The CHAIRMAN. That is correct.
Senator Baker. After all that is an executive branch decision to be made with the President and by the CIA. But this is our suggestion.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct, Senator. That is exactly what the letter says; it is the responsibility of the executive branch to make the decision. But we suggest that the CIA and the executive branch examine these possible benign medical and decent uses to which this poison could be put in limited quantities. The balance, I assume, should and would be destroyed.

Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Any further discussion?

Senator Hart?

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, like Senator Baker this is the first indication I have heard of this letter. I for my part would like to withhold a vote on this at the present time, just my own vote.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. The committee will not proceed to a vote at this moment in view of the objection of Senator Hart. But I would like to pass the letter down for the examination of each member. And later this morning we might reconsider the taking of a vote. And we will have further consultation.

The reason that the letter was prepared and presented was in order to bring an end to the impasse that has existed for some months. And I would hope that the committee could reach a vote this morning. The letter will be made available to all members and we will proceed with the remaining witnesses.

I want to thank you, Dr. Schantz, very much.

Dr. Schantz. You are very welcome.

The CHAIRMAN. For your testimony this morning. And I will call a 5 minute recess during which I would like to ask Mr. Charles Senseney if he would come forward and take his position at the witness table.

The committee is recessed for 5 minutes.
[A brief recess was taken.]

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come back to order.

Mr. Senseney, would you please take the oath?
Do you solemnly swear that all the testimony you will give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Senseney. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Senseney, do you have an opening statement you would like to make at this time?

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES A. SENSENEY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EMPLOYEE, FORMERLY IN THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION AT FORT DETRICK

Mr. Senseney. Not really. Let us proceed.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Then I will ask Mr. Schwarz to commence the questioning.

Mr. Schwarz. In February 1970, were you employed at Fort Detrick?

Mr. Senseney. Yes, sir.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Had you been there for a while beforehand?
Mr. SENSENEY. Since 1948.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And you worked in the Biological Warfare Section of Fort Detrick?
Mr. SENSENEY. I was hired in the Physical Defense Division in 1948 and transferred to the SO Division in about 1953.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Do you know a Dr. Nathan Gordon?
Mr. SENSENEY. I do.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Have you been made aware of his testimony about you in this proceeding?
Mr. SENSENEY. I read it this morning.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. I will read to you just one of several answers he gave referring to you and stating:

I got a call from Charlie Senseney. In effect, the nature of the phone call was that the stocks of the shellfish toxin that they had at the SO Division facility would be destroyed in the near future, in implementation of the directive telling DOD to destroy these materials, and did we want to think in terms of accepting the particular quantity of material to keep in store at our own CIA storage laboratory.

Did you make that suggestion to Dr. Gordon?
Mr. SENSENEY. I didn't, but I think it possibly was at a higher level.
Mr. SCHWARZ. A higher level of what?
Mr. SENSENEY. The Division. I was just an employee in the Division. I was a member of the Development Branch. I had nothing to do with policy or making decisions.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Is it your understanding that the suggestion to retain the material came from the Army or the CIA in the first instance?
Mr. SENSENEY. I think it would go this way. The materials in the stockpile were theirs, and the question was what to do with it. So they were called to see what they wanted to do with what they owned. It was theirs; they had bought it.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And your understanding is that they said—
Mr. SENSENEY. It was not offered. It was just—what do we do with it?
Mr. SCHWARZ. And your understanding is that someone at the CIA said, yes, we want it?
Mr. SENSENEY. Well, it had to be, I think.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right.
Mr. SENSENEY. Let me stress I was in the hardware section and not the agent section. I do not know really much about the agent part of this.
Mr. SCHWARZ. So that makes Dr. Gordon's testimony—first, you deny his testimony, right?
Mr. SENSENEY. I think that he was contacted, but not by me.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Do you deny his testimony, as far as you are concerned?
Mr. SENSENEY. I do.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right.
I just have one further question.
Were you aware that the CIA was working with Fort Detrick?
Mr. SENSENEY. After a while. Not when I first went with the SO Division, but it became apparent later.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Did the CIA people use a false name to describe themselves?
Mr. SENSENEY. Staff Support Group.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And that was a false name; was it not?
Mr. SENSENEY. And it was also—you asked another question earlier this morning, at least someone did, P600 was their funding citation.
Mr. SCHWARZ. P600 was their funding citation? And the Staff Support Group was a false name? And who was it designed to mislead?
Mr. SENSENEY. I don't know.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Is that a name that sounds like an Army group?
Mr. SENSENEY. Well, you would have thought so to begin, because the first two that I was aware of were a colonel in the Air Force and a colonel in the Army. It looked like an Army support group of some sort at the start.
Mr. SCHWARZ. So both the name and the personnel made it look as if it was an Army group, even though, in fact, it was CIA personnel?
Mr. SENSENEY. That's right.
Mr. SCHWARZ. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smothers.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Mr. Chairman, just one brief line of inquiry.
Mr. SENSENEY, you indicated that you were in the hardware business. Was a part of your hardware business the development of a dart launcher?
Mr. SENSENEY. I was the project engineer of the M-1 and following on micro-organism projectiles and so forth.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Is this a device that looks roughly like a .45-caliber pistol with a sight mount at the top?
Mr. SENSENEY. This was a follow-on. It was to replace the M-1 projectile to go into the Army stockpile. It did look like a .4.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Let me then ask you a question regarding your testimony before the members of this staff on September 9, when you were asked about that M-1 dart launcher.
Reading from the transcript, Mr. Snider was questioning you:
Did the CIA people ever receive any of the M-1 dart launchers to fire human darts?
Your response:
They had some, but they did not have agents, to my knowledge. They had them just, for instance, to fire the projectile, the bare projectile, to see whether it could go through human clothing, that type of thing. I do not recall them ever having or asking for one that was coated.
Now, by the reference here, the one that was coated, are you talking about the projectiles that this dart launcher would have fired?
Mr. SENSENEY. Yes.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Is it then your testimony that the Agency neither had nor requested from you or from Detrick, to your knowledge, coated materials for use in this dart launcher?
Mr. SENSENEY. They had some.
Now, let me say it this way. I do not know how many they took, but they had some for surveillance purposes. They were going to conduct heat, moisture tests, cold tests, and so forth, to see what would happen to the projectile in its coated state. These were returned.
And what happened was that there was a reaction between the agent and the metal, to the point that it cemented the projectile inside the cartridge, and there was no way this could be used at that time.
Now, this was good information to us, because it told us that we should change that metal. And we did. We changed it from what it was originally to platinum. Platinum was something that was—that seemed to be OK with the use of muscle poison.

