During the years 1953 to 1961 the Agency emerged as an integral element in high-level United States policymaking. The CIA's covert operational capability provided the Agency with the stature it acquired. Rather than functioning in a strict support role to the State and Defense Departments, the CIA assumed the initiative in defining the ways covert operations could advance U.S. policy objectives and in determining what kinds of operations were suited to particular policy needs. The force of Allen Dulles' leadership and his recognition throughout the government as the quintessential case officer accounted in large part for the enhancement of and shift in the Agency's position. The reason for Dulles' influence extended well beyond his personal qualities and inclinations. The composition of the United States Government, international events, and senior policymakers' perception of the role the Agency could play in United States foreign policy converged to make Dulles' position in the government and that of the Agency unique in the years 1953 to 1962.

The 1952 election brought Dwight D. Eisenhower to the presidency. Eisenhower had been elected on a strident anti-Communist platform, advocating an aggressive worldwide stance against the Soviet Union to replace what he described as the Truman Administration's passive policy of containment. Eisenhower cited the Communist victory in China, the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, and the Korean War as evidence of the passivity which had prevailed in the United States Government following World War II. He was equally strong in calling for an elimination of government corruption and for removal of Communist sympathizers from public office.

This was not simply election rhetoric. The extent to which the urgency of the Communist threat had become a shared perception is difficult to appreciate. By the close of the Korean War, a broad consensus had developed about the nature of Soviet ambitions and the need for the United States to respond. In the minds of government officials, members of the press, and the informed public, the Soviets would try to achieve their purposes by penetrating and subverting governments all over the world. The accepted role of the United States was to prevent that expansion.

Washington policymakers regarded the Central Intelligence Agency as a major weapon—both offensive and defensive—against communism. By 1953, the Agency's contributions in the areas of political action and paramilitary warfare were recognized and respected. The CIA alone could perform many of the activities seemingly required
to meet the Soviet threat. For senior government officials, covert operations had become a vital tool in the pursuit of United States foreign policy objectives.

During the 1950's the CIA attracted some of the most able lawyers, academicians, and young, committed activists in the country. They brought with them professional associations and friendships which extended to the senior levels of government. This informal network of contacts enhanced the stature of the Agency considerably. Men such as Frank Wisner, Desmond FitzGerald, then in the Far East Division of DDP and later Deputy Director for Plans, C. Tracy Barnes, the Special Assistant to Wisner for Paramilitary and Psychological Operations, William Bundy, an analyst in the Office of National Estimates, Kingman Douglass, former investment banker and head of OCI, and Loftus Becker, then Deputy Director for Intelligence, had developed a wide array of contacts which bridged the worlds of government, business law, journalism, and politics, at their highest levels. The fact that senior Agency officials had shared similar wartime experiences, came from comparable social backgrounds, and served in positions comparable to those of other government officials contributed significantly to the legitimacy of and confidence in the Agency as an instrument of government. Moreover, these informal ties created a shared consensus among policymakers about the role and direction of the Agency.

At the working level, these contacts were facilitated by the Agency's location in downtown Washington. Housed in a sprawling set of buildings in the center of the city—along the Reflecting Pond at the Mall and elsewhere—Agency personnel could easily meet and talk with State and Defense officials throughout the day. The CIA's physical presence in the city gave it the advantage of seeming an integral part of, rather than a separate element of, the government.

No one was more convinced than Allen Dulles that the agency could make a special contribution to the advancement of United States foreign policy goals. Dulles came to the post of DCI in February 1953 with an extensive background in foreign affairs and foreign espionage. By the time of his appointment his interests and his view of the CIA had been firmly established. The son of a minister, Dulles was raised in a family which combined a strong sense of moral purpose with a long tradition of service at senior levels of government. This background gave Allen Dulles and his older brother, John Foster, the opportunity to participate in international affairs and brought a dimension of conviction to their ideas and opinions.

Before becoming DCI, Dulles' background included ten years in the Foreign Service with assignments to the Versailles Peace Conference, Berlin, and Constantinople. Law practice in New York followed. After the outbreak of World War II William Donovan called on Dulles to serve in OSS. Dulles was assigned to Bern, the center for OSS activities against the Germans, where he developed a dazzling array of operations against the Germans and Italians. After the war Dulles returned to law practice in New York. He served as a consult-

1 Dulles' paternal grandfather had been Secretary of State under Benjamin Harrison; his maternal grandfather had served as United States Minister (then the equivalent of Ambassador) in Mexico, Russia, and Spain; and his uncle, Robert Lansing, had been Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson.
ant to DCIs Vandenberg and Hillenkoetter, and in 1948 President Truman and Secretary Forrestal asked him to participate in the NSC Survey of the CIA. He joined the Agency in January 1951 as the Deputy Director for Plans. Later that year he replaced William Jackson as DDCI, a position he held until February 1953, when he was named Bedell Smith's successor.

Dulles' experience in the Foreign Service, OSS, and the law coupled with his naturally gregarious personality had won him a vast array of domestic and international contacts in government, law, and the press. As DCI Dulles used and cultivated these contacts freely to enhance the Agency's stature. He made public speeches, met quietly with members of the press, and socialized constantly in Washington society. Dulles' own unofficial activities were indicative of the web of associations which existed among senior Agency personnel and the major sectors of Washington society. By the early 1950's the CIA had gained a reputation among United States Government agencies as a young, vital institution serving the highest national purpose.

In 1953, Dulles took a dramatic stand against Senator Joseph McCarthy, and his action contributed significantly to the Agency's reputation as a liberal institution. At a time when the State Department and even the military services were cowering before McCarthy's preposterous charges and attempting to appease the Wisconsin Senator, Dulles openly challenged McCarthy's attacks on the Agency. He denied McCarthy's charges publicly, had Senate subpoenas quashed, and demanded that McCarthy make available to him any evidence of Communist influence or subversion in the Agency. Within a month, McCarthy backed off. The episode had an important impact on agency morale and on the public's perception of the CIA. As virtually the only government agency that had successfully resisted McCarthy's allegations and intrusions, the CIA was identified as an organization that fostered free and independent thinking.

A crucial factor in securing the Agency's place within the government during this period was the fact that the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, and the DCI were brothers. Whatever the formal relationships among the State Department, the NSC, and the CIA, they were superseded by the personal and working association between the brothers. Most importantly, both enjoyed the absolute confidence of President Eisenhower. In the day-to-day formulation of policy, these relationships were crucial to the Executive's support for the Agency and more specifically, for Allen Dulles personally in defining his own role and that of the Agency.

