was begun. It made use of virtually all the media within Chile and placed and replayed items in the international press as well. Propaganda placements were achieved through subsidizing rightwing women's and civic action groups. Previously developed assets in the Chilean press were used as well. As in 1964, propaganda was used in a scare campaign. An Allende victory was equated with violence and Stalinist repression. Sign-painting teams were instructed to paint slogans on walls evoking images of Communist firing squads. Posters warned that an Allende victory in Chile would mean the end of religion and family life.

Unlike 1964, however, the 1970 operation did not involve extensive public opinion polling, grass roots organizing, or, as previously mentioned, direct funding of any candidate. The CIA funded only one political group during the 1970 campaign. This was an effort to reduce the number of Radical Party votes for Allende.

The CIA's spoiling operation did not succeed. On September 4, Allende won a plurality in Chile's Presidential election. He received 36 percent of the vote; the runner-up, Jorge Alessandri, received 35 percent of the vote. Since no candidate had received a majority, a joint session of the Chilean Congress was required to decide between the first- and second-place finishers. The date set for the joint session was October 24.

Now we will turn to the period between Allende's plurality victory and the congressional election. Mr. Treverton will go into this period.

STATEMENT OF GREGORY F. TREVERTON, PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBER OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

Mr. Treverton. Thank you.

The reaction in Washington to Allende's victory was immediate. The 40 Committee met on September 8 and 14, to discuss what action should be taken. On September 15, President Nixon met with Richard Helms, Henry Kissinger, and John Mitchell at the White House. U.S. Government actions proceeding along two separate but related tracks. Track I, as it came to be called, aimed to induce President Frei to act to prevent Allende from being seated. Track I included an anti-Allende propaganda campaign, economic pressures and a $250,000 contingency fund to be used at the Ambassador's discretion in support of projects which Frei and his associates deemed important in attempting to influence the outcome of the October 24 congressional vote. However, the idea of bribing Chilean Congressmen to vote for Alessandri—the only idea for use of this contingency fund which arose—was immediately seen to be unworkable. The $250,000 fund was never spent.

Track II, as it was called by those inside the U.S. Government who knew of its existence, was touched off by the President's September 15 instruction to the CIA. It is the subject of the Schneider portion of the committee's recent Report on Alleged Assassinations. I will merely summarize Track II here.

Track II was to be run without the knowledge of the Ambassador, or the Departments of State and Defense. Richard Helms' handwritten
notes of the meeting with the President [exhibit 21] convey the flavor of that meeting. I will quote from his note:

"One-in-ten chance perhaps, but save Chile.
"Not concerned risks involved.
"No involvement of Embassy.
"Ten million dollars available, more if necessary.
"Full-time job—best men we have.
"Make the economy scream."

Between October 5 and October 20, the CIA made 21 contacts with key military and police officials in Chile. Coup plotters were given assurances of strong support at the highest levels of the U.S. Government both before and after a coup. The CIA knew that the coup plans of all the various conspirators included the removal from the scene of Chilean Gen. Rene Schneider, the Chief of Staff of the Army and a man who opposed any coup. CIA officials passed three submachine guns to two Chilean officers on October 22. Later that day, General Schneider was mortally wounded in an abortive kidnap attempt. However, the group which received CIA weapons was not the same group as the one which carried off the abortive kidnaping of Schneider.

Along the other line of covert action, Track I, the U.S. Government considered a variety of means considered as constitutional or quasi-constitutional to prevent Allende from taking office. One of these was to induce the Christian Democrats to vote on October 24 for Alessandri instead of Allende, who finished in first place, with Alessandri to promise to resign immediately, thereby paving the way for new Presidential elections in which Frei would be a legitimate candidate.

Another scheme considered by the government was to persuade Frei to step down, permitting the military to take power.

Both the anti-Allende propaganda campaign and the program of economic pressure were intended to support these efforts to prevent Allende's accession to power. The propaganda campaign focused on the ills that would befall Chile should Allende be elected, while the economic offensives were intended to preview those ills and demonstrate the foreign economic reaction to an Allende presidency.

A few examples: Journalist-agents traveled to Chile for on-the-scene reporting; by September 28, the CIA had journalists from 10 different countries in, or en route to, Chile. The CIA placed individual propaganda news items, financed a small newspaper, and engaged in other propaganda activities.