Mr. Smothers. Is it your testimony, then, that the only darts they had were tested by the Agency and then returned to you?

Mr. Senseney. That is correct.

Mr. Smothers. Is it your further testimony that they did not subsequently ask you for a stockpile of poison darts?

Mr. Senseney. Not of that type.

Mr. Smothers. Well, then, did they have, Mr. Senseney, the wherewithal to utilize this dart launcher against humans?

Mr. Senseney. No. They asked for a modification to use against a dog.

Now, these were actually given to them, and they were actually expended, because we got all the hardware back. For a dog, the projectile had to be made many times bigger. It was almost the size of a .22 cartridge, but it carried a chemical compound known as 4640.

Mr. Smothers. And their interest was in dog incapacitants?

Mr. Senseney. Right.

Mr. Smothers. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Were you aware of the amount of shellfish toxin belonging to the CIA that was in the custody of the Army SOD?

Mr. Senseney. I knew it had to be between, say, 1 and 10 grams, in that area somewhere.

The Chairman. Actually, we are told that it was 5 grams. But when the laboratory in which it was stored was discovered a few months ago and opened up and the cache was examined, it turned out that there was an additional 6 grams, approximately 6 grams. No one has yet been able to tell us where the additional 6 grams may have come from. Do you know?

Mr. Senseney. No, I can't tell you. I did not have access, or I did not know the record keeping for the agent part of the house.

The Chairman. I have no further questions. Senator Mondale, do you have any questions?

Senator Mondale. Mr. Senseney, what do you do now?

Where do you work?

Mr. Senseney. I work for the Department of Defense. I am now with Edgewood Arsenal, Director of Engineering Development, Biological Protection Branch. I am currently on temporary duty in England, in a collaborative effort with the United Kingdom.

Senator Mondale. Do you recall any discussions about the disposal of these shellfish toxins at the time of the Presidential order and the delivery of these toxins to the CIA warehouses here in Washington?

Mr. Senseney. Well, I would look at it this way. We were prepared to actually destroy everything. However, much of the material that was stored in the S&O Division was being stored there for another agency. It did not belong to the Department of Defense.

Senator Mondale. It belonged to the CIA?

Mr. Senseney. That is correct.

Senator Mondale. Now, did you participate in discussions as to how that should be dealt with?

Mr. Senseney. No.
Senator Mondale. Did you participate in discussions as to what should happen to the DOD-owned toxins?

Mr. Senseney. Not really. I really do not know what happened.

Senator Mondale. What do you mean by "not really?" Did you participate in any discussions, did you listen in on discussions, concerning the disposition of those toxins?

Mr. Senseney. For instance, Dr. Schantz said he got 100 milligrams. I did not even know that happened, but it certainly did.

Senator Mondale. Did you participate in or listen in on or were you aware of any discussions about the disposition of these toxins, either those on assignment from the CIA or the toxins, shellfish toxins, owned by the DOD?

Mr. Senseney. Well, at that time—I guess this is getting close to 1970—at that time, there were very few people left in the SO Division. I was one of them that happened to be there. The Division Chief, Dr. Cowan, and the agent side of the thing, either Mr. Leonard Thompson or Mr. Wally Pannier—we were in the midst of an RIF at that time, so people were coming and going rather quickly. It had to be one of those two last persons mentioned that were in the agent category or in the agent area.

And the only thing that I can say is, I just have to suppose that, having been told to maintain the sort of show and tell display of hardware that we had on sort of stockpile for them, these were not items that could be used. They were display items like you would see in a museum, and they used those to show to the agents as well as to the FBI, to acquaint them with possible ways that other people could attack our own people.

Senator Mondale. Now, Mr. Senseney, let me ask the question again, and I want you to listen very closely.

Did you participate in or listen in on or were you aware of any discussions about the disposal of these shellfish toxins, either those on assignment from the CIA or those owned by the DOD?

Mr. Senseney. Will you restate your question in the context of where to whom, was I aware?

Senator Mondale. Any discussions about from where to whom at all?

Mr. Senseney. Let's say I knew none of the negotiations, let us say, between the SO Division and the CIA in their decision to do what they did. I was told to do certain things that I did.

Senator Mondale. What were you told to do with the toxins?

Mr. Senseney. I was not told to do anything with the toxins, sir. I was told to give a development display.

Senator Mondale. I am just talking about the toxins. Did you participate in, did you listen in on, or were you aware of any discussions relating to the disposition of those shellfish toxins, whether on assignment from the CIA or owned by the DOD?

Mr. Senseney. Yes.

Senator Mondale. All right. And what were they?

Mr. Senseney. They were told by our division head contacted through channels, whatever that channel was, what to do with their stockpile.

Senator Mondale. All right.
Mr.Senseney. And they came back to say they wanted the development-type prototypes, plus saving TZ. That's the only thing in the stockpile they wanted.