Dulles' role as DCI was rooted in his wartime experience with OSS. His interests and expertise lay with the operational aspects of intelligence, and his fascination with the details of operations persisted. Perhaps the most important effect of Dulles' absorption with operations was its impact on the Agency's relationship to the intelligence "community"—the intelligence components in the Department of State and Defense. As DCI, Dulles did not assert his position or the Agency's in attempting to coordinate departmental intelligence activities.

For the Agency, this constituted a lost opportunity. Throughout the 1950's, the CIA was in the forefront of technological innovation and developed a strong record on military estimates. Conceivably, Dulles could have used these advances as bureaucratic leverage in exerting
some control over the intelligence community. He did not. Much of the reason was a matter of personal temperament. Jolly and extroverted in the extreme, Dulles disliked and avoided confrontations at every level. In so doing, he failed to provide even minimal direction over the intelligence agencies at a time when intelligence capabilities were undergoing dramatic changes. Dulles was equally inattentive to the administration of the Agency itself, and the real internal management responsibility fell to his able Deputy Director, General Charles P. Cabell, who served throughout Dulles' term.

I. The Clandestine Service

It is both easy to exaggerate and difficult to appreciate the position which the Clandestine Service secured in the CIA during the Dulles administration and, to a large extent, retained thereafter. The number and extent of the activities undertaken are far less important than the impact which those activities had on the Agency's institutional identity—the way people within the DDP, the DDI, and the DDA perceived the Agency's primary mission, and the way policymakers regarded its contribution to the process of government.

Covert action was at the core of this perception, and its importance to the internal and external evaluation of the Agency was derived largely from the fact that only the CIA could and did perform this function. Moreover, in the international environment of the 1950's Agency operations were regarded as an essential contribution to the attainment of United States foreign policy objectives. Political action, sabotage, support to democratic governments, counterintelligence—all this the Clandestine Service could provide.

The Agency also benefitted from what were widely regarded as its operational "successes" in this period. In 1953 and 1954 two of the Agency's boldest, most spectacular covert operations took place—the overthrow of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran and the coup against President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman of Guatemala. Both were quick and virtually bloodless operations that removed from power two allegedly communist-associated leaders and replaced them with pro-Western officials. Out of these early acclaimed achievements both the Agency and Washington policymakers acquired a sense of confidence in the CIA's capacity for operational success.

The popular perception was an accurate reflection of the Agency's internal dynamics. The Clandestine Service occupied a preeminent position within the CIA. First, it had the constant attention of the DCI. Dulles was absorbed in the day-to-day details of operations. Working closely with Wisner and his key subordinates, Dulles conceived ideas for projects, conferred with desk officers, and delighted in the smallest achievements. Dulles never extended comparable time and attention to the DDI.

The DDP continued to command the major portion of Agency resources. Between 1953 and 1961, clandestine collection and covert action absorbed an average of 54 percent of the Agency's total annual budget. Although this percentage represented a reduction from the

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² The term "Clandestine Service" is used synonymously with the Deputy Directorate for Plans.
³ This did not include DDA budgetary allocations in support of DDP operations.
period of the Korean War, the weight of the Agency's expenditures still fell to the DDP. During the same period, the DDP gained nearly 2,000 personnel. On its formal table or organization, the DDP registered an increase of only 1,000 personnel. However, increases of nearly 1,000 in the logistics and communications components of the DDA represented growth in support to Clandestine Service operations.

A. Internal Procedures; Secrecy and Its Consequences

Within the Agency the DDP was a Directorate apart. Because of presumed security needs the DDP was exempt from many of the review procedures that existed within the Agency. Secrecy was deemed essential to the success and protection of DDP activities.

The demands of security—as defined by individuals within the DDP—resulted in capricious administrative procedures. Wisner and Dulles condoned and accepted exceptional organizational arrangements. Neither man was a strong manager, and neither had the disposition to impose or to adhere to strict lines of authority. Both men believed that the functional dynamics of clandestine activities required the absence of routinization, and it was not unusual for either of them to initiate projects independent of the staffs and divisions that would ordinarily be involved.

Although the Comptroller’s Office was responsible for tracking budgetary expenditures in the DDP on a project-by-project basis, special activities were exempt from such review. For example, foreign intelligence projects whose sensitivity required that they be authorized at the level of the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans or above were not included in the Comptroller’s accounting. Records on the costs of such projects were maintained within the Directorate by the Foreign Intelligence Staff. Often political projects which had a highly sensitive classification were implemented without full information being provided to the DDA or to the Comptroller.

The Office of the Inspector General was formally established in 1951 to serve as an intra-agency monitoring unit. Its range of duties included surveys of agency components and consideration of grievances. Until 1957 there were restrictions on the Office's authority to investigate the DDP components and to examine specific operational problems within the Directorate. The DDP maintained its own inspection group, staffed by its own careerists.

The DDP became a highly compartmented structure in which information was limited to small groups of individuals. Throughout the Directorate information was subject to the “need to know” rule. This was particularly true of highly sensitive political action and paramilitary operations, but it was also routine practice to limit the routing of cable traffic from the field to Headquarters. Within the DDP exceptions to standard guidelines for project approval and review were frequent. In certain cases an operation or the identity of an agent was known only to the Deputy Director for Plans and the two or three officers directly involved. In the words of a former high-rank-

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4 The Foreign Intelligence Staff was one of the several functional staffs in the DDP. Among its responsibilities were checking the authenticity of sources and information, screening clandestine collection requirements, and reviewing the regional divisions' projects, budget information, and operational cable traffic.
ing DDP official, "Flexibility is the name of the game." A forceful case can be made in support of these procedures, for reasons of counterespionage, maximum creativity, etc. However, the arrangements placed enormous premiums on the professional integrity of the individuals involved and left many decisions subject to the strains and lapses of personal judgments.

The Agency's drug testing program is a clear example of the excesses that resulted from a system that allowed individuals to function with the knowledge that their actions would not be subject to scrutiny from others either within or outside the DDP. Testing and experiments were conducted without the participants' prior knowledge and without medical screening, and drugs were administered without participation of trained medical or scientific personnel. One person is known to have died as a result of Agency experimentations. Those responsible for the drug testing programs were exempt from routine Agency procedures of accountability and approval.

Blurred lines of authority continued to characterize relationships among the DDP components. As discussed earlier, the intended roles of the functional staffs and the geographical divisions (administrative support vs. operational control) had broken down under the incentives to generate and manage projects. During this period both the Covert Action (CA) Staff and the Counterintelligence (CI) Staff ran field operations while also serving as advisory and coordinating bodies for the operations conducted by the geographical divisions.