Finally, the CIA gave special intelligence briefings to U.S. journalists. For example, Time magazine requested and received a CIA briefing on the situation in Chile, and, according to the CIA, the basic thrust and timing of the Time story on Allende's victory were changed as a result of the briefing.

In the end, of course, neither Track I nor Track II achieved its aim. On October 24, the Chilean Congress voted 153 to 35 to elect Allende. On November 4, he was inaugurated. U.S. efforts, both overt and covert, to prevent his assumption of office had failed.

Now let me turn to covert action between 1970 and 1973. As Mr. Miller mentioned a moment ago, is his 1971 state of the world message, President Nixon announced: "We're prepared to have the kind of re-

1 See p. 96.
relationship with the Chilean Government that it is prepared to have with us." This cool but correct public posture was articulated by other senior officials. Yet, public pronouncements notwithstanding, after Allende's inauguration, the 40 Committee approved a total of $7 million in covert support to opposition groups in Chile. That money also funded an extensive anti-Allende propaganda campaign.

The general goal of United States covert action toward Allende's Chile was to maximize pressures on his government to prevent its internal consolidation and limit its ability to implement policies contrary to U.S. interests in the hemisphere. That objective was stated clearly in a Presidential decision issued in early November 1970. U.S. policy was designed to frustrate Allende's experiment in the Western Hemisphere and thus limit its attractiveness as a model; there was a determination to sustain the principle of compensation for U.S. firms nationalized by the Allende government.

Throughout the Allende years, but especially after the first year of his government, the American Government's best intelligence-National Intelligence Estimates, prepared by the entire intelligence community—made clear that the more extreme fears about the effects of Allende's election were not well-founded. There was, for example, never a significant threat of a Soviet military presence in Chile, and Allende was little more hospitable to activist exiles from other Latin American countries than had been his predecessor, Eduardo Frei. Nevertheless, those fears, sometimes exaggerated, appeared to have activated officials in Washington.

Covert action formed one of a triad of official American actions toward Chile. Covert action supported a vigorous opposition to Allende, while the "correct but cool" overt posture denied the Allende government a handy foreign enemy to use as a rallying point. The third line of U.S. action was economic. The United States did what it could to put economic pressure on Chile and encourage other nations to adopt similar policies.

The subject of this report is covert action, but those operations did not take place in a vacuum. It is worth spending a moment to describe the economic pressures, overt and covert, which were applied simultaneously. The United States cut off further new economic aid to Chile, denied credits, and made partially successful efforts to enlist the cooperation of international financial institutions and private firms in tightening the economic squeeze on Chile.

Now to turn to the effort of covert action itself. More than half of the 40 Committee-approved funds supported the opposition political parties in Chile: the Christian Democratic Party, the National Party, and several splinter groups. CIA funds enabled the major opposition parties to purchase their own radio stations and newspapers. All opposition parties were passed money prior to the April 1971 municipal elections, the March 1973 congressional elections, and periodic by-elections. Covert support also enabled the parties to maintain a vigorous anti-Allende propaganda campaign throughout the Allende years.

Besides funding political parties, the 40 Committee approved large amounts to sustain opposition media and thus to maintain a large-scale propaganda campaign.
As mentioned before, $1 1/2 million went to one opposition publication alone, the major Santiago newspaper, El Mercurio, Chile's oldest newspaper. The U.S. Government calculated that El Mercurio, under pressure from the Allende government, would not survive without covert U.S. support. At the same time, however, CIA documents acknowledged that only El Mercurio, and to a lesser extent, the papers belonging to the opposition parties were under severe pressure from the Chilean Government. Freedom of the press continued in Chile until the military coup in 1973.

Let me say just a word about two specific topics which have been the subject of great public interest: The first of these is U.S. relations with private sector opposition groups during the Allende years; the other is United States actions vis-a-vis the Chilean military. Covert support for private sector groups was a sensitive issue for the U.S. Government during this period because some of these groups were involved with anti-Government strikes and were known to agitate for a military intervention. In September 1972, the 40 Committee authorized $24,000 for "emergency support" of a powerful businessmen's organization. At the same time, the 40 Committee decided against financial support to other private sector organizations because of their possible involvement in anti-Government strikes. In October 1972, the 40 Committee approved $100,000 for three private sector groups, but, according to the CIA, this money was earmarked only for activities in support of opposition candidates in the March 1973 congressional elections. On August 20, 1973, the 40 Committee approved further money for private sector groups, but that money was dependent on the approval of the U.S. Ambassador and Department of State, and none of these funds were passed before the military coup.