Senator Mondale. TZ is shellfish toxin?

Mr. Senseney. That is correct.

Senator Mondale. What was the discussion about TZ toxin or shellfish toxin?

Mr. Senseney. Prepare it for delivery to them. They wanted it back.

Senator Mondale. In other words, you were told that an order was given that the CIA wanted their shellfish toxin back. And did you participate in preparing the packaging?

Mr. Senseney. No, I was not in the agent category. I'm scared of that.

Senator Mondale. How did you happen to hear about that order, then?

Mr. Senseney. It was only Wally Pannier, Dr. Cowan and myself, about, in that area at the time. So he just came and told us both at the same time what he wanted. There were two things—

Senator Mondale. Who came and told you that?

Mr. Senseney. Dr. Cowan.

Senator Mondale. Dr. Cowan? He said, get this toxin ready for shipment back to the CIA?

Mr. Senseney. He told that to Mr. Pannier. He did not tell it to me.

Senator Mondale. All right.

And then what other discussions did you hear concerning the disposition of these toxins?

Mr. Senseney. That is it.

Senator Mondale. Did you participate in any or hear about any discussion relating to the DOD-owned shellfish toxin?

Mr. Senseney. No. I assumed that was taken care of under the normal destruct order. Anything that belonged to Detrick, we got back into the channel and got rid of it real quick. That, in turn, was the hardware. We cut it up with hacksaws and hammered it together, put it into ovens, and melted it up into a junk heap.

Senator Mondale. Now, what you are saying, then, is that the only discussions that you participated in, or had knowledge of, concerning the disposition of these shellfish toxins, whether they were owned by the CIA or DOD at the time you were at Fort Detrick, was the single conversation that you testified to, in which you were told that these CIA toxins were to be packaged for return to the CIA?

Mr. Senseney. That's correct. There was no reason to discuss it.

Senator Mondale. And that came from Mr.—

Mr. Senseney. It came from the division head.

Senator Mondale. It came from Mr. Cowan.

Now, you say you heard no instructions concerning the disposition of DOD toxins, shellfish toxins.

Mr. Senseney. Well, I am sure Mr. Pannier was told to destroy them.

Senator Mondale. Do you have any knowledge of orders or instructions relating to the DOD toxins?

Mr. Senseney. Not directly, no.

Senator Mondale. What do you know indirectly?
Mr. SENSENEY. Just by association with Mr. Pannier, I know that he took care of all that.

Senator MONDALE. And how did he take care of all that?

Mr. SENSENEY. By destroying it, except what he gave to Dr. Schantz, I guess.

Senator MONDALE. Gave to who?

Mr. SENSENEY. Dr. Schantz.

Senator MONDALE. He destroyed the other toxins? Do you know that of your personal knowledge?

Mr. SENSENEY. No. I have no evidence. I was not there when it was done.

Senator MONDALE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Mondale.

Senator BAKER is next.

Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. Senseney, it is my understanding from your testimony that no one from the CIA ever contacted you about the shellfish toxin.

Mr. SENSENEY. No.

Senator BAKER. But it is your surmise that the CIA did contact one of your superiors about it?

Mr. SENSENEY. I think we probably contacted them because we wanted to know what to do with it.

Senator BAKER. Who was it that contacted them?

Mr. SENSENEY. Somebody higher in the chain, either at the division level or a scientific director or commanding officer or someone.

Senator BAKER. I need to do a little better than that. If you do not know, give me your judgment on who it might have been that was higher than you in these categories.

Mr. SENSENEY. It was probably our division chief, I would think.

Senator BAKER. Who was that?

Mr. SENSENEY. Dr. Cowan.

Senator BAKER. Dr. Cowan. Where is Dr. Cowan now?

Mr. SENSENEY. He works for the University of Maryland, I believe.

Senator BAKER. Have you talked to Dr. Cowan about this subject?

Mr. SENSENEY. No.

Senator BAKER. Or has he talked to you about it?

Mr. SENSENEY. No.

Senator BAKER. You have no personal knowledge, then, of what the conversation would have been with the CIA?

Mr. SENSENEY. No.

Senator BAKER. Nor whom Dr. Cowan would have called, if in fact it was Dr. Cowan?

Mr. SENSENEY. Not at all.

Senator BAKER. Not when it occurred?

But it is your best impression, under the circumstances, and because of the actions that were taken, that apparently someone superior to you, probably Dr. Cowan, called the CIA and probably said, what do you want to do with your toxin?

Mr. SENSENEY. Correct.

Senator BAKER. And it is also your surmise that they must have said, we want it back.

Mr. SENSENEY. I would say that.
Senator Baker. But this is based entirely on what happened, and not on your personal knowledge of the conversation?

Mr. SENSENEY. That is true.

Senator Baker. According to the information we have from previous witnesses and other documents, the inventory at Fort Detrick showed that the CIA had approximately 5 grams of shellfish toxin. And yet, according to the records we also have, almost 11 grams were found at the storage cache that the CIA maintains near the Kennedy Center. Do you know how they came by that extra, approximately 6 grams?

Mr. SENSENEY. No; because I am not aware of the amount that was in the stockpile.

Senator Baker. So you have no personal knowledge about whether the 5-gram figure is correct or the 11-gram figure?

Mr. SENSENEY. That is correct.

Senator Baker. You did not personally participate in the return of the toxin to the CIA?

Mr. SENSENEY. That is right.

Senator Baker. Do you know anything else about this toxin, anything that I have not asked you about it, that would relate to the question of how the CIA got it back, on whose order and for what purpose?

Mr. SENSENEY. No.

Senator Baker. Your principle job with the DOD, I take it, was to develop new or exotic devices and weapons; is that correct?

