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COUNTY

We Discover Lee OSWALD in Nextco City

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CIA did produce one very significant piece of information on Lee OSNALD before he shot President Kennedy. On 1 October 1963, our Mexico City Station intercepted a telephone call Lee OSWALD made from someplace in Mexico City to the Ecviet Embassy there, using his own name. Speaking broken Russian and using his true name, OSWALD was talking to the Embassy guard, OBYEDEOV, who often answers the phone. OSWALD said he had visited the Embessy the previous Saturday (28 September 1963) and spoken to a consul whose name he had forgotten, and who had provided to send a telegram for him to Washington. He wanted to know if there were "anything new." The guard said if the consul was dark it was (Valeriy Vladwirovich) KOSTIKOT. The guard checked with someone else and said that the message had gone out but no answer had been received. He then hung up.

This piece of information was produced from

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SECRET

which are transcribed and reviewed by our small staff in Mexico City. By 9 October, the OSWALD telephone conversation of 1 October had been transcribed and a summary of it cabled to Washington. The name Lee OSWALD meant nothing special to our Mexico City Station, but in their report they did judge him to be an American male.

The cebled report was received in Washington on 9 October and checked in our files, where it was immediately noted that the Lee OSWALD phoning the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City was probably the Lee OSWALD who had defected to the Soviet Union in 1959 and returned to the USA in 1962. On 10 October 1963, the day after the report from Mexico City, CIA Headquarters sent out a cabled report about Lee OSWALD's phone call to the Soviet Embassy; the report went to the FEI, the Department of State (because OSWALD was a US citizen), and to the May Department (because he was a former Merine.) The cabled report to these agencies highlighted the

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A copy of this same cable was delivered by hand to the Immigration and

Baturalization Service, with which we have no cable link. The same day

a long cable went out to Herico City informing our Station of the back
ground of defector Lee OSWALD and asking for more information. Our Station

was instructed to pass its information on the phone call to the Mexico

City offices of the FEI, the Embessy, the Mayal Attache, and the Immigra
tion and Maturalization Service. This was done.

In its original report of 9 October, Mexico City had said it had a photograph of an apparent American male leaving the Soviet Embassy on 1 October 1963, the day OSMALD phone there. A very sensitive operation in Mexico City provides us with secretly taken photographs of many but not all visitors to the Soviet Embassy there, taken with telephoto lenses.

Accordingly, we cabled the Mayy Department on 24 October 1963 asking for a photograph of Lee OSWALD from his Marine Corps days so we could compare photos. We had not received this photograph by 22 November 1963, but in any event, it turned out that the man photographed outside the Soviet

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Embassy was not OSWALD anyway. As chance would have it, none of our several photo observation points in Mexico City had ever taken an identifiable picture of Lee OSWALD.

Our Mexico City Station very often produces information like this on US citizens contacting Soviet bloc embassies in Mexico City. Frequently the information we get is extremely incriminating, and on one or two occasions we have even been able to apprehend and return to the USA American military personnel who are attempting to defect. In all such cases, our Readquarters deak requests and obtains the special permission of the Deputy Director for Flans to pass the deregatory information on a US citizen to other government agencies. Derogatory information on Americans is not treated routinely; in each case the DDF or his Assistant personally scrutinise the information, make sure it is credible, and decide whether and to whom it will be passed. Only in absolute emergencies is the Kexico City Station enthorized to pass such information directly to the FBI office in the U.S. Embassy.

At this writing (13 December 1963) we do not know what action the FBI



THE may have made local checks through Mexican authorities to see if

Lee OSMALD was actually in Mexico City on 1 October. Indeed, later in
vestigation has confirmed all the details of his trip, where he stayed,

and what he did. To avoid crossing lines with the FRI, our Mexico Station

undertook me local investigation of its own. As we now know, OSMALD laft

Mexico on 3 October and was no longer there when our report was put out.