American decisions during this period suggest a careful distinction between supporting opposition groups on one hand and aiding elements trying to bring about a military coup on the other. But, given the turbulent conditions in Chile, such a distinction was difficult to sustain. There were many close links among the opposition political parties, private sector groups, militant trade associations, and the paramilitary groups of the extreme right. In one instance, a CIA-supported private sector group passed several thousand dollars to striking truck owners. That support was contrary to Agency ground-rules, and the CIA rebuked the group, but nevertheless passed it money the next month.

With respect to the covert links with the Chilean military during the Allende years, the basic United States purpose was monitoring coup-plotting within the Chilean military. To that end, the CIA developed a number of information "assets" at various levels within the Chilean military. Once this network was in place by September 1971, the CIA station in Santiago and headquarters in Washington discussed how it should be used.

At one point, the station in Santiago suggested that the ultimate goal of its military program was a military solution to the Chilean problem. But CIA headquarters cautioned that there was no 40 Committee approval for the United States to become involved in coup plotting. There is no evidence that the United States did become so involved. Yet several CIA efforts suggest a more active stance than merely
collecting information. One of these operations was a deception opera-
tion involving the passage of information, some of it fabricated by
the CIA, which would alert Chilean officers to real or purported Cuban
involvement in the Chilean Army.

At another point, the CIA station in Santiago provided short-lived
financial support to one small magazine aimed at military officers.

On September 11, 1973, of course, Salvador Allende was toppled by
a military coup. Let me just say several words about Chile since the
coup, and about United States covert action in Chile since that time.

After the coup the military junta moved quickly to consolidate its
political power. Political parties were banned, Congress was put in
indefinite recess, and censorship was instituted. Supporters of Allende
and others deemed opponents of the new regime were jailed, and the
military leader, Augusto Pinochet, indicated that the military might
have to rule Chile for two generations.

The prospects for revival of democracy in Chile have not improved
over the past 2 years. Charges concerning the violations of civil ri ghts
in Chile persist. Most recently, the United Nations report on Chile
charged that torture centers are being operated in Santiago and other
parts of the country. The Pinochet government continues to prevent
international investigative groups from free movement in Chile, and
in several instances, has not permitted these groups to enter Chile at
all.

After the coup, the United States covert action program in Chile
sank dramatically. No major new initiatives were undertaken, and
what projects were continued operated at a low level. These consisted
mainly of maintaining media assets and several other small activities.

During this period, the CIA also renewed its liaison assets with
Chilean Government’s security and intelligence forces. However, in
doing so the CIA was sensitive to worries that liaison with such orga-
nizations would open the CIA to charges of political repression, and
the CIA sought to insure that its support for activities designed to
control external subversives was not used on internal subversives as
well.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. That concludes the panel
presentation.

There is another vote on the Senate floor. I think this might be a
good time for a brief recess to give the members a chance to return.

[A brief recess was taken.]

The CHAIRMAN. The staff members on the panel have finished their
presentation, and before we go to our next witnesses, Senator Gold-
water has indicated that he has some questions for the panel, and so I
recognize Senator Goldwater for that purpose.

Senator GOLDWATER. Mr. Miller, in your presentation, you say the
record examined thus far shows that covert action programs over the
past 30 years have been successful generally against weak nations and
far less so against our major potential enemies. How many cases have
you examined over the past 30 years?

Mr. MILLER. How many cases has the committee staff reviewed?
Well, in depth, Senator, we have done six. We have reviewed in gen-
eral terms the entire scale of covert action, both in budgetary terms,
geographical coverage, and with some attempt to measure success and quality.

The reasons for this disparity of success against the major potential enemies such as the Soviet Union and China I think are fairly clear. Those nations have very strong authoritarian governments. It is very difficult to collect information there. It is very difficult to mount operations. It is not the case in the nations which are not authoritarian in structure or do not have such disciplined secret services, and have a police state that is not as effective as those of the Soviet Union and China, but I do not think I should go into any detail in open session.

Senator Goldwater. Well, has the committee examined any cases that involved Soviet Russia or Red China or any other potential strong adversary?

Mr. Miller. We have in certain areas. We have had an inquiry into particularly the areas of counterintelligence, and also the area of collection.

Senator Goldwater. Are you saying we've conducted covert actions against major potential enemies?