Mr. SENSENEY. I was a project engineer for the E-1, which was type-classified and became the M-1. They were done for the Army.

Senator Baker. Were you an Army employee?

Mr. SENSENEY. I am an Army employee. I still am.

Senator Baker. But in the course of your employment by the Army, you made your work product and developments available to the CIA, to the FBI, and to anyone else.

Mr. SENSENEY. I think the only other ones that possibly looked at the display was U.S. Customs.

Senator Baker. Anyone else?

Mr. SENSENEY. Not to my knowledge. There could have been.

Senator Baker. Did you ever have any contact with anyone else about special devices, anybody at the White House, the IRS, at the DEA, the DIA, any of these other agencies? There are about 60 agencies of Government that do either intelligence or law enforcement work.

Mr. SENSENEY. I am sure most all of those knew of what we were doing; yes.

Senator Baker. Did you have any other customers?

Mr. SENSENEY. To my knowledge our only customer was Special Forces and the CIA, I guess.

Senator Baker. Special Forces meaning Special Forces of the Army?

Mr. SENSENEY. That is correct.

Senator Baker. And the FBI?

Mr. SENSENEY. The FBI never used anything. They were only shown so they could be aware of what might be brought into the country.
Senator Baker. I see, they were never a customer in the sense they never took delivery of any material?

Mr. Senseney. That is right.

Senator Baker. Did you describe for us in the previous executive session some of the exotic devices that you developed and displayed to your customers.

Mr. Senseney. Well, I was project engineer for the M-1, so all of the missile type, dart type or this would have been from my part. I know of others but they came under the other four project engineers, they were road depositors——

Senator Baker. What are road depositors?

Mr. Senseney. A bacteriological aerosol you put on roads, on railroad tracks and things like that.

Senator Baker. Who did you give that to?

Mr. Senseney. It was not given to anyone. The Army asked for it. It was type—classified for the Army, period.

Senator Baker. Did the Army use it?

Mr. Senseney. Not to my knowledge.

Senator Baker. But it was delivered to the Army. It's an aerosol that sprays a bacteriological agent on the road or railroad track or some other place.

Mr. Senseney. It is a matter of putting the material on the roadway or in between tracks, just like dumping a sack of flour.

Senator Baker. Did you ever give that to the CIA.

Mr. Senseney. No.

Senator Baker. Or any of the other agencies?

Mr. Senseney. They had all of the prints and specifications for these things but they never asked for them.

Senator Baker. Looking at your previous executive session testimony, apparently you developed for them a fountain pen. What did the fountain pen do?

Mr. Senseney. The fountain pen was a variation of an M-1. An M-1 in itself was a system and it could be fired from anything. It could be put into——

Senator Baker. Could it fire a dart or an aerosol or what?

Mr. Senseney. It was a dart.

Senator Baker. It fired a dart, a starter, were you talking about a fluorescent light starter?

Mr. Senseney. That is correct.

Senator Baker. What did it do?

Mr. Senseney. It put out an aerosol in the room when you put the switch on.

Senator Baker. What did that aerosol do?

Mr. Senseney. It would contaminate anybody in the room.

Senator Baker. Meaning kill them or disable them?

Mr. Senseney. It depends on the agent. If you are using a lethal agent, it would probably kill. If it was a debilitating thing, it would just make you sick for awhile.

Senator Baker. Did you give that to the CIA?

Mr. Senseney. No.

Senator Baker. Only the Special Forces for the Army?

Mr. Senseney. The Special Forces did not even want that. [General laughter.]
Senator Baker. Did you feel hurt?
Mr. Senseney. Well, not really.
Senator Baker. OK, what about a cane, a walking cane?
Mr. Senseney. Yes; an M-1 projectile could be fired from a cane, also an umbrella.
Senator Baker. Also an umbrella. What about a straight pin?
Mr. Senseney. Straight pin!
Senator Baker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Senseney. We made a straight pin, out at the Branch. I did not make it, but I know it was made and it was used by one Mr. Powers on his U-2 mission.
Senator Baker. As a matter of fact, it was not used by Mr. Powers.
Mr. Senseney. He did not use it but he had it. Let us put it that way.
Senator Baker. And buttons. I noticed in the testimony some reference to buttons. What kind of buttons are you speaking of?
Mr. Senseney. You can make a button from biological material, compress it in such a way that you could actually put it on your shirt or a coat, button it up and you could walk into another country with a starter for coming up with a biological agent.
Senator Baker. Did you ever do anything about cigars? Did you ever try to impregnate a cigar with a biological agent?
Mr. Senseney. I did not; no.
Senator Baker. Do you know of any such?
Mr. Senseney. Not really.
Senator Baker. That was not done in your department, then, if it was done at all?
Mr. Senseney. No; that would be too easy. I don’t think we would have fooled with that one.
Senator Baker. You don’t think that would have been a good technique? Well, I don’t mean to press unduly, but of the list that we went into here, did you manufacture or deliver any of these for any of the intelligence agencies of the Government at any time?
Mr. Senseney. No; they were only shown and most of the intelligence groups knew of what we could do and it sort of edified them to the point that they could observe and be able to see these things if they were in foreign countries.
Senator Baker. How did you do that? Did you have a case like a salesman, you opened it up and showed it to them?
Mr. Senseney. Just about.
Senator Baker. Where did you do that?
Mr. Senseney. Mainly it was done in our division, of course.
Senator Baker. Did you send out invitations or what?
Mr. Senseney. They usually invited themselves, somehow, I don’t know how all this worked, but they showed up.
Senator Baker. All right.
Mr. Senseney. And I might add that many of your own members here, not on this panel, but many of the Members of Congress also observed these.
Senator Baker. Well, you are very generous. None of us saw them; is that right?
Mr. Senseney. I am not sure, I wouldn’t know, but I know many did.
Senator Baker. I don’t know either.
Was the toxin program or the chemical-biological agent program necessary in your judgment, for the utilization of the exotic devices that you have described to us? Were these poisons from shellfish, from cobra venom and the like, an adjunct to and a part of these exotic devices? Your straight pen, your fountain pen, the starter and the like, did you use these poisons in those devices?