22 Nevember 1963

When word of the shooting of Fresident Kennedy reached the offices of our operating divisions and staffs on the afternoon of Friday 22 November 1963, transistor radios were turned on everywhere to follow the tragedy. When the name of Lee OSWALD was beard, the effect was electric.

A phone message from the FBI came at about the same time, making OSWALD

as the possible assassin and asking for traces. The message was passed en at once by the Chief CI, Mr. Angleton, to Mr. Rirch O'Real of his Special Investigations Unit. Mrs. Betty Egeter of this Unit immediately recognized the name of Lee OSKALD and went for his file. At the ease time, Mrs. Bustos of the Mexico Desk, who had written our first feport on OSWALD on 10 October recognized the mass from redio reports and went after the same file. Mr. Reichbardt, Mexico Desk Chief, who was home on leave, heard the news and phoned in a reminder that we had something on OSWALD. While we were preparing a cable to Mexico City asking them for more information on OSWALD, Mexico City itself heard OSWALD's name on the Voice of America broadcast and cabled to us a reminder of the information the Station had sent in on him.

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For the next week, a dozen people in the Agency were continuously engaged in handling incoming messages on the case, writing reports to be cabled out, tracing the names mentioned, and researching files. Within a week, 27 cabled reports had gone out to the White House, the State Department, and the FAI. Many cables of guidance and inquiry had been sent to



our eversees stations, and many pieces of information on OSWALD and his wife had been received back. The Mexico City Station researched its telephone taps very thoroughly and came up with several more conversations probably involving OSWALD, but not actually mentioning this name; these connected him also to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City. Several Mexicans were arrested and questioned about his activities, giving a good picture of what he was really up to. Many conferences were held with the FBI lisison officer who asked as for certain actions and passed us information from the FRI investigation. One the minus side, a host of fabricators, January and Sept separation of the September 1991 of the September some anonymous, bombarded overseas embassies with spurious tips on the case, most of which we investigated. All of these are soon discredited, but they are still coming in.

PAI, which was entrusted by the President with the major responsibility for the investigation. The FRI was too busy to supply us with much of its own information, but answers were given to specific questions we posed to assist our investigation. The Department of State and photograph its entire

file on OSWALD and pass them to us, and the FRI gave us a copy of the
Soviet Consular file on OSWALD which had been publicly given by the Soviet
Ambassador to the Secretary of State. On Friday 6 December 1963, Deputy
Attorney General Katzenbach invited us to review the FRI's comprehensive
report on the case to make sure our sources were not jeopardized and that
our information was correctly quoted. We found the report highly
interesting and no threat to our security, as long as it was read only
by the authorized investigative bodies.

After the first few days, the CIA investigation of the case was bandled at Headquarters by a small staff usually charged with investigation and analysis of the most important security cases, and by a few efficers and analysts of our Western Hemisphere Division.

Reports From Mexico

As soon as our Mexico City Station realized that Lee OSHALD was the prime suspect, it began re-screening all the written telephone transcripts in its files covering the Soviet Embassy for the pertinent period. The actual tapes were also reviewed, but many of them had been erased after the

normal two weeks wait. Several calls believed to involve OSMALD were discovered and their contents cabled to Washington, where they were disseminated to the White House, the State Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

OSHALD's name was not actually mentioned in these additional calls, but similarity of speech and various plain points of content link them to him. These calls are summarized below in chronological order.

They cover the period from 27 September 1963 to 3 October 1963, the whole span of OSHALD's visit to Mexico City as later learned from travel records.

27 September - A man phones the Soviet Military Attache and says he needs a visa to 80 to Odessa. Man enswering says he should call 15-60-55 and ask for the Consul. Caller asks for the address, and it is given to him. (There is no special reason for linking this call to OSWALD.)