Mr. Miller. There have been attempts, particularly in the period immediately following the end of the Second World War, the beginning of the cold war.

Senator Goldwater. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think this is a rather important statement. I know we cannot discuss it in public, but I would suggest that proper officials of the CIA be recalled to testify as to what we have done in this general field. If we are going to pick on Chile alone as an example of covert action while we have heard testimony that there have been covert actions against major enemies, I think we have to look into that also, and I would request that Mr. Bader or any representative of the CIA be called back to testify as to what we're talking about when we hear this kind of testimony.

The Chairman. Senator, I have no objection to your request of this committee. As far as I am concerned, I would like to examine all of these covert actions in the past, because I think so many of them have been wrong, and our problem is that we cannot get the administration to agree to any kind of public presentation to any of these operations. It has only been as a result of very extended efforts that we have been able to present the Chilean case, to obtain the cooperation of the administration in a very limited way, with respect to sanitizing the presentation to protect legitimate security interests of the United States. We've had no such offer from the administration with respect to any covert operation.

Senator Goldwater. We've heard nothing about any other covert action such as has been discussed by Mr. Miller. Had we heard of it, I think the Members on my side would certainly have requested that a study to be done, and I would suggest that if this team can do as thorough a job on Chile as they have done, they certainly ought to be able to do an equally good job on a much larger country such as the Soviet Union or Red China or any other large potential enemy. I don't think we can let a statement like this stand.

Now, if Mr. Miller wants to change it, fine. But I don't want to see this made a matter of public record that we, without saying so, that we
have conducted covert actions against potential enemies of a large scale. I think this is wrong.

However, before you start I might say that had we seen Mr. Miller's statement before he read it, we might have been able to clear this up. We did not see any statements on this side of the table. We listened to them, and I think this is the first time in the whole history of this committee that the minority side has been sort of kept outside the tent.

And I just want to register my protest against that kind of treatment. If the press is going to be given statements that we're not allowed to see, I've served on these committees before and I can tell you, when the bell of end comes, that is when it rings. We didn't see the report until we sat down today. If we're going to have to put up with that——

The Chairman. Senator Goldwater, may I simply say that no member of the committee on either side had the statement. That was an oversight on the part of the committee. Each member should have had these statements before every Senator. That is the normal procedure. That is the procedure that we have followed in the past and will follow in the future. This was purely an oversight and when it was called to my attention I immediately asked that the statements be placed before all members.

Senator Goldwater. Well, I would like to have an answer to my request that we get a statement from the CIA—if they say they can't do it, then we're going to have to go higher, to see what we've done against the Soviets and Red China, because to my knowledge we have done nothing.

The Chairman. Well, the covert operations have been reviewed in executive session, all of them, and it has been the objection of the administration itself that has largely prevented the committee from developing any more cases in public session than this one, and so I have no objection to your request, Senator Goldwater, but I would solicit your help with the administration in hopes that we could clear the way for a public presentation of other covert actions. But it has been the opposition of the administration and their refusal to make witnesses available that has handicapped the committee in this regard.

Senator Goldwater. It might have been done in some other administration. I'd like to find out whether it happened under Kennedy or Johnson or Nixon or just who was the one that thought they could perpetrate a covert action upon the Soviets. That's a rather sneaky task. I'd like to know how they came out, not that I'm opposed to it.

The Chairman. Well, Mr. Miller, do you have any further response to the Senator's question?

Mr. Miller. No; I will endeavor to fulfill Senator Goldwater's request. I think that is the best response.

The Chairman. Very well.

Well, while the panel is here, if anybody wants to question members, please feel free.

Senator Mondale?

Senator Mondale. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

What do the records show to be the threat that we thought we had to meet by frustrating and overthrowing Allende?

Mr. Trevor. Let me say a word about that. The question is what the perception of officials in Washington was.
Senator Mondale. Why did we want to get rid of Allende? What did our specialists say was at stake?

Mr. Treverton. There is some difficulty with that question because, as we pointed out in the report, there is some difference between what the Government's intelligence specialists—the national intelligence estimates—were saying about Chile and the threat it posed to the United States and what senior officials apparently believed.

Senator Mondale. In other words, this was the apparatus that we established to collect information and evaluate it, is that right?

Mr. Treverton. That's right.

Senator Mondale. What did they say about the threat that Mr. Allende posed to this country?

