugurations, visits by a king or a president of a foreign country, or when the motorcade route has been known for years. (234)

(84) Some question remains concerning the conduct of Sorrels and Lawson as to possible violation of the guideline compelling inspection of buildings when a motorcade route has been standard for years. (235) Sorrels stated categorically to the Warren Commission that Main Street was the best choice for parades in that it went through the heart of the city, flanked on either side by tall buildings which maximized the opportunity for large numbers of people to see the parade. He added that this route was used for a Presidential motorcade in 1936, when President Roosevelt traversed Main Street from east to west, just as Kennedy's motorcade would have done had the Women's Building been selected. (236)

(85) Lawson testified that standard Secret Service operating procedure required agents to watch all windows, but he could not recall giving the instructions to watch them. (237) He stated that Sorrels' obligation to watch windows was greater than his own. His duties, while stationed in the lead car immediately in front of the Presidential limousine, included looking directly to the rear at the President in order to coordinate the motorcade's speed and maintain radio contact with Dallas Chief of Police Jesse Curry about adherence to schedule. (238) Although Lawson may have looked at the Depository Building, he was doing too many things at once to notice it. (239)

(86) Sorrels, riding in the lead car, did not have the same supervisory duties as Lawson and was in fact freer to observe windows. He recalled observing the facade of the Depository, but recalled nothing unusual; hence, he did not study it intently. (240)

(87) Lawson readily admitted that windows posed an added danger in a narrowing area that required the motorcade to slow down, especially given the President's "usual" action of standing up to wave. (241)

(88) Lawson further testified that on the morning of November 22, he received a call from Kellerman in Fort Worth asking about weather conditions in Dallas and whether the bubble-top on the President's car would be used or not. During that call, Lawson was told the bubble-top was to be on if it was raining, and off if it was not. (242)

(89) The final decision in this matter was made by Bill Moyers. Moyers had been on the phone to Ms. Harris, informing her that the President did not want the bubble. He told Harris to "get that God-damned bubble off unless it's pouring rain." (243) Shortly thereafter the weather began to clear. Ms. Harris approached Sorrels about the bubble-top and together they had the special agents remove the glass top. (244)

(90) Dallas Police Department Capt. Perdue W. Lawrence was assigned, on the basis of his familiarity with escort security, to be in charge of traffic control for the motorcade. (245) He recalled that he received this assignment on November 19. (246) His immediate superior was Deputy Chief Lunday, head of the traffic division, who was in turn commanded by Assistant Chief Charles Batchelor. (247) Law-

rence testified that approximately 2 days before the President's arrival, he discussed with Lunday and Batchelor the stationing of motorcycle escorts. At this meeting, no Secret Service agents were present. They agreed to use 18 motorcycles. Some of these were to be positioned "alongside" the Presidential limousine. (248)

(91) Dallas Police Department documents indicate that at a meeting between Chief Curry, Deputy Chief R. H. Lunday, and Captain Lawrence on November 19, it was agreed that a motorcycle escort should be used, "with men on either side of the motorcade [sic], with five at the rear, four motorcycles immediately ahead, and three motorcycles to precede the motorcade by about two blocks." (249)

(92) Lawrence was subsequently invited to a DPD/SS coordinating meeting held on November 21. At 5 p.m. he was told to report to the meeting. (250) It was here that a change in motorcycle escort plans occurred. The coordination meeting, according to DPD documents, was attended by Curry, Batchelor, Deputy Chiefs Lumpkin, Stevenson, Lunday, and Fisher, Captains Souter, Lawrence, and King, Inspector Sawyer, and Secret Service agents Sorrels, Lawson, and David Grant. The meeting touched on various topics; however, particular emphasis was given to the use of motorcycles as Presidential escorts. (251)

(93) Lawrence's account of the change that was introduced by the Secret Service is as follows:

. . . I heard one of the Secret Service men say that President Kennedy did not desire any motorcycle officer directly on each side of him, between him and the crowd, but he would want the officers to the rear. (252)

. . . when it was mentioned about these motorcycle officers alongside the President's car, he (the S.S. agent) said, "No, these officers should be back and if any people started a rush toward the car, if there was any movement at all where the President was endangered in any way, these officers would be in a position to gun their motors and get between them and the Presidential car . . ." (253)