The CI staff actually monopolized counterintelligence operations and left little latitude to the divisions to develop and implement their own counterintelligence activities. The staff maintained their own communications channels with the field, and CI operations were frequently conducted without the knowledge of the respective DDP Division Chiefs or Station Chiefs. The example of the CI Staff is the extreme. It was derived from the personal influence that CI chief, James Angleton, exercised for nearly twenty years. Nonetheless, the CI Staff is indicative of the compartmentation within the Directorate that created pockets of privilege for specific operations.

An important consequence of the degree of compartmentation that existed in the Clandestine Service was the impact on the intelligence process. Theoretically, the data collected by the DDP field officers could have served as a major source for DDI analysis. However, strict compartmentation prevented open contact between the respective DDP divisions and DDI components.

The overriding element in the distant relationship between the DDP and the DDI was the so-called "sources and methods" rule. DDI analysts seldom had access to raw data from the field. In the decade of the 1950's information collected from the field was transmitted to Headquarters and summarized there for dissemination to all of the analytic components throughout the government, including the DDI.

The DDP adhered strictly to its principle of not revealing the identity of its assets. Reports gave only vague descriptions of assets

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1 The Covert Action Staff was involved with a full range of political, propaganda, and labor activities.

2 More recently, reports officers in the field draft intelligence summaries which receive minimal review at Headquarters before dissemination.
providing information. Intelligence analysts found this arrangement highly unsatisfactory, since they could not judge the quality of information they were receiving without some better indication of the nature and reliability of the source. Analysts therefore tended to look upon DDP information—however limited their access to it—with reservations and relied primarily on overt materials and COMINT for their production efforts.

Throughout Dulles' term desk-to-desk contact between DDP officers and DDI analysts was practically nonexistent. The rationale for this was to prevent individual analysts from imposing requirements on the collectors. The DDP viewed itself as serving the community's clandestine collection needs subject to government-wide requirements. The DDI leadership, on the other hand, believed that the DDP should respond primarily to its requirements. The DDP's definition prevailed. The Clandestine Service maintained control over determining which requests it accepted from the community.

Intelligence requirements were established through a subcommittee of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. After the intelligence priorities were defined, the DDP's Foreign Intelligence Staff reviewed them and accepted or vetoed the requirements unilaterally. Moreover, because the requirements were very general the DDP had considerable latitude in interpreting and defining the specific collection objectives. The most significant consequence of this process was that the DDP itself essentially controlled the specific requirements for its collectors without ongoing consultation with the DDI.

The existence of this enforced isolation between the two Directorates negated the potential advantages of having collectors and analysts in the same agency. Despite efforts in the 1960's to break down the barriers between the Directorates, the lack of real interchange and interdependence persisted.

The tolerance of flexible procedures within the DDP, the Directorate's exemption from accountability to outside components and the DCI's own patronage gave the DDP a considerable degree of freedom in undertaking operations. In addition, the loose process of external review, discussed later in this section, contributed to the Directorate's independence. The DDP's relative autonomy in the Agency also affected the mission and functions of the other two Directorates. In the case of the DDI the consequences were significant for the execution of the intelligence function. These patterns solidified under Dulles and shaped the long-term configuration of the Agency.

**B. Clandestine Activities, 1953–1961**

Covert action expanded significantly in the 1953 to 1961 period. Following the Korean War and the accompanying shift in the perception of the Soviet threat from military to political, the CIA concentrated its operations on political action, particularly support to electoral candidates and to political parties. The Agency also continued

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1 Later through the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). See p. 63.
to develop its paramilitary capability, employing it in Guatemala in 1954, the Far East, and in the ill-fated Bay of Pigs landing in Cuba in 1961. Relative to the paramilitary operations in Laos and Vietnam in the 1960's, the scale of these activities was minimal.

Geographically, the order of priorities was Western Europe, the Far East, and Latin America. With the Soviets in Eastern Europe and Communist parties still active in France and Italy, Europe appeared to be the area most vulnerable to Communist encroachments. The CIA station in West Berlin was the center of CIA operations against Eastern Europe, and the German Branch of the European Division was the Agency's largest single country component. By 1962 the Western Hemisphere Division had experienced considerable success in penetrating the major Communist Parties in Latin America.

Just as the Agency's activities reflected certain geographical patterns, they also displayed functional patterns. In the period 1952 to 1963 the Agency acquired most of its clandestine information through liaison arrangements with foreign governments. Both Wisner and Dulles cultivated relations with foreign intelligence officials and because of the United States' predominant postwar position, governments in Western Europe, in particular, were very willing to cooperate in information sharing. Liaison provided the Agency with sources and contacts that otherwise would have been denied them. Information on individuals, on political parties, on labor movements, all derived in part from liaison. Certainly, the difficulty and long-term nature of developing assets was largely responsible for the CIA's initial reliance on liaison.

The existence of close liaison relationships inhibited developing independent assets. First, it was simply easier to rely on information that had already been gleaned from agents. Regular meetings with local officials allowed CIA officers to ask questions and to get the information they needed with minimal effort. It was far easier to talk to colleagues who had numerous assets in place than to expend the time required merely to make contact with an individual whose potential would not be realized for years. Second, maintenance of liaison became an end in itself, against which independent collection operations were judged. Rather than serving as a supplement to Agency operations it assumed primary importance in Western Europe. Often, a proposal for an independent operation was rejected because a Station Chief believed that if the operation were exposed, the host government's intelligence service would be offended.

Reliance on liaison did not mean that the Agency was not developing its own capability. Liaison itself enhanced the Agency's political action capability through the information it provided on the domestic situation in the host country. With the Soviet Union and communist parties as the targets the Agency concentrated on developing anti-Communist political strength. Financial support to individual candidates, subsidies to publications including newspapers and magazines, involvement in local and national labor unions—all of these interlocking elements constituted the fundamentals of a typical political action
program. Elections, of course, were key operations, and the Agency involved itself in electoral politics on a continuing basis. Likewise, case officers groomed and cultivated individuals who could provide strong pro-Western leadership.

Beyond the varying forms of political action and liaison the Agency's program of clandestine activities aimed at developing an international anti-Communist ideology. Within the Agency the International Organizations Division coordinated this extensive organizational propaganda effort. The Division's activities included operations to assist or to create international organizations for youth, students, teachers, workers, veterans, journalists, and jurists. This kind of activity was an attempt to lay an intellectual foundation for anti-communism around the world. Ultimately, the organizational underpinnings could serve as a political force in assuring the establishment or maintenance of democratic governments.

C. Executive Authorization of Covert Action

During the Dulles period there were several attempts to regularize and improve the process of Executive coordination and authorization of covert action. Although the changes provided a mechanism for Agency accountability to the Executive, none of the arrangements significantly restricted CIA activities. The perception of American foreign policy objectives encouraged the development of anti-Communist activities; the Agency held the advantage in its ability to introduce project proposals based on detailed knowledge of internal conditions in a given foreign country: Dulles' personal influence and the fact of his brother's position lent enormous weight to any proposal that originated with the Agency.