Mr. SENSENELY. No; not shellfish. I think you have got a misnomer between poison—a biological material itself is not a poison in my estimation. Yes; shellfish poison is a poison, shellfish. The others are biological agents, such as say, anthrax, tuleremia and that type of thing. The only thing that you mentioned there that could be used with shellfish poison are the dart-type things. The rest used biological powders.

Senator BAKER. The last question, and my time has expired, Mr. Senseney, do you know of any records of this program that have been destroyed?

Mr. SENSENELY. I could not tell you whether they have been destroyed or kept intact. I know when the division closed, a lot of stuff was sent, they told us, to Kansas City.

Senator BAKER. If I wanted to find out more about the conversation with the CIA and the destruction of records, would Dr. Cowan be the one to talk to?

Mr. SENSENELY. Possibly.

Senator BAKER. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Baker.

Senator HUDDLESTON is next.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Carrying on the line of questioning by Senator Baker as to the kind of items you experimented with and developed, would it be accurate to say that you worked on, and experimented with gadgets for which nobody ever yet has found a use?

Mr. SENSENELY. I think there were some intended uses. For instance, the Special Forces gave us SDR, Small Development Requirements, indicating that they had a military requirement to meet a certain situation.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Was mostly all of your work then done on the basis of these special requirement requests that came either from the Special Forces or some other source?

Mr. SENSENELY. That is true.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Did these requests come from the CIA directly, to your knowledge?

Mr. SENSENELY. No; they sort of rode piggyback on most of these. They sort of rode piggyback on the Army’s development and picked off what they thought was good for them, I guess.

Senator HUDDLESTON. But you did not undertake a development or an experimental program of a particular weapon until you had some request from the Special Forces to develop a delivery system?

Mr. SENSENELY. There was one item. It was a hand-held item that could fire a dart projectile. It was done only for them; no one else.

Senator HUDDLESTON. You developed that yourself?

Mr. SENSENELY. I had a hand in it. I did not do all of the development.

Senator HUDDLESTON. All right, during the course of your work there, did you have frequent contact with Dr. Gordon?
Mr. Senseney. I would not say it was frequent, but it was periodic; yes.

Senator Huddleston. Were some of these contacts by telephone?

Mr. Senseney. Usually the telephones came through the Director and he let us know when they were coming and they would come and see us.

Senator Huddleston. But you very seldom talked to him by telephone?

Mr. Senseney. That is correct.

Senator Huddleston. Did you ever talk to him by telephone?

Mr. Senseney. I probably did.

Senator Huddleston. You do not recall any specific instances?

Mr. Senseney. No.

Senator Huddleston. Were there frequent transfers of material between Dr. Gordon’s office and your office, either the hardware or the toxin?

Mr. Senseney. The only frequent thing that changed hands was the dog projectile and its loaders, 4640. This was done maybe five or six in one quantity. And maybe 6 weeks to 6 months later they would bring those back and ask for five or six more. They would bring them back expended, that is, they bring all of the hardware except the projectile, OK?

Senator Huddleston. Indicating that they have been used?

Mr. Senseney. Correct.

Senator Huddleston. Did they advise you as to what use they were making of them?

Mr. Senseney. No; that was one bad part of it. You did not get any feedback so you did not know whether your devices worked or did not work.

Senator Huddleston. They never advised you of whether or not they were successful?

Mr. Senseney. That is correct.

Senator Huddleston. And no information at all as to how they were being used?

Mr. Senseney. No, but I would say they would have to be used on a dog. You may as well shoot a man if you are going to use something the size that they were using there.

Senator Huddleston. But it could have been used on a human being?

Mr. Senseney. There is no reason why it could not, I guess.

Senator Huddleston. How much time usually elapsed between the time you gave them these weapons and the time they brought them back to you expended?

Mr. Senseney. Usually 5 to 6 weeks.

Senator Huddleston. Five to six weeks, and absolutely no report from them as to what the use was, whether or not they were used, whether they were efficient, whether they needed some adjustments or some modification to make them more workable?

Mr. Senseney. No, there really was not much feedback. They would bring them back but they would not say why they wanted them or what they used them on.

Senator Huddleston. You never inquired?