(94) Comparison reveals that the DPD document that describes the November 21 meeting is vague in contrast to Lawrence's explicit assertion that the Secret Service changed the "alongside" distribution of motorcycles to a rearward distribution. The DPD document for November 21 stated:

Lawrence then said there would be four motorcycles on either side of the motorcade immediately to the rear of the President's vehicle. Mr. Lawson stated that this was too many, that he thought two motorcycles on either side would be sufficient, about even with the rear fender of the President's car. Lawrence was instructed to disperse the other two along each side of the motorcade to the rear. (254)

(95) In contrast to Lawrence's testimony, this document indicated that the alteration by the Secret Service of motorcycle distribution concerned the number of motorcycles, not their physical locations in relation to the Presidential limousine. Still, the DPD and Lawrence

versions do corroborate one another in that they indicate a reduction of security protection in terms of number and placement of officers.

(96) Lawson's testimony in 1964 was that it was his understanding that the President had personally stated that he did not like a lot of motorcycles surrounding his limousine because their loud noise interfered with conversations taking place within the limousine. For this reason the four motorcycles were positioned "just back" of the limousine. (255) Lawson stated to the committee that he had "no recall of changing plans" (i.e. for motorcycles) at the Dallas Police Department/Secret Service organizational meeting of November 21. (256)

(97) There are several instances of failure by the motorcycle officers to adhere to Lawson's final plan involving two cycles on each side and to the rear of the Presidential limousine. (257)

(98) Officer Marion L. Baker confirms the original Lawrence testimony as to the alteration by the Secret Service of a prior DPD plan. Baker had originally been instructed to ride right beside Kennedy. He was later informed by his sergeant that nobody was to ride beside the car, but instead the officers were to fall in beyond it. They received these instructions about 5 or 10 minutes before the motorcade left Love Field. (258)

(99) As to actual deployment of the cycles, DPD officers Billy Joe Martin and Bobby W. Hargis were assigned to ride immediately to the left and rear of Kennedy's limousine.* (259) Martin stated that he rode 5 feet to the left and 6 to 8 feet to the rear of the back bumper. (260) He indicated that he saw Hargis to his right as he left Houston for Elm. (261)

(100) Hargis, too, rode to the rear left side of the limousine and remained even with its bumper rather than move "past" the President's car. He testified that as he turned left onto Elm Street, he was staying right up with Kennedy's car, though crowd density prevented him from staying right up next to it. Nevertheless, because of the thinning out of the crowd by the triple overpass, Hargis stated that he was right next to Mrs. Kennedy when he heard the first shot. (262)

(101) Officers M. L. Baker and Clyde A. Haygood were assigned to the right rear of the Presidential limousine. (263) The activity of both indicated again a departure from standard maximum security protection. Haygood, for example, admitted that although he was stationed to the right rear of Kennedy's car, he was generally riding several cars back (264) and offered no explanation for this. Haygood testified before the Warren Commission that he was on Main Street at the time of the shooting. (265)

(102) Baker stated that in addition to being instructed by his sergeant not to ride beside the President's car, he was also instructed by him to fall in beyond the press car. (266) Baker interpreted this assignment as an order to place himself about six or seven cars behind Kennedy. (267) Baker was on Houston Street at the time of the first shot. (268) Haygood and Baker were too far from the Presidential limousine to afford Kennedy any protection. They were in no position

*Both Baker and Martin stated to the committee that it was at the President's request that they made no effort to stay in close formation immediately to the rear of the Presidential limousine. See footnotes 259 and 266, *infra*.

to rush forward to intercept danger had there been a street-level incident, yet the forward interception capability of the motorcycles was the basic rationale for Lawson's November 21 rearward deployment of the motorcycles. (269)

(103) Kellerman who rode in the right front seat of the Presidential limousine testified before the Warren Commission that there were two motorcycles on each side of the rear wheel of the President's car. (270) Nevertheless, he was not asked either about the reason for that positioning or whether the two motorcycles on the right side were there at the time of the shooting.