Mr. Inderfurth. I think the threats perceived by officials had to do with the presence of the Soviets in Chile and the question of subversion of other Latin American Governments using Chile as a base. There was a concern about a movement by Allende, despite the fact that he had been elected constitutionally, down the road toward a Marxist totalitarian state.

There was a press conference given September 16, 1970—it was a background press briefing—in which Dr. Kissinger referred to the irreversibility of the Chilean election, meaning that it was doubtful there would be another free election in Chile.

So I think there were these concerns, as well as economic concerns. The United States had quite a bit of private capital invested in Chile. I think these were the motivating factors.

Now, in our examination of the NIE's, over a period of time, the threat that Allende posed to Chile seemed to be less shrill.

Senator Mondale. On page 229 of our assassination report the CIA's Director of Intelligence circulated an intelligence community assessment on the impact of the Allende government on U.S. national interest.

Mr. Inderfurth. That's right.

Senator Mondale. September 7, 1970. It says that: One, the United States has no vital national interest in Chile but there could be some economic losses; two, the world military balance would not be significantly altered by the Allende government; three, an Allende victory would create considerable political and psychological cost and the hemisphere would be threatened by the challenge of Allende. Is that right?

Mr. Inderfurth. Yes, sir.

Senator Mondale. So that in terms of this Nation's interest, at least the 1970 estimate was that it did not directly threaten America.

Mr. Inderfurth. That's correct.

Senator Mondale. Now did Mr. Allende ever act in a way which undermined the democratic procedures established by the constitution of Chile?

Mr. Inderfurth. That has been the subject of debate. Charges have been raised about his opposition to political parties, as well as his opposition to the media. We have looked into both of those areas and despite the fear that there would never be another free election in Chile, there were in fact national elections, municipal elections, there were congressional elections, trade union elections continued, the
political parties survived. Of course today you see there are no political parties functioning in Chile.

Concerning the press, the record there does indicate that Allende was exerting some pressure on the opposition press, especially El Mercurio. There were instances in which radio stations were closed. I think the number is three. El Mercurio itself was closed down for a day, but the court invalidated that and it was reopened the next day. There are also charges that the government was attempting to take over a paper company which was the supplying company for newsprint in Chile. The government backed off.

The NIE's took note of this growing government domination of the press, but indicated that El Mercurio had managed to retain its independence and had been able to continue operating. This was in 1971.

In 1972 the NIE stated that the opposition news media in Chile persisted in denouncing the Allende regime and continued to resist government intimidation. At no point during Allende's regime was there press censorship. Of course that is the case today.

So I think the record shows that in some ways he was moving forcefully to stifle some of the opposition press, but certainly not all.

Senator Mondale. In the hearings with Mr. David Phillips, who had extensive background and experience in Chile, I asked him whether it was his judgment that although Allende was Marxist and espoused Marxism, he also wanted to achieve this through the democratic process, and although there was some rough stuff in the press, whether that was essentially the course he was pursuing.

Mr. Phillips said—I don't recall what he said but he indeed acted that way. And I asked Mr. Phillips if Allende attempted to achieve his Marxist philosophy with popular support under the constitutional system. Mr. Phillips said that, yes; essentially that is true.

Mr. Inderfurth. That is the record we have seen. In Chile they have a term for it, via pacifica, the peaceful road, which is the road that Allende had followed. He had run for the presidency four times, each time coming back to try again. And the record is unclear, obviously, where he would have taken Chile.

Senator Mondale. They were afraid that although he had never made a move by force to take it over, that he might.

Mr. Inderfurth. That was the concern.

Senator Mondale. Even though he'd never done it.

Mr. Inderfurth. That's right.

Senator Mondale. I think Mr. Kissinger, when we asked him that, said what we were afraid of was that he would establish a Communist-dominated dictatorship very similar to Portugal.

Mr. Inderfurth. He's used that example as well as Cuba. The fear of another Cuba in Latin America was very strong.

Senator Mondale. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Hart.

Senator Hart of Colorado. I don't know to which member of the staff to direct the question, but there have been suggestions that a considerable amount of the money that was funneled into Chile from this country went into assistance of labor unions, trade unions, in Chile in support of strike efforts against the Allende government. Could you provide information to the committee in this regard as to amounts of
money and whether substantial amounts did in fact provide covert sup-
port to strikers, particularly between 1971 and 1973?

Mr. INDERFURTH. I think the record here is clear, at least at the ap-
proval stage. We have reviewed the records and there was never a 40
Committee authorization for funding strikers in Chile.