Mr. Senseney. No.
Senator HUDDLESTON. You never thought to inquire?
Mr. SENSENEY. I thought of it, but I never did.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Any other type weapons or any other materials that you transferred to them that might have been expended to some degree?
Mr. SENSENEY. No; they were the only things that they really got on a regular basis and to my knowledge, used some way.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Now, you have indicated to us what P600 is and I think you said it was the funding order. I take it this is the official Government document that provides for the funding for a particular activity. Is that correct?
Mr. SENSENEY. Well, it identified the working investigation group or the staff support group, whatever way you want to identify it. P600 was a funding citation.
Senator HUDDLESTON. All right. Would it be very specific as to what these funds are to be spent for, the type of development? Would it indicate who had authority to actually expend these funds?
Mr. SENSENEY. Well, I guess they would have to come down through our division level there. The stockpile was maintained for them. This took quite a bit of money, of course. That is their agent stockpile.
Senator HUDDLESTON. The material that was stored for 5 years has on it, "to be used only at the direction of P600." Would that order, P600, give us the information as to what specific individual had the authority to permit the use of that material?
Mr. SENSENEY. I cannot answer that. I do not think P600 was an authority. It was just a citation. That is all I know it to be.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Well, somebody must have thought it was an authority or they would not have printed on the material that it could be used only as directed by P600, in my judgment.
Now in the instructions you received from Dr. Cowan to withhold the destruction, I believe, of both the toxin and the hardware——
Mr. SENSENEY. No, not hardware per se. I call them display items. They are mounted on boards, cutaway models, that sort of thing.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Prototypes, these were not actual weapons?
Mr. SENSENEY. They would not even be a prototype really because a prototype you could actually activate. These were inert type things that were mounted on display models.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Just to show what the item was, what it looked like, the size of it?
Mr. SENSENEY. Correct.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Then you have to detail what its capabilities were. But in these instructions, were they verbal?
Mr. SENSENEY. Yes.
Senator HUDDLESTON. He just told you to hold up on it?
Mr. SENSENEY. Yes.
Senator HUDDLESTON. He did not say why?
Mr. SENSENEY. No.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Did you receive any written instructions?
Mr. SENSENEY. No.
Senator HUDDLESTON. None whatsoever relating to your responsibility to dispose of the material that you had responsibility for?
Mr. SENSENEY. I got rid of all the hardware per se, yes.
Senator HUDDLESTON. But not on the basis of a written instruction?
Mr. Senseney. No.

Senator Huddleston. Did you see any instructions on what manner was to be used, what method was to be used for the destruction of any of this material?

Mr. Senseney. Not really. We had to come up with our own means of getting rid of the hardware. It was not really very easy. It was much easier to make these things than it was to get rid of them.

Senator Huddleston. Why was that? Why would it be difficult?

Mr. Senseney. You have got to do a lot of chopping and a lot of tearing and a lot of heating to get rid of all that metal.

Senator Huddleston. Was there a great bulk of it?

Mr. Senseney. Well, for instance, we were in the midst of a development program with the Army. We had just gotten back 400 or 500 rounds from the Dugway Proving Ground that had to be destroyed. We had to go out to a contractor and get things back that we were developing. They had to be destroyed. So, yes, there was quite a bulk of material.

Senator Huddleston. What would the cost be of disposing of that? Would you have any idea?

Mr. Senseney. I would not have—I could not even estimate it really.

Senator Huddleston. Did you assist in any way in the transfer of any of this material to the CIA?

Mr. Senseney. The display items I did, yes.

Senator Huddleston. In what way did you assist?

Mr. Senseney. They came and picked it up. I helped the guy carry it out and put it in his car.

Senator Huddleston. Who is they?

Mr. Senseney. They—Boston.

Senator Huddleston. And he came in a car, his personal automobile?

Mr. Senseney. Correct.

Senator Huddleston. And you helped him. Did you see any other material or did you assist in transferring any other material?

Mr. Senseney. No; that is all I took out.

Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Mathias?

Senator Mathias. I thank Mr. Senseney for being here, but I think he has answered all the questions I had in my mind, and I have no further questions.

The Chairman. Senator Hart?

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Senseney, are you familiar with so-called vulnerability studies, or experiments conducted by personnel at Fort Detrick?

Mr. Senseney. Yes sir.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Are you familiar with studies of the water system at the FDA building here in town?

Mr. Senseney. I am.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Did you participate in that study?

Mr. Senseney. I did not participate in it, but I developed an item that they could tap into the system with.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Would you explain that item?

Mr. Senseney. It was a drill-tap-type situation, that you go through a pipe that would withstand the pressure of the water and be able to insert dye or material into the water stream.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Was that instrument used in the vulnerability study?
Mr. SENSENEY. As far as I know.
Senator Hart of Colorado. You did not actually monitor it, or participate?
Mr. SENSENEY. No.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Did you receive any report on how that experiment worked out?
Mr. SENSENEY. Well, it is pretty evident that the dye got pretty much throughout the entire water system of the building.
Senator Hart of Colorado. And to your knowledge, no one at FDA was aware of this experiment being conducted?
Mr. SENSENEY. They asked for it to be conducted. Only a very few people knew it was being conducted, however.
Senator Hart of Colorado. FDA asked for it?
Mr. SENSENEY. That's right.
In a lot of the vulnerability studies we did do, we were requested to do them.
Senator Hart of Colorado. I'm not sure you have a copy of this document before you—I guess you do not, but a June 1, 1969 summary report conducted by the Special Operations Division at Fort Detrick summarizes that study. And it is my recollection—I will try to find the specific language—it is my recollection that none of the people at FDA were aware of this. I do not think it is a major point.
Mr. SENSENEY. It may not have been.
I see where we went through GSA.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Yes.
Mr. SENSENEY. OK. Someone was aware of it; I'm not sure who.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Are you familiar with a so-called vulnerability study or experiment on the New York subway system?
Mr. SENSENEY. I participated in that.
Senator Hart of Colorado. To what extent did you participate?
Mr. SENSENEY. I was a sampler.
Senator Hart of Colorado. What does that mean?
Mr. SENSENEY. I rode a subway and sampled the air. [General laughter.]
Senator Hart of Colorado. How was the study or experiment conducted?
Mr. SENSENEY. Well, there was one person that was the operator—if you want to call it an operator—who rode a certain train, and walking between trains, dropped what looked like an ordinary light bulb which contained biological simulant agent.
And then the next train came by and, of course, it would stir up the air. So, by driving over it at, say, 60 miles an hour—and this was continuously done by certain subways, and it went quite well through the entire subway system, because we started down around 14th Street and sampled up as far as about 58th Street, and there is quite a bit of aerosol all along the way.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Just from one light bulb?
Mr. SENSENEY. One light bulb.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Were the officials of the city of New York aware that this study was being conducted?
Mr. SENSENEY. I do not believe so.
Senator Hart of Colorado. And certainly the passengers weren't.
Mr. Senseney. That is correct.