(104) The Secret Service's alteration of the original Dallas Police Department motorcycle deployment plan prevented the use of maximum possible security precautions. The straggling of Haygood and Baker, on the right rear area of the limousine, weakened security that was already reduced due to the rearward deployment of the motorcycles and to the reduction of the number of motorcycles originally intended for use.

(105) Surprisingly, the security measure used in the prior motorcades during the same Texas visit show that the deployment of motorcycles in Dallas by the Secret Service may have been uniquely insecure. The Secret Service Final Survey Report for the November 21 visit to Houston stated that in all motorcade movements, "six motorcycles flanked the Presidential limousine and an additional 33 motorcycles were used to flank the motorcade and cover the intersections." (271) There is no mention in the Fort Worth Secret Service Final Report about the deployment of motorcycles in the vicinity of the Presidential limousine. (272)

(106) The Secret Service knew more than a day before November 22 that the President did not want motorcycles riding alongside or parallel to the Presidential vehicle. (273) If the word "flank" denotes parallel deployment, and if in fact such deployment was effected in Houston, then it may well be that by altering Dallas Police Department Captain Lawrence's original motorcycle plan, the Secret Service deprived Kennedy of security in Dallas that it had provided a mere day before in Houston. (274)

(107) Besides limiting motorcycle protection, Lawson prevented the Dallas Police Department from inserting into the motorcade, behind the Vice-Presidential car, a Dallas Police Department squad car containing homicide detectives. For the Secret Service, the rejection of this Dallas Police Department suggestion was not unusual in itself. Lawson testified before the Warren Commission that with the exception of New York City motorcades, it was not the Secret Service's standard practice to insert a police homicide car into a motorcade. (275) He did not remember who recommended either its insertion, its proposed placement, or its cancellation. (276)

(108) On November 14, 1963, Lawson met with Dallas SAIC Sorrels and Dallas Police Department Chief Jesse Curry and "laid out the tentative number of vehicles that would be in the parade and the order in which they would be." (277) Curry stated at the organizational meeting on November 21 that he "thought we had planned that Captain Fritz [Chief of DPD Homicide] would be in the motorcade behind the Vice President's car." (278) Sorrels spoke up at that point

and stated that "nothing was discussed on that." (279) Lawson explained that a car with Secret Service agents would follow the Vice President's car and added that the protective detail would like to have a police car bring up the rear of the motorcade. (280) Curry then instructed Deputy Chief Lunday to take care of the matter. (281)

(109) Lawson was asked by the committee why, in his preliminary survey report of November 19, (282) he made no mention in the sequenced list of motorcade vehicles of the DPD homicide car that Curry believed on November 14 to have been included and whose absence Curry protested at the meeting of November 21. He answered that "the DPD could have put it [a DPD car] in on their own"; that "he could not recall who took it out"; that he was "not sure it was scheduled to be there"; and that "he didn't know who canceled the DPD car because he didn't know who decided to include it." (283)

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(1) Scott, Peter Dale, *Government Documents and the Kennedy Assassination* (unpublished draft), House Select Committee on Assassinations, chapter I, page 12 (JFK document No. 000814).

(2) *Ibid.*; chapter III, page 32 (Secret Service); chapter II, pages 1-12 (right-wing businessmen); chapter III, pages 28, 31, 34, 35 (Governor John B. Connally). See also outside contact (with anonymous phone caller), August 17, 1978, pages 1-2 (JFK document No. 010827).

(3) Deposition of Jerry Bruno, August 18, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pages 27-28 (JFK document No. 014025).

(4) Testimony of Kenneth O'Donnell, May 18, 1964, hearings before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964) (hereinafter referred to as *Warren Commission Hearings*); volume 7, page 443.

(5) Staff interview of Frank Erwin, July 29, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, page 13 (JFK document 010696). See also testimony of John B. Connally, September 6, 1978, hearings before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, 95th Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), volume I, page 28 (hereinafter referred to as *Connally testimony*), September 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 28.

(6) *Ibid.*, HSCA-JFK hearings, 29.

(7) Staff interview of Frank Erwin, July 29, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, page 10 (JFK document No. 010696).

(8) *Id.* at p. 10.

(9) *Id.* at p. 10. See also testimony of Kenneth O'Donnell, May 18, 1964, *Warren Commission hearings*, volume VII, page 444.