Until 1955 no formal approval mechanism existed outside the Agency for covert action projects. Since 1948, when covert action was first authorized, senior State Department and Defense Department officials were designated to provide only loose policy guidance to CIA—with the assumption that covert operations would be infrequent. As covert activities proliferated, loose understandings rather than specific review formed the basis for CIA's accountability for covert operations.

Following the Korean War, the Defense Department's role in relation to covert action became more one of providing physical support to the Agency's paramilitary operations. Liaison between DOD and CIA was not channeled through lower levels but was handled by a designated DOD representative. For several years there was some tension between the two agencies because the Defense Department official who was responsible for liaison was not trusted by senior agency personnel. In 1957 he was dismissed, and his replacement was able to ease relations between the two agencies.

Apart from day-to-day liaison at the working level, a series of senior bodies developed over the years to provide guidance for the initiation of covert operations. The Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), an NSC subcommittee, had been established in 1951. Since both departmental representatives and PSB staff members sat on the Board, it was too large and too widely representational to function as a senior policymaking body. The Board's definition of covert activity was also faulty, since it assumed a neat distinction between psychological op
erations and political and paramilitary operations. With the proliferation of activities in the latter two categories there was a need to include these programs in the policy guidance mechanism. Where the initiative for change originated is unclear, but in September 1953 the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) was established to replace the PSB. Although the new Board's membership was restricted to Deputy-level officials, it never served in an approval capacity. Moreover, its interdepartmental composition made Dulles reluctant to discuss secret operations with OCB members. Dulles employed the OCB primarily to gain backing for requests to the Bureau of the Budget for reserve releases to meet unbudgeted expenses.

In March and November 1955 two NSC policy directives, NSC 5412/1 and NSC 5412/2 were issued, outlining revised control procedures. They established a group of "designated representatives" of the President and Secretaries of State and Defense to review and approve covert action projects. Irregular procedures characterized the group's functioning. The actual membership of the 5412 Committee or "Special Group" as it came to be known, varied as ad hoc task forces were organized for different situations. Neither the CIA nor the Group established clearly defined criteria for submitting projects to the NSC body, and until 1959 meetings were infrequent. In that year regular weekly meetings began, but the real initiative for projects continued to rest with the Agency. Special Group members frequently did not feel confident enough to judge Agency capabilities or to determine whether a particular project was feasible.

After the Bay of Pigs failure President Kennedy requested a review of U.S. paramilitary capabilities. The President's request assumed the necessity for continued, indeed, expanded operations, and the purpose of the report was to explore ways of insuring successful future paramilitary actions—as well as determining why the Bay of Pigs landing had failed. Directed by General Maxwell Taylor, the report recommended strengthening the top-level direction for operations by establishing a review group with permanent membership. As a result of the report, the standing members of the Special Group included McGeorge Bundy, the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs as Chairman, U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State, Roswell Gilpatrick, Deputy Secretary of Defense, the DCI, and General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This group assumed a more vigorous role in planning and reviewing covert operations.

D. Congressional Review

During the term of Allen Dulles the Congressional committee structure and the perception of the Agency as a first line defense against Communism remained the determinants in the relationship between the CIA and the Congress. Dulles himself reinforced the existing procedures through his casual, friendly approach to Congress, and he secured the absolute trust of senior ranking members. While Dulles was DCI Richard Russell continued as Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Carl Vinson remained as Chairman of the

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*OCB members included the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War affairs, and the Director of the Mutual Security Administration (the designation for the foreign aid program at that time).*
House Armed Services Committee, and from 1955 to 1964 Clarence Cannon held the chairmanship of the House Appropriations Committee. Dulles' appearance before a group consisted of a tour d'horizon on the basis of which members would ask questions. Yet the procedure was more perfunctory than rigorous. Likewise, members often preferred not knowing about Agency activities. Leverett Saltonstall, the former Massachusetts Senator and a ranking member of the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees stated candidly:

Dominated by the Committee chairmen, members would ask few questions which dealt with internal Agency matters or with specific operations. The most sensitive discussions were reserved for one-to-one sessions between Dulles and individual Committee chairmen.

In spite of the appearance of a comfortable relationship between Congress and the Agency, there were serious efforts to alter the nature of the procedures. During the Dulles administration there were two strong but unsuccessful attempts to strengthen Congress' oversight role and to broaden the participation of members in the execution of the Committees' responsibilities. The failure of these attempts derived principally from the strength of the Committee system and from the adroit tactics of the Executive branch in deflating the impetus for change.

In 1955 Senator Mike Mansfield introduced a Resolution for a Joint Oversight Committee. The Mansfield Resolution resulted from a congressional survey of the Executive branch. The Hoover Commission, chaired by former President Herbert Hoover, was established in 1954 to evaluate the organization of Executive agencies. A small task force under General Mark Clark was assigned responsibility for the intelligence community. The prospect of a survey of the Clandestine Service, information from which would be reported to the full Congress, led President Eisenhower, presumably in consultation with Allen Dulles, to request a separate, classified report on the DDP to be delivered to him personally. The group charged with the investigation was the Doolittle Committee, so named after its Chairman, General James Doolittle, a distinguished World War II aviator. In turn, the Clark Task Force agreed not to duplicate the activities of the Doolittle Committee. Essentially, the arrangement meant that the Congress was prevented from conducting its own investigation into the Clandestine Service.9

9 The orientation and composition of the Doolittle Committee did not encourage criticism of the Agency's activities or of the existing framework of decision-making. Early drafts of instructions to General Doolittle were prepared by the Agency. The four members of the Committee were well known in the Agency and had affiliations with the Executive. Doolittle himself was a friend of Wisner's; Morris Hadley, a New York lawyer, was an old friend of Allen Dulles; William Pawley was a former ambassador; and William Franke had been an Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Although the Doolittle report did call for better coordination between the CIA and the military and better cooperation between the DDP and the DDA, the report was principally an affirmation of the need for a clandestine capability. The prose was chilling:

"It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no
Among the members of the Clark Task Force, Clark and Admiral Richard L. Connolly were responsible for the CIA. The Task Force found an excessive emphasis on covert action over intelligence analysis and in particular criticized the quality and quantity of the Agency’s intelligence on the Soviet Union. With regard to the Congress the Task Force recommended the establishment of an oversight group, a mixed permanent body including members of Congress and distinguished private citizens. The full Hoover Commission did not adopt the Task Force proposal but instead recommended two bodies: a joint congressional oversight committee and a group comprised of private citizens.