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27 September, 4:05 PN - The Cuban Consulate phoned the Soviet Consulate. Silvin Duran, Mexican mational clerk of the Cuban Consulate talked to a Soviet efficial, saying that a male American citizen was at the Cuban Consulate asking for a transit visa to mass through Cuba on his way

to the Soviet Union. She wants to know to whom he talked in the Soviet Consulate and who told him he would have no problem about it. If a Soviet visa is assured, the Cuben Consulate can grant him a transit visa and simply notify Cuban immigration authorities. The Soviet first asks her to wait, and then she has to emplain the whole thing over again to another Soviet official, who takes her telephone number and promises to call her back. Silvis MIRAN concludes this call by telling the Soviet she herself has moved and gives her new address for the Soviet Embansy bulletin. He asks her to phone (Sergey Semenovich) KIREARCHEO (Second Secretary who puts and the second of the second o out the Bulletin) to give him the new address and he asks who the Cuban Cultural Attache is. Silvia DURAN gives the Attache's name as Teresa PROEKZA and adds her telephone number.

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27 September, 4:26 PM - A Soviet official calls Silvia DURAN
back and tells her that the "American" had been to see the Soviet's and
shown them a letter from the Soviet Consulate in Washington indicating that
he had been waiting for vises for himself and his wife to go to the Soviet
Union for a long time, but that no ensuer had come from Washington, adding

shown the Seviets a letter showing he was a member of an organization in favor of Cuba and had claimed that the Cubans could not give him a visa without a Russian visa. Silvia DEBAN rejoins that they have the seme problem; the "American" is still at the Consulate; they cannot give him a transit visa unless he is assured of a Seviet visa, even though he just wants to go to Cuba to beit there for his Seviet visa to be granted. He does not know anyone in Cuba. They end the conversation on this mote.

Silvia DEBAN says that she will note this on his "card," and the Seviet concludes by saying, "Besides he is not known." He excuses himself for the inconvenience he has caused and Silvia DEBAN says it is all right.

28 September - Silvia DURAN calls the Soviet Embassy from the Cuben Consulate. She says that she has the American with her again. The Soviet enswering asks her to wait. When another Soviet takes up the phone, Silvia puts the American em. The American tries to talk Russian to the Soviet who enswers in English. The American sks him to speak Russian. The American ways that he had been in the Soviet Embassy and speken with the

Consul, and that they had taken his address. The Soviet replies that he knows that. The American then says, somewhat emigratically: "I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address because they have it." The Soviet invites him to stop by again and give them the address, and the American agrees to do so. (In this conversation, the American was speaking hardly recognizable Emssian.)

As far as our records show, OSMALD did not phone the Soviet or Cuban

Embassies again until Tuesday 1 October 1963. The intervening days were a

Sunday and a Monday. The contents of his later calls seen to show he

did not contact the Soviets on those days.

1 October, 10:31 AM - A man calls the Soviet Military Attache in broken Russian and says he had been at their place the previous Saturday

(28 September) and talked to their Consul. They had said they would send a telegram to Washington, and he wanted to know if there were anything new.

The Soviets ask him to call another phone master and gives him 15-60-55, saying to ask for a Consul.

1 October 10:45 AM - (This is the phone call in which OSWALD





used his true name and which was therefore cabled to Vashington on 9 October 1963.) Lee OSMALD called the Seviet Rabassy and emscurced his own name, saying he had visited them the previous Saturday and spoken with a Consul. They had said they would send a telegram to Washington, and he wanted to know if there were anything new. He did not remember the more of the Consul. The Soviet, who was Exhansy guart OBYEDKOV replied: "NOSTIKOY; he is dark." OSWALD replied: "Yes, my name is OSKALD." The Soviet excused himself for a minute and then said they badn't received anything yet. OSMALD asked if they hasn't done anything and the guard replied they had sent a request but that nothing had been received as yet." OSHALD started to say: "And what...", but the Soviet hung up.

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3 October 1963 - A man speaking broken Spanish at first and then English phoned the Soviet Military Attache and asked about a visa. The Attache's office referred him to the consulate, giving the number 15-60-55.

The caller wrote it down. The attache official shrugged off another

question about whether the caller could get a visa, and the convergation ended. (There is no special reason to tie this in with OSWALD, who is now known to have re-entered the UE at Laredo the same day.)