(10) Bruno deposition, August 18, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, page 13 (JFK document 014025). See also deposition of J. Eric Jonsson, July 26, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, page 17 (JFK document No. 014022).

(11) Staff interview of Frank Erwin, July 29, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, page 10 (JFK document No. 010696).

(12) Testimony of Kenneth O'Donnell, May 18, 1964, *Warren Commission hearings*, volume VII, page 443.

(13) *Id.* at p. 443.

(14) Map of Dallas, Tex., copyright by Rand McNally, House Select Committee on Assassinations (JFK document No. 014976).

- (15) *Ibid.*
- (16) Staff interview of Frank Erwin, July 29, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, page 9 (JFK document No. 010696). See also deposition of Jerry Bruno, August 18, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, pages 34-35 (JFK document No. 014025). See also, testimony of Dallas Field Office SAIC Forrest Sorrels, May 7, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, volume VII, page 335.
- (17) Bruno deposition, August 18, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, page 31 (JFK document No. 014025). See also testimony of Kenneth O'Donnell, May 18, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, volume VII, page 443.
- (18) Bruno deposition, August 18, 1978, House Select Committee on Assassinations, page 41 (JFK document No. 014025).
- (19) *Id.* at pp. 40-41.
- (20) *Ibid.*
- (21) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 51.
- (22) Testimony of Kenneth O'Donnell, May 18, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. VII, p. 443. See also Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 48 (JFK Document No. 014025).
- (23) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 11.
- (24) *Id.* at pp. 11, 12, 13.
- (25) *Id.* at p. 11.
- (26) *Id.* at p. 12.
- (27) *Id.* at p. 12.
- (28) *Id.* at pp. 12-13.
- (29) *Id.* at pp. 11, 12, 13.
- (30) *Id.* at p. 13.
- (31) *Id.* at p. 13.
- (32) *Id.* at p. 13.
- (33) *Id.* at p. 14.
- (34) *Id.* at p. 13.
- (35) *Id.* at pp. 13, 16.
- (36) *Id.* at p. 13.
- (37) *Id.* at p. 14.
- (38) *Id.* at p. 16.
- (39) *Id.* at p. 16.
- (40) *Id.* at p. 15.
- (41) *Id.* at p. 15.
- (42) *Id.* at pp. 15, 16. See also affidavit of Clifford Carter, May 20, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. VII, p. 475.
- (43) *Id.* at p. 16.
- (44) *Id.* at p. 16.
- (45) *Id.* at pp. 16, 17.
- (46) *Id.* at pp. 16-17.
- (47) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, pp. 4-5 (J. F. K. Document No. 014025). See also notes of Jerry Bruno, Dec. 13, 1977, HSCA, p. 1 (JFK Document No. 004074).
- (48) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, pp. 5, 6 (JFK Document No. 014025).
- (49) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 19-20. See also JFK Exhibit No. F-17.
- (50) *Id.* at p. 24.
- (51) *Id.* at p. 24.
- (52) *Id.* at p. 18.
- (53) Testimony of Kenneth O'Donnell, May 18, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. III, pp. 441-442.
- (54) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 18.
- (55) *Id.* at p. 18.
- (56) *Id.* at p. 25.
- (57) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 26.
- (58) *Id.* at p. 26.
- (59) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 11 (JFK document No. 014025). See also typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Dec. 13, 1977, p. 1 (JFK document No. 004074).
- (60) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, p. 11. See also handwritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Sept. 7, 1978, p. 1 (JFK document No. 011337).