Shortly before the coup there was a CIA recommendation for fund-
ing the strikers. It is unclear whether or not that proposal ever reached
the 40 Committee, but it is clear that the 40 Committee never approved
any funds; 40 Committee approval for funding private sector organi-
zations is another matter. These organizations were sympathetic to and
in support of the strikers, and on three separate occasions the 40 Com-
mittee did approve funding for these private sector organizations.

The total amount authorized was something over $1 million. The
total amount spent was something around $100,000.

Now these funds were provided with the contingency that they
would not filter down to the strikers, but at least in one instance they
did. The sum was rather small, $2,800. These funds did go through a
private sector organization to a striking group. This was against the
Agency's ground rules for funding strikers. In fact, Nathaniel Davis,
U.S. Ambassador to Chile, and the State Department, had strenuously
objected to any funding of the strikers.

So I think where we come out is that the 40 Committee never ap-
proved any funds. A small amount did, however, filter down.

Whether or not other CIA money that went into private sector op-
erations or political parties ever made it to the strikers, we have not
been able to determine from the record.

Senator HART of Colorado. Why was there a policy against this as-
sistance to strikers?

Mr. INDERFURTH. There's no question that the strikers were creating
the climate in which a military coup appeared to be inevitable. So any
direct assistance to the strikers would be directly heating up, building
up, tension in Chile, which eventually did lead to the coup.

So we would support El Mercurio and the political parties. But
when you moved into the private sector area, you got closer and closer
to the real tension within the society and eventually to the coup.

So I think that was a concern.

Senator Hart of Colorado. That's all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Do any other Senators desire to ask questions of
the panel. Senator Schweiker?

Senator SCHWEIKER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. In what time frame did we
start funding El Mercurio? Do you have any kind of date as to when
we started putting money into El Mercurio as a CIA expenditure?

Mr. TREVERTON. The first funds went to El Mercurio in the late fall
of 1970 or the early spring of 1971.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Did we previously put money into assets prior
to that period in El Mercurio?

Mr. TREVERTON. Yes. Part of that period we financed assets—that is,
people who worked for El Mercurio and who received small amounts
of money from the CIA to write or run stories favorable to American
interests.

We had not prior to that time provided substantial support to the
operation of the paper.

Senator SCHWEIKER. And we are not certain when the support for
the operation began, or are we?
Mr. TREVERTON. We are certain. I just don't have it right here in front of me.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Is it prior to our involvement with going ahead with the 1970 program against Allende? Or don't we have that?

Mr. TREVERTON. It would have been after Allende's inauguration—that is, after the Track I, Track II period, after the election period. It came in the period after Allende's inauguration. We decided on the program to support opposition parties and media.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Would it have been before the September 15 meeting in 1970?

Mr. TREVERTON. It was after that. It was either November 1970, or April 1971. Perhaps I can give you the exact date. Perhaps it was as late as September 1971, so it was surely after the 1970 election period.

Senator SCHWEIKER. That's all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Huddleston?

Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I've not heard all the questioning and I hope I'm not repetitious. In our relationship with the removal and subsequent death of General Schneider it was not clear that our policy was that he should not be done away with. There was no tension there, although we were attempting to foment a coup d'état to prevent the ascension of Allende to the presidency. And, I think it's important to understand that the reason that General Schneider had to be removed was that even though he was not a particular sympathizer with Allende, he was a constitutionalist, and he believed in his Government's constitution, which subordinated the military to civilian rule. And because of that, he was not interested in leading a coup or participating in one.

Is that not accurate?

Mr. TREVERTON. Yes; those points are correct and well taken.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions of this panel? If not, thank you very much, gentlemen. We will call the next three witnesses, Mr. Ralph Dungan, Mr. Charles Meyer, and Mr. Edward Korry.

[Pause.]

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, in accordance with the practice of the committee would you stand and be sworn?

Do you solemnly swear that all the testimony you will give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. KORRY. I do.

Mr. DUNGAN. I do.

Mr. MEYER. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I understand each of you has an opening statement and perhaps the logical way to proceed would be chronologically, starting with Mr. Dungan, please.

TESTIMONY OF RALPH DUNGAN, FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO CHILE

Mr. DUNGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate your invitation to testify in this public hearing on U.S. intelligence activities in Chile. You are ultimately interested, I take it, in the question of