Senator Hart of Colorado. At whose request were these two studies conducted?

Mr. Senseney. I'm not sure whether it was requested or whether we did it on our own. There was a special studies group in our branch that was head of vulnerability studies.

Senator Hart of Colorado. You had a special section that did nothing but vulnerability studies?

Mr. Senseney. Yes, they would come up with test plans and so forth.

Senator Hart of Colorado. What other kinds of studies did you conduct besides the subways and the FDA building?

Mr. Senseney. Well, there have been quite a few.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Well, name a few of them.

Mr. Senseney. Well, McGuire Air Force Base, which was a SAC activity that—it was requested by the Air Force to see how vulnerable they were.

Senator Hart of Colorado. To biological attack?

Mr. Senseney. That's right. And the Pentagon and the White House.

Senator Hart of Colorado. How was the White House study conducted?

Mr. Senseney. I do not know that one specifically, because I was not involved. However, I do know that they made—asked them to do certain things to make the thing so it couldn't be attacked. They had leaky filters in the White House.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Now, Mr. Senseney, in the requests that you received from your superiors to prepare, or participate in, these studies, was there discussion, to your recollection, of the actual use of these kinds of capabilities offensively?

Mr. Senseney. The main thing was to determine the vulnerability of our country to biological attack through covert means, and this was attack against people, crops, animals, things—by things, I mean machinery, airplanes.

Senator Hart of Colorado. But was there discussion of using this kind of capability against other countries?

Mr. Senseney. Not to my knowledge; no.

Senator Hart of Colorado. I refer to page 14 of the document you have before you [exhibit 12]. In the top sentence of that page, it says:

From limited consultation with design engineers it should be possible to develop simple guidelines for planning and attack on a group of people that work in a building constructed with a circulating, chilled drinking water system.

That does not say a defense; it says attack.

Mr. Senseney. If you are going to have a defense, you have got to have an offense, I suppose. I didn't write this paper.

Senator Hart of Colorado. I understand.

Mr. Senseney. I'm not even sure I've really ever seen it before.

Senator Hart of Colorado. I understand.

Mr. Senseney. That could be somebody's conclusion, you see, not mine.

1 See p. 240.
Senator Hart of Colorado. The same kind of language, in stronger form, is contained in the report on the subway system study or experiment.

But your testimony is to the effect that these experiments, or your participation in these experiments, was for defensive purposes only.

Mr. Senseney. That is correct.

Senator Hart of Colorado. And with no discussion of creating a capability to use against someone else.

Mr. Senseney. Well, you have to realize that Detrick—the overall Detrick—was to do things for the Army. That is, in terms of offense.

Senator Hart of Colorado. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hart.

Senator Schweiker.

Senator Schweiker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Senseney, I would like to call your attention to a CIA document [exhibit 6?] which basically describes Project MKNAOMI. or Project P600, whatever you want to call it, which, while funded by the CIA, was actually run and operated by Fort Detrick. And I would like to read into the record, at this point, a quote from paragraph 9 of that document:

When funds permit, adaptation and testing will be conducted of a new, highly effective disseminating system which has been demonstrated to be capable of introducing materials through light clothing, subcutaneously, intramuscularly, and silently, without pain.

Now, I just have a little trouble, Mr. Senseney, reconciling your answers in conjunction with this project, when the CIA document makes clear that one of the very specific purposes of the funding and the operation was to find a weapon that could penetrate light clothing subcutaneously, which obviously means through the skin, and intramuscularly, which obviously means through the muscles of a person.

And are you saying that you have absolutely no recollection at all that tests or programs were not designed to use any of these devices to permeate clothing on people and not dogs?

Mr. Senseney. We put them on mannequins.

Senator Schweiker. What's that?

Mr. Senseney. We put clothing on mannequins to see whether we could penetrate it. These were the requirements. You almost read the exact requirements that the SDR quoted from Special Forces there.

Senator Schweiker. I would not expect you to test them on live human beings. I would hope you did use mannequins, Mr. Senseney. Wouldn't that be directed toward people usage though? That is the point we're trying to establish.

Mr. Senseney. That is what Special Forces direction was.

Senator Schweiker. So it was not solely dogs toward which the program was directed. If you used mannequins, obviously people were involved.

Mr. Senseney. Well, you have to look at it this way. The Army program wanted this device. The only thing that the CIA asked for was a dog device. That is the only thing that was delivered to them. It was a spinoff, of course, from the M-1. The M-1 was a lethal weapon, meant to kill a person, for the Army. It was to be used in Vietnam. It never

1 See p. 204.
got there because we were not fast enough getting it into the logistics system.

Senator Schweiker. What about the device that you made, or whose development you supervised? What was the most utilized device of the ones with which you worked and supervised?

Mr. Senseney. By whom?

Senator Schweiker. The only thing that I know that was really used was the dog projectile. The other things were in the stockpiles. I don't think anyone ever requested them.

Senator Schweiker. How do you know for certain it was for dogs?

Mr. Senseney. Well, that is what they asked us to test them against. They wanted to see whether they could put a dog to sleep, and whether sometime later the dog would come back and be on its own and look normal.

Senator Schweiker. Of course, as I recall, that is what they did with Gary Powers' drill with shellfish toxin. They tested it on a dog to see if it would work. So I do not know that that at all would conclude that it was only provided for dogs.

Of the devices that came through you, which of these were utilized in any capacity other than for testing?

Mr. Senseney. That was the only one that I know of—the dog projectile. I call it a dog projectile. We were developing it because the scenario read that they wanted to be able to make entrance into an area which was patrolled by dogs, leave, the dog come back, and then no one would ever know they were in the area. So that was the reason for the dog projectile.