- (61) Connally testimony, July 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 26.
- (62) *Id.* at p. 26.
- (63) *Ibid.*
- (64) *Ibid.*
- (65) *Ibid.*
- (66) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 11 (JFK document No. 014025).
- (67) Typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Dec. 13, 1977, HSCA, pp. 1, 2 (JFK document No. 004074).
- (68) *Id.* at p. 4.
- (69) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 26.
- (70) *Id.* at p. 26.
- (71) Typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Dec. 13, 1977, HSCA, p. 8 (JFK document No. 004074).
- (72) *Id.* at p. 8. See also Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 26.
- (73) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 26.
- (74) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 12 (JFK document No. 014025).
- (75) Typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Dec. 13, 1977, HSCA, p. 8 (JFK Document No. 004074). See also Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 26.
- (76) Connally testimony, Sept. 16, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 26.
- (77) *Ibid.*
- (78) *Ibid.* See also testimony of Kenneth O'Donnell, May 18, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. VII, p. 442.
- (79) Connally testimony, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 28.
- (80) *Id.* at p. 29. See also typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Dec. 13, 1977, HSCA, p. 8 (JFK document No. 004074); Connally testimony, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 26, 29, 32.
- (81) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 24-25, 26.
- (82) *Id.* at p. 25.
- (83) *Id.* at p. 26.
- (84) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 11 (JFK document No. 014025). See also typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Dec. 13, 1977, HSCA, p. 1 (JFK document No. 004074).
- (85) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 15 (JFK document No. 014025).
- (86) *Id.* at p. 15.
- (87) Typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Dec. 13, 1977, HSCA, pp. 1, 3, 7, 8 (JFK document No. 004074).
- (88) Minutes of the Board of Trustees of Texas Christian University, June 1, 1978, HSCA, p. 208 (JFK document No. 008813).
- (89) *Id.* at pp. 6, 8.
- (90) Staff interview of Sam P. Woodson, Jr., May 10, 1978, HSCA, p. 5 (JFK document No. 013381).
- (91) *Id.* at p. 5.
- (92) *Id.* at p. 6.
- (93) *Id.* at p. 6.
- (94) *Ibid.*
- (95) *Ibid.*
- (96) *Ibid.* See also staff interview of Frank Erwin, July 29, 1978, HSCA, p. 11 (JFK document No. 010696).
- (97) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 22 (JFK document No. 014025).
- (98) Testimony of Buell W. Frazier, Mar. 11, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. II, p. 233. See also Warren Commission Exhibit 698; JFK exhibit F-13.
- (99) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 49.
- (100) *Ibid.* See also JFK exhibit F-17.
- (101) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 49-50.
- (102) Typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Sept. 7, 1978, HSCA, p. 9 (JFK document No. 011337).
- (103) Staff interview of Winston Lawson, Jan. 31, 1978, HSCA, p. 5 (JFK document No. 007066).

- (104) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 26.
- (105) Deposition of J. Eric Jonsson, July 26, 1978, HSCA, pp. 4-6 (JFK document No. 014022).
- (106) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 27 (statement of the basic plan), 28 (objection to a lengthy downtown motorcade).
- (106A) Staff interview of Frank Erwin, July 29, 1978, HSCA, pp. 2-7, 9 (JFK document No. 010696).
- (107) Staff interview of Frank Erwin, July 29, 1978, HSCA, p. 5 (JFK document No. 010696).
- (108) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 51.
- (109) Staff interview of Frank Erwin, July 29, 1978, HSCA, p. 7 (JFK document No. 010696).
- (110) *Ibid.*
- (111) *Id.* at p. 9.
- (112) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 31 (JFK document No. 014025).
- (113) *Id.* at p. 32.
- (114) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, pp. 39-40 (JFK document No. 014025).
- (115) *Id.* at p. 39.
- (116) *Id.* at pp. 41-42.
- (117) *Id.* at pp. 41-42.
- (118) Testimony of Forrest Sorrels, May 7, 1969, Warren Commission hearings, vol. VII, p. 334.
- (119) *Ibid.*
- (120) *Id.* at p. 335.
- (121) *Ibid.*
- (122) Staff interview of Forrest Sorrels, Mar. 15, 1978, HSCA, p. 2 (JFK document No. 007062).
- (123) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 35 (JFK document No. 014025).
- (124) *Id.* at p. 30.
- (125) Deposition of Ms. Elizabeth Forsling Harris, Aug. 16, 1978, HSCA, p. 25 (JFK document No. 013152).
- (126) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 30 (JFK document No. 014025).
- (127) Typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Dec. 13, 1977, HSCA, p. 8 (JFK document No. 004074). See also Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, pp. 34-35 (JFK document No. 014025).
- (128) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 35 (JFK document No. 014025).
- (129) Executive session testimony of Gerald Behn, Mar. 15, 1978, HSCA, pp. 73, 74 (JFK document No. 014670).
- (130) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 35 (JFK document No. 014025). See also typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Dec. 13, 1977, p. 8 (JFK document No. 004074).
- (131) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 36 (JFK document No. 014025).
- (132) *Id.* at pp. 34, 35.
- (133) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. IV, pp. 318, 319. See also staff interview of Winston Lawson, Jan. 31, 1978, HSCA, pp. 1-5 (JFK document No. 007066).
- (134) *Ibid.*
- (135) Lawson testimony, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. IV, p. 319.
- (136) *Id.* at pp. 322, 336.
- (137) Lawson testimony, Warren Commission hearings, vol. IV, p. 337.
- (138) *Id.* at p. 337.
- (139) For the basis of Bruno's belief that the Women's Building was initially selected as the final choice, see footnotes 127, 128, 130, *supra*. The omission of the Warren Commission to obtain exhibits or to take testimony either from Behn or from Bruno is documented at Warren Commission hearings, vol. XV, pp. 755, 757, 815.
- (140) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, pp. 36, 37 (JFK document No. 014025).