President LOPEZ Nations after 22 Hovember. The next day, 23 Hovember, he called it to the attention of our Chief of Station, who was already working feveriably on the case. Similarly, the Maxicans noticed the involvement of Cuban Consular suployee Silvia DURAH, a Maxican national.

Our Station suggested that she be arrested and interrogated about OSMALD. The Maxican authorities had the same idea and she and her humband were arrested on 23 Hovember 1963, in the midst of a party at their home. All the guests were soon released but Silvia and her humband were questioned and released on 25 Hovember 1963.

Silvia's bushend, Horacie DURAN Neverro, an industrial designer, said under police interrogation that when OSMALD was ramed as the assessin

bad writed on OSMALD when he came to apply for a Cuben transit view;

be remembered she had said she dealt with the Soviet Consulate as well

to find out whether he had a Soviet view. Howardo DURAN recelled his wife

had said OSMALD became engry and she had to call out the Caben Consul,

Eusebie AZZUE, to quiet him.

Silvia DURAN told the same story. She was a leftist sympathizer with Yuba and had worked for the Mexican-Cuban Institute of Cultural Relations.

She recalled OSWAID well, described him accurately, related how he had wanted a Cuban visa but could not get one without the assurance of a Soviet visa, and remembered his tiff with the Consul. She admitted she had phoned the Soviet Enbassy about him.

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The sum total of the statements of Silvia DURAN and her husband was to confirm that OSWALD was in Mexico to get a Cuben visa so he could wait in Cuba for his Soviet visa. The Soviet Consular file passed to the State Department in Washington by the Soviet Embassy confirms a long exchange between first, Mrs. Marina OSWALD, and later her husband, and the Soviet

Consulate in Washington about their requests for permission to return to the Soviet Union. OSWALD was still writing to the Soviets in Washington about this as late as 9 November 1963.

Silvia DURAH was arrested again on 27 Hovember and held until 29 Hovember. She told essentially the same story over again.

Well-placed sources within the Cuben Embassy in Mexico City stated
that when Silvia DERAH was released from police arrest the first time on
25 Hovember, she was quite pleased with herself. She told her colleagues
the same story set out above, adding only that the Mexican police had
threatened to extradite her to the United States to confront Lee Harvey
OSWALD. The reaction within the Cuban Embassy to the news of President
Kennedy's death was sombre. To date, there is now, credible information in
CIA files which would appear to link Lee OSWALD with the Cuban government
or the Cuban intelligence service.

The whole question of whether Lee OSWALD had any secret connection with the Soviets or Cubans in Mexico cannot yet be answered, but certain parts of the evidence indicate to the centrary. Silvin DURAH and the

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Soviet Consular officials spoke of kim as a man with "no friends in Cuha" on the one kand, and as a man net "known" in the Soviet Enhancy, on the other. The very openness of his visits and the phone calls speak against any secret role. His trip to Mexico was not itself a secret act; he traveled under his real name or a close variant of it, lived openly in Mexican hetels, and corresponded with the Soviets through the open mails about it when he got back to the US. His trip to Mexico was apparently make necessary because it was the nearest Cuban diplomatic installation where he could emply for a visa.

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A perplexing aspect of OSNALD's trafficking with the Cubans and
Soviets in Mexico City is his assertion in his call of 28 September that he
did not know his address when he was at the Soviet Consulate and come to
the Cuban Consulate because they had it. It is hard to explain just what
he meant, but it should be remembered that he was talking in Russian, a
language he could not manage, and that when he came to Mexico he was in the
process of moving from New Orleans to Texas. He may not have memorized
his new address in Texas, whatever it was, and may not have been able to

ley hands on it when he was in the Soviet Consulate that day. Perhaps he had earlier given the address to Silvie DURAS and wanted to look it up on her card.