It was on the basis of the Commission’s recommendation that Senator Mansfield introduced his resolution on January 14, 1955. Debated for over a year, the resolution had thirty-five co-sponsors. However, fierce opposition existed among senior members, including Russell, Hayden and Saltonstall, who were reluctant to concede their Committees’ respective jurisdictions over the Agency. An exchange between Mansfield and Saltonstall during the floor debate is indicative of the perspective existing in the Senate at the time:

**Mr. Mansfield.** Mr. President, I know the Senator from Massachusetts speaks from his heart, but I wonder whether the question I shall ask now should be asked in public; if not, let the Senator from Massachusetts please refrain from answering it: How many times does the CIA request a meeting with the particular subcommittees of the Appropriations Committee and the Armed Services Committee, and how many times does the Senator from Massachusetts request the CIA to brief him in regard to existing affairs?

**Mr. Saltonstall.** I believe the correct answer is that at least twice a year that happens in the Armed Services Committee, and at least once a year it happens in the Appropriations Committee. I speak from my knowledge of the situation during the last year or so; I do not attempt to refer to previous periods. Certainly the present administrator and the former administrator, Gen. Bedell Smith, stated that they were ready at all times to answer any questions we might wish to ask them. The difficulty in connection with asking

rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the United States is to survive, long-standing American concepts of “fair play” must be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counter-espionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated, and more effective methods than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American people be made acquainted with, understand and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy.”

The report called for a separation of the Clandestine Service into what was virtually the old OPC-OSO division. Its criticism was sharp and pointed:

“It appears that the clandestine collection of raw intelligence from the USSR has been overshadowed by the concentration of the DCI and others of an inordinate amount of their time and efforts on the performance of the Agency’s cold war functions. The Task Force therefore is of the opinion that the present internal organization of the CIA for the performance of the DDP types of functions has had a decidedly adverse effect on the accomplishment of the Agency’s espionage and counterespionage functions.”
questions and obtaining information is that we might obtain information which I personally would rather not have, unless it was essential for me as a Member of Congress to have it.

Mr. Mansfield. Mr. President, I think the Senator's answer tells the whole story, for he has informed us that a subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee has met only twice a year with members of the CIA, and that a subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee has met only once a year with members of the CIA. Of course, it is very likely that the meetings in connection with the Appropriations Committee occurred only at a time when the CIA was making requests for appropriations. That information from the Senator from Massachusetts does not indicate to me that there is sufficiently close contact between the congressional committees and the CIA, as such.

Mr. Saltonstall. In reply, let me state—and I should like to discuss this point more fully when I present my own views on this subject—that it is not a question of reluctance on the part of the CIA officials to speak to us. Instead, it is a question of our reluctance, if you will, to seek information and knowledge on subjects which I personally, as a Member of Congress and as a citizen, would rather not have, unless I believed it to be my responsibility to have it because it might involve the lives of American citizens.

Mr. Mansfield. I see. The Senator is to be commended.

Opposition to the Resolution also existed in the Executive branch. After its introduction, the NSC requested Dulles' analysis. The DCI responded with a long memorandum analyzing the problems such a committee would create. Although the memo did not express outright objection, the effect of enumerating the problems was to recommend against its establishment. Dulles expressed concern about the possible breaches of security on the part of committee staff members. In particular he stated that foreign intelligence services would object to information sharing and that U.S. liaison relationships would be jeopardized. Dulles ably convinced the senior members of the Executive that an oversight committee was undesirable. Although the Administration's objections were undoubtedly known by the congressional leadership, the decisive factor in the defeat of the Mansfield Resolution was the opposition of the senior-ranking members. In addition to the objections of Russell, Hayden, and Saltonstall, Senator Alben Barkley, the former Vice President, and Senator Stuart Symington spoke strongly against the bill when it came to the floor. On April 11, 1956 the resolution was defeated by a vote of 59 to 27 with more than a dozen of the original co-sponsors voting against.

One change did result from the protracted debate on an oversight committee: formal CIA subcommittees were created in the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. Yet the same small group of individuals continued to be responsible for matters related to the Agency. In the Armed Services Committee Russell appointed Senators Saltonstall and Byrd, both of whom had been meeting informally with Russell on Agency activities, to a CIA subcommittee. Subsequently, Senators Lyndon Johnson and Styles Bridges were ap-
pointed to the subcommittee. In 1957 the Senate Appropriations Com-
mittee formalized a CIA subcommittee for the first time. The members
of the subcommittee were, again, Russell, Bridges and Byrd. Essential-
ly, these three men held full responsibility for Senate oversight of
the CIA. They frequently conducted the business of the two subcom-
mittees at the same meeting. Despite attempts to regularize the sub-
committee meetings, the most frequent form of interchange with the
CIA remained personal communications between the subcommittee’s
chairman, Richard Russell, and Allen Dulles. In 1961, following the
Bay of Pigs, Senator Eugene McCarthy attempted to revive the idea of
a formally designated CIA oversight committee, but his effort failed.

In the House, under Chairman Carl Vinson, the Armed Services
Committee formally established a CIA subcommittee, chaired by Vin-
son. The Subcommittee reviewed the CIA’s programs, budget and leg-
islative needs. Briefings on CIA operations were more regularized than
in the Senate and the House Armed Services staff maintained almost
daily contact with the Agency. The House Appropriations Commit-
tee did not establish a formal subcommittee. Instead Cannon contin-
ued to rely on his special group of five members. As part of the secu-
rity precautions surrounding the functioning of the special group, its
membership never became public knowledge.

II. Intelligence Production

In the decade of the 1950’s, the CIA was the major contributor to
technological advances in intelligence collection. At the same time
DDI analysts were responsible for methodological innovations in stra-
tegic assessments. Despite these achievements, CIA’s intelligence was
not serving the purpose for which the organization had been created—
informing and influencing policymaking.

The size and structure of the Deputy Directorate for Intelligence
remained constant during the Dulles Administration, retaining the
composition it had acquired in 1950. ORR, OSI, OCI and ONE were
the centers of DDI’s intelligence analysis. The Office of Current Intel-
ligence continued to pump out its daily, weekly and monthly publica-
tions and in terms of volume produced dominated the DDI’s out-
put. OCI continued to compete with the other intelligence components
of the government in providing up-to-the-minute summaries of world-
wide events.