- (141) *Id.* at p. 36.
- (142) *Id.* at p. 37.
- (143) Testimony of Forrest Sorrels, May 7, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. VII, pp. 335-341. See also staff interview of Forrest Sorrels, Mar. 15, 1978, HSCA, pp. 2-3 (JFK document No. 007062).
- (144) See footnotes 127-131, *supra*.
- (145) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. IV, p. 337.
- (146) *Id.* at p. 337.
- (147) *Id.* at pp. 337, 338.
- (148) Staff interview of Winston Lawson, Jan. 31, 1978, HSCA, p. 5 (JFK document No. 007066).
- (149) Typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Sept. 7, 1978, HSCA, p. 9 (JFK document No. 011337).
- (150) Bruno deposition, Aug. 18, 1978, HSCA, p. 49 (JFK document No. 014025).
- (151) Deposition of Bill Moyers, Aug. 16, 1978, HSCA, p. 26 (JFK document No. 014018).
- (152) *Id.* at p. 26.
- (153) *Id.* at p. 28.
- (154) *Id.* at p. 28.
- (155) *Id.* at pp. 25, 29.
- (156) *Id.* at p. 32.
- (157) *Id.* at p. 33.
- (158) *Ibid.*
- (159) *Ibid.*
- (160) See footnote 149, *supra*.
- (161) Connally testimony, Sept. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, p. 49.
- (162) *Id.* at p. 51.
- (163) *Ibid.*
- (164) *Ibid.*
- (165) Typewritten notes of Jerry Bruno, Sept. 7, 1978, HSCA, p. 9 (JFK document No. 011337). See also Moyers deposition, Aug. 16, 1978, HSCA, p. 5 (JFK document No. 014018).
- (166) Moyers deposition, Aug. 16, 1978, HSCA, p. 6 (JFK document No. 014018).
- (167) *Ibid.*
- (168) *Id.* at pp. 22-23.
- (169) *Id.* at p. 22.
- (170) *Id.* at pp. 22, 23.
- (171) *Id.* at p. 23.
- (172) *Id.* at p. 23.
- (173) *Id.* at p. 24.
- (174) Deposition of Ms. Elizabeth Forsling Harris, Aug. 16, 1978, HSCA, p. 11 (JFK document No. 013152).
- (175) Connally testimony, Jan. 6, 1978, I HSCA-JFK hearings, 13.
- (176) Deposition of Ms. Elizabeth Forsling Harris, Aug. 16, 1978, HSCA, p. 13 (JFK document No. 013152).
- (177) *Id.* at p. 13.
- (178) *Id.* at p. 14.
- (179) *Ibid.*
- (180) *Id.* at pp. 21-22.
- (181) *Id.* at p. 22.
- (182) *Ibid.*
- (183) *Id.* at p. 25.
- (184) *Id.* at p. 26.
- (185) *Id.* at p. 25.
- (186) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. VII, p. 341.
- (187) Staff interview of Winston Lawson, Jan. 31, 1978, HSCA, p. 7 (JFK document No. 007066).
- (188) *Id.* at p. 7. See also Lawson testimony, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. VII, pp. 340, 341; staff interview of Jack Puterbaugh, Apr. 14, 1978, HSCA, p. 3 (JFK document No. 008580).