Senator Schweiker. And how many of these were made?

Mr. Senseney. Well I would say there were probably as many as 50 at least. They took—

Senator Schweiker. About 50?

Mr. Senseney. Yes.

Senator Schweiker. And didn't you get any reports back from the field on their effectiveness?

Mr. Senseney. No. That is one thing you never get; you never get the feedback. You did not know what happened.

Senator Schweiker. I'm puzzled by that. You are the research and development person; you design the weapon—and I haven't seen a part of the military yet that did not have some feedback on whether it was effective in hitting the target or missing it. How do you know if you are doing things right or wrong?

Mr. Senseney. We must have been doing right. They kept asking for it.

Senator Schweiker. Then somebody was using them, I gather. Is that correct?

Mr. Senseney. I would assume so. The missile was gone when they returned the hardware, sir.

Senator Schweiker. But you cannot give us any specific evidence or proof that they were used solely for dogs, from your knowledge, or from your feedback?

Mr. Senseney. No. Not at all.

Senator Schweiker. You said a moment ago that you also distributed the cans to Mr. Boston at the end of this shellfish project.

Mr. Senseney. No cans did I distribute to him. I only gave him the
Senator SCHWEIKER. No; I'm referring to the shellfish toxins.

Mr. SENSENey. I did not give him any shellfish toxins.

Senator SCHWEIKER. What did you give Mr. Boston?

Mr. SENSENey. All I gave him were display models.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Of what?

Mr. SENSENey. Of hardware.

Senator SCHWEIKER. No shellfish toxin? Are you aware that along with that went the shellfish toxin?

Mr. SENSENey. Well, I thought it should be. They had to pick it up sometime.

Senator SCHWEIKER. In addition to giving it to them, did you give it to any other sources, any other branches of Government or the service, or any other parts of the Army?

Mr. SENSENey. I did not give it to anybody, so I really do not know what the disposition of the material was. I was not in the agent area; I was only in hardware development.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Did you have a responsibility for cleaning out the inventory?

Mr. SENSENey. Only on the hardware side, not on the agent side.

Senator SCHWEIKER. And where did all of the inventory go?

Mr. SENSENey. I don't know.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Where did the inventory of hardware go?

Mr. SENSENey. All hardware was destroyed, period.

The only thing that was distributed to the CIA were prototypes—and I would not even call them prototypes, they were display models, cutaway models. They were mounted on boards, on plaques, that type of thing.

Senator SCHWEIKER. That's all the questions I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Schweiker.

I think it ought to be reemphasized that the document from which you read was a document in which the CIA laid out its specifications for the research work for which the Agency was paying.

Senator SCHWEIKER. And for which purpose, too, Mr. Chairman, that they met quarterly to see if their funds were being well spent.

The CHAIRMAN. Right. And their specifications with respect to the particular delivery systems we have been discussing were as follows:

When funds permit, adaptation and testing will be conducted of a new, highly effective, disseminating system which has been demonstrated to be capable of introducing materials through light clothing, intramuscularly and silently, without pain.

So I think it is clear that the CIA was interested in the development of a delivery system that could reach human beings, since not many dogs wear clothing. And you would agree with that, wouldn't you?

Mr. SENSENey. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. OK.

Mr. Schwarz here has one final question and then we will move to the final witness this morning.

Mr. SCHWARZ. Along the same line of the chairman's and Senator Schweiker's questions, I assume you agree that spending money in order to make darts of such a character that they cannot be detected in an autopsy does not have much to do with dogs.

Mr. SENSENey. No; that would not have anything to do with dogs.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
Senator Baker?

Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to renew my previous request. I would like very much to talk to Dr. Cowan, who may have been the contact between the CIA and Fort Detrick on the request for the toxins and on the recordkeeping. When the time is appropriate, I would like to interview him. And, if it seems pertinent and relevant to our inquiry, I would ask that he be called as a witness.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be arranged.

Thank you very much, Mr. Senseney, for your testimony.

Our next, and final, witness is Mr. Robert Andrews. Mr. Andrews, will you please come forward? Mr. Andrews, will you take the oath?
Do you solemnly swear that all the testimony you will give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. ANDREWS. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smothers will commence the questioning.

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT T. ANDREWS, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE GENERAL COUNSEL, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. SMOTHERS. Mr. Andrews, you are currently serving as a Senior Advisor to the General Counsel, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Is that correct?

Mr. ANDREWS. I am.

Mr. SMOTHERS. Did you have occasion to become familiar with Defense Department efforts to destroy shellfish toxin?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes.

Mr. SMOTHERS. Would you explain the circumstances of your familiarity to the committee, please?

Mr. ANDREWS. By way of background, in June of this year, when the Defense Department learned of this exercise, we appointed investigators from the Defense Investigative Service to examine witnesses and review records. In the course of that investigation they uncovered a number of records which give us some indication of the scope of the destruction program and the inventory process.

Mr. SMOTHERS. It is that inventory process that I wish to address now, Mr. Andrews. I believe you have in your possession a copy of a memorandum dated February 17, 1970, entitled “Special Operations Division Toxin Inventory” [exhibit 13]. Mr. Andrews, you have previously seen this exhibit, have you not?

Mr. ANDREWS. I have.

Mr. SMOTHERS. What amount of toxin on hand does this inventory reflect?

Mr. ANDREWS. It reflects somewhat over 2 grams.

Mr. SMOTHERS. Was this the inventory prepared at Fort Detrick?

Mr. ANDREWS. It was.

Mr. SMOTHERS. Was this inventory prepared pursuant to discussions between Defense and Fort Detrick personnel requiring them to inventory the material on hand and to indicate which material should be either retained or disposed of by destruction?

See p. 244.