The 1951 State Department-CIA agreement had given ORR ex-
clusive responsibility for economic research and analysis on the
Soviet Union and its satellites, and it was in this area that the Agency
distinguished itself during the 1950’s. ORR was divided into four
principal components: the Office of the Assistant Director, the Eco-
nomic Research Area (ERA), the Geographic Research Area (GRA),
and the Coordination Staff. The Economic Research Area was the
focus of the research and analysis effort. Each ERA division (Anal-
ysis, Industrials, Materials, and Service) had two responsibil-
ities: the production of all-source economic intelligence on the Soviet
Union and the production of material for the NIEs. Day-to-day re-
ponsibility for coordination rested with the respective divisions, but

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10 Between 1955 and 1969 when Carl Hayden served as Chairman of the Senate
Appropriations Committee, he usually sat in on the subcommittee meetings.

11 ERA had gone through several reorganizations since 1960.
most ERA publications were based on CIA data alone and did not represent coordinated interdepartmental intelligence.

The quality of ERA's work benefitted enormously from research and analysis done by outside consultants between 1953 and 1955. The Center for International Studies (CENIS) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology made the principal contribution in this category. When Max Millikan left the directorship of ORR in 1953, he arranged for an ongoing consultancy relationship between the Agency and CENIS. The CENIS effort contributed substantially to ORR's innovations in the analysis of Soviet strategic capabilities.

Although at the insistence of the military the Agency was officially excluded from military analysis, ORR’s immediate emphasis became Soviet strategic research. There were two reasons for ORR’s concentration in this area. First, the prevailing fear of the Soviet threat made knowledge of Soviet strategic capabilities a priority concern for civilian policymakers as well as the military. Second, and more importantly, military analysis was the area where the Agency had to establish itself if it was to assume legitimacy as an intelligence producer in competition with the services. The military services constituted the Agency’s greatest threat in the execution of its mission and only by generating strategic intelligence could CIA analysts begin to challenge the military’s established position as intelligence producers.

By introducing economic production capacities into assessments of Soviet strategic capabilities the Agency challenged the basic premises of the military’s judgments. For example, the Air Force mission required that it be informed about Soviet advances in nuclear weapons and air technology. The Air Force justified its budgetary claims in part on the basis of the projected size and capabilities of Soviet strategic forces. Air Force intelligence based its estimates on knowledge of Soviet technology and laboratory research, which by 1953 were well advanced. ORR based its estimates of Soviet deployments on Soviet economic production capabilities, which were severely limited as a result of the war. Consequently, ORR’s methodology attributed lower strategic deployments, i.e., long-range bombers and missiles, to the Russians.

ORR’s contribution to the area of strategic assessments came quickly. In the mid-1950’s a major controversy developed over the Soviet Union’s long-range bomber capability. The issue was complicated and intensified because the military services were then suffering post-Korean War budget cuts and were vying with one another for marginal resources. Air Force estimates that the Russians were making a substantial investment in intercontinental bombers argued for disproportionate allocations to the United States Strategic Air Command and air defense systems also belonging to the Air Force. The Navy and Army both questioned the Air Force case.

In the midst of this controversy the Office of National Estimates, drawing heavily on work done by ORR and by CENIS at MIT, produced its estimates of Soviet bomber production. The ONE assessments were more moderate than those of the Air Force. ONE analysts argued that because of production difficulties, the U.S.S.R. could not operate as large a long-range bomber force as the Air Force was predicting. The Agency’s contribution to military estimates at this time marked the beginning of its gradual ascendancy over the military in
strategic analysis. The real take-off point for the Agency occurred in the early 1960's with the data supplied by sophisticated overhead reconnaissance systems.

Despite the Agency's analytic advances, the extent to which the CIA estimates actually influenced policy was limited. The CIA had been created to provide high-quality national intelligence estimates to policymakers. However, the communication and exchange necessary for analysts to calibrate, anticipate and respond to policymakers' needs never really developed.

Although the NIEs were conceived and drafted with senior policymakers in mind, the estimates were not consistently read by high-level officials. Between 1955 and 1956, a senior staff member of the Office of National Estimates surveyed the NIE readership by contacting Executive Assistants and Special Assistants of the President and Cabinet officers, asking whether or not the NIEs were actually placed on their superiors' desks. The survey revealed that senior policymakers were not reading the NIEs. Instead, second and third level officials used the estimates for background information in briefing senior officials.

Of all the products of the intelligence community NIEs represented the broadest, most informed judgments available. The process of coordinating NIEs was laborious, involving protracted painstaking negotiations over language and nuance. In those instances where a department held views very different from those of the other agencies, a dissenting footnote in the estimate indicated the difference of opinion. The necessity to accommodate the views of numerous participants meant that conclusions were frequently hedged judgments rather than firm predictions. To obtain the broadest possible consensus the specificity of the evaluations had to be compromised. This indefinite quality in the estimates limited the NIEs' utility for policymakers.

The failure of the NIEs to serve their fundamental purpose as basic information for senior officials was indicative of the overall failure of intelligence to intersect with policy. Even in an office as small as the Office of National Estimates, where the staff never exceeded fifty-four professionals, close interchange did not exist between staff specialists and senior "consumer" officials, whose policy decisions depended on specific expert information.

The problem was magnified throughout the DDI. The Directorate's size constituted a major obstacle to the attainment of consistent interchange between analysts and their clients. In 1955 there were 466 analysts in ORR, 217 in OCI, and 207 in OSI. The process of drafting, reviewing and editing intelligence publications involved large numbers of individuals each of whom felt responsible for and entitled to make a contribution to the final product. Yet without access to policymakers analysts did not have an ongoing accurate notion of how the form and substance of the intelligence product might best serve the needs of senior officials. The product itself—as defined and arbitrated among DDI analysts—rather than the satisfaction of specific policy needs became the end.

By the 1960's the CIA had achieved significant advances in its strategic intelligence capability. The development of overhead reconnaissance, beginning with the U–2 aircraft and growing in scale and
sophistication with follow-on systems, generated information in greater quantity and accuracy than had ever before been contemplated. Basic data on the Soviet Union beyond the reach of human collection, such as railroad routes, construction sites, and industrial concentrations became readily available. At the same time, CIA analysts began reevaluating assumptions regarding Soviet strategic capabilities. Largely at the initiative of the ONE Soviet staff, a different sorting of estimates developed. The general estimate of Soviet military intentions and capabilities had become unwieldy and took an inordinately long time to produce. Gradually a series of separate estimates were drafted dealing with such subjects as strategic attack, air and missile defense, and general purpose forces. These estimates resulted in a shift from "worst case" assessments to projections on the most likely assortment of weapons. The military services tended to credit Soviet missiles with maximum range and payload and to assume that as many as possible were targeted on the United States for a possible first-strike. The Agency advanced the proposition that the U.S.S.R. was not putting all or most of its resources into maximum payload intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) but had priorities for "sizes and mixes" of weapons, including substantial numbers of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). In the short run the Agency proved to be more nearly correct than the services, though in the longer run, the Soviets were to develop much larger ICBM capabilities than ONE predicted.