(189) Testimony of Forrest Sorrels, May 7, 1964. Warren Commission hearings, vol. VII, p. 337.

(190) *Id.* at pp. 337, 338.

(191) Staff interview of George L. Lumpkin, Nov. 3, 1977, HSCA, p. 1 (JFK document No. 003087).

(192) *Id.* at p. 1.

(193) *Id.* at p. 2.

(194) *Id.* at p. 2.

(195) Staff interview of Winston Lawson, Jan. 31, 1978, HSCA p. 3 (JFK document No. 007066).

(196) Staff interview of Forrest Sorrels, Mar. 15, 1978, HSCA, p. 4 (JFK document No. 007062).

(197) Sorrels Exhibit No. 4, Nov. 30, 1963, Warren Commission hearings, p. 2, vol. XXI, p. 547.

(198) Executive session testimony of Robert I. Bouck, Nov. 17, 1977, HSCA, pp. 7-31 (JFK document No. 014609).

(199) *Ibid.* See also deposition (book II) of 1963 Secret Service Chief James Rowley, Aug. 24, 1978, HSCA, pp. 8, 64 (JFK document No. 014026). A report from a field office, if addressed to the office of the chief, would be delivered either to PRS or to the office of the head of protective operations.

(200) Lawson testimony, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. IV, p. 343.

(201) Testimony of Roy Kellerman, Mar. 9, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. II, pp. 63, 105.

(202) *Id.* at pp. 106, 107.

(203) *Id.* at p. 107.

(204) *Id.* at p. 108.

(205) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. VII, p. 319.

(206) Testimony of Roy Kellerman, Mar. 9, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. VI, p. 105.

(207) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. IV, p. 321.

(208) *Id.* at pp. 322, 323.

(209) Testimony of Roy Kellerman, Mar. 9, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. II, pp. 108, 109.

(210) *Id.* at p. 109.

(211) *Ibid.*

(212) *Id.* at pp. 109-111.

(213) Secret Service Final Survey Report (Presidential visit of Nov. 21, 1963 to Houston, Tex.), Mar. 19, 1978, HSCA, p. 7 (JFK document No. 014979).

(214) *Id.* at p. 7.

(215) Testimony of Roy Kellerman, Mar. 9, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. II, pp. 108-112.

(216) Testimony of Forrest Sorrels, May 7, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. VII, pp. 338, 339.

(217) *Id.* at p. 339.

(218) *Id.* at p. 339.

(219) *Ibid.* See also Warren Commission Exhibit No. CE 770.

(220) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. IV, p. 345.

(221) *Id.* at pp. 323, 345.

(222) *Id.* at pp. 323, 344, 345.

(223) Staff interview of Forrest Sorrels, Mar. 15, 1979, HSCA, p. 3 (JFK document No. 007062).

(224) *Id.* at p. 3.

(225) Staff interview of Winston Lawson, Jan. 31, 1978, HSCA, p. 11 (JFK document No. 007066).

(226) *Id.* at p. 11.

(227) *Id.* at p. 9.

(228) Staff interview of Gerald Behn, Jan. 30, 1978, HSCA, p. 4 (JFK document No. 012998).

(229) *Id.* at p. 4.

(230) *Id.* at p. 5.

(231) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. IV, p. 326.