A particularly sinister aspect of OSWALD's dealings with the Soviets in Mexico City arises from the liklihood that he met with Soviet Consul Veleriy Vladimirovick KOSTIKOV. In his 1 October phone call to the Soviet Embassy, the guard OEMEDROV suggests that the Consul OSWALD had talked to was KOSTIKOV if he was dark. OSKALD seems to agree with this. but the identification is very casual. In his 9 Hovember letter to the The state of the s Soviet Consulate in Washington, OSWALD gives the name of the man be dealt with as "KOSTIN," but there is no person of that exact name in the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. KOSTKOV is accredited as a Consular Attache and does actually do a lot of consular work, but he is believed to be a Soviet KGB officer, and it is believed that he works for Department 13 of the KGB, the Department charged with sabotage and assassinations. The suspicion that KOSTIKOV is a KGB officer arose from his work habits, and his association with other KGB officers. It was hardened when it was

found that he handled a Soviet agent who was trained to do sabotage work and that he turned this agent over to another KEB officer who is definitely known to work for the 13th Department. It is generally true in KEB work that sabotage agents are handled only by 13 Department officers.

Enbassy guard Ivan Ivanovich CHIEDKOY is himself believed to be a KGB man from previous assignments as a bodyguard and sureillant. But unless some direct evidence of Equiet complicity is discovered. It is most likely that OSVALD's dealing with KOB men OBYEDKOV and KOSTIKOV was to with the the term of the nothing more than a grim coincidence, a coincidence due in part to the Soviet bebit of placing intelligence men in the Embassies in positions where they receive a large portion of the visitors and phone calls. All of the five consular officers in the Seviet Embassy are known or suspected intelligence officers. Certainly if OSWALD had been a Soviet agent in training for an assessination assignment or even for sabotage work, the Soviets would have stopped him from making open visits and phone calls to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico after he tried it a comple of times. Our

range, indicates that they do make some mistakes and are sometimes insecure
in their methods, but that they do not persist in such glaring errors.

Some insight on the Cuban attitude toward the arrest of Silvia DURAN and the involvement of the Cuban Consulate in the OSWAID case can be gained from two intercepted phone calls made between Cubun President Osvaldo DORTICOS and Cuban Ambassador to Mexico Jonguin HERNANDEZ Armas on 26 Bovember 1963, the day after Silvia DURAN was released from her first arrest. At 09:40 AM that morning, President DORTICOS phoned the Ambassador Control of the second from Havana and asked him several questions about a report which the Ambassader had sent in on the errest of Silvis DURAH and the Lee OSKALD case. The whole conversation is consistent with the theory that OSWALD merely wanted a visa. The Ambassador did mention the altercation which OSWALD had with Consul AZCOR, and he says that Mexican police bruised Silvia DURAN's arms a little shaking her to impress her with the importance of their questions. They had asked her if she had been intimate with OSWALD and she had denied it. President DORTICOS twice asked Ambassadar

about "money," and the President apparently wanted to know whether the Mexicans thought the Cubans had paid OSMAID money. HERMANEZ insisted the Mexicans had not offered Silvia DERAN money, and DORTICOS gave us trying to put across his point. President DORTICOS instructed HEREANDEZ to keep on questioning Silvia DERAN and to phone him back.

At 7:39 PM that evening Ambacsador HERNANDEZ did call Fresident

DORTICOS back, saying he had questioned "that person" again and she has

nothing new to add. President DORTICOS returns to the issue of whether

"they had threatened her so that she would make a statement that the

Consulate had given money to the man+4"that American." But Ambassador

HERMANDEZ persists in misunderstanding DORTICOS, answer in the negative,

and says: "Absolutely nothing was given to her." DORTICOS seems to give

up, and the conversation dies out after a few more general remarks.

We do not know for sure what made President DORTICOS press for information about Cuben money passed to CSWALD, but russurs were current in Mexico and even; we understand, in the USA, that CSWALD had returned from Mexico





City with about \$5,000. Ferhaps DORTICOS was trying to learn whether the Mexican police believed that the Cubaus had financed OSWALD. In any event, the Cuban Government sent the Mexicans a stiff note of protest over the arrest and detention of Silvia BURAN, but the Mexicans rejected the note.