An additional factor working to the CIA's advantage in the early 1960's was material supplied by Colonel Oleg Penkovsky. Well-placed in Soviet military circles, Penkovsky turned over a number of classified documents relating to Soviet strategic planning and capabilities. Having an agent "in place," i.e., a Soviet official who was providing information from within the Soviet Government, represented the ultimate achievement in the Agency's clandestine collection mission. These three factors—technological breakthrough, analytic innovation, and the single most valuable Soviet agent in CIA history—converged to make the Agency seem the government's most reliable source of intelligence on Soviet strategic capabilities.

Of the three achievements in the late 1950's and the early 1960's, overhead reconnaissance was by far the most significant. The development of the U-2 and its follow-on systems had an enormous impact on intelligence collection capabilities and on the Agency's relative standing in the intelligence community.

Richard M. Bissell, whom Dulles named his Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination in 1954, organized a small group of Agency personnel to shepherd the project through. Bissell's background was in economics, and he combined academic experience with extensive government service, first during World War II in the Department of Commerce and the War Shipping Administration and later with the Economic Cooperation Administration, among other positions. Bissell was an innovator above all, quick to seize new ideas and to sponsor their development. For the next six years he maintained virtually exclusive control over the development of the U-2 program, its management, and the initiation of follow-on reconnaissance systems.

The Agency's sponsorship and deployment of the U-2 reconnaissance
aircraft was a technical achievement nothing short of spectacular. The U-2 represented dramatic advances in aircraft design and production as well as in camera and film techniques. In July 1955, only eighteen months after contracting the U-2 became operational, and a fleet of 22 airplanes was deployed at a cost $3 million below the original cost estimate.

The U-2 marked the beginning of the Agency's emergence as the intelligence community's leader in the area of technical collection capability. Soon after the first U-2 flight in 1955 Bissell moved quickly to organize the research and development of follow-on systems. The Agency never attempted to establish its own technological R&D capability. Instead, it continued to utilize the best private industrial manpower available. In large part this arrangement accounts for the consistent vitality and quality of the Agency's technical R&D capability, which remains unsurpassed to this day.\textsuperscript{10b}

The deployment of the U-2's follow-on systems coincided with the growing controversy over United States defense policy and the alleged Soviet advances in intercontinental missile deployment. The services, in particular the Air Force, produced estimates on Soviet missile capability which stated that the U.S.S.R. was superseding the United States in long-range missile production. By 1959 the issue involved Congress and became a subject of heated political debate in the 1960 Presidential campaign. Democrats, led by former Secretary of the Air Force, Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri, charged the Eisenhower Administration with permitting the U.S.S.R. to exceed the United States in bomber and missile strength. Data generated by the CIA's photographic reconnaissance systems produced evidence that these charges were ill-founded. The U.S.S.R. had not approached the United States in missile production. It is unclear to what extent Eisenhower relied directly on ONE estimates in taking his position on this issue. The controversy was largely a political one, dividing along party lines. However, it is likely that Eisenhower's stance, if not actually determined by, was at least reinforced by ONE intelligence analysis, which was never made public.

The development of overhead reconnaissance systems created a need for another group of intelligence specialists: photographic interpreters. The Agency had established a photographic center in the DDI in 1953. As a result of the U-2 deployment that group formed the nucleus of a quickly expanding specialty among intelligence analysts. In 1961 the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) was established under the DCI's direction. Staffed by CIA and military personnel, NPIC was a DDI component until 1973, when it was a component transferred to the Directorate for Science and Technology (DDS&T).

\textsuperscript{10b} In 1955 to coordinate collection requirements for the U-2 program Bissell arranged for an informal Ad Hoc Requirements Committee (ARC), comprised initially of representatives of CIA, Army, Navy, and Air Force. Subsequently, representatives of NSA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the State Department were included. In 1960, after the deployment of the U-2's follow-on system, a formal USIB (see pp. 62-63 for a discussion of USIB) subcommittee, the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR), succeeded the ARC. COMOR was responsible for the development and operation of all overhead reconnaissance systems.
These technological developments in the late 1950's constituted the beginning of an important expansion in the CIA's functions and capabilities. Technical collection was to have a significant effect on the Agency's relationship to the departmental intelligence services and on the allocation of resources within the intelligence community.

III. The Coordination Problem

Dulles' neglect of the community management or coordination aspect of his role as DCI was apparent to all who knew and worked with him. During a period when the Agency was responsible for numerous innovations, analytic and technical, Dulles might have seized the opportunity to strengthen the DCI's position relative to the military services. As the community became larger and as technical systems required larger budgetary allocations, the institutional obstacles to coordination increased.

Two episodes in Dulles' term illustrate his lack of initiative in coordination. One involved the Economic Research Area in ORR and the other, the Office of Scientific Intelligence. Both represented opportunities that, if taken, would have enhanced the DCI's capacity to manage the community's intelligence activities.

By 1956 the major portion of ERA's work was devoted to Soviet strategic analysis. The work was scattered throughout the four ERA divisions, making production unwieldy and inefficient. In that year senior ERA personnel advanced a proposal to establish a Military Economics Branch which would combine the fragmented military intelligence efforts then being conducted in ERA. Dulles rejected the recommendation on the grounds that the services might interpret such a move as a unilateral attempt by the Agency to assume large responsibilities in their fields of primary concern. In effect, Dulles' reluctance to challenge the military services limited the Agency's own work effort. More importantly, it allowed the Agency's production of strategic intelligence to go without formal recognition in the community.

A decision by Dulles to establish the Agency's authority in the field of national military intelligence would have required a confrontation and a bureaucratic battle—neither of which Dulles was inclined to pursue.

The second example involved the establishment of the interdepartmental Guided Missiles Intelligence Committee (GMIC), an Intelligence Advisory Committee subcommittee created in 1956. Since 1949 the Office of Scientific Intelligence had wrangled with the military services over the division of responsibility for producing scientific and technical intelligence. DCID 3/4, issued in 1952, stipulated that OSI's primary mission was research for basic scientific intelligence, leaving research for technical intelligence with the military. Despite the restrictions of DCID 3/4, the inseparable links between basic science and technology allowed OSI to branch into technical science. By 1955 OSI had five divisions in the technical sciences area, including a Guided Missiles Intelligence Division.

The growing community-wide emphasis on guided missiles intelligence raised the issue of interagency coordination. Discussions on the subject provoked a split between the State Department and the CIA, on the one hand, and the services on the other. State and the Agency, specifically OSI, favored an interdepartmental committee with overall responsibility for coordinating and producing guided missiles intelli-
gence. The services and the Joint Staff favored exclusive Defense Department control. It took two years to resolve the issue. Between 1954 and 1956 Dulles hedged on the problem and was unwilling to press OSI’s claims. Finally in 1956 he took the matter to Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, who supported the creation of a committee over the objections of the Joint Staff and Navy and Army intelligence. The services, however, retained the right to appoint the chairman.