- (232) *Id.* at pp. 326, 327.
- (233) *Id.* at pp. 339, 340.
- (234) *Id.* at p. 333.
- (235) *Id.* at p. 333.
- (236) Testimony of Forrest Sorrels, May 7, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. VII, p. 337.
- (237) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. IV, pp. 328, 329.
- (238) *Id.* at p. 331.
- (239) *Id.* at p. 330.
- (240) Testimony of Forrest Sorrels, May 7, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. VII, p. 343.
- (241) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. IV, p. 330.
- (242) *Id.* at p. 349.
- (243) Deposition of Ms. Elizabeth Forsling Harris, Aug. 16, 1978, HSCA, p. 28 (JFK document No. 013152).
- (244) *Id.* at p. 28.
- (245) Testimony of Perdue Lawrence, July 24, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. VII, p. 581.
- (246) *Id.* at p. 378.
- (247) *Id.* at p. 579.
- (248) *Id.* at p. 579.
- (249) Stevenson Exhibit No. 5053, Nov. 30, 1963, Warren Commission hearings, vol. XXI, p. 567.
- (250) Testimony of Perdue Lawrence, July 24, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. VII, p. 580.
- (251) Stevenson Exhibit No. 5053, Nov. 30, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. XXI, pp. 589-571.
- (252) Testimony of Perdue Lawrence, July 24, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. VII, p. 580.
- (253) *Id.* at p. 581.
- (254) Stevenson Exhibit No. 5053, Nov. 30, 1963, Warren Commission hearings, vol. XXI, p. 571.
- (255) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. VII, pp. 338, 339.
- (256) Staff interview of Winston Lawson, Jan. 31, 1978, HSCA, p. 8 (JFK document No. 007066).
- (257) Testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren Commission, vol. IV, p. 338. See also footnote 257, *supra*.
- (258) Testimony of Marion L. Baker, Mar. 25, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. III, p. 244.
- (259) Staff interview of Billy Joe Martin. Sept. 27, 1977, HSCA, p. 1 (JFK document No. 002393). See also staff interview of Billy Joe Martin, Jan. 17, 1978, HSCA, p. 1 (JFK document No. 014372). Martin confirms the Presidential objection to the close positioning of motorcycles.
- (260) Testimony of Billy Joe Martin, Apr. 3, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. VI, p. 290.
- (261) *Id.* at p. 290.
- (262) Testimony of Bobby W. Hargis, Apr. 8, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. VI, p. 294. See also staff interview of Bobby Weldon Hargis, Jan. 17, 1979, HSCA, p. 1 (JFK document No. 14362). Crowd pressure removed Hargis from his position and pushed him rearward. See also staff interview of Robert W. Hargis, Oct. 26, 1977, Select Committee on Assassinations, pp. 1-2 (JFK document No. 003300).
- (263) Testimony of Clyde A. Haygood, Apr. 9, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. VI, p. 297. Cf. staff interview of Clyde A. Haygood, HSCA, p. 1 (JFK Document No. 002392).
- (264) Testimony of Clyde Haygood, Apr. 9, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. VI, p. 297.
- (265) *Id.* at p. 297.
- (266) Testimony of Marlon L. Baker, Mar. 25, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. III, p. 244. See also staff interview of Marlon L. Baker, Jan. 17, 1978, HSCA, p. 1 (JFK document No. 014899). Baker corroborated Martin's account (see footnote 259, *supra*) of the President's objection to close positioning of

motorcycles and asserted that the President was responsible for Baker's position near the press bus.

(267) *Id.* at p. 245.

(268) *Id.* at p. 245.

(269) See footnote 253, *supra*.

(270) Testimony of Roy Kellerman, Mar. 9, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. II, p. 70.

(271) Secret Service Final Survey Report (Presidential visit of Nov. 21, 1963, to Houston, Tex.), Mar. 19, 1978, HSCA, p. 6 (JFK document No. 014979).

(272) Secret Service Final Survey Report (Presidential visit of Nov. 22, 1963, to Fort Worth, Tex.), Mar. 19, 1978, HSCA, p. 3 (JFK document No. 014980).

(273) Testimony of Clinton J. Hill, Mar. 7, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. II, pp. 136-137. See also testimony of Winston G. Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. IV, p. 338.

(274) See footnote 271, *supra*.

(275) Warren Commission testimony of Winston Lawson, Apr. 23, 1964, Warren Commission hearings, vol. IV, p. 334.

(276) *Id.* at p. 334.

(277) Stevenson Exhibit No. 5053, Nov. 30, 1963, Warren Commission hearings, vol. XXI, p. 563.

(278) *Id.* at p. 570.

(279) *Id.* at p. 570.

(280) *Id.* at p. 570.

(281) *Id.* at p. 571.

(282) Warren Commission Exhibit No. 767, Warren Commission hearings, vol. XVII, p. 596.

(283) Staff interview of Winston Lawson, Jan. 31, 1978, HSCA, pp. 7, 8 (JFK document No. 007066).