In both these instances, the organization of OSI and the formation of the GMIC, Dulles had an opportunity in the first stages of new areas of intelligence production to establish a pattern of organization for the community and to assert the DCI’s position. By not acting, Dulles allowed departmental procedures to become more entrenched and routinized, making later coordination attempts all the more difficult.

At the time of its 1954 survey the Clark Task Force of the Hoover Commission recognized the need for more efficient intelligence community management. The Task Force members recommended the appointment of a Deputy Director to assume internal management responsibilities for the Agency, leaving the DCI free for his coordination role. Dulles turned the recommendation around and appointed General Lucien Truscott his deputy for community affairs. Clearly, Truscott lacked even the DCI’s limited authority in his coordinating task.

Most of Truscott’s efforts were directed at resolving jurisdictional conflicts between the Agency and the military intelligence services. The most persistent and troublesome operational problem in intelligence community coordination involved the Army’s espionage activities, particularly in Western Europe. The Army, Air Force, and to a lesser extent, the Navy, had continued their independent clandestine collection operations after the war. Among the services, the Army had been the most active in the field and grossly outnumbered the CIA in manpower. The services’ justification for their operations had been that during wartime they would need clandestine collection support. That capability required long-term development. Service activities, in particular the Army’s, resulted in excessive duplication of the CIA effort and frequently, competition for the same agents.

In 1958 Truscott succeeded in working out an arrangement with the services, which attempted to rationalize clandestine collection activities. A National Security Council Intelligence Directive assigned CIA the primary responsibility for clandestine activities abroad. An accompanying directive gave the DCI’s designated field representatives a modified veto over the services’ field activities, by requiring that disagreements be referred to Washington for arbitration by the DCI and the Secretary of Defense. Although issuing these directives theoretically provided the DCI with authority over espionage activities, in practice the directives only created a means of adjudicating disputes. Military commanders continued to rely on service intelligence personnel to satisfy their intelligence requirements. To some extent the difficulties were eased after 1959 but this was not as a result of Truscott’s efforts. The principal reason was that the development

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11 The Air Force had come to support the idea of an IAC subcommittee.
of technical collection systems made heavy drains on service intelligence budgets and reduced the funds available for human collection. After 1959 Air Force activities declined sharply as the service began developing overhead reconnaissance systems. Likewise, the availability of photographic data made the Army less able to justify large budgetary allocations for human collection.

Within the Executive branch there were efforts to strengthen the direction of the intelligence community. In January 1956, President Eisenhower created the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA). Composed of retired senior government officials and members of the professions, the PBCFIA was to provide the President with advice on intelligence matters. The Board was a deliberative body and had no authority over either the DCI or the community. Accordingly, it had little impact on the administration of the CIA or on the other intelligence services. The Board did identify the imbalance in Dulles' role as DCI and in December 1956 and in December 1958 recommended the appointment of a chief of staff for the DCI to carry out the CIA's internal administration. In 1960 the Board suggested the possibility of separating the DCI from the Agency, having him serve as the President's intelligence advisor and as coordinator for community activities. Nothing resulted from these recommendations. In part the failure to implement these proposals was a reflection of PBCFIA's impotence. However, Dulles' personal standing had a major influence on policymakers' acceptance of his limited definition of the role. President Eisenhower, who himself repeatedly pressed Dulles to exert more initiative in the community, indicated his fundamental acceptance of Dulles' performance in a statement cited in a CIA history:

I'm not going to be able to change Allen. I have two alternatives, either to get rid of him and appoint someone who will assert more authority or keep him with his limitations. I'd rather have Allen as my chief intelligence officer with his limitations than anyone else I know.

On another level the PBCFIA did try to create a stronger institutional structure for the community. In 1957 the Board recommended merging the United States Communications Intelligence Board with the IAC. PBCFIA's proposal was directed at improving the community's overall direction. The USCIB was established in 1946 to advise and make recommendations on communications intelligence to the Secretary of Defense. The PBCFIA's recommendation for the IAC-USCIB merger was intended to strengthen the DCI's authority and to improve intelligence coordination, by making the DCI chair-

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13 The original PBCFIA members, all of whom were recommended by Dulles, included: General Doolittle, Sidney Souers, General Omar Bradley, Admiral Richard Connolly, General John E. Hull, Morris Hadley, a New York lawyer, William B. Francke, former Secretary of the Navy, David Bruce, Former Ambassador, Henry Wriston, former president of Brown University, and Donald Russell, a member of the Clark Task Force and former Assistant Secretary of State.

14 USCIB's membership included the Secretaries of State, Defense, the Directors of the FBI, and representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and CIA. USCIB votes were weighted. Representatives of State, Defense, the FBI, and CIA each had two votes; other members had one. Although the DCI sat on the Committee, he had no vote.
man of the newly established body. The services objected to the creation of the Board, since it meant that in the area of electronic intelligence they would be reduced to an advisory role vis à vis the DCI and would lose the representational dominance they held in USCIB. Despite the services' objections, in 1958 the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) was created to assume the duties of the IAC and USCIB. As with the IAC, USIB worked mostly through interdepartmental subcommittees in specialized areas.

Like the IAC, USIB was little more than a superstructure. It had no budgetary authority, and did not provide the DCI with any direct control over the components of the intelligence community. The separate elements of the community continued to function under the impetus of their own internal drives and mission definitions. Essentially, the problem that existed at the time of the creation of CIG remained.

From 1953 to 1961 a single Presidential administration and consistent American policy objectives which had wide public and governmental support contributed to a period of overall stability in the CIA's history. Allen Dulles' orientation and policymakers' operational reliance on the Agency made clandestine activities the dominant CIA mission. The ethos of secrecy within the DDP allowed the Directorate exemption from the usual accountability procedures resulting in a large degree of independence in the conduct of operations.

The Agency's intelligence production, though distinguished by advances in technical collection and in analysis, had not achieved the consistent policy support role that had been the primary purpose for the CIA's creation. While Dulles may have served as the briefing officer during NSC meetings, in the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy policymakers did not look to the Agency for information and analyses.

The Agency was equally unsuccessful in fulfilling its interdepartmental coordination function. The inherent institutional obstacles to management of the community's intelligence activities combined with Dulles' indifference to this area of responsibility allowed the perpetuation of a fragmented government-wide intelligence effort.

15 For chart showing CIA organization as of 1961, see p. 99.